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This thesis critically assesses the scope and method of criminalisation of the 
concept of fraud under the Fraud Act 2006 through the discussion of an apparent 
‘duality’ between (co-existing) criminal and non-criminal resolution mechanisms.  
The reader will find social sciences theory and mixed-methods research 
techniques being used to identify and characterise a dysfunction between 
legislation and the social function of fraud control and its resolution.  The 2006 Act 
appears to present a categorical and monolithic headline offence of fraud qualified 
by dishonesty, yet it is not clear that the Act clearly identifies the scope of effective 
criminalisation with respect to fraud.  The dishonesty-based conduct offence 
provided in the Fraud Act 2006 is examined in the context of contemporary theory 
and practical considerations that relate to the discipline of law-enforcement.  This 
work investigates pre-industrial modes of fraud resolution and identifies industrial-
era points of divergence between the concepts of fraud and theft (a similar 
headline offence defined and criminalised under the Theft Act 1968).  The work 
also offers an empirical study of survey-based data collection involving one-
hundred-and-forty participants (N=140).  It measured the practical extent of 
criminalisation of fraud in terms of participant indications of the (typically) most 
likely official outcome in response to sixteen hypothetical examples of fraud 
offences.  The survey results appear to support practical, contextual, and 
theoretical considerations from the literature on the inhibitors to the consistent 
application of a conduct-based general fraud offence.  The data and findings 
highlight the advantages of detailed actus reus-based criminalisation of types of 
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Fraud appears to be a gestalt concept that requires no explanation or description.  
It would seem that everyone has a clear sense of its meaning.  It becomes less 
clear as a unified concept when the term is unpacked as a criminal offence, 
despite its categorical criminalisation as a manner of conduct under the Fraud Act 
2006.  In the fields of legislation, regulation, policymaking, enforcement, 
application, and perception the concept of fraud is contested and its (alleged) 
association with law-enforcement activities appears inconsistent and obscure.  
Stakeholders perceive and address fraud in different ways as they function in 
particular domains and situations, and its resolution may be facilitated by the 
criminal justice system, the civil courts, or (privately) without judicial intervention or 
oversight.  This adds further complexities to achieving clarity around how we know 
what we know (epistemology) about fraud, and the parallel challenge of the 
application of the concept of fraud in English law and practice. 
 
Historically, fraud has been an elusive concept in English law.  In 1795, the Lord 
Chancellor observed in correspondence with a colleague that: 
Fraud is infinite, and were a court once to ...  define strictly the species 
of evidences of it, the jurisdiction would be cramped, and perpetually 
eluded by new schemes which the fertility of man’s invention would 
contrive.  (Holdsworth, 1909, p. 262 citing Lord Hardwicke, 1759; The 
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Law Commission, 2002 citing The Criminal Law Revision Committee, 
1966) 
A form of ‘duality’ with respect to the concept of fraud is implicit in the above 
quote.  Regardless of which definition may be applied, some aspects of fraud will 
be addressed by the court and others will not.  This ‘duality’ appears to be an 
intrinsic property of the legal encapsulation of the concept of fraud as a headline 
offence in English law.  Scholars, jurists, policy-makers and others are in no 
position to deny the documented fore-warning that simplifying the meaning of 
fraud by the courts (through particularisation of circumstances or conduct) is not a 
solution to understanding and addressing the meaning of fraud.  Understanding 
and addressing the inherent characteristics (ontology) of fraud continues to be 
impeded by an (alleged) conceptual clarity in English law and implementation 
confusion in practice.  In this thesis, the author examines fraud as a monolithic 
offence in English law, and the variety of resolution mechanisms the concept of 
fraud may be subject to internally and externally to the criminal justice system. 
The emerging central theme is that of an apparent ‘duality’ between: (i) a narrow 
category of incidents that are processed via the criminal justice system, and (ii) 
the broader category of incidents that are either addressed through other 
mechanisms or remain unresolved.    
 
The Fraud Act 2006 introduced a legal definition of fraud with the intent to create 
a comprehensive general offence in the form of three proscribed forms of conduct: 
false representation, failure to disclose information, or abuse of position (Law 
Commission, 2002).  Fraud is defined above in a (deceptively) simple manner by 
conduct only, and regardless of outcomes.  Gains, losses, or risk of a loss need 
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not occur to fulfil the requirements of the offence.  The completion of the 
transaction intended by the perpetrator, in whole or in part, is also not required to 
meet the above definition, thus it encapsulates the concept of fraud and imposes 
a categorical criminalisation of ‘all frauds’ (Law Commission, 2002, p.3).   
 
1.2 On the ‘Duality’ of Fraud and the Research Questions 
 
Three main observations appear to underpin the characterisation of fraud as a 
‘dual’ concept in English law.  First, the concept of fraud may be addressed under 
parallel provisions such as insolvency, civil (torts) and extra-judicial resolution 
mechanisms (Fisher, 2015; Smith & Shepherd, 2017).  Second, fraud presents 
itself as a disparate category of offending and victimisation from other common-
law and statutory offences.  This appears to be embedded in its ‘specialised’ 
status and side-lining across the procedures, work and information flows in United 
Kingdom (UK) law-enforcement and parallel agencies at the local, regional and 
national level.  Operated by the City of London Police (CoLP) since 2013, Action 
Fraud provides a central service for the receiving and processing of reports of 
fraud (Button, et al., 2013).  The centre collects victimisation accounts and feeds 
this into a national database, and it provides generic victim advice and publishes 
counter fraud advice and alerts.  The main fraud reporting interface functions at 
arm’s length to law-enforcement agencies.  It generates reports for a national 
intelligence database (the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau, NFIB), which are 
not necessarily coupled with mainstream investigatory and victim engagement 
resources.  There does not appear to be available data on the numbers of reports 
that are referred to law-enforcement for possible investigation, and anecdotal 
evidence suggests such referral numbers and investigatory uptake rates are low.  
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Apart from the volume aspects of the fraud problem, an alleged ‘upper-scale’ of 
complexity and large sums (£1 million or greater) is subject to the purview of the 
Serious Fraud Office (SFO).  Readers should note that the SFO investigates only 
a handful of cases at any given time, and its case selection processes have not 
been made clear beyond the scope of harm criteria (Button, et al., 2013; Doig & 
Levi, 2013). 
 
The third observation is the retention and subsequent introduction of statutes that 
include specific fraud offences which appear to overlap with the general conduct 
offences in the Fraud Act 2006.  Examples for these provisions are discussed in 
the literature review chapter below.  The Fraud Act 2006 represents a paradigm 
shift in legislation and the criminalisation of fraud (as a manner of conduct) and 
does not distinguish between a wide variety of typological and situational 
manifestations (Doig, 2006; Sharpe, 2013; Taylor, 2013).  The wide definition and 
absolutist approach to criminalisation, in the creation of a general dishonesty 
offence, co-exists with other specific legislative measures of fraud 
particularisation.  It should be noted that the only provisions that were repealed by 
the Fraud Act 2006 were the fraud and dishonesty related offences in the Theft 
Act 1968 (as amended) (Home Office, 2006). 
  
This context appears to present two offences that are criminalised in a similar 
fashion (a legal definition subject to categorical criminalisation).  The first (theft) is 
a common ground for law-enforcement activities and subject to ‘mainstream’ 
police activity, victim engagement and Crown prosecution.  Theft is not a common 
subject of resolution through the civil court jurisdiction, and thieves are not 
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commonly subject to torts and damages-related prosecution (although stolen 
property may be returned by the police).  Instances where theft is resolved by 
mutual or community-based resolution without the involvement of the police are 
possible.  Nonetheless, these are grounded in victim choice not to direct a highly 
likely police attention to the matter and the individuals involved.  The second 
(fraud) is subject to multiple resolution mechanisms other than the criminal justice 
system, a principle noted in this context with the civil court jurisdiction and state 
agencies who exercise regulatory powers.  These represent an awareness by the 
state that a crime may have occurred (or that it has indeed), yet it is not subject to 
adjudication by the criminal justice system.  Furthermore, fraud is not a subject for 
‘mainstream’ victim engagement and investigation structures within the police, nor 
is its processing by criminal justice system agencies as ‘streamlined’ as in relation 
to the concept of theft (Button, et al., 2013). 
 
As a result of the above context, the author sought to develop a means of 
systematising knowledge on this seemingly unique attribute of fraud as a concept 
in English law and practice.  The following research questions (RQs) stem from 
the above discussion of the ‘duality’ of fraud: 
1. How do we differentiate the concepts of ‘commercial’ and ‘criminal’ 
fraud in English law and practice, both historically and in contemporary 
society? (RQ1 – ‘duality’) 
2. How can fraud legislation be adapted to enhance conceptual and 
implementation clarity towards ‘mainstreaming’ and ‘streamlining’ 




A fundamental element of the investigation of the ‘duality’ of fraud (RQ1) is rooted 
in the question of whether the dynamic variability of possible resolution 
mechanisms for fraud is either a consequence of current policy, or an intrinsic 
property of fraud.  The approach favoured by the author would view legal 
interactions as a range of possible behaviours whose selection can be studied 
using the same methodologies as other social mechanisms (Black, 1972).  This 
study, therefore, does not focus on (alleged) means of ‘bridging the gap’ between 
the legislative intent as expressed in the Fraud Act 2006, and the extent of 
practical association of fraud with law-enforcement activities.  The concept of theft 
was selected as a point of comparison due to its similar statutory criminalisation 
through a legal definition of the terms as a monolithic category of offending, and 
one that is subject to effective criminalisation via mainstream policing.  In other 
words, there appears to be a lesser gap between ‘law-in-theory’ and ‘law-in-action’ 
across the concept of theft than there is in relation to the concept of fraud.  The 
gap in the context of fraud appears to be grounded in both perceptions (Levi & 
Burrows, 2008; Button, et al., 2009; 2013), and the availability of non-criminal 
resolution mechanisms that remain relevant despite the expansion of statutory law 
to criminalise ‘all fraud’ (Taylor, 2013; Fisher, 2015; Smith & Shepherd, 2017).  
The second central research question (RQ2), stems from the discussion and 
analysis of RQ1, and asks not how professional practice may be enhanced to 
better realise the current extent of criminalisation.  Instead, RQ2 asks how 
criminalisation may be better framed and articulated in light of the practical and 
social limitations for the criminalisation of dishonesty, so as to expand the scope 




This approach is grounded in a functionalist assumption as to the nature of the 
‘duality’ of fraud as a ‘social reality’ (Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Durkheim, 1982).  
Based on this assumption, a historical perspective was adopted in order to 
observe the ‘invisible hand’ (Smith 1776) that governs the selection of a given 
fraud resolution mechanism in English law and practice.  The verification of these 
assumptions formed a part of a set of five intermediate research objectives that 
are presented in chapter three of this thesis.  One of the research objectives was 
to determine whether the gestalt of fraud can be used as an ontological ‘anchor’ in 
a historical observation of the ‘duality’ of fraud.  The first intermediate research 
objective asks whether the defining characteristics of fraud are sufficiently similar 
to be used as an analogue to the contemporary gestalt of fraud.  The second 
intermediate research objective asks whether the ‘duality’ of fraud is indeed a 
social phenomenon that can be observed independently of trends in legislation 
and social progress (namely industrialisation).  
 
The above (primary) research questions and intermediate research objectives 
emerged (in large part) at the beginning of this doctoral research programme (with 
some development tweaks discussed further below).  This initial perspective 
reflected a sense of an absence of defining characteristics of prima facia fraud 
offences that are resolved (or at least investigated) by law-enforcement agencies 
in the UK.  This initial focus of investigation sought to identify a set of (generally) 
applicable indicators of a (likely) criminal investigation from properties such as 
typology, circumstances, or one that relates to either victim or offender.  This 
reflected a desire to identify a set of defining characteristics of criminal fraud 
under a system of law where a monolithic concept of fraud appears to fall under 
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the purview of both the criminal and civil jurisdictions (Fisher, 2015; Smith & 
Shepherd, 2017).   
 
The Fraud Act 2006 provides apparent (and perhaps deceptive) simplicity that 
masks the continuing context of the practical difficulties of managing the problem.  
In simple terms, there remains an unresolved paradox: (alleged) definitional clarity 
does not appear to have resulted in the ‘streamlining’ and ‘mainstreaming’ of fraud 
enforcement.  In part, this would appear to be grounded in the challenges 
presented by the Fraud Act 2006 conduct offences that do not conform to the 
standard ‘who’s done it’ investigative framework, but rather asks whether ‘it’ was 
dishonest.  In most investigations, this reasonable and proportionate ‘entry barrier’ 
to investigatory powers is justified with respect to evidence and deduction (‘follow 
the evidence’).  In fraud investigations, inductive reasoning is used to impute an 
assumption of dishonesty where evidence may only be suggestive (‘follow one’s 
nose’).  The assumption-based investigatory approach appears to be contrary to 
the training, incremental, and evidence-based organisational culture in law-
enforcement agencies.  This burden is subsequently eclipsed by the need to 
substantiate dishonesty to the threshold required for public prosecution according 
to the standards set by the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS, 2013). 
 
The literature accessed by the author did not appear to substantially address the 
essential characteristics of the ‘duality’ of fraud or contain means of addressing 
the challenges it imposes on legislation and law-enforcement.  The discussion of 
the co-existence of criminal and non-criminal resolution mechanisms to the 
concept of fraud, as defined in the Fraud Act 2006, appears to be an axiom in the 
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literature.  The ‘duality’ is embedded in discussion of law-enforcement structures 
and fraud victim support (Button, 2011; Button et al., 2013), methodological 
discussion (Levi & Burrows, 2008; National Fraud Authority, 2011; 2012; 2013; 
Button et al., 2016), legal practice (Fisher, 2015; Smith & Shepherd, 2017), and 
by the Law Commission (2014).  Consequently, the author was not aware of (and 
was unable to locate) any existing data, validated tools, or analytical approaches 
used to study or systematise knowledge pertaining to the use of different fraud 
resolution mechanisms (RQ1).  
 
1.3 Thesis Structure  
 
This thesis will aim to provide an original contribution to knowledge through 
systematic inquiry of key components and provide critical analysis and discussion 
relative to the main research questions.  Chapter two will provide a critical 
assessment of the Fraud Act 2006 as a guide for comprehensive criminalisation of 
all forms of offending under the concept of fraud as it is defined in the Act.  The 
literature review will discuss the contemporary ‘duality’ of fraud (RQ1) and 
apparent challenges to the categorical criminalisation of fraud subject to its 
definition into criminal law (RQ2).  The Fraud Act 2006 will be presented through a 
critical discussion of the recommendations by the Law Commission (2002), which 
were later adopted to form the Act.  Under the 2006 Act, fraud is a conduct 
offence qualified by the concept of dishonesty.  This approach to criminalisation 
was recommended due to its (prima facia) clarity and applied simplicity for 
offenders, victims, and criminal justice system stakeholders.  This claim is subject 
to critical discussion in the context of non-fraud sociology (Black, 1976) and 
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criminology (Naylor, 2003) theoretical frameworks that offer theoretical suggestion 
as to the association of known examples of crime with law-enforcement activities.  
The reader will be exposed to available evidence that the monolithic (categorical) 
criminalisation of fraud transcends theoretical typological and socio-economic 
‘fault lines’ in terms of the likelihood of law-enforcement response.   
 
The author will compare and contrast a body of laws that exists in tandem with the 
Fraud Act 2006 and provides overlapping, yet narrow, criminal definitions for 
actions (as opposed to conduct) that amount to fraud (as opposed to meeting the 
categorical definition for fraud).  This body of narrowly defined offences, which 
would otherwise be (theoretically) subject to criminalisation under the Fraud Act 
2006, is referred to as ‘particularised’ criminalisation in this thesis, and examples 
for such provisions are provided in section 2.5.  It would appear that particularised 
provisions offer an objective test as to whether an offence might have occurred 
with respect to specific activities that amount to fraud, and the evidence generated 
by the offence.  The dishonesty-based offence seems to require an assessment of 
whether an activity was underpinned by this manner of conduct.  The opposite of 
activities subject to particularised fraud criminalisation is legitimate conduct; the 
same manner of conduct could (theoretically and in practice) equate to a Fraud 
Act 2006 offence as the dividing line between fraud and legitimate conduct is 
dissolved. 
 
These barriers to clarity and mainstream enforcement appear to underpin a 
dysfunction between ‘law-in-theory’ and ‘law-in-action’ (Black, 1972) in the context 
of the Fraud Act 2006.  The similarly scoped criminalisation of the concept of theft 
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as a categorical headline offence (‘all theft’) through its legal definition into 
criminal law in the Theft Act 1968 (as amended) provides a reference point for the 
correlation between legislation and effective criminalisation (Hester & Eglin, 1992).  
The reader will find further context and justification for the framing of the ‘duality’ 
of fraud (RQ1) and challenges to conceptual clarity (RQ2) as subjects for social 
science theory in further discussion provided in chapters two and three (Black, 
1972).  
 
In the methodology chapter, the author will discuss the development of a research 
strategy relevant to the central research questions.  A justification for a mixed-
methods approach (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009) is developed from a discussion 
of the ‘duality’ of fraud as a social dynamic that is not subject to direct observation 
(Weber, 1978; Durkheim, 1982).  The author will demonstrate a ‘misalignment’ in 
focus between existing empirical research tools from the literature and the study 
of the ‘duality’ of fraud as a social function.  Whilst some quantitative tools refer to 
concepts of ‘severity’ (Wolfgang, et al., 1985) or ‘seriousness’ (Levi & Jones, 
1985; Green & Kugler, 2010), they appear to refer to perceptions of ‘what ought to 
be’ as opposed to ‘what is’.  Other qualitative tools (Button, et al., 2009; 2013) 
examine perceptions and experiences of victims of fraud and provide evidence of 
a dysfunction between ‘law-in-theory’ and ‘law-in-action’ (Black, 1972), but do not 
refer to its characteristics and functionality.  This category of tool does not aim to 
describe the essential characteristics and functionality of such dysfunction (RQ1), 
or the role of legislation in clarifying and obscuring perceptions towards, and the 
relative function of, the criminal justice system (RQ2).  None of the approaches 
examined by the author (see section 3.2) appear to address the social 
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phenomenon of variability in resolution mechanisms applicable to fraud (Fisher, 
2015). 
 
In chapter four, the researcher will present an original interpretivist analysis of the 
social function of the criminalisation of fraud, and its historical divergence from the 
criminalisation of the concept of theft and the protection of the right to property.  
The reader will find a historical narrative through which the researcher presents 
the results of a socio-legal historical analysis of secondary data and historical 
literature.  The social function of fraud criminalisation is critically analysed as a 
social ‘reality’ that exists independently and externally of individualistic 
perceptions and specific cases (Weber, 1978; Durkheim, 1982).  Whilst it is not 
subject to direct measurement (Bollen, 2002; Merton, 2016 [1968]) (see section 
3.3), the transition from agrarian (Laslett, 2005; Anderson, 2013) to an 
industrialised social structure offers insight to the function of law relative to the 
concepts of fraud and theft (Emsley, 2010; Taylor, 2013; Schubert, 2015).  Prior to 
the industrial revolution, prosecution of disputes in the context of (inter alia) frauds 
and thefts were self-funded, and compensation-seeking in focus, similar to legal 
action in the context of torts and personal insolvency (Cohen, 1982; Klerman, 
2001).  Punitive sanctions appear to have functioned as a means of coercing 
compliance to settle a court-recognised debt (from theft, fraud, commerce or tort), 
and served the additional functions of deterrence against offending and as a 
catalyst to promote bilateral settlement in lieu of formal responses.  Crown 
prosecution was reserved for limited circumstances, narrowly particularised in 
legislation and proclamations, and was conducted in response to transgressions 
in the search for punitive sanctions as opposed to compensation.  These areas of 
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particularisation functionally relate to narrow contemporary enforcement purviews 
of non-police agencies, such as in the context of tax collection, state-imposed 
regulation regimes, and company and insolvency law.         
 
The industrialisation and urbanisation of England and Wales seems to have led to 
an increase in demand for law so to substantiate the right to property through 
state investigation and prosecution in response to transgressions (Emsley, 2010; 
Schubert, 2015).  By contrast, responses to social change in the context of fraud 
and in the wake of public examples of harm and victimisation did not result with 
the inclusion of fraud under the purview of the institutions of public prosecution 
(Taylor, 2013).  Instead, regulatory regimes, market self-regulation and the 
expansion of company law requirements throughout the nineteenth century were 
aimed at adapting market self-regulation support mechanisms to emerging 
financial vehicles and wider distribution of wealth.  The chapter concludes with the 
functional analysis of the effective criminalisation of fraud as relating to a 
‘sovereign guarantee of trust’ in commercial and official conduct, and its 
divergence from the context of theft in criminal law.  It appears that whilst the 
protection of the right to property and the categorical association of transgressions 
against it with the function of criminal law, the concept of dishonesty was not 
protected against through a parallel ‘sovereign guarantee’ of trust.  From this 
historical context emerges a contemporary question of how individuals perceive 
the ‘sovereign guarantee’ of trust as a ‘social reality’ (Durkheim, 1982) (RQ1), and 




In chapter five, the author will present and critically analyse the results of an 
empirical study conducted through a single measurement of the most likely 
resolution mechanism across sixteen examples of fraud presented in a survey to 
one-hundred-and-forty (N=140) participants.  The results from the survey 
demonstrate the contemporary manifestation of the ‘duality’ of fraud, and the 
variability of dysfunction between ‘law-in-theory’ and ‘law-in-action’ in the context 
of fraud.  It appears that the study of the effective criminalisation of fraud as a 
social phenomenon subject to social science theory and methods produced 
results that agree with Naylor’s (2003) typology of profit-driven crime and Black’s 
(1976) theory of law.  The particularisation of fraud was demonstrated to flow from 
the above frameworks and be either subject to strong or weak association with 
law-enforcement activities subject to criminological and sociological theoretical 
estimations.  This discussion demonstrates the context from the literature review, 
where the dysfunction between legislation and effective criminalisation in the 
context of fraud is attributed to the conduct-based mode of criminalisation. 
 
In chapter six, the author will provide a conclusion of this thesis and 
recommendations relative to the main research questions.  Additional reflection on 
the limitations of this contribution to the literature may be found in section 6.2 of 
the conclusion chapter.  The discussion in chapter six summarises the analytical 
contributions in this thesis towards a deepened understanding of the apparent 
lack of parity between the protection of the right to property (criminalisation of 
theft) to the ‘sovereign guarantee’ of trust (criminalisation of fraud).  The historical 
and contemporary ‘duality’ of fraud appears to relate to a ‘social reality’ (Weber, 
1978; Durkheim, 1982) to which legislation could appear secondary, and is a 
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utilitarian and victim-enabling function (Smith, 1776; Levi, 1987; Fisher, 2015; 
Rawlings & Lowry, 2017; Smith & Shepherd, 2017).  The concept of fraud (or 
dishonesty) does not seem to form a categorical challenge to the existing social 
order in the same way that the protection of the right to property does (Black, 
1976).  Furthermore, it would appear that the monolithic criminalisation of ‘all 
frauds’ in its transcendence of typologies and socio-economic circumstances 
obscures conceptual clarity and stands in the way of mainstream interfaces with 
victims.  This observation extends in particular to ‘simple’ frauds in circumstances 
where an association with law-enforcement responses is socially and typologically 
plausible (Black, 1976; Naylor, 2003).  Thus, this thesis offers historical and 
contemporary evidence to support an approach to develop a body of 
particularised fraud provisions where Parliament sees fit to extend a narrow 
‘sovereign guarantee’ of trust in responses to known offending patterns.  The 
Fraud Act 2006 may still be needed to address unforeseen frauds as they emerge 
to present a challenge to the existing social order, notwithstanding the limitations 
of the Act to serve as a means of criminalising the entire concept of fraud.  
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Chapter Two: Literature Review  
 
 2.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter offers a systematic examination of sources with respect to the 
phenomenon of the ‘duality’ of fraud, which refers to a variability of outcomes with 
respect to offences under the Fraud Act 2006.  Under the 2006 Act all instances 
of fraud, which are qualified by dishonesty, are subject to criminalisation and up to 
ten years imprisonment (Law Commission, 2002; Farrell, et al., 2007).  Some 
frauds are indeed resolved in a manner consistent with this statutory measure as 
they are being resolved by the criminal justice system and its institutions of 
investigative law-enforcement agencies and public prosecution bodies.  
Nevertheless, other frauds appear to be subject to non-criminal resolution 
mechanisms such as civil litigation, regulatory measures, bilateral agreements, or 
no resolution (Smith & Shepherd, 2017).  Non-criminal justice system resolution of 
fraud does not appear to relate to a lesser (theoretical) applicability of the 
definition of criminal fraud in the 2006 Act, yet their resolution through the criminal 
courts appears dissonant.  In the context of civil litigation, it would appear that the 
State through the judiciary branch of government, establishes at the very least a 
reasonable suspicion that a fraud offence has been committed, yet allows the use 
of civil remedies (Levi & Burrows, 2008; Law Commission, 2014; Rawlings & 
Lowry, 2017; Smith & Shepherd, 2017).  Furthermore, interactions with law-
enforcement and criminal justice system agencies in the context of fraud appears 




Whilst the literature addresses considerations of law-enforcement practice with 
respect to fraud (Fraud Trials Committee, 1986; Doig & Levi, 2008; Button et al., 
2013), there appears to be a need to evaluate the Fraud Act 2006 as a means of 
identifying what types of fraud are subject to effective criminalisation.  This 
substantiates an imperative to study the underlying mechanism behind the 
determination of frauds that fall under the purview of the criminal justice system, 
and those that are subject to other resolution mechanisms (RQ1).  This imperative 
stems from the tentative rejection of the Fraud Act 2006 as a means of 
functionally distinguishing between criminal and manifestly ‘civil’ frauds (Fisher, 
2015; Smith & Shepherd, 2017).  This is notwithstanding the value of the definition 
in the Act as a guide to the unpacking of the gestalt of fraud.  This discussion 
appears to capture both a need to understand the social context in which the 
blanket criminalisation of fraud is applied, and how it differs from the context to 
which the categorical criminalisation of theft is applied.  
 
The ‘duality’ between criminal and non-criminal outcomes with respect to the 
concept of fraud (RQ1) is recorded and acknowledged as a limitation to the study 
of fraud in the literature (Levi & Burrows, 2008; National Fraud Authority, 2013).  
Nevertheless, whilst this phenomenon is well-recorded and generally understood, 
the author was not aware of a substantive analysis to identify the essential 
characteristics of ‘criminal’ and otherwise ‘civil’ fraud.  Furthermore, the literature 
accessed by the author does not provide substantive discussion on why this 
phenomenon occurs specifically in the context of fraud, and not in relation to other 
headline acquisitive crime offences.  In the context of policing practice, there 
appears to be significant variability between interfaces and processes with respect 
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to the concept of fraud and mainstream police practice, core skills, and structures 
(Fraud Trials Committee, 1986; House of Commons Library, 2006; Levi & 
Burrows, 2008; Button et al., 2013). Nevertheless, the literature accessed by the 
author does not discuss the apparent difficulties and unique processes and 
structures in the context of the practical implementation of the (alleged) simplicity 
of the statutory offence of fraud (RQ2). 
 
 2.2 Origins of the Fraud Act 2006  
 
The following section expands on the dysfunction between the apparent focus on 
trial-stage issues or legal lacunae, and the practice of law-enforcement as integral 
to the process of (fraud) criminalisation.  It critically analyses the emergent 
propensity of the Fraud Act 2006 to further augment unique criminology and 
victimology traits that independently challenge ‘policing’ in the context of fraud.   
The section highlights the ontological difficulties in past and present attempts to 
encapsulate the critical meaning of fraud and codifying it into law.  These efforts 
are seen as a contributing factor to the difficulties and inconsistencies in learning 
about and responding to crime and victimisation.  In the context of RQ1 (‘duality’), 
the use of such a litigious concept as dishonesty to qualify an offence appears to 
augment victim engagement difficulties, and particularly those that relate to the 
understanding of what is criminal fraud (Levi & Burrows, 2008; Button, et al., 
2009; 2013).  The existence of parallel fraud offences, with simpler and narrower 
points of proof than dishonesty, contributes to the further exclusion of the concept 




Prior to 2006, the concept of fraud in England and Wales was criminalised 
through a body of statutory provisions and common-law offences.  In this body of 
laws were various offences in sections of, amongst others, the Theft Act 1968, the 
Theft Act 1978, the Finance Act 1982, the Criminal Justice Act 1993, the 
Terrorism Act 2000, the Licensing Act 2003, the Asylum and Immigration Act 
2004, the Serious and Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, and the Gambling 
Act 2005.  Furthermore, fraud has also been prosecuted under the common-law 
offences of ‘Conspiracy to Defraud’, ‘Conspiracy’, and ‘Dishonest Intent to 
Defraud’.    
 
With respect to fraud, the current governing law in England and Wales is the 
Fraud Act 2006.  Under this Act, fraud is an offence qualified by dishonesty with 
respect to false representation (section 2), failing to disclose information (section 
3) or abuse of position (section 4) with intent to cause gain or loss, and regardless 
of outcomes.  Unlike the specific and narrow scope in each of the above statutory 
provisions, the Act offers a wide approach to criminalisation, which essentially 
covers ‘all fraud’ (Farrell, et al., 2007).  The 2006 Act strictly follows the 
recommendations of the Law Commission (2002) to create a general dishonesty 
offence to supplement and replace previous provisions scattered across various 
acts (Home Office, 2006).  The Law Commission (2002) opened with a summary 
from its 1998 instruction from the Home Secretary: 
… To examine the law on fraud, and in particular to consider whether it: 
is readily comprehensible to juries; is adequate for effective prosecution; 
is fair to potential defendants; meets the need of developing technology 
including electronic means of transfer; and to make recommendations to 
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improve the law in these respects with all due expedition.  In making 
these recommendations to consider whether a general offence of fraud 
would improve the criminal law.  (Law Commission, 2002, p. 1) 
The Law Commission (2002) concluded in favour of a general offence, citing the 
following advantages:  
1. It will introduce an offence more understandable to juries in “serious” (p.2) 
fraud trials by being clearer with the definitions of fraud as a criminal 
offence;  
2. It will be easier to prosecute, particularly in complex cases, using one ‘all 
encompassing’ provision rather than having to select the most appropriate 
specific provision; 
3. It will simplify the legal definition of fraud and make it easier for the public 
as well as law-enforcement to construct what fraud is and is not; and 
4. It will not attempt to define the actual practice of fraud and thus be 
impervious to future technological developments. (Law Commission, 2002 
pp. 2-3) 
 
The ‘formula’ adopted by the Law Commission (2002, p.59) for the new fraud 
offence was defined in such way that it had to include dishonest deceit, intention 
to deceive or secrecy as well as the potential for actual injury or risk of injury.   
Consequences (or potential consequences) did not have to be intended by the 
offender, as the focus was on the dishonest conduct.  This structure was 
implemented by the Law Commission (2002) as the basis for the definition and 




Part of the rationale for the new offence was to ‘future proof’ against technological 
advancement (Law Commission, 2002).  The challenge of ‘capturing’ the essence 
of the concept of fraud so it could be applied independently to means potentially 
unforeseen by legislators.  This was intended as a means of eliminating the need 
for (with a view to potentially abolishing) the conspiracy to defraud common-law 
offence, which is qualified by an agreement to carry out a scheme that amounts to 
the gestalt of fraud.  The aim of abolishing conspiracy to defraud as a common-
law offence and subjecting it to the statutory conspiracy offence that refers to 
other legal sources to qualify the object of the conspiracy as criminal (see Criminal 
Law Act 1977).  The introduction of a legal definition for fraud as a statutory 
offence could theoretically offer the conditions for the abolition of the conspiracy to 
defraud common-law offence in favour of a ‘conspiracy to commit fraud’ as 
qualified by the Fraud Act 2006.  Despite the advocacy to abolish the gestalt-
qualified conspiracy to defraud common-law offence (Law Commission, 1976; 
1980; 1985; 1994; 1999; 2002), the Home Office has yet to annul the conspiracy 
to defraud common-law offence due to its continuing utility, which is further 
discussed in section 2.7 (CPS, 2012).   
 
As a form of acquisitive crime, fraud under the Theft Act 1968 was made 
subordinate to the definition of theft.  A person is guilty of theft if he/she 
dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with an intention to 
permanently deprive its rightful owner.  The 1968 Act offence makes use of 
dishonesty as a qualifier, but the substantial actus reus component of the act 
addresses tangible gains and losses, and lack of mutuality between the victim and 
offender.  Theft Act fraud (sections 15-20), is defined as obtaining property or 
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funds by deception, false accounting, obtaining a money transfer, and false 
financial statements as particular circumstances to which the prohibition of 
dishonesty applies.   Later amendments to the Theft Act 1968, in 1978 and 1996, 
introduced more specific provisions such as obtaining services, fraud against 
creditors, and obtaining credit by deceit (Griew, 1995; Law Commission, 2002).  
 
Citing Griew (1995, p. 141), the Law Commission (2002) argues that the state of 
the criminal law on fraud suffered from “over particularisation” and “untidiness”.  A 
different approach to the challenge of fraud in criminal law was advocated by the 
House of Lords (as an appeals jurisdiction), which called for the examination of 
the merits of a general dishonesty offence (Law Commission, 2002, pp.16-18).  
This view was later cited by the Home Secretary, Lord Chancellor and the 
Solicitor-General in framing the terms of reference for the Law Commission paper 
on fraud (Law Commission, 2002, p.1). 
 
The Law Commission (2002) lists a number of limitations to fraud prosecution.  
Aside from general observations of “untidiness” (p.15), more specific limitations 
have been highlighted from case law on the application of the Theft Act 1968 (as 
amended) to fraud cases brought before the courts.  The Law Commission (2002) 
noted cases where convictions were reversed on appeal due to the wrong 
charges being brought, or the juries being inaccurately instructed by the judge in 
explaining the offence.  Specific lacunae were also highlighted, such as a failure 
to prosecute an individual who obtained a loan under a false representation.  This 
was underlined to substantiate the need for a conduct focus in order to articulate 
an offence without the need to identify and prove losses and gains.  A precedent 
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was set in R. v. Preddy [1996] when a mortgage which was obtained by false 
representation, but the charge of obtaining property by deception for which the 
defendants were found guilty was deemed inapplicable by the House of Lords.  
The difficulty was that whilst the offence was widely applicable in similar cases, 
since the funds were transferred from one account to another, they were never 
outside of the controls of the lender, and therefore no gains or losses could be 
demonstrated as required to establish a Theft Act 1978 offence (R. v. Preddy, 
[1996]; Law Commission, 2002, pp. 16-17).   
 
The above example (inter alia) brought attention to prior debate by the Criminal 
Law Revision Committee (1966), where a minority opinion advocated the 
introduction of a deception offence.  This opinion was also cited in R. v. Preddy 
[1996] as a possible solution for the prosecutorial challenges in the case, which 
resulted with the guilty verdict being overturned by the House of Lords.  The Law 
Commission (2002) cites further cases that have either been overturned by the 
House of Lords due to charging the inappropriate offence as well as other 
difficulties with the application of Theft Act definitions to the concept of fraud.  For 
example, the House of Lords was not unanimous in upholding a conviction 
against an employee in a shop who knowingly accepted a stolen cheque and was 
convicted of theft.  Prosecution under the Theft Act 1968 raised difficulties with 
interpreting how the defendant had appropriated gains since he never had 
possession over the merchandise he sold (DPP v Gomez [1993]).  This critique 
and examples of ‘over particularisation’ and ‘untidiness’ were pivotal in the 
discussion of the expected benefits of introducing a conduct offence.  The 
resulting use of dishonesty to qualify fraud under the Fraud Act 2006 was 
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intended to circumvent typological intricacies, particularly as it relates to 
identifying losses or gains in complex cases.   
 
Nevertheless, the author points to legal source and deliberation by jurists on the 
applied meaning of dishonesty.  The common-law definition of dishonesty is literal 
rather than legal, meaning that it should be uniformly understood and applied.  
The common test for dishonesty under the Theft Act 1968 (as amended) was 
established in R v Ghosh [1982] as a two-stage process, the conduct stage, and 
the state of mind stage.  To qualify, an action must be proven as inherently 
dishonest and, if so, the state of mind of the accused had to be dishonest as well 
(see Law Commission, 1999, pp. 13-14 citing R. v. Ghosh [1982] QB 1053, 1059).  
The reader will note that the test does not establish a legal meaning to 
dishonesty, but rather specifies that the application of the term, in the context of 
the Theft Act 1968, requires both the action (actus reus) and the state of mind 
(mens rea) of the accused to constitute dishonesty. 
 
The use of dishonesty to qualify an offence was deemed to require no 
interpretation or special instruction to a jury panel as the definition was not legal in 
nature (Regina v Feely [1973]; Law Commission No. 155, 1999).  For this reason, 
dishonesty was preferred over ‘fraudulently’ as a qualifier for the concept of fraud 
by the Criminal Law Revision Committee in their drafting of the Theft Bill (later, 
1968 Act): 
‘Dishonestly’ seems to us a better word than ‘fraudulently’.  The question 
‘Was this dishonest?’ is easier for a jury to answer than the question 
‘Was this fraudulent?’.  ‘Dishonesty’ is something which laymen can 
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easily recognise when they see it, whereas ‘fraud’ may seem to involve 
technicalities which have to be explained by a lawyer.  The word 
‘dishonestly’ could probably stand without a definition… (The Criminal 
Law Revision Committee, 1966, para. 39) 
This discussion was a feature of later deliberation on means by which to represent 
the concept of fraud in criminal law.  Whilst the Criminal Law Revision Committee 
(CLRC, 1966) did not go as far as to criminalise dishonesty per se, it did use it to 
describe the manner of conduct relating to the concept of fraud under the 
definition of theft.  In so doing, it limited the application of dishonesty, which was 
not itself the subject of criminalisation, to qualify activities that have resulted in 
losses or ill-gains (Griew, 1995). 
 
To illustrate this point, under the Larceny Act 1916 and the Theft Act 1968 
'intention to defraud' or 'dishonesty' can be deduced from two points of proof: the 
first is making an untruthful statement and the second is an appropriation of goods 
or funds as a result.  In R. v. Ghosh (1982) the Court of Appeals explained the 
test of the dishonesty offence in the following way: 
In determining whether the prosecution has proved that the defendant 
was acting dishonestly, a jury must first of all decide whether according 
to the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people what was 
done was dishonest.  If it was not dishonest by those standards, that is 
the end of the matter and the prosecution fails. (Regina v Ghosh, 1982 




The use of dishonest conduct as a qualifier of criminality under the Fraud Act 
2006 appears to sustain a lack of an objective test for fraud due to unclarity of the 
applied meaning of dishonesty relative to fraud, or evidence of such conduct.  In 
Rose v. Matt (1951), the words ‘fraudulently’ and ‘dishonestly’ are used 
interchangeably to debate the Larceny Act 1916 offence of larceny by a trick 
under section 1.2(a): “There is no question here that the defendant was acting 
fraudulently; he was acting dishonestly”.  Further affinity between fraud and 
dishonesty or deceit is demonstrated in the interpretation of the term fraud under 
the Larceny Act 1861, the offence of making or publishing false statement of 
accounts ‘to defraud’:  
To deceive is, I apprehend, to induce a man to believe that a thing is 
true which is false, and which the person practising the deceit knows or 
believes to be false.  To defraud is to deprive by deceit… (Re London 
and Globe Finance Corp, 1903) 
 
The above examples demonstrate an apparent lack of conceptual clarity with 
regard to dishonesty and deceit, particularly as a means of substantially qualifying 
the concept of fraud and distinguishing it from legitimate conduct.  The difficulty in 
‘unpacking’ the gestalt of fraud, or to interpret it by qualifying the manner of the 
offender’s conduct in terms of dishonesty persists.  This is also evident in the 
retention (and use) of the conspiracy to defraud common-law offence as a 
standalone offence (CPS, 2012).  Section one of the Act determines that the 
criminal component of a conspiracy can only be determined subject to the partial 
fulfilment of a primary offence.  This offence has remained unchanged by the 
27 
 
2006 Act, and individuals may still be prosecuted under the common-law 
provision, independently of a need to substantiate the fraud.   
 
Several reasons have led the Law Commission (1974) to recommend the 
preservation of the provision, including the two following themes.  The first relates 
to the limitations of prosecuting fraud under the Theft Act 1968.  These limitations 
were concerned with the need to prosecute under the legal definition of theft 
under the Act (“dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with the 
intention of permanently depriving the other of it”, section 1(1).  This requirement 
subjected prosecutors to the need to identify and articulate tangible gains or 
losses in order to fulfil the offence, which at times amounted to “a judicial 
nightmare” (R. v. Royle, [1971]).  The second reason was that the Theft Act 1968 
and other statutory offences appeared inadequate for other types of fraud that 
were not foreseen by legislators or could not be readily understood by key 
stakeholders.  The Law Commission (2002) discusses the limitations in law and 
practice of attempting to prosecute land misuse and land grabbing, misuse of 
machines (computers), swindling, licencing memberships and other regulatory 
and compliance matters.  Despite pressure and unrest with the continuing 
existence of the conspiracy to defraud provision (Law Commission, 1994; 1999; 
2002), investigations and prosecutions may still address the concept of fraud 
without being required to qualify its meaning.  In other words, conspiracy to 
defraud continues to allow parties to circumvent the ontological quest for means 




The use of dishonesty as a criminal qualifier was promoted by some jurists and 
politicians who sought to simplify the trial stage (The Criminal Law Revision 
Committee, 1966; 1977; The Law Commission, 2002).  During the same period, a 
recommendation for the creation of special tribunals where ‘complicated’ fraud 
cases would be decided by a judge and two laypersons was made (Fraud Trials 
Committee, 1986).  The Fraud Trials Without a Jury Bill 2006, was debated in 
Parliament alongside the Fraud Bill (which later became the 2006 Act), until the 
former was rejected by the House of Lords.  In the accompanying research paper 
prepared by the Library of the House of Commons, Lord Donaldson, a former 
presiding judge at the Court of Appeals, is cited on this topic: 
It is then said that one can simplify a fraud case.  To some extent one 
can, no doubt, but to some extent one risks arriving at a situation where 
one is trying something different from the real offence.  As a follow-up to 
that, it is said that every fraud case comes down in the last resort to a 
question of honesty or dishonesty, and that the man in the street is a 
wonderful judge of what is honest or dishonest.  I could not disagree 
more. (House of Commons Library, 2006, p. 19) 
Lord Donaldson, and others, reject dishonesty as offering a simple and objective 
test to denote an offence and underpin proof of mens rea beyond reasonable 
doubt (House of Commons Library, 2006). 
 
The absence of an objective test for dishonesty raises doubts about the 
theoretical ability of victims to engage with law-enforcement or otherwise articulate 
their victimisation in reference to criminal statute.  By extension, the absence of an 
objective tests raises questions as to the ability of investigators to establish 
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reasonable suspicions that an offence has taken place without engaging in a 
subjective assessment of a manner of conduct in which one party accuses the 
other.  Investigators may find themselves challenged to ‘follow their nose’ in order 
to substantiate such reasonable suspicions and access investigatory powers 
under Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984 and in compliance with the 
Human Rights Act 1998.  This requirement is somewhat unusual in the context of 
core police training and doctrine indicated by the Association of Chief Police 
Officers (ACPO, 2005).  ACPO was dissolved in 2015 and replaced by the 
National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC).  
 
This leads the discussion towards the need for a narrow and objective test, which 
is developed further below in this chapter (cf Sutherland, 1944;1949; Tappan, 
1947).  In short, if the average juror was not trusted to consistently and 
competently apply a standard of dishonesty to evidence presented in court, how 
can a constable do so?  In other words, dishonesty is a complicated and litigious 
evaluation of a manner of conduct, and not an objective test.  The Oxford 
Dictionary of Law defines dishonesty as an “element of liability” (2009, p. 175), 
which derived from the context of commercial litigation.  Therefore, the question is 
how does fraud as a dishonesty offence fare against other profit-driven crimes, 







2.3 Theoretical Frameworks 
 
The above context serves to contextualise the notion of ‘law’ as a social 
phenomenon, and to qualify how it relates to other social controls that are used to 
normalise behaviours and to provide conflict resolution.  In the context of RQ1 
(‘duality’), a theoretical framework onto which both aspects of the ‘duality’ of fraud 
can be applied (resolution via the criminal justice system and otherwise) appears 
to be useful for further analysis.  This framing of the ‘duality’ of fraud also 
promotes the understanding of non-criminal justice system related responses (civil 
litigation, negotiation, or bilateral resolution) which further promotes the analysis of 
the phenomenon as a social dynamic.  The wide applicability of Black’s (1976) 
theory of law promotes a non-binary examination of the application of law in fraud-
related dispute resolution.  This does not change the dichotomic nature of the 
parameters set in RQ1, which relate to the contemporary ‘duality’ between fraud 
resolution using the criminal justice system, and independently of it (inclusive of 
the civil court jurisdiction).  Instead, Black’s (1976) theory of law provides a 
continuum of social controls and formalised social controls (‘law’), through which 
to analyse observations of variable ‘amounts’ of law in fraud resolution.  The 
‘duality’ of fraud in this context appears to relate to a particular distinction within 
this broad framework.  This was seen as advantageous by the researcher, as it 
enables a systematic functionalist examination of a wider social dynamic, from 
which to understand the particular distinction of the ‘duality’ referred to in RQ1 




2.3.1 Black’s (1976) Theory of Law 
 
In this sub-section, the author introduces the fundamentals of Black’s (1976) 
theory of law and includes further discussion in the context of other contributions 
to the literature.  Black’s (1976) discussion on the ‘behaviour’ of law positions the 
different state-authority backed responses to disputes on a relative scale of 
resolution mechanisms that spans from no use of state powers, to civil jurisdiction 
and criminal justice system outcomes.  ‘Law’ as a sovereign function is applied in 
response to disputes that could not be resolved using social controls, and thus 
present a challenge to the existing social order (Black, 1976).  Resolution 
mechanism are evaluated and positioned relative to one another according to the 
‘amount of law’ embodied in them.  For example, incarceration embodies more 
law relative to a fine, and the latter indicate the use of ‘more’ law than a 
compensation order in civil proceedings (Black, 1976).  The use of ‘law’ according 
to Black (1976) is subject to a general ‘prediction’ according to which law would 
tend to be applied ‘downwards’ on four social scales: 
1. Stratification:  denotes the material disposition of individuals – ‘more’ law is 
applied from high stratification to lower levels of wealth, the more 
stratification the more law. 
2. Morphology:  denotes the relative social positioning of as individual relative 
to others in the division of labour – ‘more’ law is applied from higher to 
lower positions in the division of labour. 
3. Culture:  denotes the relative symbolic positioning of an individual, such as 
in education and relative levels of conventionality – ‘more’ law is applied 
downwards on this scale. 
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4. Organisation:  denotes the size, robustness, and social status of groups 
relative to one another – law is applied in the direction leaning towards the 
party who belongs to a smaller or less significant group or has a lesser 
position therein.  The same can be observed between organisations of 
varying sizes who act collectively, and not on the behalf of individual 
members. 
 
Black (1976) does not examine legislation or enforcement priorities, but rather 
focuses on the ‘amount’ and direction in which they are situationally applied.  Any 
system of government or regulatory regime is grounded in both ‘law’ and social 
controls, to which the theory can be applied.   It was said that “the law, in its 
majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to 
beg in the streets, and to steal bread” (France, 1894, chapter seven).  Whilst the 
above is evident in contemporary life, personal experiences, and social critique of 
legal limitations imposed by ‘the rich’ on ‘the poor’, Black’s (1976) theory of law 
does not regard sources for law, but the social dynamic of the use of law.  This 
theoretical framework is as applicable to the analysis of the function of law against 
financial statement fraud, which is (equally) applicable to company directors and 
the destitute.  Furthermore, the focus of this thesis is not in legislation or sources 
of definition for social order (Rousseau, 1762; Marx, 1867; Sellin, 1938; 
Chambliss & Seidman, 1971; Chambliss, 1973; Postner, 1975), but rather the 
function of law as a social dynamic (Black, 1972; Weber, 1978; Durkheim, 1982).  
Whether laws are enforced and to what degree of effectiveness (‘law-in-action’) is 
a different discussion to legislation and sources for law (‘law-in-theory’) (Merton, 
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1938; Tappan, 1947; Sutherland, 1949; Cressey, 1961; Black, 1972; Hester & 
Eglin, 1992; Tyler, 2006). 
 
2.3.2 Third-Party Theory (Black & Baumgartner, 1983) 
 
The following discussion of third-party theory (Black & Baumgartner, 1983) 
identifies the use of external parties to a dispute in order to facilitate its resolution.  
This theoretical framework accounts for both voluntary and compelled involvement 
of third-parties, or ‘settlement agents’ in dispute resolution.  Use of this theoretical 
framework in concert with Black’s (1976) theory of law offers another means of 
analysing the extent to which social controls or law are being used in conflict 
resolution.  This framework is of secondary importance in its application in this 
chapter for the two following reasons:  First, due to the focus on settlement 
agents, third-party theory does not ‘capture’ the contemporary dichotomy between 
fraud resolution using the criminal-justice system, and through the civil courts.  
Both modes of resolution appear to belong to a singular category of a judicial 
resolution.  Second, the reader will note that contemporary criminal adjudication of 
fraud does not necessarily pertain to the resolution of the conflict, but rather the 
determination of whether an accused is guilty of a crime and subsequent 
sanctioning (Button, et al., 2013).   
 
Whether the victim is ‘made whole’ does not appear to be imperative to criminal 
proceedings as crimes are construed as offences against the Crown through the 
identified means of victimisation against a person.  The criminal adjudication of 
fraud is therefore different from its resolution as a dispute between two parties, as 
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it is process initiated by a prosecution by the Crown in the context of a criminal 
offence, and not a dispute between two parties.  Furthermore, the role of the 
judge is different to that in civil litigation of fraud.  Whereas the civil court judge 
seeks to resolve the dispute by determining if the defendant is liable for fraud and 
the extent of his/her liability, the judge in the criminal jurisdiction presides over a 
fact-finding mission to determine if an offence took place (Fisher, 2015).  The 
criminal court judge should, therefore, not be confused with the civil court judge, 
as the former does not act as a ‘settlement agent’ with regards to a dispute, but 
rather to state enforcement of its laws (Black & Baumgartner, 1983). 
 
Nevertheless, third-party theory offers an added depth to the wider examination 
and characterisation of the use of social controls and the extent to which social 
controls are organic (‘less’ law) or structured (‘more’ law).  In particular, third-party 
theory (Black & Baumgartner, 1983) offers means for the relative positioning of 
social controls, marketplace and self-regulation grounded in extra-judicial 
resolution mechanisms in terms of ‘ascending’ amounts of law (Black, 1976).  
Third-party theory also provides a characterisation of diverse types of extra-
judicial means of conflict resolution in terms that are later used as part of the 
functionalist socio-legal approach in chapter four below.  This characterisation is 
used as a means of evaluating the underlying social function of various resolution 
mechanism that either apply in extra-judicial conflict resolution, or whose 
inadequacy appears to drive a demand for ‘more’ law (Black, 1976).  
 
Third-party theory identifies different official roles held by independent actors that 
are necessary for the resolution of conflicts.  The theory focuses on an 
35 
 
understanding of the relationship between two parties, and (particularly) the 
social, internal, and external controls they mutually recognise.  Five types of 
‘settlement agents’ are included in third-party theory: (i) ‘friendly peacemakers’; (ii) 
‘mediators’; (iii) ‘arbitrators’; (iv) ‘judges’; and (v) ‘repressive peacemakers’.  The 
‘settlement agent’ role is retrospectively determined by his or her ability to secure 
a resolution that is final.  (Black & Baumgartner, 1983) 
 
‘Friendly peacemakers’ use personal and ‘soft’ influence to settle disputes where 
they do not aspire to arrive at an equitable resolution, but merely to end the 
conflict at hand.  Their authority is grounded in the respect they enjoy from parties, 
apparent impartially, and ability to define and augment social controls.  For 
example, friendly peacemakers may motivate parties towards conflict resolution 
by citing ‘public disgrace’, risks to personal reputation, and exert direct influence 
by setting boundaries for any further escalation.  In other cases, arbitrary 
resolution may be brokered by a religious leader, whose legitimacy and the 
resolution, are both enforced by a social sense of belonging to the applicable 
system of faith.  “Friendly peacemakers” do not form an official part of the division 
of labour, and do not enjoy a symbolic status that underpins their function as a 
source of deference in dispute resolution.  Instead, ‘friendly peacemakers’ emerge 
from situations where deference to a particular position holder is well-conditioned, 
such as in the case of a dispute in a public house or other well-managed 
environments.  Conversely, the function of a ‘friendly peacemaker’ may appear to 
be ‘randomly’ assumed by individuals.  Ad-hoc functionality is assumed by those 
who are subjectively seen by both parties to a dispute as possessing both 
sufficient relevant knowledge or moral authority, and (perceived) symbolic 
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positioning and impartiality.  Successful and final resolution is based on both 
parties individually accepting the settlement agent and his/her decision, and the 
adequacy of social controls in enforcing the resolution as final.  The ‘strength’ of 
social controls that underpin resolution by ‘friendly peacemakers’ is the weakest 
amongst other settlement agents discussed below.  (Black & Baumgartner, 1983, 
pp. 101-103). 
 
‘Mediators’ and ‘arbitrators’ rely more on their formal role and notion of impartiality 
to ‘assist’ two conflicting parties to arrive at an equitable solution and to bring a 
dispute to an end.  Both represent types of ‘settlement agents’ whose relevance is 
grounded in socially recognised symbolic deference (mediators), or a formal 
source of deference grounded in the division of labour (arbitrators).  Mediation is a 
more structured approach (than ‘friendly peacemakers’) with more negotiation and 
a notion of fairness playing a larger role than that of the motivation for resolution.  
For example, a mediator may be called upon to resolve a dispute because the 
parties mutually recognise them.  Similarly, a mediator may enjoy a social 
standing or a formal role which designates him or her as respected by both 
parties.  For example, a police officer may mediate between two parties in a 
common dispute, where the situation dictates that it is in the best interests of both 
parties to engage and they may be exposed to social pressures to do so.  As 
mediators, police officers rely on their symbolic role as sources of moral authority, 
as well as the deference grounded in social controls that recognise policing by 
consent in general (Home Office, 2012).  This more formal approach is perhaps 
indicative of a less cohesive community and more structured society.  In the 
above example, symbolic authority and notion of impartiality are grounded in 
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social controls and not by commonly recognised and interchange functions in 
dispute resolution.  Nevertheless, as long as inter-personal disputes do not 
amount to a criminal offence or exhibit disorderly behaviour, police officers may 
not enjoy immediate legal authority, and proposed solutions could be given with 
no formal legal backing to enforce them.  (Black & Baumgartner, 1983, pp. 103-
107) 
 
‘Arbitrators’ differ from ‘mediators’ in the sense that the former aim to render a 
decision, rather than to strive to enable parties to arrive at a mutually agreed 
equitable resolution (grounded in and enforced by social controls).  ‘Arbitrators’ 
are either formally recognised as such in the division of labour or are intermittently 
called upon to function as such due to other objective properties of their role in the 
division of labour.  The finality of a decision is grounded in a pre-existing formal 
designation and consent of the parties to accept their role and decision as 
definitive.  The final decision is either enforced by social controls or market rules 
or re-issued by the courts as a verdict or a court order, and there would be formal 
penalties or sanctions in place to assure compliance. 
 
‘Judges’ are similar to ‘arbitrators’ in the sense that the former types of ‘settlement 
agents’ seek equitable solution and imposes a decision on the parties that does 
not require mutual adoption.  Nevertheless, ‘Judges’ do not require parties to 
recognise their authority at the outset of their consideration and decision-making 
process, but instead enjoy a sovereign source of authority that is intrinsic to their 
role in the division of labour (Black & Baumgartner, 1983, pp. 107-109).  ‘Judges’ 
are independent of popular acceptance or recognition, and judicial decisions are 
38 
 
enforced by state powers.  While in some cases a party may choose to initiate 
litigation, the application is to appear before the court and state appointed judges. 
There is no reference at the commencement of proceedings to the person that 
might be assigned to preside over the case.  ‘Judges’ may be called upon to 
render a decision in disputes between equal parties, or asymmetrical relationships 
such as the state and one of its citizens.  The use of ‘judges’ for dispute resolution 
should be viewed as an indicator of a failure of more intimate resolution 
mechanisms, or the social controls that underpin them.  Black and Baumgartner 
(1983, pp.109-110) discuss a fifth category of ‘repressive peacemakers’, which is 
less applicable to the UK and other common-law jurisdictions.  This category is 
applied to ‘settlement agents’ who operate by exercising next to absolute authority 
to resolve conflicts, with equitable resolution being secondary to the ending of the 
conflict. 
 
Third-party theory is a useful concept in the examination of the relationship 
between social controls and law, and the transition between the two when 
employing Black’s (1976) theory of law.  The conflicts that outweigh the strength 
of social controls and intimacy require a resolution mechanism with considerably 
more structured or state-backed sources of authority.  Disputes which typically 
require judicial powers are those where bilateral resolution has been shown to be 
beyond the reach of the parties involved.  Furthermore, arriving at a resolution 
must be perceived as important enough by at least one of the parties to break 




2.3.3 Summary  
 
In the above section, a theoretical framework for the analysis of the ‘duality’ of 
fraud (RQ1) and its characterisation as a social dynamic was presented.  Black’s 
(1976) theory of law and third-party theory (Black & Baumgartner, 1983) have 
been presented and elaborated upon in the context of their theoretical application 
to the investigation of the ‘duality’ of fraud as a manifestation of an underlying 
social dynamic (Durkheim, 1982).  The contemporary identification of the ‘duality’ 
of fraud as a dysfunction between ‘law-in-theory’ and ‘law-in-action’ is discussed 
in the Methodology chapter below as relating to the function of an underlying 
social mechanism (Black, 1972; Weber, 1978; Durkheim, 1982).   
 
The reader will have found a partial answer in the above section to RQ1 (‘duality’), 
that is, what determines and differentiates the concepts of ‘commercial’ and 
‘criminal’ fraud in theory and in practice?  Black’s (1976) theory of law introduces 
a scale of social controls on which resolution mechanisms applicable to the 
‘duality’ of fraud can be organised, whereby the criminal justice system represents 
‘more’ law than other means of resolution.  Third-party theory (Black & 
Baumgartner, 1983) offers a means for thinking about the role of social controls 
and other mechanisms towards the resolution of fraud, and it theorises the 
process of ‘escalation’ or where ‘more’ law may be required.  These theoretical 
frameworks do not address fraud per se, but rather offer a general framework 
through which to develop an understanding social function of criminal law relative 
to other resolution mechanisms in the context of RQ1.  Furthermore, both 
theoretical constructs assist in the study of the social dynamic of fraud 
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criminalisation in chapter four, where pre-industrial circumstances do not include a 
direct comparison to contemporary policing and public prosecution (Ashworth, 
2000). 
 
2.4 Theoretical ‘Fault Lines’ and a ‘Wide Blanket’ Approach to 
Criminalisation  
 
In the above section, the author discussed contextual difficulties with respect to 
the landmark change in the legislative approach to the concept of fraud, 
specifically, the criminalisation of ‘all fraud’ qualified by dishonesty.  This new 
approach and consolidation of multiple fraud offences into one criminal definition 
of fraud (despite some provisions not being repealed and the introduction of new 
provisions) was seen as a way of addressing difficulties in fraud prosecution in 
commercial circumstances.  As a qualifier, dishonesty appears odd as a criminal 
definition due to the lack of an objective test and its affinity to the gestalt of fraud, 
which it is used to define.  In this section, the author contextualises the above 
discussion to selected general social theory frameworks and applies them in the 
context of the ‘duality’ of fraud.   
 
In this section, the ‘duality’ of fraud (RQ1) flows from a framing of dysfunction 
between legislation (criminalisation) and its application as a subject for an 
investigation based in social science theory and methodology (Black, 1972).  
Statutory law is subject to application in circumstances studied by social science 
(inter-personal interactions) and can therefore be evaluated by social theory.  The 
general fraud offence in the Fraud Act 2006 appears to ‘cut across’ distinctive 
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categories of crime that the literature identifies as resulting with varying degrees of 
association with law-enforcement activities.  Two theoretical frameworks that 
represent two ‘fault lines’ with respect to theoretical suggestions of association 
between a fraud offence and the likelihood of association with law-enforcement 
activities are presented in the sub-section 2.4.1.  The first is Naylor’s (2003) 
typology of profit-driven crimes.  This theoretical framework identifies a distinction 
between a category of offences that is readily associable with law-enforcement 
activities, and a separate of offences that is not commonly associable with such 
responses.  Nonetheless, the general offence in the Fraud Act 2006 is applied 
equally to frauds from each category.  The second theoretical framework is 
Black’s (1976) theory of law.  This uses variability in social indicators between 
offender and victims as a means of estimating the likelihood of law-enforcement 
responses in dispute resolution.  Different to examples of particularised fraud 
criminalisation discussed in this chapter and in chapter four, the general fraud 
offence is applicable to all permutations in social indicators between offender and 
victim.  Both theoretical frameworks are presented and applied independently and 
in conjunction to the discussion of the ‘duality’ of fraud as a dysfunction between 
law-in-theory and law-in-action in the context of the Fraud Act 2006 (Black, 1972). 
 
Sub-section 2.4.2 further below in this section discusses the criminalisation of the 
concept of fraud through a monolithic dishonesty-based offence in the context of 
the theoretical frameworks presented in sub-section 2.4.1.  The question of 
whether the simplification of the legal meaning of the concept of fraud offers a 
clear measure for criminality and a basis for an association of the concept of fraud 
with law-enforcement activities and effective criminalisation (Hester & Eglin, 
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1992).  Furthermore, the inconsistencies in outcomes with respect to fraud provide 
a basis to critically examine the rationalisation of a conduct-based categorical 
criminalisation of fraud as it was proposed by the Law Commission (2002, p. 3). 
 
2.4.1 Theoretical ‘Fault Lines’  
 
Naylor (2003) proposed a threefold typology for acquisitive or ‘profit-driven’ crime, 
which distinguishes between three typological categories of crime.  The first 
category refers to ‘predatory’ offences that are primarily defined by their inherently 
immoral nature, which typically refers to bilateral transactions by force or threat 
(though guile or deceit may be used) and occur either in a non-business context 
or using a false business cover.  The second category refers to ‘market-based’ 
offences, which describe voluntary trade of illicit goods and services.  The third 
category refers to ‘commercial’ offences, which are defined by use of illegal 
methods in to facilitate otherwise voluntary transactions in a legitimate business 
context and with some disparity in terms of fair market value.  (Naylor, 2003) 
 
Of the above categories, this thesis discusses only ‘predatory’-type and 
‘commercial’-type offences.  ‘Market-based’ offences are excluded from this 
discussion going forward, as these offences do not feature the concept of fraud as 
a form of harm and victimisation directed at a transaction with a victim.  Instead, 
fraud in the context of these offence is a possible technique to interact with 
proceeds of crime emanating from other offences or benefiting from illicit goods 




In the context of the ‘duality’ of fraud, this discussion highlights an apparent 
theoretical ‘fault line’ between two categories.  ‘Predatory’-type frauds feature 
clarity in respect to the desired form of resolution, and an integral role for law-
enforcement activities.  ‘Commercial’-type frauds are not intrinsically associated 
with law-enforcement activities as they commonly refer to actions that are 
otherwise legitimate, and as compensatory remedies can be secured by other 
means.  This ‘fault line’ with respect to the (perceived) role and strength of 
association between the two categories in the context the role of the criminal 
justice system in their resolution.  In Naylor’s (2003) discussion of typical 
outcomes of ‘predatory’ and ‘commercial’ offences, the former is characterised as 
intuitively understood to be synonymous with law-enforcement responses, whilst 
the latter is a category of offences to which such a generalisation cannot be 
applied.  Both categories contain multiple offence-types to which the Fraud Act 
2006 is equally applicable.  This adds analytical value to the examination of the 
dysfunction between ‘law-in-theory’ and ‘law-in-action’ in the context of the Act, 
and the discussion of ‘duality’ of fraud (RQ1) (Black, 1972). 
 
The above demonstrates two theoretical insights that appear to suggest a 
dysfunction between ‘law-in-action’ and ‘law-in-theory’ (Black, 1972) in the context 
of the general fraud offence in the Fraud Act 2006.  This context highlights 
typological ‘fault lines’ in theoretically suggested outcomes based on typology 
(Naylor, 2003), and social circumstance (Black, 1976).  In conjunction, both 
frameworks point towards the likely catalyst for a ‘duality’ between the criminal 
justice system and other outcomes with respect to a dishonesty-based conduct 
offence.  This context suggests that irrespective of the study of law-enforcement 
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practice in the context of fraud, there are ample grounds for a social-science-
based evaluation of the Fraud Act 2006 and its applicability.  The first question is 
whether a monolithic headline fraud offence (akin to the concept of theft) is an 
enabler of clarity given the above theoretical context with respect to its typological 
and circumstantial span?  The second question is whether the general fraud 
offence, which appears to have been designed with substantial emphasis on 
frauds that are related to more complex typologies and methods (Law 
Commission, 2002), effectively address both ‘predatory’ and ‘commercial’ 
offences (Naylor, 2003)?   
 
2.4.2 ‘Eroded’ Criminality Under a ‘Wide Blanket’ Approach to Fraud 
Criminalisation 
 
In section 2.4.1 above, the author demonstrated a misalignment between the 
extent to which fraud is criminalised under the Fraud Act 2006, and social theory 
concerning the concept of fraud and criminal justice system outcomes.  These 
frameworks include Naylor’s discussion of the difference in association with 
criminal justice system outcomes between ‘predatory’-type offences, and 
‘commercial’-type offences, and the fraud typologies that apply to these 
categories (Naylor, 2003).  Black’s (1976) theory of law suggests the relative 
‘amount’ of law applicable in response to fraud according to four social indicators.  
The application of Black’s (1976) theory of law to the range of circumstances in 
which fraud is committed (Levi & Burrows, 2008; Smith, et al., 2011) results with a 
suggested association of both use of ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ relative amounts of law 
(Black, 1976).  Both theoretical frameworks independently and in conjunction 
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suggest a ‘duality’ in outcomes with respect to the dishonesty conduct offence 
introduced by the Fraud Act 2006.   
 
In this sub-section 2.4.2, the author contextualises the key contribution to the 
literature to the two dysfunctions identified above.  First was the discussion of 
difficulties in unpacking the concept of dishonesty in the context of mainstream 
policing and criminal proceedings discussed in section 2.2. above.  Second was 
the discussion of theoretical suggestions that support the evidence of variability in 
the use of law across the concept of fraud discussed in sub-section 2.4.1 (Black, 
1976; Naylor, 2003).  The author submits that the criminal association of the 
concept of fraud with viable probability of criminal justice system outcomes 
creates an erosion in the common association of the concept of fraud with the 
social construct of ‘crime’ (Hester & Eglin, 1992).  The change in legislation and 
the criminalisation of the concept of fraud through the introduction of a dishonesty-
based conduct offence was meant to overcome difficulties in addressing mainly 
‘commercial’-type offences (Law Commission, 2002; Naylor, 2003).  Nevertheless, 
the literature points towards difficulties with the application of the term fraud in the 
criminal justice system in England and Wales.  
 
According to Naylor (2003), ‘predatory’-type frauds are those that do not occur in 
a legitimate business context and are characterised by readily understood 
features in terms of harm, victims, morality and unfairness (or dishonesty).  One 
would expect such frauds, where dishonesty is intrinsic to the entire scheme, and 
it does not occur in the course of other legitimate activities (Sutherland, 1944), to 
be commonly associated with law-enforcement activities, as a ‘predatory’ offence 
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(Naylor, 2003).  This flows from the generalisation made with respect to this 
category of offences, which assumes a historical and contemporary association of 
these types of profit-driven crimes (‘predatory’) (Naylor, 2003) with law-
enforcement and legal responses.  Nevertheless, this generalisation does not 
seem to necessarily apply with respect to frauds of such essential characteristics, 
despite the concepts of fraud and theft being subject to categorical criminalisation 
but differ in association with law-enforcement activities.  The literature attributes 
some of the variability in outcomes between the two concepts in grounded in the 
unique victimology of fraud and inhibitors to victim engagement with law-
enforcement (Levi, 1987; 2001; Titus & Gover, 2001; Doig, 2006; Levi & Burrows, 
2008; Smith, et al., 2011).   
 
Crime occurs in the context of ordinary (‘routine’) social life, and under 
circumstances where motivated offenders identify a potential victim they can 
interact with in the absence of capable guardians (Cohen & Felson, 1979).  
Routine activity theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979) contextualises the social function 
or ability to affect capable guardianship through effective interaction between 
victims and law-enforcement agencies in the context of fraud.  In the discussion of 
RQ2 (‘mainstreaming’ and ‘streamlining’) in chapter one (introduction), the author 
refers to the unique response to fraud in law-enforcement structures and 
processes (Levi & Burrows, 2008; Button et al., 2011; 2013).  The interface 
between reporting victims and law-enforcement agencies is a critical component 
of capable guardianship (Cohen & Felson, 1979); in the context of fraud, reduced 
likelihood for law-enforcement responses compounds the perception of an 
opportunity to commit fraud (Cressey, 1973).  Furthermore, the above context 
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may support further rationalisation for offending (Cressey, 1973; Hester & Eglin, 
1992). 
 
In the context of RQ2, the demonstrable difference in law-enforcement responses 
and likely outcomes between the concepts of fraud and theft is arguably an 
‘eroding’ factor for effective criminalisation of fraud (Hester & Eglin, 1992).  
Furthermore, approaches for fraud prevention also appear to place less of an 
emphasis on law-enforcement engagement as a means of establishing capable 
guardianship (Felson & Boba, 2009) or addressing known inhibitions on victim 
reporting.  Instead, responses to some examples of ‘predatory’-type fraud (Naylor, 
2003) do not demonstrate a clear association between the offence and law-
enforcement activities (Smith, et al., 2011; Button, et al., 2013; Levi, et al., 2015).   
 
A study of victims of fraud who reported their victimisation to a law-enforcement 
agency highlights several reasons as to why they initially considered not reporting 
(Button et al., 2009).  Among such reasons was confusion as to whom to report 
fraud, embarrassment in relation to speaking to a stranger about their 
victimisation, formalising their status as a victim in the eyes of their family, and the 
perceived low prospect of a police response or financial recovery.  The 
dysfunction between ‘law-in-theory’ and ‘law-in-action’ is even apparent in 
narrative provided by victims who have reported fraud harm and victimisation to 
law-enforcement agencies.  For instance, the victim of a pyramid scam (who did 
eventually report the crime) articulated to researchers the following insights:        
Yeah, that’s all really, I don’t like prison, because they’re not really 
criminals, isn’t it? [Laughs] Sorry, that’s what I think, my own opinion, 
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they’re not criminals, they haven’t committed very deep crime… (Button, 
et al., 2009, p. 28) 
 
As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, there may be merit to the 
argument that criminality under the Fraud Act 2006 is not specific enough (or 
practically divisible from legitimate practice) to identify or assume ‘intrinsic 
criminality’ (cf Tappan, 1947; Cressey, 1961).  The difficulty with a general 
dishonesty offence is that it seems grounded in a Victorian dogma of the 
“untarnished character of the English merchant” (Taylor, 2013, pp.26-27) that 
assumes prevailing and unqualified honesty of conduct as the rule.  Deviations 
from this rule, under this somewhat naïve perspective, is in the public interest to 
address in severe terms in order to maintain overall confidence in participation 
and investment in trade.  Furthermore, the above quote (Button, et al., 2009, p. 
28) from the pyramid scam victim reflects an ‘erosion’ of the concept of fraud as it 
relates to conduct that mimics ‘market-rules’ and is therefore seen as having less 
intrinsic criminal properties.   
 
The same confusion appears to have some presence within law-enforcement 
when approached by reporting victims and even in the criminal courts (Button et 
al., 2013).  It would also appear that despite typological features consistent with 
the ‘predatory’-type category, perceived (yet not existent) features of ‘commercial’-
type offences underline confusion and ‘erode’ the association of criminal justice 
system responses to ‘predatory’-type fraud (Naylor, 2003; Button, et al., 
2009;2013).  Nevertheless, it would appear that practical association of 
‘predatory’-type frauds with criminal justice responses do not meet the theoretical 
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suggestion by Naylor (2003), or the scope of fraud criminalisation in the UK, and 
its alleged clarity (Law Commission, 2002). 
 
Criminalising dishonesty does not recuse investors (or would-be victims) from 
exercising judgement and conducting due-diligence on potential investment 
opportunities as well as the individuals involved.  Similarly, not installing an alarm 
system or failing to secure a dwelling does not diminish from the criminal liability 
of a burglar, or the status of victims (Griew, 1995).  Despite introducing wide-
reaching conduct offences, the Fraud Act 2006 has not supplanted deference to 
market-rules and regulation by reputation as the dominant crime control approach 
to some frauds (Action Fraud. n.d.; Financial Conduct Authority FCA, 2016).  
Furthermore, the notion of an investor engaging in a voluntary transaction being a 
valid reason for diminished expectations for law-enforcement action was largely 
dismissed by the Fraud Trials Committee (1986).  Instead, recommendations 
emphasised the public interest in effective responses so to encourage the general 
public to participant in business investment (Fraud Trials Committee, 1986).  
Nevertheless, the ‘blanket’ criminalisation of the concept of fraud and the 
dishonesty-based qualification (as opposed to a range of narrowly defined 
objective tests), appears to greatly contribute to the apparent lack of effective 
criminalisation. For instance, in one case victims persisted in seeking a criminal 
justice outcome only to meet the following critique in court: 
The worst thing for us was when they did the actual court case, the 
judge said that we were all wealthy arrogant people that wanted to get 
on the bandwagon of hedge fund investment ... He did. He just said that 
we were wealthy arrogant people that had erm ... which was annoying 
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’cause we weren’t. We were just normal people, obviously if my husband 
hadn’t been involved we would never have got involved in it. We 
probably would’ve gone straight to the building society, paid off the 
mortgage and said, end of. Instead, we thought well could invest it, 
make a bit more from it, do something more for the children, that type of 
thing. (Button, et al., 2013, p. 54) 
 
The above example demonstrates a feature of ‘commercial’-type frauds (moral 
ambiguity) that appears to overshadow the ‘predatory’ typological features of an 
offence in criminal justice system settings (Naylor, 2003).  Another example of a 
feature of ‘commercial’-type offences obscuring criminal justice system 
interactions with ‘predatory’-type frauds is the notion of a particular skill 
requirement that extends beyond the ability of most law-enforcement agencies.  
This topic is developed in Roskill (Fraud Trials Committee, 1986), by Levi (1987), 
and others (Button, 2011; 2013; 2015; Smith, et al., 2011), but often in relation to 
so called ‘serious’ frauds, which the author (loosely) attributes to the category of 
‘commercial’-type crimes (Naylor, 2003).  For ‘predatory’-types frauds, the author 
submits that investigatory skills cannot be genuinely identified as a ‘bottleneck’, 
particularly due to the simplicity of the transaction and financial instruments, and 
readily understood dishonesty in a non-corporate context (Naylor, 2003). 
 
In the context of RQ2 and the role of law-enforcement as the point of entry to the 
criminal justice system, the ‘bundling’ of ‘predatory’ and ‘commercial’ type frauds 
(Naylor, 2003) into a singular offence and enforcement structures should 
(theoretically) add value.  Whilst there may have been some difficulties with the 
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prosecution of frauds that have taken place in the workplace environment, or 
related to more complex exchange mechanisms, these would not apply to 
‘predatory’ frauds.  Whilst this is not a fundamental cause for the somewhat 
unique victimology of fraud, it would have added value to the deliberations of a 
new approach to fraud victimisation (Law Commission, 2002). 
 
The question with respect to the approach to criminalisation recommended by the 
Law Commission (2002), and enacted in the Fraud Act 2006, is not one of extent 
of criminalisation, but rather its substantiation as a headline offence. In chapter 
three (methodology), the author separates the Fraud Act 2006 as a means of 
unpacking the gestalt of fraud from a ‘guide’ to behaviour that are synonymous 
with law-enforcement responses.  In this section, the author focused on the Fraud 
Act 2006 as a source of a criminal definition, and the resulting dysfunction 
between ‘law-in-theory’ and ‘law-in-action’ in the context of the Act, and by 
comparison to the general offence of theft.  There appears to be a considerable 
challenge with the use of dishonesty as a qualifier for fraud by misrepresentation, 
failure to disclose, and abuse of position.  Whilst the new fraud offence offers a 
significant contribution to the unpacking and the gestalt of fraud, it is doubtful 
whether the monolithic approach to the criminalisation of fraud is attainable.  
Different to the concept of theft, the concept of fraud manifests itself in a far wider 
range of means, typologies, and social circumstances.  Theft is also defined in 
criminal law by an objective test with respect to gains and losses as a result of the 
offence, as opposed to a dishonest manner of conduct in making a representation 




A further contributor to the ‘erosion’ of criminality in relation to the concept of fraud 
and ‘predatory’-type examples of it rests with the absence of lower thresholds and 
degrees of offending in the Fraud Act 2006.  This discussion is separate from the 
discussion of the particularised mode of legislation due to the 2006 Act being the 
effective means of criminalisation (see section 2.5).  There seems to be no ‘lower-
end’ for the application of the Fraud Act 2006, or what misrepresentations, 
omissions or abuses of position can be brought before a jury to pass judgement 
on the honesty of the (alleged) perpetrator.  Whilst there are apparent degrees for 
brackets of sentencing by financial harm, these only provide recommendations to 
an independent judiciary, and relate only to the post-conviction stage (Sentencing 
Council, 2014).  This supports a notion that the terms of harm for which the Fraud 
Act 2006 is intended to address are not necessarily on the lower end of the scale.  
Such examples could be seen by multiple stakeholders as not amounting to 
‘criminal fraud’ serve to further confuse the concept of ‘criminal’ fraud (Levi, 1987; 
2001; Titus & Gover, 2001; Doig, 2006; Levi & Burrows, 2008; Smith, et al., 2011).   
 
The above discussion demonstrates difficulties that do not result from a 
complicated law, but rather from the dysfunction between the scope of means of 
the criminalisation of the concept of fraud through a monolithic conduct offence.  
In this sub-section 2.4.2, the theoretical dysfunction between typological features 
(Naylor, 2003) and social circumstances (Black, 1976) were demonstrated as an 
inhibitor for contextualising fraud as an offence.  The author suggested that 
perceived features and limitations of ‘commercial’-type offences are also present 
in examples that appear to disassociate (or decouple) ‘predatory’-type frauds from 





The dysfunction between ‘law-in-theory’ and ‘law-in-practice’, with respect to the 
concept of fraud, is critically discussed in this chapter in terms of an inherent 
misalignment between the Fraud Act 2006 as contrasted with sociological and 
criminological theory (Black, 1976; Naylor, 2003).  The discussion in this section is 
considered in conjunction with the discussion of the absence of an objective test 
for fraud as a driver for the instigation of a criminal investigation and further 
discovery in the section above.  The absence of an objective test appears to 
relate to a focus on some legal lacunae and difficulties with the pre-existing scope 
of available provisions for the prosecution of fraud, particularly of the ‘commercial’- 
type (Law Commission, 2002; Naylor, 2003).  In sub-section 2.4.1, the wide span 
of monolithic criminalisation in critically analysed through the prism of Black’s 
(1976) theory of law and Naylor’s typology of profit-driven crimes (Naylor, 2003).  
Both frameworks provide theoretical suggestions of variability in outcomes across 
an axis of relative social rankings between offender and victim (Black, 1976), and 
the typological and contextual settings of the offence (Naylor, 2003).  Both 
frameworks converge on a suggestion of lesser association of ‘commercial’-type 
frauds with law-enforcement activities (Black, 1976; Naylor, 2003).  This appears 
to be the reverse of the typological circumstances from which prosecutorial and 
trial-phase challenges had originally created the drive for a revision of the law with 




In theory, whilst the context from sub-section 2.4.1 should have resulted with 
demonstrably clearer association of ‘predatory’-type frauds and law-enforcement 
activities, observations do not confirm this suggestion (Button et al., 2009; 2013). 
In sub-section 2.4.2, the challenges for enforcement of ‘commercial’-type offences 
and misalignment of the fraud offence and ‘mainstream’ law-enforcement practice 
is identified as a contributor to the ‘erosion’ of effective criminalisation of fraud.  
This ‘erosion’ is evident from findings that demonstrate some of the limitations of 
‘commercial’-type offences, which appear to extend into the legal and personal 
application of the offence of fraud with respect to ‘predatory’-type offences 
(Naylor, 2003; Button et al., 2009). 
 
A final contributor to the apparent ‘erosion’ of the association of law-enforcement 
activities with ‘predatory’-type frauds is the difficulty of engaging with such 
agencies in the context of alleged dishonest conduct.  Whilst other offences are 
typically investigated and prosecuted using points of proof that connect an 
accused offender to material evidence of criminality, the Fraud Act 2006 offences 
are qualified by dishonesty.  With respect to an examination of conduct, fraud 
trials have the potential of being conducted in full agreement of the facts, but not 
their interpretation in terms of the state of mind of the accused (as discussed 
above).  By contrast, the ‘predatory’-type offence (Naylor, 2003) of theft defines 
criminality through activities and their outcomes, not the state of mind of the 
offender qualified by a binary determination of honesty versus dishonesty.  An 
understanding of the offence emerges directly, and 'traditionally’ (Stuart, 1967, p. 
610), from section one of the Theft Act 1968.  Whilst section one of the Theft Act 
1968 qualifies offences through dishonesty, it offers clarity and simplicity through 
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which to understand the offence and related harm and victimisation: 
“…dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with the intention of 
permanently depriving the other of it; and “thief” and “steal” shall be construed 
accordingly”.  Furthermore, such activities are ‘confined’ within the definition of 
‘predatory’ offences and cannot be honestly carried out in the course of legitimate 
activities (Naylor, 2003). 
 
Both the Theft Act 1968 (as amended) and the Fraud Act 2006 define an activity 
into criminal law (the concepts of theft and fraud respectively).  However, the 
former is an example of a correlation between a clear and simple offence and its 
effective criminalisation, whilst the latter does not describe a behaviour that is 
synonymous with law-enforcement activities.  This difference in effective 
criminalisation (Hester & Eglin, 1992) appears unrelated to the internal ‘simplicity’ 
(Law Commission, 2002) of the two criminal statutes.  The general dishonesty 
offence in the Fraud Act 2006, despite its simplicity, does not align with social 
science theories on the association between criminal behaviour and criminal 
justice system resolution.  Social science theoretical constructs appear to provide 
considerable insight to this dysfunction between ‘law-in-theory’ and ‘law-in-action’ 
that underpins the ‘duality’ of fraud in English law (RQ1).  In cutting across 
typological and socio-economical categories that suggest the involvement of law-
enforcement agencies, the scope of monolithic criminalisation in the Fraud Act 





2.5 Parallel and Competing Provisions 
 
In the above sections, the author discussed the origins of a monolithic approach 
towards the comprehensive criminalisation of the concept of fraud using a 
seemingly ‘simple’ criminal definition (Law Commission, 2002, p.3).  In this 
section, the author examines parallel criminal fraud and non-criminal justice 
system resolution mechanisms facilitated by the state.  Provisions that appear to 
criminalise specific behaviours otherwise subject to general criminalisation using 
the Fraud Act 2006.  This mode of fraud criminalisation through the specification 
of actions and/or outcomes limited to narrow circumstances is referred to in this 
thesis as particularisation.  Particularised provisions that exist concurrently with 
the Fraud Act 2006 have either pre-dated it, were not repealed, or were 
introduced after 2007.  These offences do not employ a dishonesty test in the 
qualification of the offence, but instead dishonesty is implied in the description of 
these offences.  Further included in this section is a discussion of other fraud 
resolution mechanisms facilitated by the judiciary that are external to the criminal 
justice system.  
 
Particularised offences are mutually exclusive to legitimate conduct in two ways: 
(a) if the actus reus had not occurred, there is a clear distinction between the 
offence and legitimate conduct; and (b) if the same manner of conduct 
(dishonesty) is applied in a circumstance that is not specified by particularised 
fraud provisions, it amounts to a Fraud Act 2006 offence.  Despite the enactment 
of a general offence by the Fraud Act 2006, fraud is also specifically criminalised 
under the following provisions inter alia:  
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1. Taxes Management Act 1970,  
2. Customs and Excise Management Act 1979,  
3. Weights and Measurements Act 1985, 
4. Insolvency Act 1986, 
5. Social Security Administration Act 1992,  
6. Value Added Tax (VAT) Act 1994,  
7. Social Security Fraud Act 2001, 
8. Land Registration Act 2002, 
9. Companies Act 2006,  
10. The Welfare Reform Act 2012, 
11.  Prevention of Social Housing Fraud Act 2013, and 
12.  Immigration Act 2014. 
 
Additional particularisation of fraud beyond the general offence (in sections one 
through four) under the Fraud Act 2006 are included in later sections of the Act 
itself.  These provisions further criminalise offences in the Companies Act 1985 
that relate to the concept of fraudulent trading and fraud against company 
creditors, as well as including supplementary liabilities on company directors in 
the same context.  An offence under the Social Security Fraud Act 2001, such as 
‘failing to disclose’ a change in circumstances that may remove a previous benefit 
entitlement (Section 16/2), amounts to a criminal offence.  In addition to the 
specified imprisonment and financial penalties, a conviction also limits the 
offender with respect to future entitlements under the Welfare Reform Act 2012.  
Disclosing such changes in circumstances is therefore the legal avenue citizens 
are required to follow, and the law specifies narrowly and specifically the 
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criminalisation of the opposite proscribed behaviour.  Nevertheless, the same 
manner of conduct (dishonest failure to disclose) under circumstances that are not 
subject to narrow definitions in law, would appear to (nevertheless) fall under the 
purview of the Fraud Act 2006.  
 
Similarly, (some) contractual misrepresentation, fraudulent trading, and frauds 
relating to insurance policies, may be made known to the state through the civil 
courts or insolvency proceedings.  For instance, in Agapitos and Another V 
Agnew and Others (2002) the civil jurisdiction analysed the liability of an insurer 
when fraudulent documents are produced by the beneficiary.  It emerged that a 
deliberate misrepresentation was made as it was demonstrated that there was no 
good faith or error exceptions, and a civil remedy was applied in favour of the 
insurer (Agapitos and Another V Agnew and Others [2002] EWCA Civ 247, 2002; 
Rawlings & Lowry, 2017).  The deference to (insurance) market rules in the above 
examples serve to demonstrate the supportive role played by the judiciary in 
enabling markets to predominantly self-regulate, by upholding market standards in 
the adjudication of fraud.   
 
The study of the ‘duality’ of fraud (RQ1) as a dysfunction between ‘law-in-theory’ 
and ‘law-in-action’ (Black, 1972) is made particularly insightful by the above 
examples of adjudication of a particularised offence and a Fraud Act offence.  
Particularised provisions are easily applicable in investigative and prosecutorial 
contexts, yet the underlying conduct that underpins them is in itself subject to 
criminalisation (see section 2.2).  Nevertheless, the literature demonstrates that 
knowledge of prima facia Fraud Act 2006 offences is brought before the judiciary 
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as a matter of course, but often as a civil matter and not through Crown 
prosecution (Smith & Shepherd, 2017).  The role of the civil judiciary in 
adjudicating potentially criminal offences further contributes to the factors 
discussed in sections two and three above.  In addition to the concept of fraud not 
being commonly understood as a criminal offence (cf Law Commission, 2002; 
Button et al., 2013), it is demonstrably included in the purview of the civil courts 
(Law Commission, 2014; Smith & Shepherd, 2017).   
 
The civil jurisdiction over some matters relating to fraud and the use of 
compensatory remedies is functional and not subject to criticism in this thesis 
(Smith & Shepherd, 2017).  Instead, it is simply referred to as an additional 
inhibitor to examples of desired law-enforcement activities in response to fraud.  
The legislator appears to have sought to clarify the criminal properties of fraud in 
narrow sets of circumstances through particularised legislation, making such fraud 
inherently criminal, and readily investigated and prosecuted.  Whilst the ‘motives’ 
behind the preservation of particularised offences, in concurrence with the Fraud 
Act 2006 and the introduction of new provisions post 2007, is not recorded in the 
literature the author would offer a functional observation.  Despite the explicit 
intention for the criminalisation of ‘all fraud’ (Law Commission, 2002), the standard 
of effective criminalisation applied to the concept of theft has not been achieved in 
the case of fraud.  Competing resolution mechanisms, theoretical (see above), 
and functional (see chapter four) misalignments between reasonable expectations 
from the criminal justice system appear to suggest a place for an additional tier of 
criminalisation.  Therefore, the questions are what categories of fraud are made 
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explicitly and effectively criminal, whilst other are subject to a general offence and 
ineffective criminalisation? 
 
Historically, the particularisation of fraud was made by proclamation (and later, 
legislation) of fraud in narrow circumstances that pertained to sovereign interest 
(see sections 4.5 and 4.6).  In this section, two general types of sovereign interest 
are identified from examples of particularised fraud criminalisation.  This topic is 
further analysed in chapter four in a broader socio-legal historical context.  The 
first type of offences concerns specific sovereign vulnerabilities to fraud 
victimisation, for example:   
1. Section 111A(a)(b) of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 reads: 
“Dishonestly producing or furnishing false information of [sic or] documents 
to obtain benefit” 
2. Similar wording exists in the Value Added Tax Act 1994 and the Customs 
and Excise Management Act 1979. 
Both provisions are still in effect and, theoretically, also prosecutable under the 
Fraud Act 2006.  In addition to particularisation in law, such offences are also 
‘particularised’ in law-enforcement, with designated agencies and personnel that 
focus on these offences such as local authorities and Her Majesty’s Revenue and 
Customs (HMRC).  In these offences, the state is subject to harm and 
victimisation.  The Crown is made to either accept less than its rightful dues or is 
made to provide funds beyond the just allocation determined by the scheme 




This type of criminalisation does not address the full extent of vulnerabilities and 
potential harm from fraud that the state experiences, which can extend to (inter 
alia) procurement fraud, or embezzlement by a civil servant (Levi, 2008).  
Nevertheless, the scope of particularised criminalisation refers to legislative 
provision, and not the potential vigilance and ability to engage with law-
enforcement that the mechanism of the state possesses. 
 
The second type of particularisation relates to cases of corporate insolvency, 
administration and winding-up proceedings, and the state-imposed rules and the 
desired ‘balance of power’ between debtor and creditor in a bankruptcy context.  
The most recent revision of insolvency law in England stems from the work of the 
Cork Commission (1982) and enacted in the Insolvency Act 1986.  The 
recommended imperative of insolvency under English law was comprised of 
maximisation of asset recovery as well as taking appropriate actions against 
directors, and other stakeholders, should their past actions have contributed to the 
company becoming insolvent.  Both the Insolvency Act 1986 and the Companies 
Act 2006 contain provisions to recover funds and/or assets from former directors 
should the liquidator of a company be able to demonstrate the relevant personal 
liabilities.  Most of these provisions are subject to discovery and enforcement 
powers that reside in the civil jurisdiction. 
 
Different to fraudulent trading (a criminal offense of knowingly trading whilst 
insolvent), wrongful trading is a civil wrong under which directors and other 
stakeholders may be liable.  As a civil wrong, the liquidator is entitled to exercise 
judgment in deciding on such a course of action.  For example, the liquidator may 
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consider the cost of an investigation, estimated litigation cost, and likelihood of 
recovering assets or cash, against the prime duty of optimising recovery for the 
creditors.  For a director to be liable for 'wrongful trading', the presiding judge has 
to be convinced that a director: "ought to know or ascertain conclusions which 
he[/she] ought to reach and the steps which he[/she] ought to take" (Great Britain, 
1986, section 214(4)).  A judge would have to make a finding on a balance of 
probabilities, which can be seen as amounting to an offence, or at least sufficient 
suspicion to merit a criminal investigation where it had concerned other forms of 
acquisitive crime.  
 
The role of the state is identified by the Cork Commission (1982, pp. 1-13) as 
maintaining an equilibrium between the legal remedies available for creditors and 
the protections afforded to borrowers.  This discussion is viewed in the context of 
providing a ‘sovereign guarantee’ of trust to allow the market to sustainably self-
regulate over-time in the face of growing intricacies and lower intimacy, which 
reduce the effectiveness of social controls (Black, 1976; Black & Baumgartner, 
1983).  The Insolvency Act 1986 (as amended) contains several fraud offences 
which were not repealed by the Fraud Act 2006.  These include two categories of 
offences: particularised fraud offences that apply to company shareholders and 
officers, and offences that relate to matters of compliance with the winding-up 
process and cooperation with administrators.  Of the first kind are such offences 
as detailed in sections 207, 358, and 359 of the Act, which criminalises making 
gifts, or transferring assets or receivables, from a company undergoing or about to 
undergo winding-up or liquidation.  Whilst this offence can be charged as 
dishonest abuse of position (Fraud Act 2006 section four), it remains in effect and 
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was not repealed as part of the Act coming into force in 2007.  Similar 
particularisation addresses the concept of misrepresentation or failure to disclose 
in section 356, to identify a further example.  Conversely, the practice of 
fraudulent trading and fraud against creditors is further particularised in section 
nine of the Fraud Act 2006, which appears to represent a subset of the conduct 
detailed in sections one through four of the Act. 
 
The Companies Act 2006 and the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, 
both contain definitions of duties and obligations of company directors.  Actions 
can be taken against directors failing to meet these general requirements, and to 
recover losses using the civil courts under the balance of probabilities standard of 
proof.  Compliance with these processes and specific duties to disclose 
information is underlined by criminal provisions within inter alia the Insolvency Act 
1986.  Amongst these sanctions are the possible disqualification of individuals 
from acting in the future as company directors.  Under the Insolvency Act 1986 
and the Companies Act 2006, an administrator can approach a former director 
suspected of fraud directly, access court powers to obtain documents and 
statements, pursue restitution in civil proceedings (‘wrongful trading’), or refer the 
case to law-enforcement as a ‘fraudulent trading’ offence.  Furthermore, should 
the suspected fraud involve a third-party or an employee of the company, the 
administrator can use a variety of torts on behalf of the creditors such as 
‘conspiracy to Injure’, ‘deceit’, ‘breach of trust’, or the conspiracy to defraud 
offence.  Failure to comply with these investigatory measures, and court 
mandated disclosures, are either particularised against in the Insolvency Act 1986 
through the concept of contempt of court, or specific offences.  (Goode, 2011) 
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The investigative burden rests with the administrator.  It is subject to ‘cost/benefit’ 
considerations in relation to the liquidated assets as well as the recovery potential 
for any chosen course of legal action.  In cases where the alleged perpetrator 
does not comply and appears to have means from which value can be recovered, 
it is likely that such courses of action will be taken on a commercial basis (Goode, 
2011).  This highlights the dysfunction in outcomes between criminal prosecution 
and civil litigation (inclusive of insolvency proceedings in the context of civil 
liabilities and civil wrongs).  The former does not directly serve to remediate the 
victim, whilst the latter is prosecuted by the Crown through its resources and 
seeks to address harm and victimisation construed as a transgression against the 
Crown (Ashworth, 2000). 
 
The above insolvency context provides insight into a functional division of 
circumstances and outcomes.  The Insolvency Act 1986 (as amended) sets out a 
regime of civil powers and procedure in the administration and liquidation of a 
company, and potential recourses for creditors.  Fraud aimed to undermine this 
regime is particularised as a narrowly applicable offence.  Dishonest conduct that 
undermines the position of creditors or their potential recovery in the case of a 
liquidation might offer grounds for civil remedies that are similar to other 
particularised fraud offences (wrongful/fraudulent trading, for example).  Whilst the 
preference of creditors might lean towards civil proceedings and remedies, in 
some cases the evidence could amount to a criminal standard of proof.  The 
investigation is led by the court-appointed administrator and financed from the 
assets of the liquidated estate (meaning that resources are spent out of the 
recoverable amount).  Similar to fraud disputes in commercial circumstances not 
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involving bankruptcy, civil litigation and criminal charges are options available to 
the alleged victim, and subject to cost-benefit considerations (alongside extra-
judicial resolution mechanisms) (Smith & Shepherd, 2017).   
 
An additional form of particularisation relates to state-imposed standards in certain 
markets, or in relation to specific goods and services.  For these provisions, the 
state is not a direct victim of harm (as opposed to the first type), but instead its 
capacity to regulate trade is undermined.  This type of particularisation, together 
with a further analysis of the role of criminal law and historical analogues served in 
substantiating a regime to regulate creditor-debtor relations, is discussed in 




This section examined offences, torts and insolvency practices that are available 
to specific manifestations of dishonest conduct as it is criminalised under the 
Fraud Act 2006, but (seemingly) independent of it.  These provisions are 
particularised offences that are simple and narrow enough to be readily 
understood, and easily deduced to evidential points of proof by investigators.  
Indeed, it could be said that particularised offences tend to meet the standard of 
clarity alleged in relation to the criminalisation of ‘all fraud’ as a dishonesty 
conduct offence:  
Introducing a single crime of fraud would dramatically simplify the law of 
fraud. Clear, simple law is fairer than complicated, inaccessible law.  If a 
citizen is contemplating activities which could amount to a crime, a clear, 
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simple law gives better guidance on whether the conduct is criminal, and 
fairer warning of what could happen if it is… A general offence of fraud 
would be aimed at encompassing fraud in all its forms. It would not focus 
on particular ways or means of committing frauds… (Law Commission, 
2002, p.3) 
 
In the context of research question one (RQ1 ‘duality’), fraud appears to be either 
a subject of specific guarantees of trust given to the state and selected victims, or 
a general offence.  Whilst the particularised offences are narrow in scope and 
readily understood, the general fraud offence is grounded in the dishonest 
conduct implied by the former.  This distinction appears to augment difficulties 
with victim engagement in the context of fraud, and the misalignment between the 
Fraud Act 2006 offence and other statutory offences discussed above.  
Particularised frauds may be investigated and prosecuted by specifically 
designated agencies and powers, and not necessarily local police forces as in the 
context of theft.  Regardless of the identity of the investigating agency, Crown 
prosecution and a criminal justice system adjudication and sanctions, and known 








2.6 Theoretical Discussion of a Dishonesty-Based Conduct Offence (the 
Fraud Act 2006) 
 
The above section examined various parallel legal applications to Fraud Act 2006 
offences, and the role of the former in fostering ambiguity with regards to the 
general offence of fraud in the latter.  The discussion highlighted the limitation of a 
conduct-based approach to the criminalisation adopted in responses to 
challenges to the successful prosecution of ‘commercial’-type frauds (Law 
Commission, 2002; Naylor, 2003).  This approach was thus far discussed 
primarily in the context of its apparent dysfunction between ‘law-in-theory’ and 
‘law-in-action’ (Black, 1972) with respect to ‘predatory’-type frauds (Naylor, 2003).  
In this section, the focus is shifted to the application of a wide scope of 
criminalisation (‘all frauds’) through the use of monolithic dishonesty-based 
offence of misrepresentation, failure to disclose or abuse of position.  
‘Commercial’-type offences are primarily identified through the business settings 
in which they are committed, which offers a parallel to the classic definition of 
‘white-collar crime’ (Sutherland, 1940) and is a category exclusive to such 
settings.   
 
This section examines the application of fraud (to the concept of white-collar 
crime) as it is defined under the Fraud Act 2006.  White-collar crime refers to the 
relative absence of alleged offenders that come to the attention of the criminal 
justice system where the offences are committed by skilled workers and business 
owners (Sutherland, 1940).  These offences, that on their own merits may have 
come to attention under the criminal justice system, are directed away from its 
68 
 
purview to be resolved using ‘less’ law (Sutherland, 1940;1949; Black, 1976).  
This discussion approaches the ‘duality’ of fraud as it relates to research question 
one (RQ1 ‘duality’) by critically examining the use of a general dishonesty offence 
(cf Tappan, 1947; Law Commission, 2002).  It would appear that to study fraud as 
a ‘true’ white-collar crime (Sutherland, 1940; 1949; Cressey, 1961; Smith et al., 
2011), there has to be a system of law which clearly and narrowly defines its 
scope (cf Tappan, 1947; Cressey, 1961).  
 
This discussion advances the analysis of the ‘duality’ of fraud (RQ1) and current 
inhibitors to the ‘mainstreaming’ and ‘streamlining’ of its application (RQ2).  The 
focus in the thesis is on an ‘invisible hand’ (Smith, 1776) that directs some frauds 
away from the criminal courts.  In the UK, law-enforcement and public prosecution 
agencies are the main (and virtually exclusive) gateway to the criminal courts 
where culpability is determined.  The scope of RQ1 (‘duality’) in this thesis is 
therefore delimited to the activities of the institutions of public prosecution, and the 
author does not extend this remit to the application of the Fraud Act 2006 by the 
judiciary. 
 
A theme which emerges from the examination of the gestalt of fraud is that 
criminalisation acts as a ‘sovereign guarantee’ of trust in the relevant field of 
commercial or legal conduct.  The state can be expected to provide a guarantee 
to the standards and regulations it imposes: coins are expected to be authentic, 
weights and measures must be consistent and accurate, and trade and safety 
standards require compliance.  Key to this discussion is the (alleged) departure, 
embedded within the Fraud Act 2006, from the legal principle to not “…indict one 
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man for making a fool of another” (Domina Regina v Jones [1703]; The Law 
Commission, 1974, p. 4).  Historically, the Crown did not provide broad and 
comprehensive guarantees against all manners of dishonest conduct; this is novel 
to the Fraud Act 2006.    
 
In addition, the state assumed its role in regulating trade by imposing a rules-
based system of state-backed procedural compliance such as in the legislation 
relating to companies and insolvency.  These functions may be theoretically 
regulated through the criminalisation of dishonesty in these limited contexts.  Such 
provisions address manifest state-interest and are discussed in a wider historical 
context in chapter four of this thesis as a category of frauds that are more credibly 
associated with Crown prosecution and related activities upon discovery.  There 
appears to be a discrepancy between such particularised provisions, and the ‘one 
size fits all’ measure for white-collar crime (Sutherland, 1949), as an analogue of 
‘commercial’-type offences (Naylor, 2003).  Furthermore, the category of 
‘commercial’-type offences is not intrinsically associated in the literature to law-
enforcement and criminal justice system resolution (Naylor, 2003).  Instead, this 
category of offences is often subject to outcomes which may not include a 
resolution, or bilateral negotiations, or civil litigation (Rawlings & Lowry, 2017; 






2.6.1 On the Scope of (Effective) Criminalisation and Criminology in the 
Context of Fraud and White-Collar Crime 
 
The original definition of white-collar crime is that of a “crime committed by a 
person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation” 
(Sutherland, 1949, p.9).  This family of crimes to which some frauds belong (Levi, 
2008a; Levi & Burrows, 2008) are not defined by the action taken by the criminal, 
but rather by the circumstances in which he or she offends.  Criminality under 
such social and organisation circumstances offer more choice for victims in terms 
of official resolution mechanisms as well as presenting tangible disincentives for 
law-enforcement engagement.  Such considerations include: control over the 
investigation process, access to information and the ‘optics’ of the investigation, 
and its effects on the workforce.  Internal investigations offer an opportunity to 
address victimisation on a bilateral basis with the offender(s), which is typically 
done with the prospect of law-enforcement intervention as a lever to enhance the 
position of the victim.  Bilateral negotiations may also result with meaningful 
insight for future prevention, and a non-disclosure agreement to prevent third-
party knowledge of incidents, including creditors, investors, clients, and law-
enforcement.  (Green, 2004; Levi & Burrows, 2008; Hand & Blunt, 2009; Tunley, 
2014; Button, et al., 2015; Gee & Button, 2015) 
 
Not deferring to law-enforcement by default allows employers and companies in a 
commercial dispute (as well as customers), to only access the ‘amount’ of law and 
the type of settlement agent they require (Black, 1976; Black & Baumgartner, 
1983).  The mutual self-interest of offenders and victims may encourage them not 
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to interact with law-enforcement agencies.  The avoidance of officially recognising 
that a fraud has occurred may lead both parties to arrive at a mutually-agreeable 
solution or to part ways without further action being taken.  In other cases where 
directors and officers of a company are the perpetrators, the company and other 
involved parties may ‘hijack’ controls and skew internal or joint bilateral (or even 
multilateral) processes to conceal the scheme and protect participants.   When 
relationships are undermined by dishonest business behaviour, the parties are 
incentivised to address the matter on a mutual basis via arbitration or an 
adversarial process of zero-sum resolution mechanisms.  (Levi & Burrows, 2008; 
Smith, et al., 2011; Button, et al., 2015; Smith & Shepherd, 2017) 
 
The application of routine activity theory (RAT) (Cohen & Felson, 1979) in the 
context of fraud in the literature is demonstrated by the “fraud triangle” (Cressey, 
1973).  This term is a commonly used theoretical framework to study and evaluate 
the rejection of marketplace rules by offenders.  The fraud triangle includes three 
circumstantial variables that may increase the individual disposition to commit 
fraud: (i) a perceived financial need, (ii) a perceived opportunity, and (iii) 
rationalisation (Cressey, 1973).  This is not limited to white-collar crime or 
‘commercial’-type offences (Naylor, 2003), and may be applied in frauds that do 
not necessarily involve individuals who are placed in positions of explicit trust or 
business settings.  Nevertheless, the focus is this section is on the application of 
the general fraud offence in the Fraud Act 2006 to ‘commercial’-type offences and 




If considered in the context of the ‘fraud triangle’ (Cressey, 1973), the role of 
criminal law in the context of fraud is to provide a simple guide and warning of the 
criminal nature of a perceived ‘opportunity’.  Nevertheless, the capacity of a 
general offence to offer clarity, particularly with respect to offending settings where 
outcomes grounded in law-enforcement activities are rare, is called into question 
(Hester & Eglin, 1992; Levi & Burrows, 2008; Button, et al., 2015).  Whilst some 
frauds under the white-collar crime umbrella are particularised against (see 
above), others are not, yet dishonesty qualifies any misrepresentation, failure to 
disclose, or abuse of position as an offence.  Even an expressed knowledge of 
such stranded may still not be stuffiest in deterring one from perceiving an 
opportunity to engage in dishonesty outside the scope of particularised offences.  
For example, one might perceive opportunities not to disclose material facts about 
a condition of an asset to an insurer as different to mis-stating the value of the 
same asset a financial statement of a public company (Ulph, 2006; Law 
Commission, 2014; Rawlings & Lowry, 2017).  Seeing as the latter is a ‘serious’ 
(‘particularised’) offence, it may be better associated with law-enforcement 
activities, or the reasonable expectation of which (upon detection) (Hester & Eglin, 
1992; Tyler, 2006).  In the following subsection 2.6.2, the absence of a lower 
threshold to the general Fraud Act 2006 offence is discussed further in this 
context.   
 
The absence of a valid claim of clearly manifest criminality, as opposed to critique 
of conduct, is at the heart of the criticism against the construct of white-collar 
crime in the literature (Cressey, 1961).  Tappan (1947; 1960) argued against the 
Sutherland (1940;1949) definition of white-collar crime.  The former maintained 
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that the scope of criminology had been exceeded, and that the definition had 
passed into the realm of the law.  At the heart of Tappan’s (1947) distaste for the 
inclusion of behaviours that are ‘foreign’ to the criminal justice system is that it is 
the very interaction with the criminal justice system, and court conviction, that 
imposes the social label of a criminal (Chambliss & Seidman, 1971).  Tappan 
(1947) places emphasis upon the conferment of a criminal label as an entry 
barrier to the field of criminology, not typological agreement between other 
offences or social constructs.  The distinction between what is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, 
‘social’, or ‘anti-social’ can be measured using the application of common 
standards such as legislation, ethics or systems of value, but these are ‘regulated’ 
(or not) by social controls (Black, 1976; 1998).  The concept of criminality is 
detached from typological or abstract definitions and is exclusively within the 
purview of the criminal justice system to determine.  Conviction by a criminal court 
is the sole determining factor of criminality in this perspective, not the 
interpretation and theoretical applications of law by sociologists or criminologists 
(Tappan, 1947).  
 
The argument by Tappan (1947) in this context is an extension of this historical 
and jurisdictional logic within the United States of America.  Nevertheless, the 
critique of the dysfunction between condemnable conduct and criminality appears 
to be applicable to the discussion of the ‘duality’ of fraud (RQ1) in this chapter.  
The reader is encouraged to consider a theoretical common-law jurisdiction with 
an elaborate body of particularised fraud offences, but not a conduct-based 
general offence.  In such a jurisdiction, dishonest conduct may amount to an 
offence under the concept of fraud or it could be subject to other resolution 
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mechanisms such as a commercial dispute, a tort, or a civil wrong (Ulph, 2006; 
Smith & Shepherd, 2017).  Should that jurisdiction replace its corpus of 
particularised fraud provisions with the equivalent of the Fraud Act 2006, the 
following gross simplification would potentially apply:  some examples of 
dishonesty may be subject to prosecution by the state, whilst others will be subject 
to other resolution mechanisms.  Such a dysfunction between ‘law-in-theory’ and 
‘law-in-action’ (Black, 1972) will appear, in this context, to relate to Tappan’s 
(1947) argument and will require an external observer to depend on the criminal 
justice system as a qualifier of criminal dishonesty.  Over time, generalisations 
could be made about frauds that challenge the existing order to an extent which 
resulted with law-enforcement activities and criminal justice system resolution 
(Black, 1976; Black & Baumgartner, 1983).  From these generalisations could 
emerge a discussion of the ‘criminal properties’ of frauds, with the means of 
resolution (the criminal courts) underpinning the understanding of ‘criminal’ fraud.  
This discussion is developed specific to English law in chapter three 
(methodology) and in section 4.2.    
 
Tappan (1947) and Fisher (2015) do not address the ‘duality’ of fraud, rather they 
observe it in acknowledging that circumstantial variability may determine ‘criminal 
fraud’ from other resolution mechanisms.  Some behaviours are subject to social 
controls except for specific provisions in law under which it is specified to fall 
under the purview of the criminal justice system.  Conversely, other behaviours 
become a matter for law-enforcement and public prosecution (almost) with no 
exception, such as in cases of violent crime or ‘predatory’ profit-driven crime 
(Naylor, 2003).  Deviant behaviours are made synonymous with criminal 
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prosecution and the subject for near-intuitive criminal labelling as a result of the 
demonstrable enforcement of criminal law (Sellin, 1938; Tappan, 1947; Erikson, 
1962; Hester & Eglin, 1992; Tyler, 2006).  Nevertheless, the dishonest manner of 
conduct itself (as a means of defining and criminalising ‘all frauds’) appears to 
over-extend the reach of criminal law (as discussed above and see sub-section 
2.6.2 in this section).  The question is whether this form and extent of 
criminalisation is conducive in the context of fraud and dishonesty.  In this context, 
the general offence in the Fraud Act 2006 appears to offer some parallels to 
critique of the study of white-collar crime.  Tappan (1947) argues against the 
expansion of criminology to the study of those behaviours that occur in the 
workplace, yet are under-represented in criminal justice system statistics, as it 
rests on an unadjudicated premise of criminality:  
It has become a fashion to maintain that the convicted population is no 
proper category for empirical research for the criminologist. […] this 
position reflects in part at least the familiar suspicion and 
misunderstanding held by the layman sociologist toward the law. […] 
They unite only in their denial of the allegedly legalistic and arbitrary 
doctrine that those convicted under the criminal law are the criminals 
[…] and promote confusion as to the proper province of criminology.   
(Tappan, 1947, p. 96)  
 
The reader may find some components of enticing logic in this argument.   
Tappan (1947) directly rejects the notion of intrinsic criminality that is inherent to 
‘an offence’.  From an outcome perspective, the absence of a criminal conviction 
may appear as the opposite to fulfilment of the social role of those agencies and 
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institutions that are entrusted with the enforcement of the criminal law (Hester & 
Eglin, 1992).  This could be a result of a myriad of reasons, all of which result with 
no legal finding as to the application of the law to its transgression by the only 
agent of the state who is charged with this task (the criminal courts).  Tappan 
(1947) objects to the view that sets of offenders or offences can (generally) be 
defined independent of specific court rulings, and based on conduct, or a notion of 
something that ‘ought to be’ criminal as it undermines the public interest.  Whilst 
there is logic in questioning the intrinsic criminality of some alleged offences that 
are under-represented in the criminal justice system, the notion could be 
controversial and perhaps offensive.   
 
The adoption of the above analysis is therefore applied strictly in the context in 
which it was introduced (as a critique of the criminological definition of white-collar 
crime) (cf Sutherland, 1940; Tappan, 1947).  If applied to a wider context, this 
analysis may offer less value.  For example, domestic violence is an under-
represented criminal phenomenon, which the literature attributes to particular 
victim vulnerabilities and law-enforcement engagement difficulties (Felson & Paré, 
2005).  It should be valid and reasonable to study incidents that are not reported 
to law-enforcement but may be brought to attention via victim outreach, analysis 
of data from related support mechanisms or other evidence of its occurrence.  
Fostering specific understanding of the reasons why the criminal-justice system 
seems to underperform in terms of fulfilling legislative intent should be a valid field 
for enquiry notwithstanding the absence of a legal ‘seal of approval’.  This 
approach to criminology is not grounded in ‘wishful’ or ‘idyllic’ pursuit after 
“conduct norms” (Tappan, 1947, p.97), but rather in an understanding that the 
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existence of law does not (necessarily) imply seamless and uniform enforcement.  
Given that law-enforcement activities represent the primary entry point to the 
criminal justice system, this appears to require that the study of law extends to 
other evidence of prima facia offences that are not being investigated.   
          
The concept of white-collar crime was introduced as a theoretical framework to 
understand class-specific criminality, which was distinctively absent from law-
enforcement statistics and public debate.  In its current, somewhat more actus 
reus specific application, white-collar crime is defined by the US Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) as “[crimes] characterised by deceit, concealment, or 
violation of trust, and are not dependent on the application of threat of physical 
force or violence” (FBI, 2015).  This definition is consistent with the UK Fraud Act 
2006.  Nevertheless, the FBI (2015) focuses on offences that are subject to other 
legal definitions and does not assign criminality to deceit, concealment or violation 
of trust per se.    
 
The FBI (2015) definition of white-collar crime is contingent on the capability to 
identify an underlying offence and is defined by the subset of readily identifiable 
offences which feature deceit, concealment, or breach of trust with no physical 
force.  The Fraud Act 2006 defines criminality using conduct-based and non-
specific qualifiers.  This distinction is important in examining the parameters for 
criminological examination of that which is not labelled as ‘criminal’ by the criminal 
justice system but is criminal by virtue of satisfying ‘artificial’ or ‘arbitrary’ 
definitions.  Deviance, anti-social, and unethical behaviour are forms of conduct 
which undermine the public interest and may constitute ‘criminality’.  Criminology 
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theory has developed around concepts such as social deviance that may function 
independently of strict legal definitions of crime (example: Durkheim, 1893; 
Merton, 1934; 1964; Hester & Eglin, 1992), but this does not appear to be the 
case with white-collar crime (Sutherland, 1940; 1944; Cressey, 1961). 
 
The literature on the construct of white-collar crime is grounded in the 
identification of underlying criminality, which is in the practical reach only of those 
socio-economic groups in positions of trust (Sutherland, 1944).  As emphasised 
by Cressey (1961), in his dissent from Tappan (1947) narrowing the scope of 
criminology, the construct of white-collar crime is grounded in specific provisions 
in law rather than abstract ‘norms’ of conduct (cf Tappan, 1947; Cressey, 1961).    
Unlike the classic definition of white-collar crime (Sutherland, 1940;1944; 1949), 
the definition in the Fraud Act 2006 is subjectively construed and shaped by a 
value-system and manner of acceptable conduct (honesty).  Some forms of deceit 
(not underpinned by criminality) are widely considered acceptable.  These may 
even be considered desirable by wide segments of Western societies, which 
regulate forms of deceit using social controls and the advantages of having a 
decent reputation (Selling, 1938; King, 2000; Taylor, 2013).   
 
The above discussion is somewhat absent from contemporary (or indeed, recent) 
contributions to the literature.  The reader may wonder what contemporary value 
this (apparently) long-settled debate (Cressey, 1961) offers.  The author submits 
that the current dysfunction between ‘law-in-theory’ and ‘law-in-action’ (Black, 
1972) that underpins the discussion of the ‘duality’ of fraud (RQ1) appears to stem 
from the adoption of a conduct-based offence in the context of fraud.  Unlike the 
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definition of white-collar crime (Sutherland, 1940; Cressey, 1961), the general 
offence in the Fraud Act 2006 does not specify particular ways of offending, but 
rather pre-judges ‘all fraud’ or dishonesty to be criminal.  Subsequently, there 
emerges a dysfunction between fraud offences that are effectively dealt with by 
the criminal justice system, and those that are subject to other resolution 
mechanisms, which appears to defy the legislative intent (Law Commission, 
2002).  This dysfunction stems from the difference between the criminalisation of 
‘all theft’ and ‘all fraud’.  The former is achieved by a definition and criminalisation 
of an actus reus and the general acceptance of the guarantee of the right to 
property (Griew, 1995), whilst the latter is grounded in the criminalisation of a 
mens rea definition (Law Commission, 2002; Farrell, et al., 2007).  This theoretical 
expansion of criminalisation engulfs some frauds that are typically resolved using 
means other than the criminal justice system, and that may perhaps offer 
preferable outcomes for victims when construed as grounds for damages (Smith & 
Shepherd, 2017; Ulph, 2006). 
 
2.6.2 The Absence of a Lower Threshold for Fraud in the Fraud Act 2006 
 
In sub-section 2.6.1 above, the author revived the debate around the scope of 
criminological discussion based on a premise of criminality associated with 
dishonest conduct.  The discussion demonstrated the applicability to Tappan’s 
(1947) critique of conduct-based scoping of under-reported crime to the scope 
and means of the criminalisation of ‘all fraud’ under the Fraud Act 2006.  In this 
sub-section 2.6.2, Tappan’s (1947) critique is further discussed and applied to the 
general fraud offence in the Act, but in the context of the absence of a lower 
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threshold in the conduct-based offence of fraud.  The discussion in the following 
paragraphs challenges the claim of simplicity, particularly in the context of the 
discipline of law-enforcement, which is the dominant gateway to the criminal 
courts in the UK. 
 
The dysfunction between ‘law-in-theory’ and ‘law-in-action’ in the context of the 
general fraud offence appears, as previously discussed in this chapter, through a 
prism of misalignment with social science theory.  In this section, the discussion 
turns to the de facto expansion of fraud criminalisation (‘all fraud’) and asks 
whether the absence of a lower threshold, as in the Theft Act 1968, contributes to 
the alleged clarity of the fraud offence.  Unlike the concept of theft, the literature 
accessed by the author and discussed in this chapter points away from the 
general conduct offence in the Fraud Act 2006 being synonymous with law-
enforcement actions.  The only post-legislative evaluation the author was able to 
access demonstrates that despite the expansion of fraud criminalisation, no 
evidence of law-enforcement expansion was mentioned (Ministry of Justice, 
2012).  According to this evaluation, the advantages of the new Act appear to 
relate to the application of the general fraud offence in pre-existing enforcement 
contexts (Ministry of Justice, 2012).   
 
The literature points to insular attempts to apply the offence in the Fraud Act 
2006, outside what would previously been considered the remit of law-
enforcement and criminal law, appears to have resulted with further confusion.  
For example, the offence of fraud (a monolithic provision carrying a sentence of 
up to ten years imprisonment) was applied in relation to representations made by 
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parents on a school form (Monaghan, 2010).  Whilst the mother in this example 
might have known that her actions were morally questionable (Tappan, 1947), it is 
doubtful that the objective behind the statute under which she was prosecuted 
(before the charges were dropped) was achieved, namely:   
If a citizen is contemplating activities which could amount to a crime, a 
clear, simple law gives better guidance on whether the conduct is 
criminal, and fairer warning of what could happen if it is.  (Law 
Commission, 2002, p.3) 
 
The difficulty with the above example appears to relate to the absence of a lower 
threshold to the general offence of fraud.  Whilst the definition of theft is itself 
functional for effective and readily understood criminalisation (Griew, 1995; Law 
Commission, 2002), it varies from the definition of fraud into criminal law in (inter 
alia) two different ways.  First, different to fraud, it does appear to have a lower 
threshold; the Theft Act 1968 identifies losses and gains as a result of actions (not 
conduct) as part of the offence.  Second, it relates to the social function of the 
protection of the right to property, and not the guarantee of honesty (see 
discussion in chapter four of this thesis).  Finally, the criminalisation of ‘all theft’ 
did not appear to expand the scope of theft criminalisation, but merely followed a 
path of modernisation and clarification in order to maintain it as synonymous with 
law-enforcement activities (The Criminal Law Revision Committee, 1966).  The 
literature points to an inherent difficulty with the expanded spectrum of fraud 
criminalisation:  The Fraud Act 2006 scope of (theoretical) offences spans across 
questionable morality (Ormerod, 2007), otherwise civil or employment matters 
(Allgrove & Sallars, 2009), or entirely banal minutiae (Monaghan, 2010).  These 
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did not form a part of the statutory scope of fraud criminalisation prior to the 
enactment of the Fraud Act 2006.   
 
In the absence of a lower threshold or degrees or relationship to harm, the 
standard of criminalising dishonesty without meaningful qualification does not 
foster intrinsic understanding of conduct that is excluded from the ‘sovereign 
guarantee’ of trust.  The criminalisation of dishonesty, and the dysfunction in the 
consistent application of law, may exhibit some unfortunate similarities to the pre-
industrial offender-victim relationship dynamics.  Both historically and in the 
modern era, engagement with the criminal justice system is: victim-driven and 
costly, the state offers little in terms of investigatory resources, and if the victim 
can identify the offender, both parties are incentivised to settle as the court 
process is skewed against the offender.  Some offences of state-interest remained 
(or recently were) particularised, and these offences are prosecuted and 
investigated.  The state seems indifferent to evidence of dishonesty offences, as 
represented in civil or insolvency litigation, as these processes allow victims to 
seek financial remedies using the civil courts.  This dynamic has also been 
observed with respect to insurance contract law: 
It is impossible for the law to set out clear sanction to deter policyholders 
from acting fraudulently.   Although insurance fraud is a criminal offence, 
prosecutions are relatively rare, meaning that the civil law has an 
important part to play in deterring fraud.   (Law Commission, 2014 cited 




The above discussion demonstrates the difficulty was a conduct-based mode of 
criminalisation, particularly as a means of expanding the remit of criminal law.  
The absence of a lower threshold demonstrates the dysfunction between the 
definition of fraud by the Law Commission (2002), and its effectiveness in clearly 
communicating the extent to which fraud is criminalised (RQ2).  This discussion 
should be considered in conjunction to the critique in section three above 
regarding the ‘erosion’ of the applied understanding of fraud as a criminal 
concept.  Whilst difficulties with the lower end of theoretical application of general 
fraud offence in the Fraud Act 2006 is of little concern, some of its characteristics 
appear to inhibit the application of the offence in ‘commercial’-type circumstances.  
This is the topic of the following sub-section 2.6.3. 
 
2.6.3 White-Collar Crime 
 
In sub-section 2.6.2 above, the absence of a lower threshold to the Fraud Act 
2006 general offence was discussed in the context of the critique voiced by 
Tappan (1947) on conduct-based framing of a crime.  The discussion related to 
the limitations discussed above with respect to lower-end theoretical applications 
of the 2006 Act and the absence of clarity and uniform unpacking of the gestalt of 
fraud in a criminal context.  In this sub-section 2.6.3, the discussion above which 
may not necessarily be of great concern, is applied in the context of ‘commercial’-
type fraud and the concept of white-collar crime (Sutherland, 1949; Naylor, 2003).  
Workplace-based fraud offences offer at times complicated typologies and use of 
(allegedly) complicated financial vehicles (Naylor, 2003).  As discussed in section 
two of this literature review chapter, the Fraud Act 2006 was intended to create 
clarity with respect to fraud offending in such settings.  In section 2.4, the 
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limitations to the effective criminalisation of fraud in the context of ‘predatory’-type 
offence were attributed (in part) to the focus of the Law Commission (2002) in 
addressing limitations to the prosecution of ‘commercial’-type frauds (Naylor, 
2003).  The question is therefore what benefits does the Fraud Act 2006 offer to 
the clarification of the legislative intent of absolutist criminalisation and (alleged) 
clarity in the context of white-collar crime? 
 
Societies harbour an embedded tension between how they codify and reward 
‘success’ and the legitimate means for its achievement.  Whilst most share ‘goals’ 
(social currencies) and the ‘means’ (the confines of the law), ‘delinquents’ are 
those who reject conventional ‘means’ and ‘innovate’ by finding other ways to 
satisfy common incentives (Merton, 1945; 1957; 1964).  Merton codifies social 
adaptation by the acceptance of goals (or social currencies) and the acceptance 
of norms for achieving such goals.  Notwithstanding a criminal definition, the 
rejection of norms is ‘encouraged’ by inadequate social controls to enforce norms 
and acceptable marketplace practices and regulations (Merton, 1938, p.676).  In 
the context of white-collar crime, the literature on acquisitive crime generally 
converges on the notion of restitution as a main (if not primary) imperative for 
victims, even under the well-established norms of public prosecution (Bentham, 
1789; 1843; Greenberg, 1990; Green, 2004; Levi & Burrows, 2008; Button, et al., 
2015).   
 
This imperative appears to have particular relevance in the context of two main 
observations on the official responses to fraud victimisation in professional or 
‘normal business settings’ (Naylor, 2003).  These observations appear to provide 
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insight into (some) of the underlying inhibitors for the referring of fraud in such 
environments to the criminal justice system, and the resulting under-
representation of these frauds in crime statistics (Sutherland, 1940; Levi & 
Burrows, 2008; Tunley, 2014; Button, et al., 2015):  First, the availability of other 
means of resolution that are more likely to result with a financial or procedural 
remedy (Smith & Shepherd, 2017).  Second, the preference of taking no official 
action so as to ‘not send good money after bad’; such an approach can result with 
no action against the perpetrator, or some bilateral agreement.  The second 
category of outcomes can also be discussed in terms of cost effectiveness, either 
in real terms, or in conjunction with reputational considerations as well (Levi & 
Burrows, 2008; Smith & Shepherd, 2017).  Such latitude in terms of outcomes and 
ability to apply cost effectiveness considerations in the pursuit of compensatory 
outcomes does not appear to be available for other forms of acquisitive crimes in 
English law, and particularly in the context of theft. 
 
The criminalisation of fraud through a dishonesty-based conduct offence does not 
appear to have been accompanied by a parallel ‘mainstreaming’ and 
‘streamlining’ of law-enforcement structures and policies, particularly as applied to 
commercial and professional settings.  This is not to diminish enforcement 
activities in this field, but when compared to the criminalisation of ‘all theft’ by the 
Theft Act 1968, the concept of fraud is not policed in a manner that effectively 
regulates honesty in all settings.  On the alleged ‘upper-scale’ of complexity and 
sum amounts, the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) would appear to be investigating 
only a handful of cases at any given time, and its case selection processes have 
not been made clear (SFO, 2017).  
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In the context of the challenges of ‘mainstreaming’ and ‘streamlining’ the 
investigation of Fraud Act 2006 offences (RQ2), the literature on the victimology of 
fraud needs to be considered in the context of the above paragraph.  These 
unique characteristics result in serious limitations that undermine the construction 
of valid and reliable estimation of the cost of fraud to the British economy (Levi, 
1987; Levi & Burrows, 2008; Button, Lewis, & Tapley, 2009; Tunley, 2014).  
Despite unclear estimation, the literature appears to be consistent in its analysis of 
the problem of fraud (under the current definition in law) to be extremely wide, 
particularly in the private sector (National Fraud Authority, 2010; 2011; 2012; 
2013; Button & Gee, 2015; Button et al., 2016).   
 
Estimation of the extent of fraud victimisation in the UK surveyed by the author did 
not include specific estimations on the extent through which victimisation to public 
and private bodies is caused through ‘predatory’- and ‘commercial’-type offending 
(Naylor, 2003).  Both sectors are exposed to fraud from both internal and external 
parties, and of varying complexity (Levi, 2008a; ACFE, 2016).  Whilst businesses 
and public bodies are exposed to ‘predatory’-type offences, the focus of this 
discussion is on ‘commercial’-type offending (Levi, 2008a; Naylor, 2003), 
particularly as it overlaps with the concept of white-collar crime (Sutherland, 1940; 
1944; Naylor, 2003; Smith et al., 2011).  These refer specifically to fraud offences 
commissioned by employees or company officers.  These offences may be 
targeted against the firm (and its stakeholders) or perpetrated to the disadvantage 





The simplistic view of the ‘duality’ of fraud is that fraud is ‘criminal’ if resolved (or 
thought of as typically being resolved) by the criminal justice system, or ‘civil’ fraud 
accounts for those frauds typically associated with the civil courts and other 
resolution mechanisms (Fisher, 2015).  This outcomes-based approach to the 
identification of ‘criminal’ fraud points away fostering an understanding of the 
essential characteristics of ‘criminal’ fraud (or ‘civil’ fraud).  See chapter Three for 
a more detailed epistemological discussion with respect to outcomes-based fraud 
categorisation in the context of the ‘duality’ of fraud (RQ1).   
 
The concept of fraud under the Fraud Act 2006 appears to leave stakeholders 
with less confidence and reduced conceptual clarity (RQ2), especially if they are 
aware of other specific particularised offences that relate to their occupation.  The 
questions raised by Tappan (1947) offer a valuable test for distinguishing between 
criminal conduct, behaviours that are against the public interest, and legitimate 
conduct.  A specific question emerges from the above discussion: what is the 
extent of social interest in dishonesty so as “to bear the odium of crime” (Tappan, 
1947, p.98)?  Whether dishonest misrepresentation, failure to disclose or abuse of 
position ‘amount’ to an offence is an important and unresolved issue, and in 
practical terms that are mutually exclusive to other behaviours?  How can one 
judge dishonesty as the qualifier of whether a violation has occurred or not?  The 
‘duality’ of fraud (RQ1) is a property that points to tensions between the criminal 
justice system, the perceived benefits of other resolution mechanisms, or the lack 
of efforts to officially address harm and victimisation.  If viewed more narrowly, 
particularised offences such as insolvency or value added tax (VAT) frauds are 
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different to the general dishonesty offence in the Fraud Act 2006 with respect to 
levels of conceptual and practical clarity (Cressey, 1961).  
 
It would appear that the definitive challenge for the definition of fraud in the 
context of white-collar crime and ‘commercial-type offences (Sutherland, 1940; 
Naylor, 2003) is not an ontological one, but a practical one.  In other words, the 
clarity with regards to the legal definition in the Fraud Act 2006 does not seem to 
translate to a clear association of dishonest conduct with law-enforcement actions 
outside the scope of particularised offences.  This context demonstrates the 
limitations of the approach to fraud criminalisation employed by the Law 
Commission (2002) in order to create an offence that applies to ‘all frauds’.   
 
In a corporate environment there appears to be a distinct dysfunction between the 
anti-fraud regime that in imposed by particularised fraud criminalisation and 
regulations, and the abstract conduct-based offence as it exists in the Fraud Act 
2006.  For example, in relation to the concept of false accounting (Section 17 of 
the Theft Act 1968 (as amended).  The Companies Act 2006 details duties for the 
production and submission of financial reports in parts 15 and 16 of the Act.  It 
does not set specific standards for accounting or reporting practices, rather it 
defers to standards set by associations of the accounting profession to self-
regulate the fashion in which their members operate.  The Companies Act 2006 
contains criminal offences that are clearly and narrowly defined.  These offences 
do not state that a company or its directors should not engage in fraud.  Instead, 
such offences ensure procedural compliance with ongoing company and company 
director registration requirements as well as compliance with audit and reporting 
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duties.  That is, with the exception of the offence of trading whilst insolvent, 
otherwise known as fraudulent trading under section 993, which is a preserved 
measure in the 1985 Companies Act and section 213 of the Insolvency Act 1986.  
In England and Wales, the specific accounting, financial reporting, and audit 
standards are determined by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC).  The Council 
establishes best practice audit standards known as the Generally Accepted 
Accounting Practices (the UK GAAP), and functions an independent regulator of 
company law (ICAEW, 2016). 
 
A form of market-based private sector self-regulation, company law and the UK 
GAAP act as an assurance for investors and stakeholders against fraud and 
malpractice by codifying a standard for financial reporting and an audit regime.  
An (allegedly) independent review of public company financial statements and 
underlying methodology (external audit) is the mechanisms that ensures that the 
shareholders are provided a sufficiently accurate financial representation.  Despite 
common misconceptions (see Levi, 1987; 1992), the standard of audit applied is 
not absolute, but rather focused on discrepancies and errors that are significant to 
the representation of company finances (Financial Reporting Council, 2004; 
Financial Reporting Council, 2014).  The audit regime is not impenetrable, nor 
does it seek to detect such frauds that do not inflict a material impact on the 
finances of a firm, but it is instead concerned with the overall integrity and 
methodology of financial reporting (Rezaee & Riley, 2009). 
 
Despite this assurance and standardisation of accounting method and 
presentation of the financial statements of a firm, non-GAAP accounting appears 
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to be endorsed by the marketplace as a basis for financial reporting and 
investments.  Of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) top 100 companies in market 
capitalisation terms on the Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE), 95% of 
companies depart from the GAAP in accounting for profits in their financial reports 
(PWC, 2016).  This is not to imply that criminality is associated with non-GAAP 
compliance, particularly when compliance is not alleged in the first place, and the 
departure for convention is rationalised and explained.  Instead, the context is 
provided as an observation of the ‘ease’ with which investors agree to accept an 
additional (potential) fraud risk by investing in firms that do not follow a common 
methodology in representing their revenues, costs, profits or the value of their 
assets.   
  
Levi (1987) analyses the propensity towards ‘self-regulation’ in the context of 
practicality and political reality.  Actively ‘policing’ markets and imposing sufficient 
intervention to guarantee trust may be politically unpalatable.  In a capitalist 
economy, it is seldom astute to be perceived as causing disruption to market trade 
and investment.  Embedded in this approach is the capitalist romanticism of ‘the 
firm’ and free economic trade systems, and the ‘natural’ capability to optimise 
returns on investment (Smith, 1776).  Any government intervention is inevitably 
viewed to interfere with ‘natural’ market dynamics, and to generate sub-optimal 
micro- and macro-economic performance (Smith, 1776; Demsetz, 1988).    
 
Without going into a detailed critique on the validity and degrees of confidence 
that are available to support the above ethos of ‘the firm’, the notion appears 
persistent and resilient even when confronted by ample evidence of abuse 
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(Sutherland, 1940; Cressey, 1973; Demsetz, 1988; Levi 2008b; Platt, 2015; 
ACFE, 2016).  Individual short-term decisions such as the bundling of re-financed 
housing debts into commodities seemed to do little to change the context of 
political debate on self-regulation (The New York Times, 2008; The Economist, 
2014).  The discussion on regulation and fraud is still rooted in this ‘breed’ of 
economic idealism rather than criminology or sociology research.  Levi (1987) 
expands on the tenuous relationship between the political class and the business 
elite in their perceived roles as the employer of the masses and tax revenue 
generator, respectively.  Deviation from the puritan and profitable behaviour of the 
capitalist firm are set aside as a rarity or the infiltration of dishonest ‘bad apples’ 
into the financial system (Levi, 1987). 
 
For example, newspapers and other advertising outlets enforced through self-
regulation anti-false advertising rules since at least the middle of the nineteenth 
century, and long before similar standards were put into law in the UK and the US 
(Jordan & Rubin, 1979; Miracle & Nevett, 1988; Burns, 1999;).  In is another 
example of regulation by reputation, publishers sought to retain the long-term 
viability of the print advertisement business model by avoiding inherit consumer 
distrust as a result of a short-term exploitation by dubious businesses.  Dishonest 
misrepresentation, failure to disclose or abuse of position appears not to be 
‘automatically’ associated with the concept of ‘criminality’, but rather as 
dishonesty-related risk that can be mitigated by deference to reputation.    
 
The question is therefore the extent to which conduct that may appear to be 
legitimate in a business context can itself qualify as white-collar criminality?  In 
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other words, to what extent does the co-existence of a body of narrowly defined 
offences and a monolithic conduct-based offence serve the interest of clarity in 
the context of ‘commercial’-type fraud criminalisation (Law Commission, 2002; 
Naylor, 2003)?  Particularised anti-fraud provisions in UK company and insolvency 
laws, in conjunction with employment law, health and safety, information 
protection and other industry specific offences, form a body of narrowly defined 
offences.  Such offences are readily understood offences that are both specific to 
professional settings and offer considerable clarity for stakeholders.  
Nevertheless, as discussed in section 2.5 above, these offences are only mutually 
exclusive in actus reus terms to otherwise legitimate conduct.  Dishonesty that 
may be implicit is such provisions, is the qualifier for criminality for the general 
fraud offence in the context of any misrepresentation, failure to disclose, or abuse 
of position.  The author submits in this context that the clarity offered by 
particularised provisions in the context of an anti-fraud and industry standards 
regimes provides a much “better guidance on whether the conduct is criminal, and 
[a] fairer warning of what could happen” (Law Commission, 2002, p.3).   
 
The aforementioned standard for clarity, which was provided as a justification of 
the legislation of the Fraud Act 2006, is arguably further diminished by the 
coexistence of particularised offences alongside a general, monolithic offence, 
and the absence of entry barriers.  Dishonesty itself does not appear to be 
objective, descriptive or grounded in specific and narrow definitions in law 
(Cressey, 1961).  The lack of an objective test implies the use of subjective 
assumptions in discussing the ‘duality’ of fraud, as discussed in section 2.2 of this 
chapter.  The relative positioning against ‘proper’ particularised offences, as well 
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as the de facto expansion of criminality to contexts that were not previously 
considered to be part of the remit of criminal justice system outcomes appear to 
lead toward less clarity.  Other than the distinction between particularised offences 
and other behaviours, there does not appear to be any clear guide to determine 
what examples of dishonest conduct are effectively associated with potential law-
enforcement responses.  In light of such clarity, the context provided in this 
chapter concerning the lack of an objective test and a lower threshold to the 
monolithic conduct-based offence, there is doubt that the Fraud Act 2006 meets 
its stated objective of clarity and fairness (Law Commission, 2003).  The above 
context is appositely problematised in the quote below: 
We take it that anti-social conduct is essentially any sort of behaviour 
which violates some social interest.  What are these social interests?   
Which are weighty enough to merit the concern of the sociologist, to 
bear the odium of crime?  What shall constitute a violation of them?   
(Tappan, 1947, p.98) 
The critique of the Fraud Act 2006 in this chapter appears to lend contemporary 
relevance to Tappan’s (1947) initial dissent from the definition and scoping of the 
concept of white-collar crime (Sutherland, 1940).  Prosecutorial challenges in the 
context of ‘commercial’-type frauds (Naylor, 2003) were integral to the frame of 
reference of the Law Commission on Fraud (2002), as discussed in section 2.2 of 
this chapter.  It is therefore apposite to contextualise the structure of the offence 
and the means through which a (theoretical) criminalisation of ‘all frauds’ is 
achieved by the Fraud Act 2006 in the context of the literature on white-collar 
crime.  The emerging observation from the literature and the historical white-collar 
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crime debate (Cressey, 1961) offers considerable insight into the underlying 
dysfunction between ‘law-in-theory’ and ‘law-in-action’ (Black, 1972).   
 
 
In sub-section 2.4.1 above, the variability of outcomes in relation to ‘predatory’-
type frauds were discussed in terms of a theoretical ‘misalignment’ between 
criminology theory and the practical application of the Fraud Act 2006 (Naylor, 
2003).  Different to ‘predatory’-type offences, ‘commercial’-type frauds are pre-
disposed to exhibit variable association with law-enforcement outcomes (Naylor, 
2003; Sutherland, 1940; 1949).  The theoretical misalignment discussed in section 
three does not apply as a valid theoretical critique in this context.  Nonetheless, 
the legislative intent in the context of ‘commercial’-type frauds is explicitly 
identified as the driver behind the recommendations of the Law Commission 
(2002).  This focus has also been contextualised above in terms of a ‘trade off’ 
with respect to the emergence of perceived inhibitors to law-enforcement in the 
context of ‘predatory’-type fraud that resemble those attributed to ‘commercial’-
type frauds (Button et al., 2009; 2013, Naylor, 2003).  Therefore, the question is 
what benefits in terms of clarity and likelihood of the realisation of the legislative 
intent in the 2006 Act has been achieved in the context of ‘commercial’-type 
offences (Law Commission, 2002; Naylor, 2003)? 
 
In the context of a conduct-based criminalisation, it would appear that a two-tier 
system of offences is effectively in force.  The first tier represents particularised 
and narrow offences which are circumstantially applicable to white-collar 
professionals.  Some of these offences are subject to some degree of market-self 
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regulation through financial reporting standards and audit regimes in the context 
of company and insolvency laws.  Other offences may be subject to enforcement 
by non-police bodies such as industry specific regulators, or other regulators such 
as the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), environment regulations or health 
and safety (inter alia).  Outcomes that relate to known examples of transgressions 
are consistent with both the typological and sociological theoretical suggestions of 
an association with resolution mechanisms requiring ‘less’ (Naylor, 2003; Black, 
1976).  The second tier relates to a general criminalisation of dishonesty, which in 
itself could encompass most (if not all) of the first tier of offences using sections 
one through four of the Fraud Act 2006.  These offences are not circumstantially 
exclusive to professionals or to legitimate business environments, but instead are 
absolute by design (Law Commission, 2002).  Unlike Sutherland’s definition and 
scoping of white-collar crime (Cressey, 1961), the Fraud Act 2006 creates a 
criminal definition based on conduct without underpinning it using narrow criminal 
definitions of transgressions against the public interest.  Similar to the theoretical 
misalignment discussed in section three, it is questionable to what degree clarity 
of association between behaviour (dishonesty) is achieved outside the scope of 
particularised offences (Tappan, 1947).  The author would be remiss not to 
include a fundamental quote from the field of military strategy by Frederick the 
Great (1712-1786): 
Little minds try to defend everything at once, but sensible people look at 
the main point only; they parry the worst blows and stand a little hurt if 
thereby they avoid a greater one.  If you try to hold everything, you hold 






In this section, the author critically analysed the limitation to the study of fraud that 
extends beyond the concept of white-collar crime or linked to its unique 
criminology or victimology.  In the contemporary context, the ‘duality’ of fraud 
(RQ1) seems to relate principally to the dysfunction between ‘law-in-theory’ and 
‘law-in-action’ (Black, 1972) in relation to the Fraud Act 2006.  The scope of this 
conduct offence, combined with the pre-existing challenges of ‘policing’ white-
collar crime (Sutherland, 1940; 1944; 1949), and the unique criminology and 
victimology of fraud (Titus & Gover, 2001; Ganzini, et al., 2001; Levi, 2001; 
Button, et al., 2009; Perri & Brody, 2012;) were not addressed by the Law 
Commission (2002).  Indeed, the literature accessed by the author does not 
appear to present evidence to support a notion of increased association between 
law-enforcement actions and ‘commercial’-type frauds (Levi & Burrows, 2008; 
Levi, 2012; Button, 2013; Ministry of Justice, 2014; Smith & Shepherd, 2017). 
 
In the context of the ‘duality’ of fraud under the ‘blanket’ criminalisation of 
dishonesty in the Fraud Act 2006, the primary ‘gateway’ to the criminal justice 
system is via the institution of public prosecution (RQ1).  The author identified the 
existence of particularised offences, which denote criminal conduct in a way that 
makes clear the extent to which it can be applied.  However, the Fraud Act 2006 
offers no such practical distinction, as it imposes no limitation or entry barriers to 
the criminalisation of dishonesty in the context of a misrepresentation, failure to 
disclose, or abuse of position.  This creates a difficulty to meaningfully argue a 
material deficiency in law-enforcement with respect to frauds that do not result in a 
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criminal prosecution (cf Tappan, 1947; Cressey, 1961;).  On the other hand, some 
frauds are sufficiently particularised to be understood and applied to Fraud Act 
2006 offences where dishonesty is not directed towards a victim that enjoys a 
‘sovereign guarantee’.  For example, a company that makes proper 
representations with respect to its VAT obligations, and does not trade whilst 
insolvent, may still act dishonestly in its interactions with clients and investors.   
Complying with the tax code is a narrow and mutually exclusive test for legal 
conduct; dishonesty towards others is (potentially) mutually exclusive to narrowly 
defined applications of a ‘sovereign guarantee’ of trust that can still generate an 
offence under the Fraud Act 2006. 
 
The reader should question whether simplicity is grounded in the ease of offence 
selection (see Law Commission, 2002, p.3) as compared with a body of offences 
that may apply (narrowly) to clear and defined typologies or circumstances 
(Cressey, 1961).   Such a diversity and specificity in legislation may better 
confront the citizen with a specific and proportionate “odium of crime” (Tappan, 
1947, p.98), and associate these offences specifically with a demonstrable 
prospect of criminal conviction.  The existing general (omnibus) offence 
encompasses the legal concept of fraud, but the (alleged) simplicity has resulted 
in complicated and inaccessible law.  The Fraud Act 2006 has not fostered the 
‘streamlining’ and ‘mainstreaming’ of fraud enforcement (RQ2), and the intended 
scope of application appears to remain stymied. 
 
The discussion above illustrates a general lack of deference to the discipline of 
law-enforcement as well as the lack of consideration for the unique criminology 
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and victimology of fraud.  It embeds a seemingly impossible property for the post-
2006 omnibus offence, which makes the nebulous construct of dishonesty the 
only applicable means of articulating fraud as an offence.  The new offence 
(allegedly) serves as the primary (simplifying) concept in law to deter and 
prosecute all frauds, regardless of means or circumstances.  In the following 
section six, the alleged simplicity of use with respect to the Fraud Act 2006 is 
examined. 
 
2.7 The Fraud Act 2006 in Practice 
 
This section will apply the above discussion on the ‘role’ of the general dishonesty 
conduct offence to the challenge of ‘policing’ the concept of fraud and the current 
state of its ‘duality’ in English law and practice.  Whilst previous sections focused 
on the interface between law-enforcement agencies and victims in the context of 
the general dishonesty offence in the Fraud Act 2006, this section focuses on the 
prosecution of fraud.  The Tappan (1947) framing of criminality in relation to RQ1 
will be applied to discussion of the Fraud Act 2006.  As no other qualifiers or 
conditions are attached to the conduct offence of fraud (by dishonest 
misrepresentation, failure to disclose and abuse of position) the extent to which 
trust is guaranteed in commercial and legal conduct is (theoretically) absolute and 
uniform.    
 
Whilst the Fraud Act 2006 appears to provide a more orderly approach to the 
criminalisation of fraud, the non-transactional nature of the Act is less compatible 
with simple ‘predatory’ offences (Naylor, 2003).  On the other hand, its use of 
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dishonesty as a criminal qualifier creates its own investigatory and legal difficulties 
when tested in some ‘commercial’-type frauds (Naylor, 2003).   The route taken by 
the Law Commission (2002) pointed away from particularising specifically how 
financial vehicles are forbidden from being manipulated, or particularising fraud in 
relation to financial sector services.  The idea was that a conduct offence would 
‘capture all frauds’ to such an extent that the fall-back common-law offence of 
conspiracy to defraud could (finally) be abolished (Law Commission, 1974; 1999; 
2002). 
 
Nevertheless, the conspiracy to defraud offence is still available and used 
subsequent to 2007.  It continues to be put to use by the CPS and SFO to 
prosecute fraud cases, most notably a Ponzi scheme valued at £45 million, and a 
solar power marketing scheme (SFO, 2016; SFO, 2017).  More prominent 
examples in the media include the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) index 
of average interest relates by City of London banks, which is commonly used in 
international foreign exchange trade by global trade companies and financial 
institutions.  In R v Hayes (2015), a group of traders were charged with 
manipulating the Yen (Japanese currency) LIBOR and convicted of conspiracy to 
defraud.  The focus of the case for the prosecution was not an examination of 
single actions taken by the accused, nor proving fraud by establishing dishonest 
misrepresentation, failure to disclose or abuse of position.  Whilst this was 
theoretically achievable, conspiracy to defraud allowed prosecutors and jurors to 
default to the gestalt meaning of fraud and establish whether two or more persons 
were conspiring to defraud in the manner above.  In the case of the LIBOR rigging 
affair, the accused could have argued that they were acting in the best interest of 
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their employer, and that they were not individually benefiting, or standing to 
benefit, from any particular representation.  Conspiracy to defraud allowed a 
‘looser’ examination of specific actions, whilst focusing on the agreement between 
the accused to conspire in the overall scheme and towards its potential outcomes. 
 
The CPS-issued guidelines direct prosecutors to favour the use of statutory Fraud 
Act 2006 offences over the common-law offence of conspiracy to defraud.  The 
House of Lords in Scott Appellant v Metropolitan Police Commissioner 
Respondent [1975] found that “the object of a conspiracy must not be confused 
with the means by which it is intended to be carried out.”  The court ruled that 
despite the existence of a statutory offence (the Theft Act 1968 at the time), 
conspiracy to defraud forms a part of the general criminal law relating to “fraud in 
its widest sense” (gestalt), irrespective of statute.  To defraud is held as: 
to […] dishonestly […] cause unjustifiable prejudice to that other. The 
meaning is synonymous with the corresponding adverb "fraudulently" 
and is much older than the common law itself (Scott Appellant v 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1975]). 
 
From an investigative standpoint, such offences require an ‘all-knowing’ 
prosecutor, who is in possession of all the material facts to develop the narrative 
for the offence, and unique insight into the state of mind of the offender.  The 
evidence in R v. Hayes (2015) came from a number of banks and their computer 
systems, and the investigation was triggered following the payment of fines 
regulators in the US and UK by implicated banks.  Initial attention was brought to 
the practice of LIBOR-rigging by the Wall Street Journal in April of 2008 
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(Mollenkamp, 2008).  In June 2012, the New York Times had published a 
chronology of the digital evidence to a conspiracy to manipulate the exchange 
rate by the perpetrators (The New York Times, 2012).  In September of 2012, 
incriminating text messages between named traders were made public, and 
showed the wilfulness, and depth of knowledge of the fraudulent trade and 
cavalier attitudes towards it by the participants (The Guardian, 2012).  This was in 
conjunction with regulators and law-enforcement agencies in the US, UK, and 
Singapore issuing summonses for information from banks that were suspected to 
be involved (The Guardian, 2012).  It was in this context, and level of knowledge 
and depth of evidence that existed between regulators and law-enforcement 
agencies, that the SFO initiated its own investigation into the matter (Binham & 
Parker, 2012). 
 
The primary source of evidence in the R v. Hayes (2015) investigation appeared 
to come from digital evidence controlled by, and provided by, cooperating financial 
institutions.  This is different to the ‘classic whodunit’ (who-has-done-it) 
investigation and discovery model (Innes, 2012).  In this type of investigative 
scenario, an investigation is instigated in response to a report of a crime being 
commissioned in the past, and the identity of the offender is deduced from 
gathering and analysing evidence generated by the offence.  The hypotheses 
developed by the investigators are subject to test in the trial-phase: jurors are 
asked to determine whether the evidence generated by the offence indicating the 
identity of the offender to be the accused (beyond reasonable doubt)?  The 
questions are not whether (for example) a house was burgled or not, but rather by 




Conversely, investigations into frauds carried out by employees in the course of 
their employment generate evidence that is mostly in the possession of the victim 
organisation (through computers, phones, and other records) (Comer, 2003; 
Wells, 2011; Bragg, 2016).  By extension, a criminal investigation into the actions 
of an employee or a company officer could be thought of as an akin to a ‘self-
solving’ investigation, whereby circumstances make the identity of the offender 
readily established (Innes, 2012).  Knowledge of the identity of the offender often 
rests with victims of both ‘predatory’ and ‘commercial’ offences (Naylor, 2003), 
particularly when the fraud is conducted through representations made in person 
(Button, et al., 2009; 2013).  In cases when there was no ‘real world’ 
communication between the offender and victim it can be said that a fraud (or so 
called ‘cybercrime’ or ‘cyberfraud’) investigation takes the shape of a ‘whodunit’ 
(Levi, et al., 2015). 
 
Fraud investigations and prosecutions, particularly of the ‘commercial’-type 
(Naylor, 2003) are considered ‘difficult’ (Fraud Trials Committee, 1986).  Whilst 
some rely on narrow definition and scoping of an offence (false accounting, for 
example), others are conducted using either the Fraud Act 2006 or the common-
law conspiracy to defraud provision (CPS, 2012).  In order to establish the 
necessary evidential basis required to substantiate fraud based on a qualifier of 
dishonesty, there is a need to develop a state of knowledge that may be equated 
to the theological concept of an ‘all-knowing god’ (Kvanvig, 1986).  Under the 
Code for Crown Prosecutors (CPS, 2013, p. 6), a pre-indictment determination is 
conducted as to the sufficiency of the evidence to provide a realistic prospect of 
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conviction in reference to itself and possible defences.  Whilst particularised 
offences seem to be grounded in objective tests of material evidence (from which 
dishonesty can be inferred), a dishonesty-based offence requires a wide body of 
evidence to establish mens rea as a subjective test.  From an investigatory 
perspective, this demand can be answered by a wide evidential basis which 
extends beyond the transaction of representation from which harm had been 
inflicted on the victim.  This appears to be consistent with the special powers of 
investigation available to the director of the SFO under section two of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1987.  The provision grants the Director of the SFO the power to 
compel persons of interest in relation to an ongoing investigation as well as third-
parties individuals or firms to produce documentary evidence or testimony.  This 
provision empowers the SFO to create the evidential basis required to the 
investigation of ‘complex fraud’ (Fraud Trials Committee, 1986; Savla, 1997).  
Victims that are not in legal possession of the relevant data to establish that an 
accused has been dishonest (or the identity of the offender) are therefore less 
likely to be able to offer substantial evidence to establish dishonesty.    
 
The concept of dishonesty, together with the concepts of misrepresentation or 
failure to disclose, all stem from civil litigation (see Carter v. Boehm [1766]; Derry 
v Peek [1889]; Tackey v Mcbain [1912]), which seeks to achieve a balance of 
probabilities standard during adversarial litigation.  ‘Mainstream’ law-enforcement 
are (typically) not available to accept reports of fraud harm and victimisation, nor 
is it likely that knowledge of alleged fraud would be investigated in a similar 
fashion to other offences (Button, 2011; Button et al., 2013).  The shift in focus 
from particular incriminating material findings, such as a written falsehood about 
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an investment opportunity, or titles to property or land, to evidence ‘predatory’ 
offences would appear to undermine potential investigative successes.  Under the 
Fraud Act 2006, a police officer would be required to make a determination of the 
likelihood of such documentation to evidence dishonest conduct.  The traditional 
context in which law-enforcement operates will tend to favour an incremental 
process of deduction as opposed to the application of subjective judgement in 
attributing dishonesty to the actions of others. 
 
In Carter v. Boehm [1774], failure to fully disclose facts and circumstances in the 
process of procuring an insurance policy is given as reason for its annulment.   
The policy in question related to a trading post that was known by the person 
seeking the policy to be inadequately defended whilst under threat of an attack by 
an enemy fleet.  The annulment of the policy was made as the omission of that 
knowledge amounted to concealment and fraud:   
Some circumstances... not having been mentioned... at the time the 
policy was underwritten, amount to a concealment… The underwriter 
trusts to his representation, and proceeds upon confidence that he does 
not keep back any circumstance in his knowledge to mislead the 
underwrite[r] into a belief that the circumstance does not exist, and to 
induce him to estimate the risk if it did not exist.  Keeping back such 
circumstance is fraud... The question, therefore, must always be 
whether there was, under all the circumstances, at the time the policy 
was underwritten, a fair representation or a concealment, fraudulent if 




 Carter v Boehm [1774] continues to be a reference point as a qualifier of grounds 
for annulment on account of fraud, in contract and insurance related litigation, in 
the commercial (‘civil’) jurisdiction in England and Wales.  The contemporary 
reader will not be surprised to find similar examples, resolved in a similar manner, 
despite the case belonging prima facia within the criminal justice system.  In 
Involnert Management Inc v Aprilgrange Ltd & Ors. [2015], a depreciation in value 
demonstrably known to the owner of a luxury yacht was not disclosed to the 
insurer when a policy was signed for a higher than market value.  The 
concealment of the new valuation and market value (the yacht was placed on sale 
at the time), was just over half of the amount for which the yacht was insured.   
Furthermore, the owner did not abide by all the terms of the policy and did not 
maintain the yacht to the required standard, which led to its eventual write-off and 
insurance claim.  The definition in Carter v Boehm [1774] is that the concealment, 
or failure to disclose, as it is explained in the decision amounted to the court’s 
understanding of the gestalt of fraud.  This invoked the principle of not allowing a 
person to benefit from his own fraud or allow the disinheritance of another (see 
Bracton 1210-1268) but was not in itself criminal as per R. v. Jones [1703] (“[not 
to indict a] man for making a fool of another”) (and see Law Commission, 1974; 
p.4; Law Commission, 2002; Sharpe, 2013).    
 
Notwithstanding the above discussion, the Fraud Act 2006 has resulted in fraud 
charges.  KPMG (2016), a multinational accountancy and consultancy firm, tracks 
high value-sum criminal fraud prosecutions across the UK and annually publishes 
regional figures and examples of cases litigated by the criminal jurisdiction in that 
area.  The examples provided reflect frauds against employers or relate to 
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particularised offences such as tax and customs-related frauds.  Occupational 
frauds are reported to the police typically in the form of a report of the findings of 
an internal investigation (Button, et al., 2015).   Organisations are less likely to 
consider the criminal justice system as the most useful resolution mechanism as 
discussed in the previous section.   
 
The KPMG (2016) report includes a number of examples of employees of public 
sector bodies, such as local councils, the National Health Service (NHS), and 
large sum embezzlement from within the private and financial sectors.  Other 
examples include VAT-related frauds, benefits and customs-related offences, 
which are typically investigated by dedicated agencies, and using particularised 
legal provisions for fraud.  Only two examples of ‘predatory’-type fraud (Naylor, 
2003) were included as examples.  Of the large sum frauds that were litigated in 
the courts, the proportion of monies lost were respectively: financial services 
sector (38%), public sector (26%), investors (19%), commercial businesses (8%), 
and ‘others’ including individuals (9%).  Originally developed for the Home Office, 
the now dissolved National Fraud Authority (2010; 2011; 2012; 2013) 
implemented a methodology for the assessment of the scope of fraud in the UK 
based on an extrapolation from a national victim survey.  The indicator 
methodology was ‘revived’ by private-sector stakeholders (Gee & Button, 2015; 
Button, et al., 2016) following the discontinuation of the public-sector engagement.    
The last annual cost estimation of fraud under the Home Office instruction was 
£51.9 billion (National Fraud Authority, 2013) and £193.4 billion under private 




The absence of an objective test for the dishonesty-based offence in the Fraud 
Act 2006 discussed in section two of this chapter.  An objective test is 
nonetheless available for particularised provisions as discussed in section four 
above.  Such offences are often a form of ‘self-solving’ offences (Innes, 2012), as 
the objective test refers to evidence generated by the offence and often pertain to 
legal entity of the offender, particularly so in frauds directed against the state.  
Another class of victims who are potentially able to identify perpetrators are 
corporate victims who are in possession of (enough) evidence generated by the 
offence and are able to forensically attribute them to a known entity.  This is often 
achieved through the findings of an audit or a self-resourced investigation (ACFE, 
2016; Bragg, 2016).  Victims who have ultimate control and ownership of 
evidence of their victimisation are better situated to ‘take’ law-enforcement 
agencies over the threshold needed to negate the default assumption of good 
faith in English law (Teubner, 1998).  Negating this assumption may be equated to 
articulating a reasonable suspicion that may initiate the investigation of a criminal 
offence (Association of Chief Police Officers, 2005).    
 
Law-enforcement agencies must grapple with the difficulties in overcoming the 
assumption of good faith to ‘police’ a social function that is traditionally (and to 
some extent, currently) external to their social function (the protection of property 
as opposed to the dishonesty).  Particularised and narrowly prescribed offences 
can be readily deduced to points of proof and prima facia evidence of offences 
can be deemed sufficient to access investigatory powers.  As discussed in the 
section above, the general concept of fraud requires an investigatory induction to 
infer dishonesty as opposed to ‘legitimate’ loss or honest misrepresentation.   
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Whilst this may be somewhat easier with respect to ‘predatory’-type frauds, 
‘commercial’-type frauds represent professed ‘financial craftsmanship’ that is 
perceived to be beyond the capability of law-enforcement to investigate (Fraud 
Trial Committee, 1986). 
 
There appears to be another difficulty, which is concerned with the challenge of 
‘mainstreaming’ and ‘streamlining’ a uniform understanding and enforcement of 
the concept of fraud as defined in the Fraud Act 2006 (RQ2).  The co-existence of 
resolution mechanisms operated and enforced by the state outside of the criminal 
jurisdiction is a (useful) fact, and not a subject of critical discussion in this thesis.   
What is a subject for critical analysis is the ‘erosion’ of the (alleged) intrinsic 
criminality of fraud (The Criminal Law Committee, 1966; Law Commission, 2002), 
as it is over-generalised and non-particular, and criminalised in a manner that is 
not generally divisible from legitimate conduct (even if it may be unethical).  The 
general offence appears to be ‘eroded’ by particularised offences that relate to 
specific ‘sovereign guarantees’ of trust (and specific and specialised enforcement 
bodies in some cases).  The offence is further ‘eroded’ by the deference to 
existing regulatory and common-law provisions, which are resolved under 
mediaeval principles of restorative justice and particular attention to addressing ill-
gotten-gains (see discussion on Bracton (c. 1210 – c. 1268) in chapter four).  This 
mechanism of legal custom presently relates to a system of precedents which 
creates specific tests for principles of reasonable conduct in common-law and 
means of articulating harm as torts and civil wrongs.  In turn, these mechanisms 
help regulate the marketplace by establishing the principles according to which 
individuals foster a near uniform understanding of market-rules, and the principles 
109 
 
which define and test them.  These rules may also be used in extra-judicial 
resolution, as they provide all parties involved an understanding of the tests that 
will be applied in hypothetical commercial litigation (Black, 1976; Black & 
Baumgartner, 1983; Ulph, 2006; Rawlings & Lowry, 2017).  This is similar to the 
discussion on the merits of specificity and narrow descriptions of offences in 
criminal law (Tappan, 1947; Tyler, 2006). 
 
In the above section, the author examined the extent to which the unpacking of 
the gestalt of fraud into criminal law serves an as effective means for the 
criminalisation of ‘all frauds’.  The literature identifies effective criminalisation by 
the association of known infractions with law-enforcement action and criminal 
justice system resolution (Hester & Eglin, 1992).  A dysfunction in the relationship 
between the bounds of an offence and the extent to which known examples of it 
generate responses by law-enforcement agencies demonstrates a gap between 
‘law-in-theory’ and ‘law-in-action’ (Black, 1972).  Above in this chapter, the ‘duality’ 
of fraud is discussed in terms of outcomes of Fraud Act 2006 offences discussed 
in its legislative context, in terms of social theory and ‘predatory’-type offence, and 
in the context of white-collar crime (Sutherland, 1940; Black, 1976; Law 
Commission, 2002; Naylor, 2003).  This section focused on the expectation of 
effective prosecution set by the Law Commission (2002, p.3), and the expansion 
statutory fraud criminalisation.   
 
It would appear that outside of the limited scope of offences previously subject to 
enforcement efforts, there has been no noticeable expansion of effective (Hester 
& Eglin, 1992) criminalisation (Ministry of Justice, 2012).  The claim of 
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‘simplification’ with respect to the new offence appears to apply to pre-existing 
typologies and areas of enforcement (Ministry of Justice, 2012), much like in the 
case of the criminalisation of ‘all theft’ (Griew, 1995).  There appears to be little 
evidence of typological or circumstantial expansion of the association of known 
examples of dishonesty with law-enforcement action.  Furthermore, The Fraud Act 
2006 reflects a conduct-based approach to criminalisation, which is meant to pre-
empt technological or typological innovations or use of ‘loopholes’ (Law 
Commission, 2002).  Nevertheless, it would appear that particularised statutory 
offences and the common-law offence of conspiracy to defraud are still in 
extensive use by law-enforcement bodies and (inclusive inter alia of HMRC and 
local authorities).  Particularised statutory offences do not unpack the gestalt of 
fraud.  Instead, they provide a narrow definition for fraud in the particular 
circumstance of criminalisation to which they apply.  Furthermore, despite the 
apparent theoretical ability to prosecute agreements to engage in a Fraud Act 
2006 offence under the general definition for conspiracy under the Criminal Law 
Act 1977, the gestalt-qualified conspiracy to defraud common-law offence is 
retained due to its prosecutorial advantages (CPS, 2012). 
 
The question that arises from this discussion is the extent to which the absence of 
a definition in law for fraud was an obstacle to the criminalisation of fraud and 
criminal fraud trials?  Where the difficulties with the law in 2002 (including case 
cited by the Law Commission) ontological, or practical?  In other words, has the 
criminalisation of fraud suffered from an objective ambiguity in the past, or rather 
the extent to which criminal law applied to it?  The Law Commission (2002) 
provide a partial answer.  In its critique, the Law Commission (2002) cites 
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‘untidiness’ as a challenge contributed to insular examples of fraud being 
prosecuted using one provision, whereas another was indicated by the courts to 
be more applicable (see section two above).  The focus placed on the prosecution 
of fraud and its ‘misalignment’ with the practice of law-enforcement and social 
theory discussed in this chapter does not appear from the discussion in this 




The above chapter provided a review of the literature pertaining to the ‘duality’ of 
fraud in English law (RQ1), and inhibitors to the ‘streamlining’ and ‘mainstreaming’ 
of the concept of fraud in law-enforcement actions (RQ2).  The ‘duality’ of fraud 
refers to the variability of outcomes with respect to the general offence of fraud in 
sections 1-4 of the Fraud Act 2006.  The ‘duality’ is studied as a dysfunction 
between ‘law-in-theory’ and ‘law-in-action’ (Black, 1972) and the inconsistent 
association of effective criminalisation across the span of fraud criminalisation 
under the 2006 Act (Hester & Eglin, 1992).  It appears in the context of the 
general fraud offence, which was explicitly intended to criminalise ‘all frauds’ (Law 
Commission, 2002), that the scope of ‘theoretical’ offending is wide, and 
comparable in its absolutism to theft or other violent offences in law.  In ‘action’, 
the concept of fraud is subject to a variety of resolution mechanisms outside of the 
criminal justice system (Levi & Burrows, 2008; Law Commission, 2014; Smith & 
Shepherd, 2017).  Whilst there may be latitude to consider perceived and 
objective inhibitors to law-enforcement practices (Button et al., 2013), the focus of 
this thesis is the Fraud Act 2006 and its alignment with social theory and practice.   
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In its reasoning for recommending a conduct-based offence, the Law Commission 
(2002) explained that:  
Introducing a single crime of fraud would dramatically simplify the law of 
fraud. Clear, simple law is fairer than complicated, inaccessible law. If a 
citizen in contemplating activities which could amount to a crime, a clear, 
simple law gives better guidance on whether the conduct is criminal, and 
fairer warning of what could happen if it is. [...] A general offence of fraud 
would be aimed at encompassing fraud in all its forms. It would not focus 
on particular ways or means of committing frauds. (Law Commission, 
2002, p.3) 
Nevertheless, this literature review contested the existence of such applied clarity 
with respect to the effective criminalisation of fraud as it is defined by the Fraud 
Act 2006.   
 
The offence in the Fraud Act 2006 transcends typological (Naylor, 2003) and 
sociological (Black, 1976) categories for association of known harm and 
victimisation with law-enforcement activities.  Furthermore, many previously 
existing (and subsequently introduced) fraud provisions were not abolished by the 
act, creating together with the preserved common-law offence of conspiracy to 
defraud, a body of overlapping offences.  Such offences rely on an implicit 
understanding of the gestalt of fraud (as in conspiracy to defraud) or specify 
unique circumstances where misrepresentations or omissions are construed as 
fraud (such as in the context of housing benefits or tax).  The wide scope of the 
offence appears to create difficulties in its application, even in the context of 
theoretically suggested association with law-enforcement activities and 
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‘predatory’-type offence (Naylor, 2003).  It would appear that the Fraud Act 2006 
limits the ability of victims and law-enforcement to realise the theoretical potential 
for criminal justice system responses in the context of ‘predatory’-type offences 
(Levi & Burrows, 2008; Button et al., 2009; 2013; Naylor, 2003).  Furthermore, the 
difficulties identified from the literature appear to mimic (mis)conceptions 
regarding ‘predatory’-type offences that are otherwise attributed to ‘commercial’-
type offences, namely moral ambiguity and an allure of complexity (Naylor, 2003; 
Button et al., 2009; 2013).  This theoretical ‘misalignment’ in not entirely a result of 
the legislative approach to fraud criminalisation since 2007 (Fraud Trials 
Committee, 1986).  Nevertheless, stakeholder confusion and the resulting 
theoretical ‘misalignment’ appears to be somewhat augmented by its focus on 
conduct, the absence of an objective test, and typological and circumstantial 
span.   
 
The criminalisation of ‘all frauds’ through its definition into criminal law does not 
seem to result with a similar outcome as the criminalisation of ‘all theft’ – retention 
of the degree of its effective criminalisation and a degree of legal modernisation.  
The concept of theft is different to the concept of fraud in that the former is 
axiomatically criminal (Naylor, 2003), whilst the latter is a manner of conduct (Law 
Commission, 2002) that the literature warns against a sole basis of criminalisation 








In the above chapter, the author discusses critical gaps in the literature with 
respect to the ‘duality’ of fraud (RQ1), and the ‘mainstreaming’ and ‘streamlining’ 
of fraud enforcement (RQ2) in England and Wales.  The context of the literature 
review supports the need for a study of the ‘legal effectiveness’ (Black, 1972) of 
the Fraud Act 2006, and the extent to which it may not represent the scope of 
effective fraud criminalisation in England and Wales.  In this chapter, the author 
presents and explains the development of the research philosophy adopted in this 
thesis.  The following section (3.2) includes a detailed discussion of the research 
philosophy.  First, a reflexive discussion of the author as a decisionmaker and 
potential source of error in the development of an approach to research is 
developed.  This is followed by discussion of four categories of approaches to 
research of the phenomenon of fraud that were identified from the literature, and a 
consideration of their applicability to the focus of the main research questions.  
From this problematised background, key philosophical assumptions are 
presented to support a justification for a mixed-methods (Bryman, 2004; Teddlie & 
Tashakkori, 2009) approach to research. 
 
In section 3.3, the design for a historical socio-legal functionalist analysis (Weber, 
1978) of secondary data and key literature resources is presented.  The study 
provides an investigation of the essential characteristics of the association of 
fraud with Crown-led investigation and prosecution as part of the social function of 
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fraud resolution through the characterisation of the historical ‘duality’ of fraud.  
The investigation was guided by five intermediate research objectives that are 
presented further below in this chapter. 
 
In section 3.4, the design for an empirical survey-based study is presented as a 
means of examining the contemporary characteristics of the ‘duality’ of fraud by 
applying the theoretical and historical contexts developed in chapters two and 
four.  The research presents a bespoke measurement tool that was designed and 
used in a survey completed by one-hundred-and-forty (N=140) participants who 
were asked to indicate their perception of likely fraud resolution mechanisms in 
response to hypothetical examples of fraud offending.  This presentation includes 
discussion of research philosophy, design, sample procedure, and analytical 
approach. 
 
3.2 Research Philosophy  
 
3.2.1 Reflexivity and Positionality 
 
This sub-section discusses the role of the researcher and a potential source for 
error and tendency towards a normative preference in the development and 
design of the approach to methodology discussed further below in this chapter.  In 
section 6.2, a critical reflection on the reliability and validity of the findings from 
this study is provided relative to the research questions and the methods that 
were implemented (see sections 3.3, and 3.4).  The following is a discussion of 
the researcher as a source of error and subjective influence on the design of the 
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approach to the study of the ‘duality’ of fraud in this thesis.  The role of the 
researcher as an observer and a decision-maker provided relative to 
consideration of methods from the literature, attempted approaches, ontology, 
epistemology, and the tools presented in sections 3.3, and 3.4 further below in 
this chapter.   
 
The approach to the challenge of RQ1 in the context of the discussion of the 
association with law-enforcement activities is applicable to examples of dishonest 
conduct and observation of their course of resolution.  In thinking about the 
‘duality’ of fraud, the researcher perception of this phenomenon was that of one 
that cannot be directly observed from anecdotal evidence.  Furthermore, the 
literature accessed by the author (academic or professional) did not result with the 
identification of a clear definition of the essential characteristics of fraud.  The 
professional background of the researcher included training as a network-
intelligence analyst and service as an intelligence analyst (later officer) in the 
Israeli Defence Force (IDF) mainly in counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation 
roles (2006-2011).  Following this period, the researcher continued to analytical 
roles in the context of private-sector fraud examination, digital forensics and 
electronic-discovery in Israel and then in the UK.  In 2015, the researcher earned 
the qualification of Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE) from the Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE). 
 
This doctoral thesis forms a part of the continuing interest in deepening 
understanding of the concept of fraud in applied circumstances.  This interest 
stems from earlier focus on indirect fraud victimisation (Levi & Burrows, 2008), 
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which was a key theme of dissertation work submitted by the researcher as part of 
a master’s programme at the University of Derby (2012-2013).  The dissertation 
research (Tolkovsky, 2013) focused critical attention on the gap in policy 
responses to indirect-fraud victimisation, and the absence of means to 
systematically characterise and quantify indirect-victimisation.  The normative 
preferences of the researcher in his role as an intelligence officer gravitated 
towards evidence not grounded in qualitative interpretation and subjective 
assessments.  Nevertheless, the nature of academic interests in the field of fraud 
does not appear to offer ample opportunities to engage in quantitative data 
collection and analysis.  Instead, through research methods training and 
discussions with the director of studies, the researcher adapted to an apparent 
imperative to collect and critically analyse qualitative data (interviews with 
stakeholders).  After receiving an award for ‘best dissertation’, the researcher was 
encouraged to continue to expand on study of fraud and address barriers to the 
applied understanding of fraud.  The focus on the ‘duality’ of fraud emerged from 
‘unfinished business’ from the master’s dissertation project, as it had been 
referred to in the literature (Levi & Burrows, 2008; National Fraud Authority, 2013) 
and by the interviewees who participated in the study.  The ‘duality’ between the 
criminal resolution of fraud and other resolution mechanisms may not be unique to 
the UK.  Nevertheless, the categorical criminalisation of fraud as a conduct-
offence appears to create an interesting relationship between statutory law and 
the applied understanding of fraud as a concept in criminal law.  In this context, 
the Fraud Act 2006 appeared to the researcher as both anecdotally useful, and 




Following from Black’s (1972) analysis, ‘anecdotally useful’ refers to 
considerations of whether theoretical scenarios could be qualified as fraud under 
the qualifications of what fraud is in sections one through four of the Fraud Act 
2006 (‘law-in-theory’).  ‘Systematically confusing’ refers to the 2006 Act as a 
‘guide’ to associate behaviour with law-enforcement responses to known incidents 
(‘law-in-action’), and public perceptions (see sections 2.4, and 2.6).  From the 
outset of this project, the researcher was philosophically pre-disposed to 
approach all manners of inquiry (literature review, data collection, and analysis) 
relating to the ‘duality’ of fraud as pertaining to a social phenomenon and not a 
legal or practice-related topic of investigation.  Subject to this pre-conception, 
legislation, law-enforcement activities, and decisions by victims were all seen as 
relating to the workings of an ‘invisible hand’ (Smith, 1776) and a yet-to-be 
characterised social dynamic.  One of the key references to a ‘duality’ of fraud in 
the literature is in context of a barrier to the measurement of fraud harm and 
victimisation (Levi & Burrows, 2008; National Fraud Authority, 2013).  To the 
extent of the researcher’s awareness, the literature tends to accept the ‘duality’ of 
fraud in near-axiomatic terms, and without sufficient fidelity in the characterisation 
of its essential properties and functionality (Levi & Burrows, 2008; Fisher, 2015; 
Smith & Shepherd, 2017).  It was therefore not clear how this social phenomenon 
can be measured directly, what were the rules that shaped it, or how such rules 
could be understood from anecdotal observations (see further discussion in sub-
section 3.2.3 below). 
 
An abundance of anecdotal of evidence of the ‘duality’ of fraud appears to exist, 
particularly between criminal and civil case-law (‘civil’ including fraud-related 
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compensation-seeking insolvency proceedings in non-criminal courts).  The 
prospect of secondary-data analysis was therefore integral to the approach taken 
towards research design, yet no method appeared to be available through which 
to aggregate anecdotal evidence into a means of systematic inquiry.  This initial 
focus on insight from case-law correlated with the researcher’s normative 
preference towards quantitative research and the creation and analysis of large 
datasets.  Furthermore, the master’s degree research methods training exposed 
the researcher to structured approaches to qualitative data analysis (Miles, et al., 
2013), and a specific software application (NVIVO). The prospect of systematically 
analysing and developing theoretical synthesis from case-law was appealing in 
this context. 
 
Parallel to the development of a literature review, research design focus shifted 
towards systematising case-law in order to investigate the essential 
characteristics of cases litigated in the criminal and civil jurisdictions in England 
and Wales.  This was grounded in an earlier iteration of RQ1, which focused on 
the historical changes in the divide between criminal and other resolution 
mechanisms in the context of fraud.  In retrospect, this approach was both 
simplistic and naïve.  The author’s assumption was that case-law analysis would 
yield sufficient reliability and fidelity so as to be able to describe the ‘duality’ of 
fraud, and the practical ‘dividing line’ both historical and contemporary.  The 
epistemological assumption that underpins the current scope of RQ1 is discussed 




The dysfunction between ‘law-in-theory’ and ‘law-in-action’ (Black, 1972) in the 
context of the Fraud Act 2006 as discussed in the literature review stems from the 
‘duality’ of fraud relative to legislation and the categorical criminalisation of fraud.  
The approach to the study of the ‘duality’ of fraud was not limited to the enactment 
of the Fraud Act 2006 onwards, but rather in wider historical perspective of a 
social phenomenon to which legislation could apply.  There was therefore an 
appeal in considering a pre-2006 perspectives, for its expected value-added in 
finding a lesser dysfunction between criminalisation and the prospect of law-
enforcement responses.   
 
This context provided an early indication of an interpretivist component that would 
subsequently inform possible approaches to primary data collection (which were 
not yet determined).  As will be discussed in the following sub-section (3.2.2), this 
normative preference was not realised due to barriers to reliable analysis and 
synthesis that emerged from test experimentation with the data.  Deeper and 
more systematic analysis and synthesis of case-law and archival materials was 
conducted so as to inform the design of a primary data collection tool.  This was 
initially packaged as historical literature review, and later fully developed as part of 
a mixed-methods design towards historical secondary data analysis (see chapter 
four).  Nevertheless, a case-law research project presented an underlying tension 
between ample anecdotal evidence of the ‘duality’ of fraud, and a need to 
synthesise systematic understanding of the relationship between different fraud 




The above approach seemed preferable, particularly given awareness of the 
limitations of the researcher as an ‘outsider’ in interpreting context and managing 
the collection of primary qualitative data or securing sufficient access to 
participants.  The decision to include a substantive qualitative analysis of 
secondary-data (case-law) or archival data was to eliminate (to the extent 
possible) the unique background of the research as a source of error in the 
creation of a dataset (Bryman, 2004).  The disadvantages of the researcher as a 
party to qualitative primary-data creation may be seen (in part) as advantageous 
in secondary-data analysis, the perspective as an ‘outsider looking in’ may result 
in fewer contextual pre-conceptions.  The normative preference in terms of 
primary-data collection was to collect quantitative data (particularly using survey-
based tools) so as to not interact with participants directly and thereby (hopefully) 
enhance the reliability and replicability of such a measurement (Bryman, 2004; De 
Vaus, 2013).  In the following sub-section 3.2.2, a discussion is provided of 
approaches to the study of fraud from the literature, and those that were 
considered in the context of this project. 
 
3.2.2 Approaches to the Study of Fraud 
 
The ‘duality’ of fraud refers to the difference of outcomes in terms of the prospect 
of criminal justice system resolution in the context of Fraud Act 2006 offences.  
The apparent dysfunction between ‘law-in-theory’ and the criminalisation of ‘all 
fraud’ and ‘law-in-action’ (Black, 1972) was discussed in social science terms 
(Black, 1976; Naylor, 2003; Tappan, 1947).  Despite claims of such insight being 
contained in the Fraud Act 2006 (Law Commission, 2002), there does not appear 
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to be a definitive guide in law to the association of dishonesty and law-
enforcement activities.  The discussion in this chapter reflects an awareness of 
objective difficulties with the investigation of some frauds on the grounds of 
financial complexity (Fraud Trials Committee, 1986) and in cases where the 
identity of the offender is obscured through the use of information and 
communication technology (ICT) (Levi et al., 2015).  Nevertheless, the focus of 
this thesis is on the extent to which the 2006 Act can function as a reliable guide 
for ‘law-in-action’ (Black, 1972) 
 
The set of frauds that are subject to statutory criminalisation under the Fraud Act 
2006 was, to the author’s perception, a category that is theoretically wider to that 
of frauds that are resolved by the criminal justice system.  Nevertheless, the 
litigation of civil cases appears to represent a public-gallery substantiation of a 
reasonable suspicion that a statutory offence of fraud had occurred, and a 
determination of the facts on a basis of balance of probabilities by the state via the 
courts.  There does not appear to be a theoretical legal basis through which to 
understand how frauds that are subject to resolution by the criminal justice 
system, as Fraud Act 2006 offences, are mutually exclusive to the conduct that 
underpins fraud resolved by the civil justice system.  The initial approach was 
therefore to develop a typological and contextual means of identifying essential 
characteristics through an examination of case-law from criminal and civil 
jurisdiction.   
 
The development of the case-law research project reflected an underlying tension 
between ample anecdotal evidence of the duality of fraud, and a need to deepen 
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the understanding of fraud resolution mechanisms through systematic analysis.  In 
the following paragraphs a discussion of an approach that was developed 
alongside the literature review the second half of the first year of work in this 
thesis is presented, and the reasons for which it was not included in this 
submission are explained. 
 
Fisher (2015) distinguishes between criminal fraud and civil fraud in England and 
Wales, strictly, according to the resolution mechanisms, remedies, and 
consequences that were applied in its resolution.  Consequently, it appeared that 
the distinction between ‘criminal’ and ‘civil’ fraud was grounded in the 
circumstances under which an offender will only be liable for dishonesty, without 
being charged or convicted of a crime (Fisher, 2015; Hayton, 2015; Smith & 
Shepherd, 2017).  Whilst this does not form part of the scope of this thesis, the 
literature offers potential frameworks to systematise knowledge of fraud 
stakeholders and circumstances.  The literature offers means of distinguishing 
between victims of fraud and offenders in the context of smaller typological 
subsets of the wider concept of fraud.   
 
A combined interpretivist and functionalist approach was developed as an 
exercise of applying concepts from the literature to secondary-data as a means of 
inductive theory generation in relation to RQ1 (‘duality’).  A dataset of criminal and 
civil case-law was to be used as a basis for evaluating the role of theoretical and 
circumstantial distinctions from the literature in determining the preference of one 
jurisdiction over the other.  Two samples, one of cases from the criminal 
jurisdiction, and one from the civil jurisdiction (inclusive of insolvency 
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proceedings), were to be coded for typological features (i), and litigation 
imperative (ii).  Typological features refer to categorical information about the 
victim, offender, and circumstances in which the fraud occurred.  Circumstances 
were to be coded for type of fraud offence (as prosecuted, or as appropriate 
Fraud Act 2006 section in civil litigation), and circumstances of fraud discovery 
(routine, through audit, by a whistle-blower, through pro-active detection efforts, or 
by an official receiver or liquidator).  The litigation imperative variable refers to 
sought remedies, sanctions, and eventual remedies ordered by the courts.   
 
The case-law analysis would not have been ‘legalistic’ in nature, but instead 
identify typological and circumstantial features in an attempt to associate (some 
of) them with the preference of one resolution mechanism over the other.  
Accordingly, cases would have been coded according to the information 
(narrative) included in the reporting of the case into the case law database that 
were accessible to the researcher (The British and Irish Legal Information 
Institute, and Westlaw).  The coding system would have included such victim 
attributes as sector (Levi, 2008a), degree of contributing or enabling behaviour 
(Titus & Gover, 2001; Button, et al., 2009; Smith, et al., 2011), stratification, and 
morphology (Black, 1976).  Offenders would have been coded for imperative 
(distress, greed, opportunistic, or organised crime), relation to victim, stratification 
(through proceeds of crime or legitimate assets), stratification, and morphology 
(Sutherland, 1949; Black, 1976; Cressey, 1973; Naylor, 2003; Levi, 2008a).  The 





Table 1 – Case-Law Analysis Matrix 
 












Furthermore, in the context of RQ2 (‘mainstreaming’ and ‘streamlining’), the above 
matrix of post Fraud Act 2006 case law would have been compared to earlier 
periods in English history, namely the last decade of the sixteenth, seventeenth, 
eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries.  This comparative analysis of the five 
datasets (four historical and one contemporary), would have provided a pre-
industrial, industrial, post-industrial and modern era bases for comparing the 
scope of fraud association with the criminal justice system.  Variations in the 
strength of association between a given indicator and one of the jurisdictions 





































A further anticipated advantage influenced this design to include criminal and civil 
court samples representing earlier periods so as to add analytical depth to the 
investigation of the essential characteristics of the ‘duality’ of fraud.  As discussed 
in the literature review (section 2.7), key definitions in the Fraud Act 2006 can be 
traced to compensation-seeking (‘civil’) case-law as components of liability and in 
relation to damages in commercial disputes.  The inclusion of a historical 
perspective to case-law analysis was therefore anticipated to add further 
analytical value through being able to refer not only to the gestalt of fraud, but also 
some of its specific qualifiers under the 2006 Act.  
 
There were a number of limitations that dissuaded the researcher from developing 
the above approach as secondary-data analysis tool as part of this thesis.  First, 
the two samples would have accounted for a small portion of prima facia fraud 
offences which were resolved by the criminal justice system or using other dispute 
resolution mechanisms.  Criminal jurisdiction cases would have been subjected to 
three non-probabilistic reductions that could not be accounted from the data.  
They will have included cases that were reported or otherwise became known to a 
law-enforcement agency, investigated as a result, and resulted with a prosecution 
(CPS, 2013) to which an early guilty plea was not entered (Ministry of Justice, 
2012).  Similar to the criminal jurisdiction, civil jurisdiction cases are representative 
of those incidents where a decision by the court was required.  Civil litigation 
cases represents a smaller portion still, in the sense that they relate to only one 
non-criminal justice system resolution mechanism, and one to which there are 
high entry barriers, both financial (Smith & Shepherd, 2017), and in terms of 
underlying social dynamic (Black & Baumgartner, 1983).  In other words, the civil 
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jurisdiction may only account for those frauds that were resolved externally to the 
criminal justice system, but nevertheless required legal adjudication in order to 
achieve final resolution (Black, 1976; Black & Baumgartner, 1983; Smith & 
Shepherd, 2017).    
 
Another limitation to data analysis became apparent after testing some of the 
data.  Criminal court decisions in England and Wales are decided by jury panels, 
and thus offer (far) less written discussion of the evidence and circumstances of 
the case in comparison to civil court decisions.  This resulted with a (relative) 
abundance of information about parties to civil litigation, as well as narrative 
concerning the behaviour that underpinned the allegation of fraud, circumstances 
relating to its discovery, harm, as well as other relevant information.  By contrast, 
the descriptions of offences on which a jury panel decides are shorter and 
contained fewer details.  This was ever more pronounced in records of historical 
criminal cases, where the available information on record for a case could include 
only a handful of sentences.  This limitation invalidated the utility of the above 
approach towards systematisation of case-law.  The primary concern was that the 
prevalence of social indicators, financial instruments, evidence of financial harm, 
and other typological observations, would be more prevalent in the civil court 
sample due to overall comparative richness in detail. 
 
Following on from the above exercise, the researcher’s focus returned to the 
literature in search of an approach to the study of fraud that could be 
implemented.  The adoption of social sciences theory and methods for the 
examination of the ‘duality’ of fraud (Black, 1972) drove the researcher to revisit 
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the question of how can the ‘duality’ of fraud be indirectly measured so as to 
generate analytical insight?  The literature presents a number of approaches to 
collect and analyse data in the context of fraud.  Four general categories of 
empirical data gathering tool designs emerged from the literature that was 
reviewed in this context.  The first is victim survey-based primary data collection, 
which occurs in studies that measure the extent of the phenomenon of fraud 
(alone) or in the context of other categories of harm and victimisation (National 
Fraud Authority, 2013; Gee & Button, 2015; Office of National Statistics, 2017).  
The second category relates to perceptions of crime severity towards multiple 
criminal concepts which include fraud (Levi & Jones, 1985; Wolfgang, et al., 1985; 
Green & Kugler, 2010).  The third category offers qualitative analysis and insight 
that is based on narratives that relate to a limited number of real-world cases and 
the perceptions of those that are directly involved in various capacities, but 
predominantly victims (Button, et al., 2009; Arvedlund & Roth, 2010 Button, et al, 
2013; 2015).  The fourth category relates to analysis of types of frauds that are 
litigated in the criminal courts as a means of estimating the scope of (‘criminal’) 
fraud, and categorisation of typologies and victims (KPMG, 2016). 
 
Studies from the above four categories have been a source of considerable 
insight for discussing some of the essential characteristics of the dysfunction 
between ‘law-in-theory’ and ‘law-in-action’ in the context of the Fraud Act 2006 
(Black, 1972).  Nevertheless, the types of method considered did not appear to 
sufficiently align with the study of the ‘duality’ of fraud (RQ1), or the potential for 
legislation to enhance conceptual clarity in the context of fraud in mainstream 
criminal justice practice (RQ2).  The first category of studies aims to generate an 
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extrapolation of the extent and cost of fraud (across the UK or limited to England 
and Wales) from self-reporting of harm and victimisation by victims.  Such 
methodologies do not distinguish between frauds that involve criminal justice 
system resolution or law-enforcement activities.  Nevertheless, responses are 
grounded in the state of knowledge of participants (who may themselves not be 
aware of all fraud experienced by their organisation) as well as individual 
perceptions and interpretation of the gestalt of fraud (Levi & Burrows, 2008; 
National Fraud Authority, 2013).  In part, this contributes to the tendency of such 
methods to generate highly variable estimations of fraud, particularly in relation to 
the private sector (National Fraud Authority, 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; Gee & 
Button, 2015; Button, et al., 2016). 
 
The second category (perceptions of crime severity) also appeared as somewhat 
misaligned with the main research questions.  The measurement designs appear 
to focus on perceptions towards examples of offending including fraud, and 
relative ‘ranking’ in terms of severity, or appropriate criminal sanction (Levi & 
Jones, 1985; Wolfgang, et al., 1985; Green & Kugler, 2010).  These tools appear 
to focus on individualistic opinions as to ‘what ought to be’, as opposed to ‘what is’ 
which better relates to the parameters of RQ1 (‘duality’).  Furthermore, the author 
agrees that some categories of crime may be ‘more severe’ than fraud, yet that 
does not fall within the parameters of the main research questions, which frame 
the concept of fraud relative to itself.  The dysfunction that unpins RQ1 (‘duality’) 
refers to the extent of effective criminalisation (Hester & Eglin, 1992) across the 
span of offending, that may be encompassed under the Fraud Act 2006, and not 
the perceived relativism against other offending categories.   
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The third category (qualitative analysis of narrative from stakeholders) provides 
ample examples for underlying perceptions that underpin elements of 
disassociation between the gestalt of fraud, and its unpacking in the context of 
‘mainstreamed’ and ‘streamlined’ law-enforcement activities (RQ2).  Studies from 
this category appear to provide examples for the workings of an ‘invisible hand’ 
(Smith, 1776), yet they provide limited insight to support inductive reasoning of its 
essential characteristics.  Such studies are based on accounts of known victims, 
which appear to be identified primarily (if not exclusively) by their eventual 
interaction with law-enforcement agencies (Button, et al., 2009; 2013).  There is 
little information gathered from stakeholders in circumstances where the criminal 
justice system route was not chosen by the victim, either through lack of 
knowledge and understanding, the preference of civil litigation or bilateral 
agreement, or a decision not to take any further steps following the discovery of 
fraud.  This limitation extends to both individual, corporate and government sector 
victims.  Given that the primary source of knowledge in such cases are victims, 
objective access difficulties, and the researcher’s own evaluation of a low affinity 
between such an approach and the main research questions led to the dismissal 
of similar approaches to design.  Furthermore, the researcher questioned whether 
the risk in direct conversational interaction with victims was proportionate to the 
expected contribution to knowledge in the context of the main research questions.  
These ethical limitations would not have been sufficiently mitigated for this thesis 
given the limited relevance of victims as exclusive sources of knowledge in the 




The fourth category (categorisation of criminal litigation) provides a basis for 
generalisations of ‘what is criminal’ based upon cases that were adjudicated by 
the criminal justice system (Tappan, 1947; KPMG, 2016).  A more elaborate 
approach which presents a similar means for the study of case-law as secondary 
data and the reasons for which it was ultimately not included in this thesis were 
presented above in this section.  In the context of this discussion, an epistemology 
that is based on cases decided upon by the criminal courts is ultimately limited to 
a subset of examples of ‘criminal’ frauds.  Such an approach does not account for 
frauds that were investigated but did not result with criminal charges, and frauds 
that were subject to early guilty pleas (Ministry of Justice, 2012).  Furthermore, 
such a subset of fraud does not include information on frauds that were reported 
to a law-enforcement agency but not investigated further and relates to RQ2 
(‘streamlining’ and ‘mainstreaming’).   
 
Of the above four types of approaches from the literature, the second approach 
(perceptions of crime severity) appeared to be the most viable in terms potential 
for adaptation to the requirement of the main research questions.  The below 
discussion provides a detailed explanation of key design features from a US and a 
UK example of such an approach.  First is a methodology developed by the US 
Department of Justice in which 60,000 participants were asked to rate the 
seriousness of offences based on short descriptions of victimisation (Wolfgang, et 
al., 1985).  The US study included one-hundred-and-ninety-eight offences, which 
contained examples of white-collar crime (including fraud) alongside ‘mainstream’ 
offending (including violent crime, sexual offences, and narcotic-related crime).  
Offences were presented using short sentences and represented various forms of 
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criminality and degrees of harm within them in a consistent and utilitarian manner, 
with no details on the offender or the victim beyond that which qualify the offence.   
 
The above survey cannot be characterised as fraud-centric, nor does it describe 
or directly name fraud in any of the one-hundred-and-ninety-eight cases.  The 
study does explore several elements of corporate criminal liability, indirect 
victimisation, white-collar crime and offences that relate to dishonest conduct but 
emphasises mainly financial and corporal forms of harm in a direct and readily 
understood fashion (Wolfgang et al., 1985 p. vi-x).  The study does not measure 
the extent to which offences are enforced and made synonymous with a response 
by law-enforcement agencies.  This feature of the above design appealed to the 
researcher as a style of measurement could be adapted to the parameters of the 
main research questions (see section 3.4).  
 
Levi and Jones (1985) examined crime severity perceptions in England and 
Wales in a study was focused on fraud offence descriptions relative to other forms 
of ‘predatory’-type offences (Naylor, 2003), and sampled the general public and 
law-enforcement personnel.  The study measured an underlying sense of crime 
severity with respect to both ‘volume’ and violent crime, and with respect to fraud 
and related offences where harm and victimisation are not readily understood.  
The stated aim of the study was the examination of the differences and similarities 
in indications of crime seriousness among the general public and law-
enforcement.  The results suggested that fraud against individuals and companies 
is similarly integrated into the ‘crime seriousness’ matrix from both the public and 
the police but is secondary to ‘volume’ or violent crime (Levi & Jones, 1985 p. 
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240).  In addition to the similar conceptual design of the measurement from the 
US study (Wolfgang, et al., 1985), the analytical value-added in including both 
members of the public and law-enforcement personnel as potentially applicable to 
the main research question was on note.  
 
Despite their advantages, the above examples appear to focus on ‘internal’ 
perceptions of ‘what ought to be’ towards crime and are therefore conceptually 
‘misaligned’ with the main research questions and analytical focus in this thesis.  
Nevertheless, the substantive measurement technique appeared to the 
researcher as potentially applicable subject an adaptation of the measurement to 
measure ‘what is’, as opposed to ‘what ought to be’.  The parameters of RQ1 
(‘duality’) and RQ2 (‘mainstreaming’ and ‘streamlining’) relate to the concept of 
fraud relative to the scope of its categorical criminalisation under the Fraud Act 
2006 and particularised provision.  The main research questions are subject to 
examination as a dysfunction between ‘law-in-theory’ and ‘law-in-action’ in the 
context of the Fraud Act 2006, and not relative to other offence categories (Black, 
1972).  The reader will recall from the literature review that a comparative 
discussion is developed in the context of an apparent higher correlation between 
statutory criminalisation and law-enforcement activities across the concept of 
theft.  This discussion is developed in principle due to the similarity in the manner 
of criminalisation between the Theft Act 1968 (as amended) and the Fraud Act 
2006; both statutes provide a legal definition for their headline offence, which is 




Given the above context, there appeared to have been a need to develop an 
approach to research that can realise the potential insight from historical socio-
legal analysis as well as include a means of measuring contemporary perceptions.  
In the following paragraph a justification for the implementation of a mixed-
methods (Bryman, 2004; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009) approach is presented.  
Notwithstanding further discussion of research philosophy in the ontology and 
epistemology sub-sections (3.2.3, and 3.2.4), the following refers to the two 
methods discussed in sections 3.3, and 3.4 in this chapter.   
 
The decision to develop an interpretivist socio-legal historical analysis (originally in 
the context of the literature, and subsequently as an analytical chapter), results 
from the aforementioned consideration of a potential contextual contribution.  The 
potential to develop contextual means of understanding the phenomenon of the 
‘duality’ of fraud and what (potentially) measurable properties of it may be used as 
variable in quantitative research provided the justification for a qualitative study 
(Bryman, 2004).  This form of reasoning towards the development of approaches 
for measurement and identification relates to the researcher’s former role as a 
counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism analyst.  It can also be compared to 
the tracing of proceeds of crime through a labyrinth of transactions and financial 
entities across criminal and legitimate contexts, whilst maintaining an awareness 
of such funds as ill-gotten gains (Financial Action Task Force, 2006).  This 
normative preference is grounded in a need to replace contemporary and 
historical examples of the ‘duality’ of fraud (RQ1) with a functionalist 
understanding of its properties (Weber, 1978).   An observation of the 
manifestations of variability in fraud resolution mechanism across social changes 
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in English history offers insight into the essential properties of fraud criminalisation 
as a social function.  The historical research objective, and research philosophy 
are presented in section 3.3, and the findings and discussion are developed in 
chapter four.  
 
The resulting inductive reasoning from the development of the historical context 
(‘phase one’, section 3.3) informed the epistemological development of the 
empirical deductive measurement tool (‘phase two’, section 3.4).  In chapter four 
the reader will find an emerging characterisation of the criminalisation of fraud as 
underpinned by an imposition of a ‘sovereign guarantee’ of trust for commercial 
and official conduct.  This guarantee appears to be sparingly applied by the 
Crown, and stems from its protection of its interests, and narrow particularisation 
of circumstances where a guarantee of trust is essential for commerce and private 
investment.  This is contrasted with the divergence between the concepts of fraud 
and theft.  Both concepts existed prior to the industrial revolution as categories of 
inter-personal disputes subject to bilateral resolution of private prosecution aimed 
at a compensatory form of justice (Klerman, 2001).  The concept of theft became 
categorically associated with law-enforcement activities and punishment-seeking 
Crown prosecution (Emsley, 2010).  Nevertheless, the concept of fraud retained 
its narrow scope of criminalisation and was not categorically criminalised prior to 
the enactment of the Fraud Act 2006 (Taylor, 2013). 
 
I therefore sought to develop a measurement that would simply ask participants 
on the consistency of their experience of a ‘sovereign guarantee’ of trust across 
the span of offending under the Fraud Act 2006.  Furthermore, the approach to 
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theory generation preferred in this thesis is not specific to fraud and is not 
grounded in fraud-specific theory.  Instead, theory is generated relative to Black’s 
(1976) theory of law, which is general to dispute resolution mechanisms including 
law and social controls, and the relationship between them in a non-offence 
specific context.  This preference was grounded in the researcher’s view of fraud 
as a standard category of crime, and one that should be explained through 
general social and criminological theory.  The researcher was aware of Black’s 
(1976) theory of law in general terms prior to starting this project but had not yet 
considered its meaning or application in full or as a tool for critical analysis in the 
context of fraud.  The initial scoping of the investigation into the ‘duality’ of fraud 
led to a re-consideration this theoretical framework.  On re-examination, Black’s 
(1976) theory of law appeared to offer a framework to develop an understanding 
of the ‘duality’ of law in broader and functional terms than the categorical 
identification of observed resolution mechanisms (Weber, 1978).  This capacity 
extends to both contemporary and historical resolution mechanisms, a topic which 
is discussed below and in the literature review in the context of RQ1.  In addition, 
Black (1976) positions formal and informal resolution mechanisms on a continuum 
of social controls and law (to represent ordinal or rank order division), on which a 
binary definition (to represent nominal or categorical division) for the ‘duality’ of 
fraud (RQ1) can be established and tested historically and in the present.  
Furthermore, the application of ‘more’ law is tied by Black (1976) to socio-
economic indicators, which are subject to historical change, particularly in the 




As discussed above in this sub-section, the literature reviewed in this context did 
not appear to offer validated data collection tools through which to directly engage 
with RQ1 (‘duality’) or RQ2 (‘streamlining’ and ‘mainstreaming’).  The dysfunction 
between ‘law-in-theory’ and ‘law-in-action’ with respect to Fraud Act 2006 offences 
appears to require further methodological development aimed at assessing the 
social circumstances to which the Act applies (Black, 1972).  A survey-based 
methodology offered a basis for quantitative analysis, and a platform for concise 
and narrow ‘indirect’ measurement of the ‘invisible hand’ (Smith, 1776) which 
determines the course of fraud resolution.  The preference towards the inclusion 
of such a study was both in terms of design, ethics (see sub-section 3.4.3 below), 
as well as a normative preference towards positivism (Bryman, 2004, pp.14-18) 
and quantitative analysis.  The latter is grounded in the perception of the ‘duality’ 
of fraud as an external social function (Weber, 1978; Durkheim, 1982), and the 
consequent imperative to develop means for its measurement.  Nevertheless, 
available literature and methodology does not appear to directly characterise or 
measure this dynamic (as discussed above).  In the absence of a readily apparent 
approach to be adopted and direct the design of a survey-based data collection 




This sub-section examines the assumptions made with respect to the nature of 
key components that are core subjects for research in this project, and the reality 
in which they exist.  Ontology is a branch of philosophy that studies the nature of 
and essence of being, which is fundamental to the conceptualisation of key 
138 
 
concepts in scientific inquiry (Martins, et al., 2013).  In approaching social science 
methodology, the ontological basis must be established through a set of 
assumptions of the nature of the social phenomenon that is subject to 
investigation.  In the context of this chapter, the challenge is to qualify what is the 
‘duality’ of fraud.  ‘Duality’ may (and does) exist as a property of socially 
constructed concepts of crime that are commonly associated with law-
enforcement responses to know examples of the behaviour which their headline 
denotes (Hester & Eglin, 1992).  This property is defined in chapter one 
(introduction) as the variability in outcomes of an offence, and particularly the 
dichotomy between by the use of the criminal justice system or other dispute 
resolution mechanisms.   
 
The extent of this dichotomy is analogous to a degree of dysfunction between 
‘law-in-theory’ and ‘law-in-action’ in the context of the headline offence to which it 
relates, or a specific legal definition of an offence (Black, 1972).  The ‘duality’ 
refers to the extent to which external legal definitions apply to the use of law as a 
social force (Black, 1972; 1976).  In this thesis, the view of the ‘duality’ of any 
offence category is grounded in the relationship and functional association 
between the use of criminal law and a category of offending as a ‘social fact’ 
(Durkheim, 1982).  ‘Social facts’ are both external and independent from 
individuals, and their experience is common to all members of society, yet it may 
be subject to different individualistic interpretations and error in measurement 
(Durkheim, 1982).  No particular individual possesses superior knowledge or 
influence over this reality although levels of insight may vary.  Durkheim (1982) 
discusses ‘social facts’ in terms of a ‘whole that is larger than the sum of its parts’ 
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(p.127), or in distinguishing between the elements making up a biological cell, and 
the gestalt concept of ‘life’ (pp. 128-129).  By similar analogy, ‘social facts’ can be 
considered in terms of an ‘emergent property’: 
Systems at each hierarchical level have two characteristics.  They act as 
wholes (as if they were a homogeneous entity), and their characteristics 
cannot (not even in theory) be deduced from the most complete 
knowledge of the components, taken separately or in other practical 
combination.  In other words, when such systems are assembled from 
their components, new characteristics of the new whole emerge that 
could not have been predicted from knowledge of the components. 
(Mayr, 1985, p.58) 
 
This approach to the ontology of the concept of ‘duality’ provides a useful 
conceptualisation of the hierarchical relationship between the ‘duality’ as a 
‘social fact’, and knowledge of it that can be derived from mere examples.  
Whilst the latter refers to the former, deepened understanding of the 
essential properties of the former ought to be characterised through 
observation of how it interacts with reality, as opposed to its components. 
 
The second ontological component is that which defines what is the meaning 
of the gestalt term of fraud (‘what is fraud’).  The critical discussion in the 
literature review supports a conceptual separation between the definition for 
fraud in sections one through four of the Fraud Act 2006, and the practical 
scoping of ‘criminal’ fraud in the context of RQ1 (‘duality’).  The definition 
adopted for what fraud is, therefore, flows from the 2006 Act and the work of 
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the Law Commission (2002):  Fraud is qualified by dishonest 
misrepresentation, failure to disclose, or abuse of position.  This assumption 
is examined in an historical (pre-industrial) perspective in section 4.3. 
 
3.2.4 Epistemology  
 
This sub-section examines assumptions through which a researcher develops an 
understanding of the ‘duality’ of fraud as a ‘social fact’ (Durkheim, 1982).  
Epistemology is a branch of philosophy that studies means of knowledge 
generation, the derivation of meaning, and discusses logical frameworks 
(assumptions) through which reality could be understood and meaning conveyed 
(Burrell & Morgan, 1979, pp. 1-4).  The above ontological assumption with regards 
to ‘duality’ being a ‘social fact’ is consistent with the positivist epistemological 
positioning, which is grounded in the application of natural sciences logic to the 
social sciences (Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Durkheim, 1982).  The positivist 
assumptions (Bryman, 2004, pp. 13-18) is grounded in the derivation of 
knowledge form empirical observation of reality and the application of deductive 
reasoning towards the nature of the property that is being examined.  It stems 
from the framing of subjects of social sciences research in terms of ‘social facts’ 
that exists independently, similarly to objects of research in the physical sciences 
(Durkheim, 1982; Bryman, 2004).   
 
As discussed in sub-section 2.2.2 above, a validated means of empirical data 
collection and analysis was not directly available from the literature accessed by 
the author.  The context of RQ1 requires a development of an understanding of 
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the ‘duality’ of fraud in historical and contemporary terms through a consistent 
frame of reference.  The relevance of positivism is to the contemporary 
component, as it relates to empirical measurements that can be conduct in the 
timeframe in which this thesis is authored.  The positivist component of the mixed-
methods study in this thesis is presented in section 3.4 below, and in chapter five.  
Whilst the literature review provides relevant theoretical framework that discuss 
variability of resolution mechanism in the context of fraud (section 2.4), a context 
for the understanding of what is being measured was missing. 
 
The framing of the ‘duality’ of fraud in RQ1 as a ‘social fact’ (Durkheim, 1982) 
implies that its contemporary existence and interactions with the social world are a 
continuation of its consistent historical existence and manifestations.  The 
inclusion of an historical dimension to RQ1 (‘duality’) implies the preference of the 
functionalist approach to the nature of society as being of considerable 
consistency in structure and properties of its internal self-regulating functions 
(Weber, 1978; Burrell & Morgan, 1979).  Deductions as to the essential 
characteristics of the ‘duality’ of fraud can be made through functionalist analysis 
(Weber, 1978) of its varying manifestations across socio-economic changes and 
developments (qualitative).  Furthermore, the function of fraud criminalisation can 
be developed as a means for empirical (quantitative) research. 
 
The general inference from historical socio-legal analysis to the understanding of 
the contemporary element of RQ1 and the development of recommendations in 
the context of RQ2 is grounded in functionalist discussed above.  In the context of 
this implementation of a mixed-methods research strategy (Bryman, 2004; Teddlie 
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& Tashakkori, 2009), the interpretivist (‘anti-positivist’) approach to the 
implementation of the qualitative (secondary) of historical socio-legal analysis is 
adopted.  The interpretivist paradigm adds a dimension of analysis through the 
latitude to foster of an understanding based on contextual analysis of a social 
phenomenon and is not necessarily based on primary data (Willis, et al., 2007). 
The ‘reconstruction’ of some properties of the ‘duality’ of fraud through its 
historical manifestation adds value to the development of a subsequent positivist 
study through the functionalist approach (Weber, 1978).  The understanding that 
emerged from the development of the historical socio-legal analysis informed the 
development of the positivist single measurement presented in section 3.4.   
 
On reflection, it is possible that the positivist component design may have been 
developed independently of this context as part of an inquiry of perceptions 
association of criminal law with the concept of fraud.  Nevertheless, the historical 
functional component of RQ1 presented in section 3.3 informs the analysis of the 
findings from the positivist study.  Chapter four serves to deepen the 
understanding of the relationship between the concept of fraud and criminal law.  
The reader will find functionalist analysis of drivers for particularisation, the role of 
law in inter-personal disputes, and the historical divergence between the concepts 
of theft and fraud and the role of Crown prosecution relative to the two.  This 
analysis provides increased depth to the application of the positivist findings and 
the development of recommendations in the context of RQ2 (‘mainstreaming’ and 
‘streamlining’) in chapter six (conclusion and recommendations).  It allowed the 
researcher to refer to an apparent ‘social fact’ (‘law-in-action’) that underpins a 
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dysfunction in effective criminalisation relative to the scope of criminalisation in the 




The design of the approaches to data collection and analysis that are presented in 
sections 3.3, and 3.4 in this chapter and are grounded in a positivist (Bryman, 
2004, pp.13-18) approach to social research.  The research design is influenced 
by Black’s (1972, p.1087) approach to ‘legal sociology’, which studies the law as 
subject to “scientific analysis of legal life as a system of behaviour”.  The 
application of the social sciences to the study of law is a process of “[discovering] 
the principles and mechanisms that predict empirical patterns of law” (Black, 
1972, p. 1096).  This approach relates to the discussion of the social and 
contextual circumstances onto which the categorical criminalisation of ‘all fraud’ 
was applied, as discussed in the literature review above.  Consequently, a two-
phased mixed-methods (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009) approach was adopted as 
discussed below. 
 
‘Phase one’ critically analyses past illustrations of a disparity between criminal and 
other dispute resolution mechanisms in the context of the modern construct of 
profit-driven crime (Naylor, 2003).  A discussion of the research philosophy and 
methodology with of this phase is provided in the proceeding section of this 
chapter, and the analysis and findings are provided in chapter four of this thesis.  
Chapter four provides an inductive functionalist (Weber, 1978) analysis of 
secondary data and sources on dispute resolution from history and sociology 
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literature.  The findings of this investigation provide contextual and functionalist 
understanding of the apparent dysfunction between ‘law-in-theory’ and ‘law-in-
action’ (Black, 1972, p.1087).   
 
‘Phase two’ utilises a positivist (Bryman, 2004, pp.14-18) empirical study that 
features a single measurement to test whether the epistemology of the ‘duality’ of 
fraud (RQ1) enables insightful research and supports theoretical suggestions in 
empirical study.  The critical contribution of ‘phase one’ was in developing an 
epistemological framework to the study of the ‘duality’ of fraud, primarily in the 
form of identifying the underlying social function of effective fraud criminalisation 
(Hester & Eglin, 1992).  The conclusion of chapter four, submits that the effective 
criminalisation of fraud is a manifestation of a ‘sovereign guarantee’ of trust in 
commercial and official conduct.  A single measurement questionnaire was 
developed to denote the extent to which typological features of fraud referred to in 
the literature, in the context of enforcement challenges are associated with a law-
enforcement response (Black, 1976; Naylor, 2003; Button, et al., 2009). 
 
The study of the ‘duality’ of fraud as a ‘social fact’ (Durkheim, 1982) requires an 
explanation of how its essential characteristics can be identified.  Yet the literature 
reviewed by the researcher did not seem to point towards a means of 
understanding the social function of associating fraud with law-enforcement 
activities.  In other words, what social structures and perceptions collectively 
shape the ‘collective consciousness’ to engage the senses to view fraud as a 
challenge to the existing social structure and a basis for law-enforcement 
response (Black, 1976; Durkheim, 1982)?  Nevertheless, such an approach will 
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lack epistemological clarity; how can there be a measurement of ‘a thing’ that 
relates to an underlying social function (Smith, 1776; Weber, 1978) and is not 
itself subject to direct observation (Bollen, 2002; Merton, 2016 [1968])?  In other 
words, what is it that underpins the perceptions and social structures (as they 
exist in contemporary society and historically) that prefer the criminal justice 
system over other resolution mechanisms across the concept of fraud? 
 
The above questions compounded the mixed-methods approach taken in this 
thesis (Bryman, 2004; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009).  RQ1 (‘duality’) was expanded 
to include both contemporary and historical qualitative dimensions in order to 
foster an understanding of the essential characteristics of the social function that 
is later subject to quantitative analysis.  This application differs from mainstream 
triangulation of reality using mixed-methods in the sense that the interpretivist 
functionalist stage (‘phase one’) does not involve primary data collection (Bryman, 
2004).  Instead, the ‘qualitative’ discussion is developed from functionalist 
analysis of historical narrative and specific contributions to the literature on 
historical dispute resolution.  This was preferred over the development of an 
interpretivist analysis of contemporary narrative in favour of an observation of the 
phenomenon of the ‘duality’ of fraud over time and through socio-economic 







3.3 ‘Phase One’ – Secondary Data 
 
3.3.1 Historical Socio-legal Interpretivist Approach   
 
This sub-section provides methodology-oriented discussion of the first of two 
phases of data collection and analysis that were carried out as part of this thesis.  
The study introduced in this section is a secondary-data based interpretivist 
analysis into the essential characteristics of the criminalisation of fraud in English 
law, which is presented in chapter four of this thesis.  The study provides 
functionalist analysis of the historical application of higher ‘amounts’ of law (Black, 
1976) in response to incidents of fraud.  The study reflects an attempt to develop 
a deepened understanding of the social function behind the association of 
different ‘amounts’ of law (Black, 1976) and settlement agents (Black & 
Baumgartner, 1983) with fraud.  The reader will find in chapter four a systematic 
inquiry into the variability of fraud resolution mechanisms in a socio-legal historical 
analysis of the ‘duality’ of fraud as a ‘social fact’ (Durkheim, 1982).  The study 
addresses RQ1 (‘duality’) through its historical perspective.  Further analytical 
value to the contemporary analysis of the ‘duality’ of fraud (RQ1) is derived 
consistent with the functionalist assumption (Weber, 1978; Burrell & Morgan, 
1979), as discussed in the above section.  Similarly, the socio-legal historical 
analysis adds value through contextualising ‘mainstreaming’ and ‘streamlining’ 





Five intermediate research objectives (or research questions) were derived from 
RQ1 (‘duality’), and RQ2 (‘mainstreaming’ and ‘streamlining’) and refer to the 
context provided in the literature review in chapter two.  These research objectives 
are aimed to develop an understanding of the essential characteristics of effective 
fraud criminalisation in English law.  These characteristics are discussed in terms 
of an ‘invisible hand’ (Smith, 1776) behind the resolution of fraud using varying 
‘amounts’ of law (Black, 1976).  The reader will note that the modern construct of 
‘criminal justice’ grounded in readily identifiable processes, institutions and court 
jurisdictions, is a recent phenomenon that had begun to emerge in the 1880’s 
(Ashworth, 2000; CPS, 2013).  The research objectives are therefore articulated 
using the constant of ‘use of more law’ (Black, 1976) as a means of denoting the 
underlying social dynamic in use of the modern criminal justice system as a 
resolution mechanism.  The following are the intermediate research objectives 
that were developed to address the historical component in RQ1 (‘duality’): 
1. Have the defining characteristics of the gestalt of fraud been a constant in 
English law, or a concept shaped by case law or legislation (or both)? 
2. Is the ‘duality’ of fraud (in terms of use of varying ‘amounts’ of law for 
fraud resolution) a historical trend, or a more recent phenomenon? 
3. Was the particularisation of fraud in law aimed at substantiating an 
overriding criminal definition of fraud, or has it specified historical states 
of ‘duality’? 
4. Can the social dynamic behind the historical relationship between use of 
‘higher’ and ‘lower’ amounts of law (‘criminal’ and ‘civil’ or bilateral 
resolution) (Black, 1976) be characterised? 
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5. Given the criminalisation of ‘all thefts’ (Theft Act 1968 as amended) and 
‘all frauds’ (Fraud Act 2006), how did the two concepts relate to the 




As part of this study, a number of legal and historical databases, as well as key 
publications relating to despite resolution, the concept of fraud and the history of 
substantive and procedural law in England and Wales were accessed.  The basic 
structure of the investigation tentatively identified three periods of history that 
were inferred as potentially capturing relevant circumstantial change that would 
offer an opportunity to learn about the ‘duality’ of fraud as a ‘social fact’ 
(Durkheim, 1982).  The three periods were (i) time immemorial to early industrial 
times (1189 – circa 1750), (ii) circa 1750 – the introduction of public prosecution in 
England (1880), and (iii) 1880 onwards.  The analysis of the first and second 
periods is provided in chapter four, whereas the analysis of the third period was 
amalgamated into the discussion and analysis provided in the literature review.  
Chapter five (‘phase two’ and see section 3.4) relates to the contemporary period 
in which this thesis was authored.  The identification of the above time periods 
flows from the discussion in the above section, and particularly the structural-
functionalist assumption towards the ‘duality’ of fraud (Burrell & Morgan, 1979, pp. 
49-57).   
 
The above periods of time, particularly the first and the second, were identified as 
representative of fundamental aspects of social change (industrialisation and shift 
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from agrarian to capitalist society).  Whilst the social dynamic that determines the 
course of fraud resolution itself was assumed to be a lasting ‘social fact’, changes 
to its manifestation were expected to be insightful.  As in the literature review in 
chapter two, the reader will find in chapter four a comparative discussion of the 
concept of fraud relative to the concept of theft.  The introduction of public 
prosecution in the 1880’s (period three above) may appear to drastically change 
the resolution dynamic relative to the concept of theft toward effective categorical 
criminalisation (see section 4.7).  Nevertheless, the reader will find contextual 
analysis of social change as a driver to the re-shaping of the guarantee of the 
right to property in response to social change subject to the structural-functionalist 
assumption (Weber, 1978; Burrell & Morgan, 1979). 
 
The types of sources used can be classed into two categories, literature, and 
secondary data (in the forms of case law, historical archives and legislation).  In 
addition to the theoretical background presented in section two of the literature 
review, which features Black’s (1976) theory of law and third-party theory (Black & 
Baumgartner, 1983), literary sources were used in the following way:  a general 
frame of reference was developed from contributions pertaining to the legal 
history of English law and legal history, both in general, and in relation to 
acquisitive crime and fraud.  This general framework was used to conceptualise a 
time-line of critical developments in procedural law, as well as hallmark changes 
in legislation and fraud-related challenges.  Sources were identified through digital 
library searches of books and journals that provided a genera historical analysis of 
legal history, as well as search of reference to fraud in historical context.  Sources 
used in publications were also accessed if they referred to a theme that appeared 
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to be relevant.  Through Google Scholar (scholar.google.com) there is an option 
to search for publications that cite a particular source – this technique was also 
used alongside the keyword fraud to identify further sources of potential 
relevance.  These searches have also contributed to the identification of 
secondary-data sources that were used in historical research, as discussed in the 
following paragraph. 
 
Secondary-data sources were queried and ‘sifted through’ by the researcher in 
order to provide depth and examples that are insightful in the context of the main 
research questions, as well as address the intermediate research objectives.  
Intermediate research objectives one, three, and five in particular were 
investigated with extensive reliance on:  Bracton (c. 1210 – c. 1268) in Harvard 
Law School Library, 2003), and “British History Online” (Institute of Historical 
Research, n.d.), the “Parliamentary Rolls of Medieval England (Ed. Given-Wilson, 
et al., 2005), and Westlaw.  These databases were searched for the keywords of 
‘fraud’ and ‘defraud’ to identify types of sources and periods of history from which 
relevant records were available for examination by the researcher.  Result types 
included case law, mediaeval legislation, official records of transactions, claims of 
fraud in courts and in political discourse.  Selective and unique examples were 
analysed as they added value in the context of the theoretical frameworks (Black, 
1976; Klerman, 2001), or the intermediate research objectives. 
 
The key analytical contributions from the historical socio-legal study provide 
further epistemological understanding of the social dynamic behind the ‘duality’ of 
fraud, and a basis and justification for empirical study in the following section 
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(Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Weber, 1978).  This is achieved through the 
contextual analysis of fraud in historical records dating back to the thirteenth 
century that demonstrate the historical consistency and durability of the essential 
characteristics of the gestalt term of fraud.  The ‘duality’ of fraud as it has been 
characterised in the discussion of ontology and epistemology in the above section 
is observable in historical records and appears to have been typical of other 
modern definitions of acquisitive crime, inclusive of the concept of theft.  The 
social dynamic behind the ‘duality’ between the use of ‘lesser’ and ‘higher’ 
amounts of law in response to the same acquisitive crime typologies (including 
fraud) is identified in the literature, and further refined by the researcher (Klerman, 
2001).  The role of the concept of theft in the social circumstances from which the 
institutions of public prosecution emerged is contrasted with responses to ‘moral 
panic’ with respect to the concept of fraud (Ashworth, 2000; Taylor, 2013; 
Schubert, 2015).  The historic mode of legislation with respect to fraud 
(‘particularisation’) is characterised as a means of postulating on its function as a 
means of effective criminalisation in the context of interpersonal litigation 
(Klerman, 2001). 
 
3.4 ‘Phase Two’ – Primary Data Collection and Analysis 
 
In this section the reader will find a presentation of the second phase of research 
undertaken in the context of the overall research philosophy and objectives 
presented in section 3.2 above.  The study is based on the epistemological 
expansion on the underlying social dynamic behind the ‘duality’ of fraud (RQ1), 
and the intermediate research objectives discussed in the previous section.  The 
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relevance of the historical insight to the development of a primary-data collection 
tool is grounded in the functionalist (Burrell & Morgan, 1979) assumption.  The 
ontological view of fraud as a ‘social fact’ that is experienced by members of 
society as an external ‘thing’ that is independent of internal interpretation supports 
the survey-based methodology presented below (Durkheim, 1982; Groves, et al., 
2011).  The study is based on the identification of a ‘sovereign guarantee’ of trust 
in commerce and official conduct as the social function fulfilled by effective 
criminalisation of fraud (elaborated upon in chapter four) and seeks to identify its 
present-day scope. 
 
3.4.1 Contemporary Empirical Approach  
 
The discussion in section two of this chapter qualifies the gestalt of fraud using 
sections one through four of the Fraud Act 2006 (Dishonest misrepresentation, 
failure to disclose, or abuse of position).  As part of the overall ontological 
assumption, the definition in the Act is used to capture the essential 
characteristics of fraud as a literal term, and not a criminal offence.  For the 
purposes of phase two and the research design below, the Act applies a 
categorical criminalisation of fraud.  As discussed in chapter two, there appears to 
be a dysfunction between the scope of criminalisation in the Act (‘law-in-theory’), 
and the scope of effective criminalisation (‘law-in-action’) (Black, 1972).  In order 
to clarify this to participants in the study that is presented below, the briefing 
materials (see below and in Appendix A) clearly state that all case descriptions 




3.4.2 Theoretical Background 
 
The study outlined in this section refers to a second phase of theory generation in 
the context of the ‘duality’ of fraud (RQ1).  Different to the above phase one, 
which described a study of secondary data and interpretive approach to analysis, 
this phase two is grounded in a positivist assumption of reality (Weber, 1978; 
Burrell & Morgan, 1979).  The dysfunction between ‘law-in-theory’ and ‘law-in-
action’ (Black, 1972) in the context of fraud is analysed (retrospectively of ‘phase 
one’) through a theoretical perspective, and a functionalist perspective deduced 
from historical interpretation (Durkheim, 1982).  
 
Three assumptions were made with respect to possible theoretical suggestions of 
law-enforcement activities in response to known examples of fraud. The first 
assumption was that ‘predatory’-type offences will generally be better associated 
with law-enforcement activities than offences of the ‘commercial’-type (Naylor, 
2003).  In the literature review, Naylor’s (2003) framework is used to identify a 
typological ‘fault line’ in terms of the likelihood of law-enforcement responses that 
the general fraud offence in Fraud Act 2006 spans across.  The second 
assumption was that offences where harm was directed ‘upwards’ on three social 
scales will typically result with the application of a high ‘amount’ of law 
‘downwards’ on the same social scales.  These social scales are stratification, 
morphology (relative positioning in the division of labour) and organisation (in 
terms of rank and relative exclusive associations) (Black, 1976).  The third 
assumption was that particularised offences will generally be better associated 
with law-enforcement activities than those subject to conduct-based 
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criminalisation.  The third assumption also needed to be tested against the first 
two and include examples of ‘predatory’ and ‘commercial’ types of fraud, in order 
to examine the relationship between statutory legislation, and the social dynamic 
of fraud resolution and the role of law therein.  
 
3.4.3 Design  
 
The following section presents a cross-sectional study (Bryman, 2004, pp. 11-44) 
designed to measure the perception of the ‘sovereign guarantee’ of trust as a 
means of denoting the effective criminalisation of fraud (see chapter four).  The 
selected means of primary data collection at this stage was conducting a survey-
based study, featuring a single measurement (see below).  An online survey-
based tool was selected due to its advantages and correlation to the positivist 
paradigm on which the philosophical approach to data collection and analysis is 
based.  An online survey provides a means to record observations made by 
multiple individuals who are independent of the researcher.  The survey is 
provided in full in Appendix A.  In Appendix A appears a section 2 of the 
questionnaire, which does not form a part of the methodology presented in this 
chapter or the scope of discussion in this thesis.  Section 2 was included in the 
survey as an opportunity to collect data in relation to a separate research interest 
that relates to victim imperative and indirect-victimisation (Levi & Burrows, 2008), 
and will not be further discussed.  Section 2 of the questionnaire in the appendix 
does not form a part of the scope of this thesis, and references to Appendix A are 




The measure is captured through an indication of the typically applicable ‘amount’ 
of law using a scale of possible responses to fraud.  The survey questioned 
financial investigators and laypersons to indicate what they consider to be the 
most likely resolution mechanism in relation to sixteen (16) hypothetical fraud 
offences.  Included in the briefing was an explicit qualification that all examples of 
fraud included in the study were criminal offences.  The scale was developed 
specifically for this study so as to represent types of potential resolution 
mechanisms, and to measure ‘how much law’ participants would view as most 
probable (Black, 1976).  It presents participants with a question of ‘what typically 
happens’ as opposed to asking participants to indicate their consideration of ‘what 
ought to happen’ as discussed in section 3.2 above. 
 
The research design seeks to measure a social dynamic that exists independently 
of particular individuals and may be experienced with only slight variation 
(Durkheim, 1982) (the ‘duality’ of fraud, see 3.2.3).  The ability of measuring the 
effects of a social self-regulation functions (Weber, 1978) in the context of RQ1 
(‘duality’) and generating observations that correspond to analytical themes from 
the literature review were the main design imperatives.  This measurement 
relative to the three theoretical assumption discussed in the previous sub-section 
was intended to test suggestion of association between different types and 
circumstances of fraud and law-enforcement activities (Black, 1976; Naylor, 
2003).  The use of a survey was preferred as a means of data collection for a 
number of practical and ethical reasons.  From a practical standpoint, a survey-
based design enables the application of a consistent measurement of a ‘social 
fact’ through the perceptions of a (potentially) large number of observers 
156 
 
(participants).  Despite its advantages, using a survey-based tool generally limits 
the quality and depth of data collected from participants (Bryman, 2004; De Vaus, 
2013).    
 
The survey was designed to support quantitative analysis as part of an overall 
mixed-methods approach to research (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009; De Vaus, 
2013).  This survey design is a single measurement questionnaire based on a 
five-point ordinal scale (Stevens, 1946; 1951), and a general assumption is made 
is that the interpretation of the meaning of the measurement (hypothetical 
question and scale) is consistent (Groves, et al., 2011).  One dimension of this 
assumption that was not part of the interaction with the questions and scale was 
the extent to which participants are aware of the scope of fraud criminalisation in 
English law.  This study measures perceptions of ‘law-in-action’ as an experience 
of an external social fact (Durkheim, 1982) and participants are therefore not 
tested for their knowledge of ‘law-in-theory’ (the Fraud Act 2006).  This was 
mitigated by the explicit identification of all hypothetical examples as criminal 
offences in the briefing and consent sheet so as to clarify the ‘law-in-theory’ to be 
that all examples in the measurement could be investigated by a law-enforcement 
agency.  The ‘duality’ is therefore measured subject to this supposition as the 
extent to which participants apply their perceptions to what they understand to be 
an offence, yet its resolution is determined by another social function (Smith, 
1776; Weber, 1978; Durkheim, 1982).   
 
Whilst the above addresses the question of comprehension, the below discussion 
addresses the process of ‘retrieval of impression’ (perceptions) (Tourangeau, et 
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al., 2000).  The survey design was careful not to sequence the case descriptions 
in a manner that may suggest a progressive hierarchy or relativity in ‘severity’ or 
harm or support assimilation or contrast effects (Schwarz, et al, 1991).  
Assimilation effects may affect responses when similar questions appear in close 
proximity and the judgement of the latter is influenced by relevant consideration 
given to the former.  For example, chapter five includes a discussion of difference 
in responses between typologically similar survey questions (abbreviated as ‘Q’), 
Q5 and Q10.  The two questions represent a very similar predatory-type scenario 
that was worded in terms of ‘predatory’- and ‘commercial’-type offences 
interchangeably (Naylor, 2003).  These offences were intentionally separated in 
sequence, so findings could best reflect independent consideration of each 
question.  Contrast effects may influence results when a previous question 
appears to create a ‘threshold’ to the one that follows by creating a clear 
benchmark for comparison.  To that end, the sequencing of hypothetical examples 
of fraud harm and victimisation in the questionnaire distances narratives that were 
similar or dissonant in terms of narrative, socio-economic circumstances, or 
typology.  (Schwarz, et al, 1991; Tourangeau, et al., 2000) 
 
The ethical considerations related in particular to participants who are employed 
in law-enforcement or financial investigation or intelligence functions (see sample 
below).  Surveys can offer participants a high degree of anonymity, and the 
survey presented in this section was designed with this consideration in mind.  
The survey was administered either in paper format, or using an online platform 
configured not to record browser and Internet Protocol (“IP”) data.  This degree of 
anonymity meant that upon paper submission or online completion, there was no 
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potentially identifying information available for the researcher or through the 
author’s online survey site account.  Two items of nominal-categorical information 
were collected from participants.  First, participants were asked to indicate 
whether they are professionally employed in a financial investigation or 
intelligence function (in law-enforcement or otherwise) in a form of a yes or no 
question.  Second, participants were asked to indicate the geographical area in 
which they reside by their police constabulary.  The details collected by the 
researcher did not fall under the definition of sections one and two of the Data 
Protection Act 1998, and therefore did not require further action to protect the 
identities of participants.  Affording this level of anonymity alongside the generic 
nature of the questionnaire, and the non-sensitive nature of the questions using 
vignettes was a design parameter from the point of conception.  The researcher 
sought to encourage participants, and particularly financial investigators working 
in the government and private sector, by not including any meaningful identifying 
details that may refer to known case law, and by designing a measurement that 
does not ask for opinion on matters of professional practice. 
 
The analysis of the above survey was also intended to be supplemented by 
qualitative analysis of semi-structured interviews with practitioner stakeholders, 
based on the findings from the historical socio-legal study (phase one).  The 
intended design for the interview-based study called for a non-probability stratified 
convenience sample and identified possible participants from organisations such 
as the CPS, SFO, CoLP, a regional force in the Midlands area, a local force in the 
Midlands area, private sector solicitors and barristers.  A sample of up to five 
(N=5) was considered for this stage.  The semi-structured interviews would have 
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expanded on themes from the literature, primarily victim imperatives and the use 
of alternative resolution mechanisms (Levi & Burrows, 2008; Smith, et al., 2011; 
Fisher, 2015; Smith & Shepherd, 2017) as well as the concept of fraud in the 
context of the criminal justice system (Button, 2011; Button, et al., 2013; 2015; 
Levi, et al., 2015).  The provisional interview framework included specific 
questions to different stakeholder groups.   
 
Ultimately, potential interview participants were difficult to reach given the 
(perceived) sensitivity of discussing the dysfunction between the extent of fraud 
criminalisation, and effective enforcement.  Would-be participants that were 
approached through networking were generally unwilling to participate.  A small 
number of practitioners were open to the idea of participation in the form of 
interviews; however, they requested considerable information about the analytical 
approach and emerging conclusions in advance.  This respondent need for prior 
comprehensive knowledge of the study (beyond consent requirements) made the 
empirical value-added of these interviews doubtful.   
 
The author’s primary concern was the extent of conversation that (repeatedly with 
different individuals) had to happen with potential interviewee practitioners.  
Substantive conversations with would-be participants pertained specifically to 
elements of case-law, critique of legislation that is part of the literature review in 
chapter two, and discussion of the context that was developed from ‘phase one’ 
(see chapter four).  Ultimately, the researcher grew concerned of these 
preliminary conversations possibly determining some aspects of the interviews 
and thereby undermine the quality of possible data collection.  This barrier to the 
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requirement of practitioner interviewee participants without substantive pre-





The sample for this survey-based study utilises a non-probability convenience 
sampling method (Bryman, 2012), which includes one-hundred-and-forty (N=140) 
participants.  There are two groups in the sample.  The first group includes fifty-
one (N=51) individuals with a professional background in financial investigations 
whether law-enforcement or otherwise.  The second group includes eighty-nine 
(N=89) laypersons who did not indicate a professional involvement in financial 
investigations.  More information on participant outreach, interaction and response 
rate in provided in sub-section 3.4.6 further below.  
 
The use of a non-probability sample was not the preferred approach to data 
collection, yet it emerged as the most applicable.  The original intention was to 
collect responses from two separate samples, a stratified probability sample, and 
a non-probability convenience sample of laypersons.  The stratified probability 
sample was intended to include National Crime Agency (NCA) accredited financial 
investigators across the UK who were potentially accessible as a group via an 
electronic portal with access provided by a practitioner-colleague-turned-
academic.  The request to distribute the survey in this manner was denied as use 
of the portal is restricted to law enforcement personnel.  In addition to indicating 
whether they were professionally involved in financial investigations, participants 
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were asked to indicate their general area of residence based on police 
constabulary localities in the UK.  Participants were asked to select one of forty-
two local force areas in England and Wales (for example, Derbyshire or South 
Wales), or the regional force of Scotland (Police Scotland) or that of Northern 
Ireland (Police Service of Northern Ireland).  This was included in the data 
collection in order to facilitate possible collaboration with a third-party that was 
conducting national-level data collection for Action Fraud.  As this prospect was 
not realised, data pertaining to local police jurisdiction in which participants 
resided was not included in the analysis of findings or the aggregated dataset of 
responses (see Appendix B). 
 
3.4.5 Measures  
 
This section presents a single measurement that was developed from Black’s 
(1976) theory of law for the purpose of measuring the ‘duality’ of fraud and tests 
potential theoretical indicators of its essential properties from the literature (3.4.3).  
The measurement asks participants to assign the most likely official responses to 
sixteen short hypothetical descriptions of harm and victimisation, which are 
identified for participants in advance as criminal offences.  These are numbered 
as questions one through sixteen (Q1-Q16) in the thesis for ease of reference, 
though the questions began at number seven in the survey due to consent and 
related questions (see Appendix A).  Each case description was followed by five 
possible resolution scenarios (consistent across the questionnaire), with each 
representing an increment in the ‘amount’ of law exercised in what he/she 
considered a typical resolution of a given form of victimisation.  The increments 
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were in response to each case description using the following five-point ordinal 
scale (Stevens, 1946; 1951): 
1. A criminal investigation potentially leading to an arrest. 
2. The incident being reported to a law-enforcement agency but taken no 
further. 
3. Regulatory sanctions / commercial litigation. 
4. The victim takes other steps against the perpetrator or recovers some of 
the losses from the perpetrator. 
5. No action is taken by law-enforcement or the victim. 
 
Each increment represented a category of resolution mechanisms and expressed 
decreasing ‘amounts’ (Black, 1976) of law going from option one towards option 
five.  The ‘duality’ of fraud (RQ1) is manifested through the ratio between option 
one (criminal investigation) and other resolution mechanism across the sixteen 
hypothetical examples.  Option two indications manifest a barrier to successfully 
unpack the concept of fraud as a criminal offence in the interface between the 
victim and the criminal justice system (RQ2).  The sixteen examples in this study 
span across the theoretical ‘fault lines’ identified in section 2.4 of the literature 
review (Black, 1976; Naylor, 2003), and include frauds that are subject to 
particularised criminalisation or criminalised only under the Fraud Act 2006. 
 
In the context of RQ1 (‘duality’), section 3.2 discusses the researcher’s review of 
the literature and the apparent absence of a validated tool to measure a 
dysfunction between ‘law-in-theory’ and ‘law-in-action’ directly in the context of 
this study (Black, 1972).  As discussed in chapter two, the literature qualifies 
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effective criminalisation with the association of known examples of a behaviour 
with responses by law-enforcement agencies.  In terms of Black’s (1976) theory of 
law, law-enforcement activities can represent the ‘highest’ amount of law when 
they are compared to other resolution mechanisms in the context of fraud, such as 
regulatory actions, civil litigation or bilateral resolution.  Outcomes and relative 
‘amounts’ of law within each category, particularly downstream implications of law-
enforcement activities, do not provide additional qualification for the measurement 
of ‘law-in-action’ (Black, 1972; 1976; Hester & Eglin, 1992).  
 
In the context of RQ2 (‘mainstreaming’ and ‘streamlining’), there is further 
analytical value in identifying typically unfulfilled demand for law-enforcement 
activities.  The literature indicates that victims of fraud have a lesser tendency to 
engage law-enforcement agencies in response to fraud harm and victimisation 
(Ganzini, et al., 2001; Green, 2004; Levi & Burrows, 2008; Smith, et al., 2011; 
National Fraud Authority, 2013; Smith & Shepherd, 2017).  Other contributions 
shed light on challenges experienced by victims who do interact with law-
enforcement agencies in response to fraud harm and victimisation (Button, et al., 
2009; 2013).  As discussed in section 2.4, the researcher recognises the role of 
unfulfilled demand for law-enforcement in contributing to lower reporting rates and 
further disassociation of known examples of fraud with a criminal justice system 
outcome.  Thus, there was a need to include an expression of such unfulfilled 
demand to distinguish between typically otherwise resolved frauds (through civil 





In response to this imperative and the lack of validated tools in the literature, a 
novel measurement was developed for implementation as phase two.  The 
measure was the five-point ordinal scale (noted above and described below in this 
section) to represent differing ‘amounts’ of law (Black, 1976) to respond to the 
challenges posed by RQ1 and RQ2.  The scale is directly related to social theory 
(Black, 1976; Black & Baumgartner, 1983) and existing resolution mechanisms 
that are commonly recognisable, and applicable to the context of fraud (Levi & 
Burrows, 2008; Fisher, 2015; Smith & Shepherd, 2017).  
 
The single measurement is designed to provide an empirical basis through which 
to evaluate the extent to which a categorical criminalisation of fraud (‘law-in-
theory’) is experienced (‘law-in-action’) as a social fact (Durkheim, 1982).  The 
measurement includes hypothetical examples of fraud that were designed to 
represents different theoretical suggestions of association of fraud with law-
enforcement activities discussed in section 2.4 (Black, 1976; Naylor, 2003).  The 
hypothetical cases in the measurement also include three types of particularised 
offences identified from the functionalist analysis in ‘phase one’ (see section 4.6).  
The three hypotheticals subject to particularisation were included so provide and 
empirical basis for further analytical discussion to the critique of conduct-based 
criminalisation in section 2.6 (Tappan, 1947).  Fourteen of the sixteen hypothetical 
offences relate to typologies where the identity of the offender is known, or it could 
potentially be readily discoverable.  This was done so as to focus analytical 
attention on the application of legislation (RQ2) and not investigatory or evidential 
challenges.  The two remaining hypotheticals relate to the concept of ‘cybercrime’, 
which suffers from objective investigatory difficulties and technological barriers to 
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attribution of offending to a legal entity, and the involvement of transnational 
offending groups (Levi, et al., 2015).  The two offences were included so to 
contrast (if possible from the data) the application of legislation from the attribution 
and enforcement challenge.  Alternatively, the data may suggest that perceptions 
towards the likelihood of law-enforcement activities in the context of fraud are 
similar regardless of the prospects of offender identification in some cases. 
 
The measurement tool was designed to empirically assess the extent to which the 
legislative intent (a generalised ‘sovereign guarantee’ of trust) may be perceived 
by participants as the typical response to given forms of fraud offences.  The null-
hypothesis was that the assumptions and justifications for the Fraud Act 2006, in 
the creation of a dishonesty conduct offence, would have created a clear and 
consistent association between fraud offences and law-enforcement responses.  
In other words, the instigation of criminal investigations should be indicated at a 
high frequency across the sixteen hypothetical descriptions of fraud and 
representing a low standard deviation value (RQ1).  In order to isolate a criminal 
investigation outcome from cases where fraud is being reported but not 
investigated further, an option to indicate that a fraud would have been reported to 
law-enforcement was included.  The inclusion of option two was intended to 
distinguish between a resolution mechanism other than a criminal investigation 
through the preference of another settlement-agent (Black & Baumgartner, 1983), 
or through challenges in engaging law-enforcement (RQ2).   The frequency of 
option two indications is intended to reflect a contribution of the contextual and 
practical dysfunctions between a dishonesty-based conduct offence and the 




In order to enhance the possible utility of this tool, which was bespoke to this 
study as there was no validated analogue in the literature, advice was sought from 
a retired UK financial investigator with respect to the design of this instrument.  A 
version of the questionnaire was subsequently tested as a pilot study with ten 
(N=10) participants, including financial investigators in active service at a local 
midlands area police force.  The pilot study participants provided oral comments 
to the contact, which were communicated along with completed test pilot paper 
copies (some of which contained written comments).  The comments highlighted 
specific points where questions were not sufficiently clear to participants.  No 
comments were made with respect to the scale developed for this study.  The pilot 
study and resulting conversation with colleagues and the director of studies 
should lend a degree of face validity to the design of the tool.  The study does 
repeat a manner of presentation of hypothetical description of harm and 
victimisation, which has been validated in the literature (Levi & Jones, 1985; 




The survey was distributed as a link to an online platform (smartsurvey.co.uk) and 
in paper format based on a printout of the online survey (see appendix A).  The 
questions were presented in the same sequence to all participants (see above on 
measures).  Arrangements were made for the survey to be sent via the Midlands 
Fraud Forum (MFF) weekly email newsletter for a period of one month following 
the inclusion of the study in the chairman’s opening remarks at the MFF annual 
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conference in February 2016.  Several professional contacts were asked to email 
a link to the survey in a number of private sector bodies that are involved in 
financial investigations.  Outreach efforts also benefited from opportunities to 
include an invitation to link to the survey in an internal email to criminology 
colleagues at the University of Derby.    
 
Data collection was further supported by attending an MFF ‘masterclass’ in 
Birmingham with a substantial number of financial investigation professionals from 
law-enforcement, public bodies and the private sector.  During that masterclass, a 
number of tablet devices were circulated to collect responses from attendees by 
accessing the survey on the website through a tablet computer.  The number of 
responses collected on that day was significantly limited by the duration of time it 
took individuals to complete the survey using a web browser on a tablet device 
(approximately ten minutes per participants in a noisy environment).  The 
researcher proceeded to use printouts of the survey (adapted for formatting) in 
future opportunities to collect data from financial investigators (FI) and laypersons.  
This avoided ‘bottleneck’ limitations on the number of participants that can be 
asked to complete the survey at any given time (up to three using the three tablet 
devices that were available with assistance from colleagues for such 
opportunities).  The paper format questionnaires also seem to have been 
completed by participants quicker than the online version accessed through a 
tablet device, most likely since ticking a box with a pen was less time consuming 
than touching a tick-box on a screen.  On reflection, more FI participants could 
have been included if the online version would have been reserved to email-




Opportunities where noteworthy amounts of data were collected included an 
outdoor charity event in the Derby area in the summer of 2016 as well as a 
professional conference hosted by the University of Birmingham (both with the 
consent of the organisers).  Other events were attended and yielded few (or no) 
participants, namely a general-theme research conference hosted by the 
University of Derby, and a national level event hosted in a law-enforcement 
training facility.   A final email appeal was sent to all undergraduate criminology 
students at the University of Derby in early 2017, which yielded very few 
participants.  The response rate cannot be accurately determined due to the 
number of broad email appeals made on behalf of the author by third-parties 
(namely the MFF and the University of Derby), and in-person appeals.  
Furthermore, a handful of colleagues promised to disseminate a link to the online 
survey in internal law-enforcement and private sector distribution networks.  The 
researcher cannot verify the extent to which such dissemination had occurred or 
quantify the scope of outreach achieved by such efforts.  A reasonable 
assumption given the above context would place the response rate at about 3%, 
with about 20% of the estimated outreach being based on faith alone and not 
subject to verification. 
 
Participants were asked to indicate if they had a professional background in 
financial investigation on the consent sheet.  All participants had to indicate their 
consent to participate in the study and were given the author’s email address, so 
they could make future contact if they were to have further questions.  Participants 
with a professional background in financial investigation had to confirm that they 
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either had line manager approval to participate in the anonymous survey, or that 
they did not require such authorisation.   
 
Upon the completion of the online survey or the handing in of a paper format, 
there were no parameters that could be used to identify an individual participant, 
and upon completion withdrawal was no longer possible.  This is due to the 
original design decision made to appeal to law-enforcement practitioner by not 
including potentially identifying information in the data collection.  A completed 
paper-format survey only identified whether the participants is professionally 
involved in financial investigations, and the area of police jurisdiction where he or 
she resides.  Online survey responses included the same details, as the 
researcher ensured the disabling of features such as IP logging (which would 
have preserved time stamps of access to the survey, IP addresses, operating 
system and web-browser versions amongst other potentially identifying details).  
An inclusion of a withdrawal mechanism would therefore have had to include a 
unique reference number that participants would self-generate, and thereby 
introduce a theoretical means through which responses could be attributed to 
individual participants.  In addition, as follows from the design decision, the survey 
asks for the participant’s opinion of typical resolution of sixteen brief hypothetical 
descriptions of fraud harm and victimisation.  This means that participants 
(practitioners in particular) do not express an opinion that is relevant to ‘real-world’ 
cases, areas of professional practice, or opinions as to ‘what ought to be’ in the 




3.4.7 Analytical approach 
 
There were no missing results due to online survey settings wherein participants 
would either answer each question in turn, and complete the whole survey, or 
elect to withdraw (from the survey as a whole) at any point by ending the session.  
This included the option to withdraw after the survey was completed as the 
debriefing provided the final opportunity to consent to participate in the survey.  
The author followed the same principles above used for the online survey to the 
paper-format survey returns.  A small number of paper-format surveys were 
discarded (about ten), and these paper-format questionnaires included responses 
to two or three questions out of the sixteen.  Since the design of the tool identifies 
responses to the sixteen hypotheticals as a single measurement, these partial 
responses were not included as response (meaning they do not form a part of the 
eventual sample of one-hundred-and-forty (N=140).  This is consistent with the 
mandating of a box to be ticked for each of the sixteen hypotheticals in the online 
versions of the survey, meaning the survey could not have been completed and 
the response recorded had not all sixteen questions been answered.  Insular 
responses do not represent the experience of a member of society who becomes 
aware of the different typological, contextual and situational attributes of fraud that 
are tested in the survey.  Such incomplete single measurements do not properly 
capture the nature of the social phenomenon of the ‘duality’ of fraud, and do not 
contribute to meaningful analysis of the varying amounts of law applied in the 
context of fraud.  No examples of ‘nearly completed’ paper-format questionnaires 
were submitted to the researcher (meaning ones with almost all sixteen questions 
answered, or beyond the first two or three).  The final data set thus included only 
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(online and paper-based) fully completed questionnaires representing a single 
measurement. 
 
The results were uploaded to the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(SPSS) for descriptive analysis (Pallant, 2013).  Given that each of the sixteen 
scenarios were measured on a five-point ordinal scale, the statistics that were 
included were mode, median, and frequency (N and percentage).  Additional 
analysis was conducted on aggregated percentages of response selections 
relative to each of the sixteen hypotheticals in the measurement.  To assess 
whether there was statistical significance to the variation in responses between 
the FI and laypersons subgroups the Mann Whitney U-test (Ruxton, 2006) was 
used on each of the sixteen questions in the measurement.  The test assumes 
that variations in responses in a non-parametric (ordinal) measurement between 
the two sub-groups is equal.  Observation of instances where the distribution of 
results is 0.05 consistent or less, are defined as negating the assumption of equal 
variability, which requires further analytical discussion of its possible origins 
(Ruxton, 2006).  These results and discussion are included in chapter five. 
 
In chapter five, the results are presented, and analytical discussion is provided in 
reference to the main research questions, Black’s (1976) theory of law, Naylor’s 
(2003) typology of profit-driven crime, and particularised legislation (see section 
2.5).  The percentages of option one indications are across the sixteen 
hypotheticals in the measurement.  No pre-determination was made to create a 
‘threshold’ for effective criminalisation, as it is qualitatively defined in the literature 
as an association with law-enforcement activities without a quantitative 
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qualification of which the researcher was aware (Hester & Eglin, 1992).  Instead, 
the approach to analysis that was adopted sought to qualify effective 
criminalisation of fraud in this study relative to itself, and applicable to the concept 
of fraud alone.  This effectiveness of the three assumptions that were made in the 
design is tested against the analysis of the variation of option one indications in 
the context of the operative properties of the hypotheticals and their correlation to 
the empirical findings (RQ1).  The same procedure was repeated with respect to 
RQ2 in the examination of indication of a ‘demand gap’ for law-enforcement 
activities that is not fulfilled despite victim engagement.  The discussion in the 
chapter includes further insight as to the validity of the theoretical and contextual 
variables through which the researcher critically discussed the dysfunction 
between ‘law-in-action’ and ‘law-in-theory’ in the context of fraud in chapters two 
and four.  The chapter presented ‘groups’ of offences based on a descending 
order of option one indications by participants and examines potential 
generalisations that can be made in response to varying association of fraud with 




In the above chapter, the author detailed the research philosophy and justification 
for a mixed-methods (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009) approach in the development 
of a means to study the main research questions.  In section 3.2, the development 
of the research philosophy was presented through discussion of the role of the 
author as a decisionmaker and a source for error in developing a research 
strategy.  This discussion was followed by an evaluation of research strategies 
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related to the study of fraud from the literature and a critical evaluation of their 
suitability as data collection and analysis tools relative to the main research 
questions.  The normative preference of the author led to the development of an 
approach based on case-law analysis and the use of textual analysis software 
(NVIVO) to develop systematic understanding of the essential characteristics of 
the ‘duality’ of fraud.  Whilst the development of this approach did not result with a 
tool that was judged to be potentially applicable to the topic of this thesis, it 
formed part of the author’s process (and personal development vector) towards 
the research strategy in this thesis.   
 
Section 2.3 concludes with a justification for mixed-methods approach that is 
justified by the ontological assumption towards the ‘duality’ of fraud as a ‘social 
fact’, and the development of an epistemological discussion.  The initial attempts 
by the author to systematise historical case-law pointed towards the analytical 
value in observing manifestation of the ‘invisible hand’ (Smith, 1776) that 
determines the course of fraud resolution.  This supported the inclusion of an 
historical component to the framing of RQ1 (see section 1.2), and the 
development of a socio-legal historical functionalist analysis (Weber, 1978) of the 
role of criminal law relative to the concept of fraud.  This analysis informed the 
development of a positivist phase (Bryman, 2004, pp. 13-18) that features a 
bespoke single measurement.  The analytical approach to the empirical positivist 
phase incorporated theoretical elements from the literature in the context of the 
contemporary ‘duality’ of fraud (RQ1).  In addition, the analytical approach also 
incorporated parameters for further functionalist analysis toward the development 




In section 3.3, the first of the two phases of research was presented.  Five 
intermediate research objectives were derived from RQ1 (‘duality’) in order to 
develop a depended understanding of essential characteristics of the historical 
‘duality’ of fraud as a consistent normalising social function (Weber, 1978; 
Durkheim, 1982).  The researcher explained the justification for a historical socio-
legal investigation of the ‘duality’ of fraud as a means of fostering a critical 
understanding of the social function of effective criminalisation (as opposed to 
stated intention).  Independent of the legislative means, the effective 
criminalisation of fraud is contrasted with the social function behind the effective 
criminalisation of theft – the protection of the right to property (Griew, 1995).  The 
‘sovereign guarantee’ of trust in commercial and official conduct is proposed as 
the social dynamic behind the effective criminalisation of fraud, and the 
characteristics of sovereign interest in substantiation the protection of trust.   
 
In section 3.4, a positivist empirical research tool (Bryman, 2004, pp. 13-18) is 
presented as a second phase designed to test the hypothesis raised in phase 
one.  This second phase of research presents a sample of one-hundred-and-forty 
(N=140) financial investigators and laypersons with a single measurement tool 
based upon Black’s (1976) theory of law representation of possible resolution 
mechanisms.  The survey measures the extent to which fraud is effectively 
criminalised, and three theoretical suggestions are included in the design and 
approach to analysis so to test their relevance to the development of an 
understanding of the role of criminal law relative to the concept of fraud.  The 
study features a bespoke single measurement that is based on an adaptation of 
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seemingly related methodologies discussed in the conclusion of the literature 
review.  The key difference between other perception-based surveys in the 
context of fraud policy is the focus on ‘what is’ in the context of the relationship 






Chapter Four: Historical Perspective  
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter provides a historical analysis of fraud resolution mechanisms through 
the use of social theory.  The investigation into the ‘invisible hand’ (Smith, 1776) 
that determines the contemporary resolution of fraud using the criminal justice 
system from other resolution mechanisms (‘duality’, RQ1) is particularly important 
given the categorical criminalisation of fraud under the Fraud Act 2006.  This 
dysfunction between ‘law-in-theory’ and ‘law-in-action’ (Black, 1972) with respect 
to the effective association of the 2006 Act offences with law-enforcement 
activities.  Black (1972; 1976) includes the concept of law as being subject to 
direct observation using standard social science methods.  In the context of the 
criminalisation of fraud, its association with law-enforcement activities can serve 
as common instrument to identify the extent to which the law effectively prohibits 
the phenomenon (Hester & Eglin, 1992).  Nevertheless, this study does not 
examine the historical effectiveness of enforcement in the context of fraud, but 
rather examines historical mechanisms of resolution and their development in 
relation to the concepts of fraud and theft. 
 
The concepts of fraud and theft were initially similar in terms of possible resolution 
mechanisms, their functionality, and in terms of the apparent dynamic which 
determined the course of resolution for such disputes.  In contemporary English 
law, both concepts are subject to categorical criminalisation under the Fraud Act 
2006 and the Theft Act 1968 (as amended).  The researcher was interested in 
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investigating the root causes for the contemporary difference with respect to these 
previously similarly resolved phenomena.  In the following section, the theoretical 
framework of Black’s (1976) theory of law and third-party theory (Black & 
Baumgartner, 1983) are presented and applied as a means of studying the 
‘duality’ of fraud as a social phenomenon (Black, 1976; Black & Baumgartner, 
1983).  This social framework is subsequently used to characterise the underlying 
social dynamic behind the resolution of fraud and theft, and their industrial-era 
divergence.  This study was developed using the following five intermediate 
research objectives presented in section 3.3: 
1. Are the defining characteristics of the gestalt of fraud a constant in 
English law, or a concept shaped by case law or legislation (or both)? 
2. Is the ‘duality’ of fraud (in terms of use of varying ‘amounts’ of law for 
fraud resolution) a historical trend, or a more recent phenomenon? 
3. Was the particularisation of fraud in law aimed at substantiating an 
overriding criminal definition of fraud, or has it specified historical states 
of ‘duality’? 
4. Can the social dynamic behind the historical relationship between use of 
‘higher’ and ‘lower’ amounts of law (‘criminal’ and ‘civil’ or bilateral 
resolution) (Black, 1976) be characterised? 
5. Given the criminalisation of ‘all thefts’ (Theft Act 1968 as amended) and 
‘all frauds’ (Fraud Act 2006), how did the two concepts relate to the 
development and social functions of the institutions of public prosecution? 
 
The study was conducted through the interrogation of secondary data sources 
and selected academic and classic English jurisprudence and legal history titles.  
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The following sources were used for targeted keyword searches (fraud, defraud) 
and for broader reference:  The Institute of Historical Research at the University of 
London School of Advanced Study (Institute of Historical Research, n.d.), “Bracton 
on the Laws and Customs of England”, attributed to Henry of Bratton, c. 1210-
1268” (Harvard Law School Library , 2003), and the Parliamentary Rolls of 
Medieval England (Ed. Given-Wilson, et al., 2005) and Westlaw.  Other sources 
from the literature are referred to at the appropriate passages in this chapter, as 
well as references to specific records and statutes from the aforementioned 
sources when specific examples are provided. 
 
In section 4.2, the social circumstances in pre-industrial England are presented, 
alongside the commonality in resolution dynamic between pre-industrial fraud and 
other contemporary criminal concepts.  Prior to the emergence of public 
prosecution in England in the 1880’s, only in limited circumstances of direct harm 
against the state would a person be subject to prosecution by the Crown.  Instead, 
many contemporary criminal concepts would have been addressed through 
compensatory justice, and the courts would preside over matters if a plaintiff 
would bring a petition and take on the financial cost of so doing.  The functional 
role of this form of litigation is analysed as an ultimate means of coercion in 
securing just compensation, whether through adjudication of the premise of 
alleged liability (points of facts and of law) or by authority.  The researcher refers 
to the punitive means (by authority) that underpinned compensation orders by the 
courts, which applied to those who did not satisfy court orders, or ‘legitimate’ 




Private prosecution is seen as inherently analogous to contemporary ‘civil’ 
litigation.  It represents an escalation of a dispute and the use of the courts to 
secure a remedy to address an injustice and is driven by the allegedly aggrieved 
party.  By contrast, prosecution by the Crown did not seek to amend a wrong 
through compensation, but rather to use punitive means to address a subversive 
act against royal authority and supremacy.  This form of litigation is, therefore, 
similar to the contemporary use of the criminal courts.  Nevertheless, in the 
absence of a concept of public prosecution, it is not to say that those actions that 
were not subject to Crown prosecution were ‘legitimate’, but rather they were civil 
wrongs and grounds for compensation.  In that sense, both the concepts of theft 
and fraud appear to have been subject to the same resolution dynamic, and their 
‘duality’ subject to a similar characterisation. 
 
In section 4.3, the author uses historical records to unpack the pre-industrial 
defining characteristics of the gestalt of fraud in order to validate the ontological 
assumption made with regards to the definition of fraud in this thesis.  In section 
3.2.3 the researcher refers to the meaning of the term ‘fraud’ in sections one 
through four of the Fraud Act 2006.  This definition is independent of the question 
of whether a particular fraud is subject to criminal law in the context in which the 
term is used.  This discussion also addresses the argument by the Law 
Commission on Fraud (2002), which placed an emphasis on the absence of a 
definition for fraud in statute.  It would appear that the use of the term fraud in 
legal records and in examples of its use by laypersons would be largely consistent 




In section 4.4, a focused discussion on the pre-industrial resolution dynamics of 
the concepts of theft and fraud is provided.  The discussion examines the 
evolution of responses to victimisation by individuals, and legislative responses to 
the concept of fraud by the Crown.  The section identifies the use of particularised 
fraud provisions (see discussion on particularised fraud offences in section two of 
the literature review above) as the primary means through which Crown 
prosecution was associated with the concept of fraud.  The criminalisation of fraud 
through its association with Crown prosecution is the subject of section 4.5, where 
examples of particularisation are used to identify and categorise drivers for an 
imposition of a ‘sovereign guarantee’ of trust.  The researcher identifies the 
protection of the Crown and its coffers as the first driver.  The extension of this 
protection to regulation of certain trade functions is the second driver.  The third 
driver is the enforcement of an imposed insolvency regime. 
 
In section 4.6, the common resolution dynamics of the concepts of theft and fraud 
appear to diverge as a result of an increased demand for law in order to regulate 
the right to property.  This increase in demand appears to result from socio-
economic change in industrial-era England, which made the right to property more 
difficult to regulate using social controls.  The researcher refers to the literature on 
local associations for the prosecution of felons as indicative of that change 
(Schubert, 2015).  These local associations appear to have mimicked the 
punishment-oriented mode of litigation in response to victimisation against 
members of their group, or in an area they sought to regulate.  The local 
associations used their resources to investigate and prosecute those they 
suspected of theft and (criminal) damage to property, but with no case-specific 
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cost-benefit consideration or focus on compensating the victim.  Instead, the 
courts were used in order to access sanctions against those who did not comply 
with a court order, partly because the local association did not seek 
compensation, and would therefore not engage in attempts to compromise.  
Punitive measures served primarily for the purpose of deterrence through 
retaliation and were made synonymous with theft or damage to property in 
particular areas. 
 
The discussion in section 4.7 represents the ‘mould’ for modern policing and 
public prosecution as well as the driving role of the protection of the right to 
property that underpinned their emergence and social function.  This is compared 
and contrasted with industrial-era responses to the concept of fraud in response 
to market crashes and political pressure in the wake of frauds enabled by 
emerging forms of trade and social currency.  Despite differences to pre-industrial 
responses, the researcher characterises industrial-era approaches as stemming 
from the three drivers identified in section 4.5 as categories of particularisation, 
and to examples of particularisation discussed in the Literature Review chapter.  
This point of divergence appears to be of substantial importance in the analysis of 
the gap between the effectiveness of the categorical criminalisation of theft and of 
fraud.  The social dynamic that allows for a ‘duality’ between compensatory and 
punitive justice does not seem to be applied to the concept of theft as it does to 
fraud, despite the similarity in manner in which they are criminalised in 




4.2 Acquisitive Crime in the Age of Private Prosecution 
 
In this section, the author further develops the epistemological synthesis required 
for the development of a positivist research approach to the study of the 
contemporary manifestations of the ‘duality’ of fraud (RQ1).  In the previous 
section, the author presented a general social theory of the behaviour of law as a 
mechanism of social regulation (Black, 1976).  Black’s (1976) theory of law offers 
a means of positioning various resolution mechanisms on a continuous scale that 
represent a relative ‘amount’ of law that underpins each observation.  This 
framework was developed in a contemporary context where relative ‘amounts’ of 
law can be categorically identified in observation as representing the ‘use’ of more 
law than others.  In the context of the ‘duality’ of fraud (RQ1), the use of the 
criminal courts represents ‘more’ law than the use of the civil courts, and the use 
of investigatory powers represents ‘more’ law than disclosure under the Civil 
Procedure Rules (Ministry of Justice, 2016).  Comparatively ‘lower’ amounts of 
law that are grounded in social controls (as opposed to state powers) may include 
resolution mechanism that are characterised by extra-judicial resolution agents 
(arbitrators, moderators and friendly peacemakers) (Black & Baumgartner, 1983).   
 
The author opens with an implementation of Black’s (1976) theory of law to pre-
public prosecution social structures in England, and the absence of clear 
categorical distinctions between the criminal and civil courts (Pollock & Maitland, 
1898; Ashworth, 2000;).  The author examines the functionality of the courts in 
resolving ‘interpersonal disputes’ pertaining to fraud, but also to acquisitive and 
violent crime by contemporary standards (Burell & Morgan, 1979; Durkheim, 
1982).  The below discussion also traces principle concepts of judicial remedies to 
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fraud and other acquisitive crimes.  This analysis is primarily based on Klerman’s 
(2001) discussion of the role of the courts in enabling aggrieved parties (‘victims’) 
to negotiate out-of-court settlements with alleged offenders.   
 
4.2.1 The Epistemology of ‘Criminal’ and ‘Other Resolution Mechanisms’ 
(RQ1) Prior to the Emergence of Public Prosecution in England 
 
In the context of the ‘duality’ of fraud (RQ1), there is analytical value in examining 
how contemporary constructs of crime were resolved by the judiciary prior to the 
emergence of a distinction between the criminal and civil jurisdiction.  This 
discussion relates to the epistemological challenge of studying the ‘duality’ of 
fraud as a manifestation of a social dynamic (Black, 1972; Durkheim, 1982), as 
opposed to an insular legislative lacuna in contemporary provision.  The second of 
the intermediate research objective for this chapter asks whether indeed the 
‘duality’ of fraud can be observed directly and in the context of a wider social 
function (an ‘invisible hand’, Smith, 1776).  A preliminary assessment of punitive 
measures in a historical context suggested that a categorical outcomes-based 
approach to the epistemology of historical analogues to use of the criminal justice 
system was functionally inapplicable.  Judicial (punitive) outcomes appear to have 
been dependent primarily on the circumstance of the party found liable, and his or 
her ability to comply with compensation or other remedies.  When offenders could 
not abide restorative justice measures, they might have been subjected to 
imprisonment, or even the death penalty in some cases.  Similar to the dynamics 
which govern contemporary civil proceedings, the historical process appears to 
have been designed to favour extra-judicial settlement between offender and 
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victim.  Settlements could have been achieved during the proceedings, and the 
possibility of imprisonment was often used to promote the value of compliance 
with compensation orders (Pollock & Maitland, 1898; Klerman, 2001). 
 
Below is a functional analysis of judicial outcomes that are representative for the 
use of the ‘highest’ relative amounts of law in the context of inter-personal 
disputes (Black, 1976; Klerman, 2001).  It would appear that there has been a 
comparatively vast use of ‘harsher’ punitive measures to the style of law currently 
practiced in western countries (Cottu, 1820).  In some cases, those accused and 
convicted of murder, or theft, in some cases, were put to death.  This provision 
included the transfer of all their belongings and titles to the aggrieved or next of 
kin, or to the Church or the Crown (Pollock & Maitland, 1898; Klerman, 2001).  
Other sanctions, particularly in the context of petty ‘crimes’ included 
imprisonments or the use of the pillory.  Nevertheless, these outcomes did not 
appear to be directly synonymous with a judicial finding of guilt in the same 
manner as imprisonment, fines or community service are currently predictable 
outcomes for guilty verdicts (Sentencing Council, 2014).  Instead, it appears that 
compensatory measures were favoured for both acquisitive ‘crimes’, and for 
offences where harm is not readily quantifiable.   
 
Furthermore, the same ‘harsh’ punitive measures observed in relation to 
contemporary constructs of crime appear equally applicable as outcomes of 
personal bankruptcy, which was by no means in itself ‘forbidden’.  It is important to 
highlight in this context that in ‘applicable’ the researcher does not mean to 
indicate prevalence, but instead a ‘worst case scenario’, or use of the highest 
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‘amount’ of law (Black, 1976).  Nevertheless, the application of such outcomes 
appeared not to follow from the offence typology, but rather from individual case 
circumstances.  In addition to the inconsistencies in sentencing outcomes, 
historical research further disassociates the practice of hanging (or other means of 
executing a court issued death warrant) from the imposition of death sentences.  
Even at the height of use of the death penalty in English history (under the so-
called ‘bloody code’ in the early nineteenth century), only about one in five of 
those so sentenced to death were actually put to death by the state (Gatrell, 1996; 
King & Ward, 2015).   
 
Seemingly ‘punitive’ measures by contemporary standards appear to have also 
been applicable as possible outcomes for debtors in the course of personal 
bankruptcy (Levinthal, 1919; Cohen, 1982).  The imprisonment of debtors was 
practiced in English law through the middle-ages and industrial era, until its 
abandonment in the latter half of the nineteenth century (Cohen, 1982).  As early 
as the thirteenth century, historical legal research points to provisions to arrest a 
merchant debtor for the purposes of formally adjudicating his debts.  Should the 
court or local administrative official recognise the debt, the merchant may be 
imprisoned until such time as the debt is settled or restructured to the satisfaction 
of the creditor (Cohen, 1982, pp. 154-155).   
 
Case law or legislative measures did not appear to assign any consideration to 
the circumstances by which a debt was incurred, through honest trade, 
negligence, or fraud.  Outcomes indicative of the use of ‘more’ law (such as 
imprisonment) were applicable, but not prevalent.  Under 1% of debtors involved 
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in bankruptcy litigation were committed to imprisonment, and only due to their 
inability to satisfy the process by payment or compliance (Rubin, 1984).  Until the 
gradual abolition of debtor imprisonment towards the end of the nineteenth-
century, it ‘supplemented’ the remedies available to victims of fraud, yet without 
the need to argue fraud (Innes, 1980; Cohen, 1982).  Creditors would enjoy 
principally similar protection against insolvency whether a default was triggered by 
fraud as well as other objective and subjective reasons.  Nevertheless, the 
application of ‘more’ law (imprisonment) did not follow from a default, but rather 
from a lack of compliance with the insolvency regime by the debtor, and cost-
benefit and other considerations by the creditors (The Cork Commission, 1982; 
Taylor, 2013). 
 
Despite the absence of an allegation of wrongdoing that underpins court petition 
pertaining to interpersonal disputes, outcomes with respect to debts that have 
been recognised by the Crown are similar.  Imprisonment was not associated with 
bankruptcy, much like it appears not to have been associated with inter-personal 
disputes analogous to modern concepts of acquisitive and violent crime in 
mediaeval England (Klerman, 2001).  The epistemology of historical analogues to 
inter-personal dispute resolution (inclusive of the gestalt of fraud and other 
contemporary concepts of acquisitive crime) appears therefore not to be a 
categorical outcomes-based observation.  Instead, the variability of ‘amounts’ of 
law used in dispute resolution, as well as the question of use of the judiciary as a 
‘settlement agent’, seems to relate to the function of social controls in the context 
of compensatory justice (Black, 1976; Black & Baumgartner, 1983).  With no direct 
sovereign interest in the dispute itself, the essence of the function of the courts 
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could be summarised as the adjudication and enforcement of debts incurred 
through social interactions.  These interactions extend to behaviours that are 
currently synonymous with Crown prosecution (such as violent crime and the 
concept of theft), the concept of fraud, and debts incurred thought trade (by fraud 
or the realisation of risk). 
 
The function of imprisonment was used in a similar fashion by the mediaeval 
courts in relation to compliance with compensation orders issued in relation to 
inter-personal disputes, and through the adjudication of bankruptcy (Cohen, 1982; 
Klerman, 2001).  Pre-industrial imprisonment in this context does not appear 
formally or functionally related to later industrial and contemporary notions of 
‘correction’, retribution, or the imperative of protecting the public.  The industrial 
and contemporary imprisonment system stems from a pre-existing institution, but 
one of a different function to its current role as the primary punitive means of 
responding to crime, and of corrective and preventative utility (Bentham, 1843; 
Foucault, 1977).  The function of imprisonment in the context of personal 
bankruptcy was primarily ‘coercive’ in nature, creditor satisfaction with respect to 
the recognised debts or its restructure would result with the release of the debtor 
(Cohen, 1982, p. 155).  Therefore, imprisonment was not a judicial response in 
isolation, but a means of substantiating compensation orders and other debts 
recognised by the court.  Imprisonment served as deterrence for debtors and 
those with compensation orders issued against them so as to ensure their 
compliance, and as a means of pressuring their relatives to contribute towards 




Interpersonal disputes that feature readily quantifiable harm, particularly those 
that relate to contemporary ‘predatory’-type profit-driven offences (Naylor, 2003) 
favour compensatory remedies (Bentham, 1789; Crabb, 1831).  The categorical 
association of punitive outcomes (imprisonment, corporal punishment, death inter 
alia) with relatively ‘higher’ amounts of law (Black, 1976) does not appear to 
correctly underpin the measure of law used to resolve allegations of this nature.  
This dysfunction is present in observation, where the aforementioned outcomes 
appear arbitrary, and do not closely associate with typological features of 
interpersonal disputes (exceptions are discussed further below in this chapter).  
Instead, such outcomes appear to be indicative of the ‘amount’ of law required to 
enforce the order of the court, and not to resolve the underlying dispute.  
Furthermore, the dysfunction between the contemporary association of such 
outcomes and higher ‘amounts’ of law applied in relation to harm and victimisation 
appears to also be contextually misleading.  Instead, the use of law appears to 
enable victims (and creditors) to achieve their compensatory requirements.  
Should social controls and regulation by reputation not apply or suffice, 
compensation is made possible through the use of ascending ‘amounts’ of law: 
the context of criminal proceedings may ‘encourage’ an offender (or debtor) to 
arrive at a resolution, a judicial outcome may enforce compliance, or 
imprisonment may be required in order for a payment to be made.   
 
The above discussion relates to the epistemological challenge of denoting the 
dichotomy in the ‘duality’ of fraud (RQ1) in historical terms, particularly in 
circumstances that preceded the introduction of public prosecution in the 1880’s 
(Ashworth, 2000).  The contemporary categorical distinction between the criminal 
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justice system and other resolution mechanisms (inclusive of civil litigation) 
appears to be without a direct (categorical) historical analogue.  Instead, the 
‘amount’ of law applied in relation to a wide category of disputes (of which fraud is 
a part) does not appear to be subject to typological theoretical suggestions, but 
rather social and other circumstantial considerations.  These considerations relate 
to a commonly understood concept of compensatory justice, and a utilitarian 
undertone in victim-offender interactions.  The use of law appears to function as 
an upper stratum on a scale of means of coercion against defendants (Black, 
1976; Black & Baumgartner, 1983; Klerman, 2001).        
 
4.2.2 The Functionality of the Courts in Resolving ‘Inter-Personal Disputes’ 
 
In the above sub-section, the researcher framed the discussion of the study of 
variable ‘amounts’ of law used in a wide category of social interactions and 
refuted the possibility of studying the historical ‘duality’ of fraud through outcomes.  
In this part, the researcher provides additional analysis for the social function of 
the judiciary, and its emergence as a means of resolution for ‘inter-personal 
disputes’.  In this role, the Crown adjudicates in disputes to which it is not a party.  
This capacity is of similar function to civil litigation of fraud and appears to exhibit 
similar plaintiff-defendant dynamics in the social characterisation of the 
requirement for judicial resolution (Black & Baumgartner, 1983).  Furthermore, the 
dynamic between parties in a compensatory-based judicial process appears 
similar to characterisations of contemporary processes in the context of fraud 
(Levi & Burrows, 2008; Law Commission, 2014; Button, et al., 2015; Hayton, 
2015; Smith & Shepherd, 2017).  This is a different capacity to the Crown as a 
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prosecutor, which is discussed further below in this chapter in the context of an 
epistemology of ‘criminal’ analogues in legislation and practice.  Nevertheless, the 
study of the historical use of the judiciary is relevant to the investigation of the 
historical ‘duality’ of fraud.  This use of the court for ‘inter-personal disputes’ 
represents the ‘highest’ available amount of law, which is similar to the 
contemporary use of the criminal justice system, as well as the dynamics of ‘civil’ 
judicial adjudication (Black & Baumgartner, 1983; Klerman, 2001).     
 
Historically, the Crown was not a party for many dispute-types that are understood 
as ‘criminal’ in contemporary society, nor were they necessarily resolved by the 
courts in the past (Pollock & Maitland, 1898; Turner, 1962).  The extent to which a 
lack of sovereign interest results with vastly different offender-victim dynamics and 
judicial outcomes is perhaps best represented by the common means of murder 
resolution.  Murder ‘investigations’ would not have been led by a state force, but 
rather it was left for the relations of a deceased to determine who the offender 
was, apprehend him/her, and level charges against the accused in court.  Those 
'convicted' were typically be ordered to pay compensation (a ‘bot’) towards the 
estate or heirs of the victim.  To the bot, additional payments to local 
administration and/or the church might be added, but not as a rule (Rubin, 1996). 
 
Over time, the emerging norms and 'tariffs' set by the courts in response to 
successful applications stabilised and created compensatory norms that served to 
end disputes and feuds (Pollock & Maitland, 1898, p. 24 vol.1).  Furthermore, 
stable judicial norms created a benchmark for punishment (or damages awarded) 
and established a system of closure and recognition of harm and victimisation 
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(Bentham, 1843).  These norms and compensation benchmarks are important for 
a wider social 'acknowledgment' of victimisation, which supports closure and 
conclusion of interpersonal disputes (Hamilton & Rytina, 1980).  The majority of 
responses to victimisation included material reparation that were not sufficient to 
reverse the crime, but were of symbolic importance, and provided an opportunity 
of the Crown to facilitate a widely understood sense of justice (King, 2000).  In the 
context of Black’s (1976) theory of law and third-party theory (Black & 
Baumgartner, 1983), insights are offered on the political development and 
emerging dominance in jurisdiction over inter-personal disputes, and the formation 
of a new stratum of law (Black, 1976; Black & Baumgartner, 1983; Shapiro, 1986).   
 
The victim-enabling potential of the judicial process in respect to specific cases, 
and a systematic utility in a final and orderly conclusion of disputes appears to 
have contributed to common use of the courts (Shapiro, 1986).  Schmidt (2005) 
constructs the function of sovereignty in a manner that seems to converge with 
the utilitarian drivers for the growing acceptance of ‘judges’ as ‘settlement agents’ 
through the recognition of sovereign authority over inter-personal disputes (Black 
& Baumgartner, 1983; Shapiro, 1986; Rubin, 1996).  The essence of sovereignty 
is not the ability to coerce per se, but rather the exclusive latitude to make ultimate 
decisions in the jurisdiction (Cristi, 1997; Schmitt, 2005).  Tensions might arise in 
response to the exercise of sovereign power to raise taxes and engage in 
ecclesiastical, administrative, trade regulation or foreign affairs.  Nevertheless, the 
adjudication of inter-personal disputes appears to be a platform through which the 
sovereign is validated though a ‘litmus test’ of authority when it facilitates its 
function as a ‘settlement agent’ (Black & Baumgartner, 1983; Shapiro, 1986).    
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The administration of the courts was conducted by a local sheriff, the most 
important officer of government in the mediaeval England counties, who was the 
Crown's chief administrative, executive, and legal officer (Palmer, 1982).  The 
sheriff presided over local undersheriffs, bailiffs and clerks.  The sheriffs were not 
'policing' (in the modern sense of the term) their counties, but rather providing 
administration for the courts, enforcing their orders, writs, and other decisions 
under the general duty of fulfilling the orders of the Crown.  Sheriffs would only 
actively pursue individuals who offended against the Crown, and facilitate 
prosecution in the special King's courts, acting as officers of the Exchequers, or 
taking actions to protect the Crown estates and assets (Commissioners for 
Inquiring into County Rates, 1836; Chadwick, 1839; Palmer, 1982; Klerman, 
2001). 
 
The courts were not ‘open to all’.  Prosecution was subject to the payment of court 
fees and related expenses, and at times even sheriff expenses related to the 
apprehension of the accused.  To bring an application before the courts, victims of 
acquisitive crime would have to dedicate considerable resources, perhaps in 
concert with neighbours, and possibly interact directly with offenders.  Upon 
apprehension, alleged offenders were rarely placed under arrest pending trial.  
They would be expected to appear in court under pain of ex-communication and 
the forfeiture of their property.  These controls were sufficiently effective to make it 
uncommon for alleged murderers to be arrested in anticipation of, or during, their 




The courts heard applications concerning fraud in the context of transactions that 
had been brought into contention, in part or in full, or when compliance with deeds 
were not fulfilled.   When the fraud was carried out against the Crown, or in trade 
standardised or protected by the Crown, the courts responded with corporal and 
custodial punishments against the perpetrators.  The ‘amount’ of law sought by 
the applicants (procedural or compensatory remedies, for example) determined 
the course that the courts would adopt in resolving the fraud.  The Anglo-Saxon 
and Norman Kings were using the courts to establish their power and relevance. 
In their enabling role, the courts were almost entirely concerned with private 
applications and prosecutions, primarily in search of monetary compensation 
(Rubin, 1996; Klerman, 2001).  Third-party theory (Black & Baumgartner, 1983) 
does not identify the use of ‘judges’ as being intrinsic to either jurisdiction, but 
rather to the general need to apply sovereign authority to resolve disputes.  In 
more practical terms, the principle of ‘deciding on exceptions’ (Schmitt, 2005) has 
been fulfilled in mediaeval England to, for instance, annul deeds on the grounds of 
fraud (Shapiro, 1986).  
 
In the context of the ‘duality’ of fraud (RQ1), the distinction between those cases 
that were brought before the courts, and those that were not fails to provide a 
valid criterion by which to distinguish between ‘criminal’ and ‘civil’ frauds.  The 
apparent contemporary dysfunction between absolutism in fraud criminalisation, 
and the resolution of fraud outside of the criminal justice system requires the 
existence of the later institutions and procedural distinctions.  In chapter Three 
(Methodology), the researcher presented the parameters and research philosophy 
adopted in this thesis.  These parameters included an epistemological discussion 
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on the study of an underlying social dynamic, or an ‘invisible hand’ (Smith, 1776) 
that determines the eventual course of resolution for fraud cases.  This dynamic is 
inherently external to the researcher, as well as not necessarily fully manifested in 




In the context of the ‘’duality’ of fraud (RQ1), this section identified principles of 
addressing harm and victimisation in the history of English law in general, and in 
the context of fraud as part of a wider sets of inter-personal disputes.  The 
contemporary framework of the ‘duality’ of fraud is not between the involvement of 
judiciary or its absence, but rather that of the criminal jurisdiction in particular.  In a 
historical context, the highest ‘amount’ of law applied in response to harm and 
victimisation (inclusive of fraud) to which the Crown was not a party was 
compensatory-oriented litigation.  Outcomes that represent the ‘highest’ amounts 
of law (imprisonment or even death), were used as means of further coercion 
when the defendant could or would not comply with the compensation ordered by 
the court.  There might have been further benefits in the (often public) 
demonstration of the court power of coercion, but these do not appear to have 
been the imperative of either the court or plaintiffs (at least prior to the industrial 
era).  The procedural preference for compensation, and victim ‘ownership’ over 
proceedings pertaining to modern constructs of acquisitive crime, overshadowed 




There is an analytical value to the examination of the current ‘duality’ of fraud by 
‘populating’ the criminal bracket with those cases that concluded with a sanction 
against the person found liable.  In an epistemological context, the value added is 
in departing from an outcome (or remedy style) based approach to determine the 
whether a matter is ‘criminal’ or ‘civil’.  The procedural remedy (or other means of 
undoing benefit from fraud), similar to orders of compensation from other forms of 
acquisitive crime, is underlined by sanctions that do not benefit the victim yet harm 
the offender.  The application of ‘more law’ (Black, 1976) is not to indicate a 
different response.  By virtue of appearing before the court, the aggrieved party 
had already appealed to the most authoritative settlement agent shared with the 
accused, even if only in theory (Black & Baumgartner, 1983).  ‘More’ law is 
available to substantiate the outcome of the judicial process, and the ability of the 
offender to comply with the decided remedy seems to have been the determining 
factor. 
 
The principles and customs which appear to have governed the resolution of fraud 
in mediaeval times (Bracton (c. 1210 – c. 1268) in Harvard Law School Library, 
2003) may seem a familiar imperative to the modern reader, and reflect the 
common approach to ‘civil’ procedure, and victim preference (Bentham, 1789; 
Bentham, 1843; Crabb, 1831; Levi, 1987; Greenberg, 1990; Levi & Burrows, 
2008).  This resolution mode, which was applicable to behaviours across a range 
current criminal constructs, was not at all unique to fraud, or even acquisitive 
crime (Klerman, 2001).  In the context of the contemporary examination of the 
‘duality’ of fraud, the victim-led social dynamic observed above seems applicable 
to the ‘civil’ category but was also the ‘highest’ amount of applicable law (Black, 
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1976).  In the next section, the above context will be specifically applied to the 
concept of fraud and used to examine the historical unpacking of the gestalt of 
fraud in comparison to the essential qualities identified by the Law Commission 
(2002).  
 
4.3 A Historical Ontology 
 
From this context emerges a discussion that relates to two of the five intermediate 
research objectives identified in chapter Three and the introduction to this chapter 
above.  The first is a historical reconstruction of the gestalt of fraud, and an 
examination of whether it possessed different meanings, or unpacked in 
substantially different ways in judicial or other official records.  The second 
component in this section relates to a functionalist analysis of the role of the 
judiciary system in ‘interpersonal dispute’ resolution in the absence of a public 
prosecution institution (Ashworth, 2000; Klerman, 2001).  This includes an 
analysis of historical records relating to fraud resolution and judicial remedies in 
the context of fraud as well as other form of acquisitive crimes (by contemporary 
standards).   
 
In the following passages, the researcher addresses another of the research 
philosophy parameters presented in chapter three as an assumption with respect 
to the ontology of fraud, and as the first of five intermediate research objectives.  
Whilst this study is grounded in the assumption towards the ‘duality’ of fraud being 
a continuing social self-regulation mechanism (see section 3.2.4), this section 
examines the historical application of the ontology of fraud in section 3.2.3.  In the 
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referred section, the assumption made by the author with regards to the general 
research philosophy in this thesis was that the common understanding of the 
gestalt of fraud preserves its essential characteristics since time immemorial.  This 
understanding was thought of as existing independently of statutory provisions 
that seek to define fraud and forms the basis of understanding onto which such 
legal definitions are applied.  Due to the contemporary and forward-facing nature 
of this thesis and the analysis of the Fraud Act 2006 therein, the definition of fraud 
provided in the Act was adopted as a ‘yardstick’ for historical comparison.  In the 
first intermediate research objective the researcher asks whether the adopted 
‘unpacking’ of the gestalt of fraud in the Fraud Act 2006 can be applied as an 
ontology for the historical socio-legal analysis in this chapter.  
 
 
In 1290, Ms Eleanor de Wautham petitioned before King Edward I and his council 
to abolish a deed of gift signed in her name.  She testified to the verbal promise of 
a will that would provide her with rights to a tenancy upon the death of its 
occupant.  It was alleged that the formal will was fraudulently altered to prevent 
her inheritance, per the expressed wishes of the deceased.  The application, 
which presumably was made at a cost to the applicant, sought justice by 
appealing to a sense of equity.  In this case, fraud was a term used to describe 
the inequitable pretext of the transaction and to justify that it should be overturned, 
and the financial situation resolved by awarding damages and expenses. (Petition 
by Eleanor de Wautham, 1290)  
 
When de Wautham was making her application, she had done so under a rules-
based system that will be familiar in certain respects to the modern-day observer.  
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Much like contemporary ‘civil’ fraud litigation, De Wautham was able to bring forth 
a claim of a tort against the alleged perpetrator and refer to a principle of equity, 
under which a procedural remedy was sought (Smith & Shepherd, 2017).  Whilst 
other ‘wrongs’ might have been codified in certain terms (or in statute), the 
principles of justice, custom and precedent were a normalising principle, under 
which the King could order damages, annul contracts, and assign deeds (Pollock 
& Maitland, 1898, pp. 183-184 vol.1).  Such customs (and systems of precedents) 
were recorded by Bracton, a thirteenth century judge, cleric and jurist in his 
collection of records De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae (On the Laws and 
Customs of England) (Bracton (c. 1210 – c. 1268) in Harvard Law School Library, 
2003).  References in the text to fraud inform the contemporary reader about the 
legal custom to which de Wautham (and others) appealed. 
 
Bracton discusses fraud as a category of grounds for “an obligation [to be] 
extinguished”, as part of an array of concerns that could be investigated around 
the signing of a writ as well as forgiveness in circumstances of force majeure or 
fraud (Bracton in Harvard Law School Library, 2003. p.228 vol.2; pp.59-60 vol.2; 
p.333 vol.4; pp.356-357 vol. 4).  The apparent imperative for the courts to 
intervene in many cases was so “…no one ought to benefit from his own fraud nor 
do we wish to maintain, as we ought not, that anyone be wrongfully 
disinherited…” (Bracton in Harvard Law School, 2003. p.61 vol.2).  Critically, 
access to this ideal of justice was by no means open to all; instead, access was 
limited by the barriers of social status, and the capability of a party to afford the 




Whilst the general principle behind judicial interventions and resolution of fraud 
allegations were readily understood, Bracton particularises some frauds in more 
detail than others (Harvard Law School Library, 2003).  For example, local rulers 
and landlords granted protection, in the form of a legal bond, to (some) tenants, in 
exchange for their loyal service.  This valuable status and legal instrument could 
be annulled if it was obtained by fraud (Bracton in Harvard Law School Library, 
2003. pp. 228-231 vol.2).  Other particularisations included the invalidation of the 
legal status of a ‘gift’ between a man and his wife if it serves to circumvent 
creditors or rightful hires, or gifts made to third parties who will, in turn, transfer the 
gift (or part of it) to a member of a man’s family (Bracton in Harvard Law School 
Library, 2003. pp. 49-57 vol. 2).  The contemporary reader may associate these 
examples of particularisation of the principle of not gaining from one’s fraud to 
modern principles of contract law and the construct of fraudulent preference (The 
Cork Commission, 1982).    
 
In order to address the first intermediate research objectives, the researcher 
sought to identify early legislative provisions that make explicit use of the term 
‘fraud’.  The ontological assumption with respect to the gestalt of fraud made in 
chapter Three (Methodology) was that its underlying meaning has not altered over 
time, but rather remained the same.  The test applied by the author was whether 
earlier references to the gestalt of fraud could be retrospectively unpacked using 
definitions introduced in the Fraud Act 2006.  This was not a ‘shot in the dark’ on 
the part of the researcher, but rather an assumption rooted in an awareness of the 
historical common-law concepts of misrepresentation and failure to disclose.  In 
the Literature Review chapter above, the researcher provides an analytical 
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discussion of the manner in which the Law Commission unpacked the gestalt of 
fraud in the work foreshadowing the introduction of the Fraud Act 2006 (Law 
Commission, 2002).  An example of common-law origins and key case-law 
references to the concepts of misrepresentation and failure to disclose, which 
relate to sections two and Three of the Act.  Thus, the challenge was not to trace 
the common-law concepts adapted by the Law Commission (2002) to ‘unpack’ the 
gestalt of fraud to the source.  Instead, the question was whether evidence of the 
use of the term ‘fraud’ in historical records could be contextually re-constructed 
using the standards in the contemporary Fraud Act 2006.  This challenge is also 
in-line with the view that fraud itself is a subject of criminalisation in the 2006 Act, 
and not merely a subject of characterisation (Taylor, 2013).  The meaning of this 
framing is that the concept of fraud in English law is of a largely consistent quality, 
and is not strictly requiring of a substantive qualification, but rather of scoping of 
criminalisation.  
 
Notwithstanding the substantive discussion on statutory fraud criminalisation (or 
scoping of criminalisation) in section five of this chapter (‘particularisation’), the 
following contains an interpretivist analysis of the essential characteristics of fraud 
in a historical context.  This discussion does not relate to the functionalist analysis 
of historical scoping of fraud criminalisation as it appears in section five of this 
chapter.  Instead, it focuses on the meaning of the term as it appears in early 
examples of its use and relates to the assumption made in chapter Three 
(Methodology) with respect to the ontology of fraud in the context of the overall 
research philosophy and strategy.  In the context of this historical socio-legal 
study, the same assumption, which ‘unpacks’ the gestalt of fraud using the Fraud 
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Act 2006 as a ‘timeless’ social constant, was made with respect to this study, and 
is substantiated further in the following paragraphs.   
 
To that end, the author searched for the earliest examples of use of the term fraud 
inclusive of the terms defraud, and ‘fraude’, meaning fraud in French and Middle-
English.  This search, which included the example of the above petition by 
Eleanor de Wautham (1290), resulted with additional examples of use of the term 
in administrative and legislative contexts.  In the case of Eleanor de Wautham 
(1290), her illiteracy (and presumably the deceased as well) exposed a 
vulnerability to an altering and misrepresentation of the will.  Further examples are 
characteristic of the use of the term ‘fraud’ in mediaeval records included extracts 
from parishes administrative records, parliamentary records, and ecclesiastical 
records. The following discussion refers to a small number of examples of the use 
of the term ‘fraud’ in context from twelfth and thirteenth century records from the 
aforementioned sources.  
 
In December of 1203, King Edward I issued a decree to the Abbot of Dore 
(presently known as the Dore Abbey, Herefordshire), which was subordinate to 
the Abbot of Citeaux, situated in France and under French rule.  The Crown was 
informed that Abbot of Citeaux sent an emissary to its subordinate abbots in 
England to collect from them various sums of money.  In order to specifically 
address this demand by the French and clarify pre-existing prohibitions on the 
export of silver from the realm without royal consent, an explicit clarification was 
issued.  The newly issued stipulation further orders the Abbot of Dore, or anyone 
acting in its behalf, from making any other forms of payment to the French (be it 
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silver, currency or goods).  The new decree specifies the prohibition of using other 
financial instruments from being used to satisfy the French emissary, including 
loans or gifts.  The decree includes the following reasoning:   
whereof money or silver may be carried out of the realm or fraud may 
otherwise be done to the ordinance aforesaid [the prohibition on 
transferring silver outside of the real without royal consent – the author], 
by reason of any subvention, gift, loan or in any other manner, without 
the king's assent and licence, or from making any exaction from any 
abbots in the realm to pay any such subvention to the abbot of Citeaux 
(Close Rolls, Edward I: December 1302, 1908, pp. 68-69). 
 
The use of the term ‘fraud’ appears to relate to an existing gestalt.  The 
researcher interprets the use of the term as reference to the underlying 
property of otherwise legitimate means of transacting wealth, which could be 
used by the Abbot of Dore to circumvent the ban of silver exports.  Whereas 
such transactions may be legitimate, the Crown notices that in this context 
they will amounts to fraudulent means of affecting the transfer of wealth to 
France, but without directly trespassing against royal statutes.  Attempts to 
facilitate a transfer by misrepresenting it as a part of a foreign transaction, or 
otherwise failing to disclose the ultimate beneficiary of a loan, or transfer of 
goods or deeds as the Abbot of Citeaux, will amount to fraud.  Since the 
fraud is against both a statutory prohibition (the transfer of silver outside of 
the real), as well as specific prohibitions on the transfer of any wealth to the 
French via the emissary of the Abbot of Citeaux, the decree ends with a 
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promise of severe punitive measures that would be affected on those who 
engaged in such transactions directly, or by enabling it by ‘fraud’. 
 
The above example relates to the contemporary understanding of fraud, 
though it is not indicative of methods or specific and actus reas that is 
mutually exclusive to legitimate conduct (or other offences).  Instead, fraud 
appears to be used to qualify otherwise legitimate means of transacting 
wealth on account of the underlying context in which they are connived and 
fulfilled (Law Commission, 2002).  Furthermore, the reader will recall the 
discussion on the ‘duality’ of fraud in the context of Naylor’s (2003) typology 
of profit-driven crimes provided in section 2.4 in the literature review.  Whilst 
some instances of fraud may be featured in circumstances that fall under the 
‘predatory’ set of typological and situational characteristics, and possess 
inherent and readily understood criminal properties, others may not.  The two 
other categories of ‘market-based’ and ‘commercial’ categories refer to 
frauds that are carried out using otherwise legitimate means to either 
circumvent a regulatory regime (‘market-based’) or for illicit gain in 
commercial settings (‘commercial’) (Naylor, 2003).  Both ‘commercial’ and 
‘market-based’ categories refer to the use of otherwise legitimate means of 
transferring wealth, which are ‘tainted’ by an underlying criminal context.  As 
discussed in the literature review in a contemporary context, fraud as a 
primary category appears to extend across the ‘predatory’ and ‘commercial’ 
categories of Naylor’s typology.  Fraud may be used in order to facilitate 
‘market-based’-type offences, as in the above example, but such fraudulent 
techniques relate to the concept of money laundering, which is not subject to 
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substantive examination in this thesis (Naylor, 2003; Financial Action Task 
Force, 2006). 
 
A recurring theme in royal proclamations concerns the function of state 
officials in insuring that currency and other trade and measurement 
standards are maintained.  In this context, Kind Edward I had instilled a 
mechanism to devalue inferior silver coins minted on the European continent, 
and predominantly introduced to local commerce by trade shipmen.  In May 
1301, the King sent a decree to the treasurer and barons of the exchequer 
that discusses the implementation of a recent royal decree to set the value of 
European silver coins at half the value of Royal Mint sterling silver coins.  
The decree orders the establishment of local commissions of inquiry with 
broad powers to investigate persons and estates that made payments to the 
Crown using European coins, and those who accepted them as payment.  
The inquiries were ordered to establish whether the original payment was 
made before or after the Crown’s devaluation of the European coins.  
Furthermore, the commission of enquiry were tasked with investigating at 
what value were European coins accepted as payments of duties to the 
Crown and processed by the local administrations.  The ultimate objective of 
these commissions of enquiry was to establish that no abuse took place at 
the time when the value of the currency was set at half its face value, and the 
enforcement of its abolishment that followed suit (Fitz-Thedmar, 1863, pp. 
237-248):  “to defeat the schemes and frauds of certain persons… [and] that 
there shall be no fraud or deceit in the receiving or levying of such money” 




During the Parliament of 1423, the topic of losses inflicted on the Crown as a 
result of fraud committed by merchant sailors trading wool and other commodities 
with what is the modern-day Netherlands and Belgium was discussed.  This was 
previously addressed in the Parliament of 1354, when it was proclaimed that the 
state would regulate and protect the production, trade and export of wool and 
other goods in and from the territories of England, Wales and Ireland.  While this 
substantive piece of legislation covers many aspects of trade and export, the term 
'fraud' was used in the particular context of forbidding participants from benefiting 
from fraudulent trade.  This applied to both domestic and foreign trade.  While in 
this scenario the fraud was specifically aimed at avoiding tax and duties, other 
usage of the word in this measure was generic.   For example, goods being 
recovered from shipwrecks are to be repatriated to their intended recipient or 
originator “without fraud or deception” (section 17); Constables are required to 
swear before a staple mayor that they “shall lawfully perform their office, without 
fraud or deception” (section 26) (Given-Willson, et al., 2005, pp. 329-344).  The 
qualifier of “without fraud or deception” appears in many official reports of action 
carried out on behalf of the Crown or noblemen, or accounts concerning the 
affairs of the Crown or the Church 
 
In the above examples of the use of the term fraud, it appears to possess an even 
further abstract and obscure meaning, as it relates to forms of abuse unknown at 
the time of when the commissions of enquiry were established.  It appears to refer 
to ‘straightforward’ abuses, but also to other ‘schemes and frauds’ that are 
attributable to potentially more sophisticated undertakings, to which local officials 
206 
 
may be co-conspirators.  Such use of the term fraud seems to demonstrate the 
advantages of utilizing the gestalt of fraud in particularised and narrow situational 
framing of criminalisation.  In the Introduction chapter above, the author refers to 
correspondence between Lord Hardwicke and a jurist colleague about the futility 
of strictly defining fraud in the face of the “new schemes which the fertility of man’s 
invention would contrive” (Holdsworth, 1909, p. 262 citing Lord Hardwicke, 1759; 
The Law Commission, 2002 citing The Criminal Law Revision Committee, 1966).  
This is seen by the author as particularly applicable in the context of ‘commercial’-
type fraud offences (Naylor, 2003) and the concept of white-collar crime 
(Sutherland, 1940).  The term fraud appears to be used in relation to unknown 
means in which one or more may use otherwise legitimate means to subvert wider 
definitions of ‘the public interest’.  Nevertheless, this use of the gestalt does not 
appear to the researcher to relate to an underlying quality that is different to the 
contemporary meaning of the term, and its unpacking by the Law Commission 
(2002) as represented in the Fraud Act 2006.   
 
In the above two examples, the underlying criminal property of the frauds 
discussed appears to relate to the identity of the victim (sovereign interest), as 
opposed to a clear self-contained actus reus (such as theft).  Fraud is used by the 
Crown to denote an elusive concept to denote a variety of legitimate actions that 
may ultimately be part of a scheme against its interest.  As will be further 
discussed in section five in this chapter, the criminal property of these frauds 
appears to be qualified by the identity of the victim (the Crown), as opposed to 
being intrinsic to the action itself.  In the context of this discussion, the term 




The gestalt of fraud also features in litigation to which the crown is not a party, 
and with no observable reference to statutory or other sources to qualify its 
meaning.  As discussed in the section above, fraud allegations were brought 
before the courts by the alleged victim as inter-personal disputes, a category that 
includes concepts that would, in contemporary times, belong to either the criminal 
or civil jurisdiction.  Records of such cases feature either the identification of fraud 
as the cause, or as a qualifier for other causes.  The following offer discussion 
and analysis of such cases that were identified in the records of the Mayor of the 
City of London Court. 
 
In January of 1303, the Mayor’s Court in the City of London heard a petition by a 
local merchant, who accused a fellow merchant of a general trespass offence 
against himself on grounds of fraud.  The petition concerned the sale of 
lambskins, a number of which were counterfeit.  The defendant denial that he 
acted fraudulently, as he bought the merchandise in question from a third party, 
believing it to be genuine leather.  The defence rejects the allegation of a trespass 
against the plaintiff on grounds that fraud was not committed by the defendant.    
Simon de Canterbury, skinner, was summoned to answer Geoffrey le 
Lacer in a plea of trespass, wherein the latter complained that he had 
bought from the defendant five dozen lambskins for 10s, of which eleven 
were false and counterfeited out of old skins, being newly sheared 
again. The defendant denied the fraud and said that he bought the skins 
at St Botulph's Fair in their present condition and sold them as such, and 
thereon he put himself on his country. And Geoffrey said he bought 
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them as lambskins, and that the defendant, knowing they were false, 
deceived him, and he also demanded a jury.  (City of London, 1924, pp. 
142-169) 
Similarly, 
Bennet de Burgo was attached to answer Godfrey de Loveyne in a plea 
of trespass, wherein the latter complained that he bought from Bennet 
two barrels of ashes of good and faithful woad (duos barillos cinerum 
wisde) (fn. 79), of which one barrel was mixed with earth and the other 
almost all false[…] The defendant denied receiving damages from the 
merchants, and said that they had gone abroad before the fraud was 
known to him… (City of London, 1924, pp. 170-227) 
 
Historically, the elected role of the Mayor of London (not to be confused with the 
City of Westminster) includes the role of Chief Magistrate of the City of London.  In 
this capacity, the Lord Mayor would hear cases relating to the commercial 
activities in the City of London that would be brought before the court by traders 
and guilds (Taylor, 2013).  The court did not apply a different standard of law but 
was instead empowered by the Crown to operate as a procedural jurisdiction over 
commercial and inter-personal disputes, as well as other administrative and civic 
affairs (de Gray Birch, 1884; Taylor, 2013).  The Mayor’s Court traditionally sought 
to function in a manner that was conducive to trade and the reputation of the 
merchant and trade guilds.  In general terms, the Mayor of the City of London is 
elected by an electorate that is greatly influenced by the professional guilds 
operating in its jurisdiction (de Gray Birch, 1884; Taylor, 2013).  The way in which 
the Mayor’s court interpreted the gestalt of fraud appears to be consistent with 
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both periodical sources and contemporary understanding.  Furthermore, the 
below example from 1304 records of the Mayor’s court demonstrates the dynamic 
between alleged offender and victim in the context of fraud related inter-personal 
disputes (Klerman, 2001): 
Adam le Brochere was summoned to answer Arnold de Teler in a plea 
that he pay him £9 owed for five casks of wine, which the plaintiff sold 
him, and which he fraudulently took away on payment of 20s [shilling – 
the author], promising to pay the rest when the plaintiff came to his 
house; but before the latter's arrival he sent the casks to Coventry, and 
when the plaintiff came and asked for his money, he did not pay it, but 
only said he would do his best to pay. The defendant admitted buying 
the wine, but said he had not the money to pay at present. He admitted 
also that he promised to pay and had sent the wine to Coventry. 
Judgment that the defendant for his fraud be committed to prison till he 
satisfy the plaintiff for the money. Afterwards, on Thursday following, 
Robert de Dodeford and Peter de Byri, skinners, entered into a 
Recognizance to pay the £9...  (City of London, 1924, pp. 170-227) 
 
The term fraud also featured in records that do not directly related to legal 
proceedings and appear to have originated from laypersons.  For example, a 
tombstone epitaph to a Devonshire parish clerk who died in 1755, features the 
following inscription: 
This stone distinguishes no vaulted cave, A plain good man, has here as 
plain a grave […] His real wants his industry supplied; His labouring 
210 
 
hand procured his daily bread […] sincere, religious, just; Guiltless of 
fraud and faithful to his trust.[…]  (Lysons & Lysons, 1822, p. 565) 
 
The above are examples and discussion are representative of the use of the 
term fraud as it was observed by the author in a review of thirteenth to 
eighteenth century records.  Across the examined appearances of the term 
fraud in the records referred to in the introduction to this chapter, the 
researcher did not encounter use of the term in a manner that exceeded the 
scope of definition in the Fraud Act 2006.  This is consistent with the general 
ontological assumption made by the author with respect to the gestalt of 
fraud in both contemporary and historical perspectives.  The defining 
characteristics of the gestalt of fraud do not appear to have significantly 
changed in quality over time in both legal and colloquial usage, at least since 
mediaeval times.  This was also the subject of the first of the five 
intermediate research objectives of this particular historical socio-legal 
research, as discussed in the introduction to this chapter above.  The 
substantiation of the aforementioned assumption concerning the ontology of 
fraud gives further validity to this historical socio-legal analysis and 
discussion.  
 
4.4 Pre-Industrial Justice and Acquisitive Crime 
 
This section establishes a set of social circumstances that existed prior to the 
industrial revolution, and their impact on the use of social controls and ‘law’ to 
coerce compensation in response to victimisation.  Sub-section 4.4.2 contains an 
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analysis of a ‘base point’ from which there appears to be a divergence between 
the concept of theft and the concept of fraud in terms of the function of social 
controls and the ‘law’ in their resolution.  In sub-section 4.4.3, the researcher 
provides a depiction of the scope of sovereign interest in general, by identifying 
the role of the Crown as a plaintiff (or prosecutor) in the pre-industrial county 
courts, which related to its direct involvement as a direct or indirect ‘victim’.  The 
dynamic between plaintiff and defendant in the context of compensatory justice in 
pre-industrial England in section three is compared to the dynamic between a 
Crown prosecutor, and a defendant.  The dynamic in 4.4.3 is also provided as an 
introduction to the analysis and developed typology of pre-industrial constructs of 
Crown victimisation specific to the concept of fraud in further below in this chapter.       
 
4.4.1 Social Circumstances and Dispute Resolution in Pre-Industrial 
England  
 
Laslett (2005) describes pre-industrial England as a ‘one class system’ where 
those considered as the aristocracy were very few in numbers, and wielded so 
much power and influence over matters of state.  Thus, the majority of the 
population experienced a ‘single class’ existence.  The society of the 1560’s has 
been divided into four tiers according to how much authority individuals 
possessed, or how they ranked in comparison in relation to the division of labour 
(social morphology): 
1. “Nobilitas Major,  
2. Nobilitas Minor, 
3. Citizens, Burgesses and Yeoman, and  
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4. Those who were at the bottom of the division of labour :“[A] sort of men 
which do not rule… day labourers, poor husbandmen, [the] merchants or 
retailers… brick-makers, brick-layers etc.  These have no voice nor 
authority in [the] commonwealth and no account is made of them…” 
(Laslett, 2005 p.31)  
Burial records of the era demonstrate that in most parishes between 3% and 4% 
of individuals belonged in their lifetime to the first three groups, indicating the 
position of up to 97% of the populace belonged in the ‘one class’ system. 
  
Further analysis estimates that English society in 1688 was made up of 4.5% 
landed gentry and professionals (such as litigators, and senior members of the 
‘civil service’ of the day).  These 4.5% of households were nonetheless generating 
nearly a quarter of estimated income.   Furthermore, 20% of income was earned 
by 9.2% of households who were involved in commercial life.  Industry, 
construction, agriculture, general labour, and other households and vagrants 
accounting for nearly 80% of households, and just under 52% of estimated 
income.  The remainder were military and maritime households, which were 
subject to separate jurisdiction and are, therefore, of lesser importance to the 
present discussion (Lindert & Williamson, 1982).  This is not to suggest that the 
proportion of available income, asset pool, or rate of asset accumulation was 
entirely consistent with these figures, as they are based on an examination of 
reported taxable income only.  For example, farming households on average 
enjoyed income per capita of ten pounds per annum and incurred nine pounds 
and ten shillings in expenses.  About 80% of merchant households had four 
pounds of available income per capita per annum on average, which would 
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equate to just under £650 in 2015 Retail Price Index (RPI) terms (King, 1688; 
cited by Laslett, 2005, pp.32-33; Measuringworth.com, n.d).  Furthermore, a 1696 
tax and customs records survey estimated that 55% of people over sixteen years 
of age in England were earning less than their annual estimated cost of living.  
This figure is based upon households who reported their income and evidenced 
their deprivation and is likely lacking in representation of nomads and remote 
parishes (King, 1696; Coleman, 1956).    
 
The above context of generally limited financial means appears to support that 
there was a substantial entry barrier to making use of the courts for dispute 
resolution, as well as participating in forms of trade from which disputes of fraud 
may arise.  Furthermore, the use of contracts, multiparty transactions, and 
sophisticated financial vehicles, which may require astute legal adjudication for its 
resolution, seems to have been outside the reach of the overwhelming majority of 
the population (Coleman, 1956; Naylor, 2003).  In the context of ‘simple’, 
‘predatory’-type acquisitive crimes (such as burglary or theft) (Naylor, 2003), 
presenting an application before the courts would typically be inaccessible for the 
average person in pre-industrialised England.  Black’s (1976) theory of law and 
third-party theory (Black & Baumgartner, 1983) suggest that such interpersonal 
disputes are not only subject to financial entry barriers to the justice system, but 
also social ones.  Use of the courts to resolve a dispute between two members of 
the public (dispute to which the sovereign is not a party to directly, or through a 
later notion of public prosecution), is an outcome of the inadequacy of other 
available resolution mechanisms.  The use of law primarily represents not the 
availability of means, but rather a prior failure of social controls and sources of 
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mutual deference in enabling (or coercing) a compensatory resolution.  Amongst 
peer groups of similar ranking on the stratification, morphology, culture, and 
organisational scales, it is generally expected that ‘less’ law would be applied in 
dispute resolution (Black, 1976).  Furthermore, the more intimate a group is, the 
more sources of common deference are available to act as resolution agents 
within.  For a party to call upon ‘judges’ whose authority is external to the group 
and is not grounded in consensus but rather in obedience to state-authority, is 
similarly indicative of the prior inadequacy of other settlement agents (Black & 
Baumgartner, 1983).   
 
The above theoretical reminder relates equally to the analytical view taken by the 
researcher with respect to both the pre-industrial landed gentry, the nobility, and 
those who lived in the small parishes and market towns.  The four groups 
identified by Laslett (2005 p.31), and in the opening of this section, particularly the 
nobility, and those who populated the parishes and market towns in mediaeval 
England are analysed as having similar attributes.  Both strata are characterised 
by internal similarity in terms of stratification, morphology, culture, and 
organisational scales.  The landed gentry and senior nobility and administrative 
officials (with respect to their private capacities rather than their official roles) 
would sustain higher level of social intimacy and common deference.  Members of 
this groups were therefore less likely to require an external source of authority in 
order to effectively resolve interpersonal disputes amongst themselves, but 
instead could rely on existing social control to facilitate a resolution (Black & 




The above discussion is not intended to portray the past in nostalgic or idealistic 
terms.  The lack of need for an external authority to regulate the daily life of 
communities is not an explicit or implicit appeal to a society of ‘lost values’ or 
‘honesty’.  In the words of Adam Smith: 
The affluence of the rich excites the indignation of the poor, who are 
often both driven by want, and prompted by envy, to invade his 
possessions.  It is only under the shelter of civil magistrate [jus civitas] 
that the owner of that valuable property, which is acquired by the labour 
of many years, or perhaps of many successive generations, can sleep a 
single night in security. …[W]here there is no property, or at least none 
that exceeds the value of two of three days’ labour, civil government is 
not necessary  (Rupp, 2008, p. 59) 
In other words, parish communities offered limited and exclusive membership, in 
which opportunities for acquisitive crime were limited (Rupp, 2008), and further 
controlled by familiarity and reputations (King, 2000). 
 
Social controls imposed by these small communities of ‘near equals’ (Rupp, 2008) 
were sometimes sufficient to limit the practical exercise of sovereign powers by 
the Crown and the courts well into the eighteenth century (Malcolmson, 1980; 
King, 2000; Sharpe, 2013).  Under such conditions, Black’s (1976) theory of law 
suggests that significantly ‘less’ law should be applied to regulate disputes within 
these communities, and greater ‘amounts’ of law should be applied to them by 
external parties.  The majority of the population ‘technically’ had access to the 
courts, but at a substantial cost relative to disposable income.  Individuals and 
communities would thus resort to law not as a default position, but as a calculated 
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necessity, and after other settlement agents were deemed or proven ineffective 
(Black & Baumgartner, 1983).  Intimacy, (relative) closeness in terms of 
stratification, morphology, culture, and organisation, together with common 
sources of deference (Laslett, 2005) also suggests lower quantities of law to be 
employed within the upper classes.  Whilst the costs related to making an 
application before the courts was not as substantial to the upper classes, disputes 
would likely be resolved without the need for an external source of authority 
(Black & Baumgartner, 1983). 
 
Pre-industrial prosecution of acquisitive crime is therefore analysed as fulfilling a 
dual functionality.  Legal proceedings may result with compensation for the victim 
and deter others from offending in a similar manner against those equipped to 
bring forth a prosecution.  The offender could offer the victim compensation to 
circumvent the legal process and avoid being subjected to punishment and the 
object of deterrence measures.  The offender may see that it is in his or her best 
interest to attempt to cooperate with the victim, and to pay compensation early 
and avoid future costs or risks.  It would appear that the desired outcome for 
interpersonal dispute that relate to the contemporary concept of acquisitive crime 
remains compensatory, irrespective of whether it was obtained bilaterally, 
facilitated by social controls, or through the courts.  Nevertheless, some offenders 
against local communities with limited means were external to their systems of 
social controls, common adherences, and reputations (McIntosh, 1975; 
Hobsbawn, 2000).  The courts fulfilled an enabling role with respect to such 
‘external threats’ against the community (King, 2000).  These benefits would be 
accessed by small communities that organised a ‘pool’ of resources to finance the 
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apprehending and initiating proceedings against those who harm the community 
or its members.  These groups are thought to have either organised 
spontaneously in response to victimisation or would form longer term membership 
associations.  These forms of community organisation made use of the Crown 
appointed judges (Black & Baumgartner, 1983) to enforce a source of common 
deference (the sovereign) in the absence of other means through which to resolve 
disputes.  This use of the courts also communicated that a specific community 
and its physical surroundings were not a lawless enclave, but rather a sphere 
where consequences were imposed upon those who offend against its members 
(Shapiro, 1986; McIntosh, 1975; King, 2000; Klerman, 2001; Tyler, 2006; 
Schubert, 2015).  
 
The advantages for an organised parish in using law or relying on its existence in 
informal settlement negotiations with offenders were considerable in addressing 
victimisation and establishing communal deterrence (Cottu, 1820; Hobsbawn, 
2000; King, 2000; Sharpe, 2013).  Social controls were generally effective to 
resolve most cases of acquisitive crime before being brought to the court (King, 
2000; Emsley, 2010).  Low literacy rates amongst parish constables as late as the 
seventeenth century could be seen as indicative of the nominal historical 
importance of statute or precedent (Royal Commission, 1823; Wrightson, 1980).  
Sheriffs and justices of the peace in the local parishes had to exercise judgment in 
enforcing the law.  There was an ongoing need to fulfil the real and perceived role 




Two main factors constitute the analysis of the social dynamic that determined the 
use of varying ‘amounts’ of law (Black, 1976), in the resolution of contemporary 
constructs of acquisitive crime (and particularly the concepts of theft and fraud).  
The first is the absence of a categorical distinction between the contemporary 
equivalents of the ‘civil’ and ‘criminal’ court jurisdictions.  The second element is 
the discretionary nature of the use of the highest bracket of law (the courts), which 
is contrary to the (alleged) contemporary consequence of such crimes (particularly 
with regards ‘predatory’-type offences (Hester & Eglin, 1992; Naylor, 2003).  The 
primary distinction between the evaluation of the ‘amount’ of applicable law used 
in historical typological equivalents of the contemporary concepts of acquisitive 
crime appears to be the lack of sovereign interest in ‘interpersonal disputes’ 
(Klerman, 2001).  Consequently, the characterisation of the underlying social 
dynamic which determines the typically applicable ‘amount’ of law used in 
interpersonal dispute resolution is an important element of this historical socio-
legal analytical discussion.   
 
4.4.2 The Crown as a Prosecutor, and Prosecutions on Behalf of the 
Crown’s Local Administration 
 
Sharpe (2013) analyses community responses to ‘simple’ types of contemporary 
constructs of crime (such as theft) in the absence of a prescriptive central 
authority response.  For instance, ninety-three thefts were prosecuted between 
1629 and 1631 in Essex, compared to six-hundred-and-ninety-eight cases of 
individuals failing to comply with their obligations to work on the highways, and 
six-hundred-and-fifty-two persons prosecuted for beverage trade regulation 
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offences (Sharpe, 2013 p.7).  The latter represent ‘offences’ that were subject to 
prosecution by the Crown, or by the local administrative élites, as opposed to 
interpersonal disputes.  This category of litigation included such ‘offences’ as the 
enforcement of personal or communal obligations, primarily road works, or 
regulatory prosecutions such as the unlicensed trade in ale, or non-attendance in 
church (Wrightson, 1980, pp. 300-303).  Cases of this category were typically 
initiated by presenting juries, which were made of local noblemen who would 
present the court with allegations against individuals on behalf of the 
administration of the county.  Cases brought by presenting juries ranged from 
trading specific good and services without a permit, disorderly behaviour, 
unregulated sporting activities, harbouring criminals, and ecclesiastical offences.  
The primary function of these prosecutions was to enforce the local 
administration, legal and tax systems, and related to a narrow concept of 
‘community interest’ as defined by the nobility and their duties to the Crown 
(Walter, 1980; Wrightson, 1980). 
 
The above examples of prosecution of cases by presenting juries represent the 
use of ‘higher’ amounts of law downwards on the stratification, morphology, and 
organisation social scales (Black, 1976).  Whilst not entirely synonymous with 
explicit state interest, cases of this nature represent enforcement that is not 
grounded in consent, but rather in enforcement of decrees.  These decrees and 
regulations may have related to an early notion of public interest (namely in the 
enforcement of weights and measurements), but this chapter refers only to the 
‘amount’ of law used for conflict resolution (Black, 1976).  Local administration, 
which was constituted by regional landed gentry and Crown-appointed officials, 
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represents a group that is of higher stratification, morphology, and organisation 
scales.  The local administration and its members do not share a system of social 
controls, intimacy or common deference as local merchants, tradesmen and 
peasants who may be in violation of the locally imposed order.  The use of ‘more’ 
law is typical in situations where consensus or resolution that is grounded in social 
controls does not appear likely.   
 
Another catalyst for the use of the courts (as representative of the ‘highest’ 
amount of law that can be applied in response to allegations which relate to 
contemporary concepts), is the direction of harm towards the Crown.  The 
references to the courts as grounded in ‘external’ sources of authority (Black & 
Baumgartner, 1983) are made in relation to the social function of a judge as a 
settlement agent.  When the alleged harm is directed at the Crown, two theoretical 
components come into effect.  The first is the identification of the Crown as the 
‘ultimate’ entity of the stratification, morphology, culture, and organisation scales 
(Black, 1976).   
 
A sovereign entity (under typical circumstances, particularly so in classic 
monarchies) signifies the upper most theoretical levels on each of the 
aforementioned scales.  The Crown is traditionally thought of as representing the 
highest amount of riches in the land, as reigning supreme over the division of 
labour, as having a substantial role in codifying elements of cultural standards.  
Examples of the Crown’s traditional ‘ultimate’ cultural standings include its classic 
functions and position as head of the Church of England, patronage of the arts, 
determining fashions in design and clothing, amongst others.  The English people 
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commonly refer to the ‘golden standard’ of their language as the ‘Queen’s / King’s 
English’, after the title of an early twentieth century dictionary and grammar book 
(Fowler, 1926; Holt, 2009).  In terms of organisation, the monarch in a classic 
monarchy is the head of government, and those officials who are not appointed 
but elected, swear allegiance to the Crown and operate on its behalf (Hobbes, 
1651).  The notion of agency of the Crown persists in British constitutional 
monarchy, but the Crown has far less direct practical involvement with the running 
of the mechanism of the state, but rather a more symbolic one (Blackstone, 1765; 
Bagehot, 1873).   
 
Transgressions against this ‘ultimate’ social entity in terms of Black’s (1976) 
theory of law means that an offender, elevated one or more social scales, would 
still be exerted law upon by the Crown.  The sovereign is not a peer in any social 
groups and does not share a common (earthly) deference with any of its subjects.  
Therefore, there are less grounds for consideration of possible settlement agents 
that could address harm against the sovereign other than the courts (Black & 
Baumgartner, 1983).  In pre-industrial England, transgressions against the Crown 
and its protections would commonly be construed as ‘traitorous’, as the concept of 
criminal law (Hester & Eglin, 1992) had not yet emerged (Ashworth, 2000).  The 
property that underpinned the ‘amount’ of law used to address harm against the 
Crown or a challenge to its protections were the undermining of royal authority.  
(Pollock & Maitland, 1898; Walter, 1980; Wrightson, 1980) 
  
The scope of ‘traitorous’ offences extended beyond the contemporary meaning of 
the term and included matters such as taxes and other duties (Walter, 1980; 
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Wrightson, 1980; Sharpe, 2013).  The social dynamic behind the historical 
relationship between the use of 'higher' and 'lower' amounts of law appears to 
follow the contemporary theory proposed by Black (1976).  The social function of 
the courts in relation to contemporary equivalents of acquisitive crime appears to 
have been the facilitation of compensation by either direct means (litigation and 
enforcement), or by victim empowerment.  The courts would have been used 
when social controls and potential settlement agents whose authority is grounded 
in social control and shared deference could not facilitate compensation (Black, 
1976; Black & Baumgartner, 1983).  The agreement of English pre-industrial 
historical literature and records with the Black’s (1976) theory of law and third-
party theory (Black & Baumgartner, 1983) supports the characterisation of the 
‘duality’ of fraud as a manifestation of an underlying social function (Black, 1976; 
Durkheim, 1982; Black & Baumgartner, 1983).  That which determines the use of 
law in resolution of interpersonal disputes before the introduction of public 
prosecution (Ashworth, 2000) appears to be capable of critical analytical insights 
through the lens of the aforementioned contemporary theoretical frameworks.  
The historical and contemporary ‘duality’ of fraud appears to be a manifestation of 
an underlying social dynamic that governs the use of law as a means of 
maintaining order when it cannot be sustained through social controls alone 
(Black, 1976; Black & Baumgartner, 1983).   
 
The above discussion relates not exclusively to a pre-industrial variability of 
typically applicable ‘amounts’ of law in response to fraud, but rather to 
contemporary concepts of acquisitive crime to which the state is not a party.  
Where harm could conceivably be directed against the Crown, particularised 
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provisions were made to codify the practice as mutually exclusive to legitimate 
conduct and subject to punitive prosecution by the Crown.  Whilst the nature of 
these offences is analysed in further detail in the following section, this section 
concerns itself with a characterisation of the social dynamic that determines the 
‘amount’ of law (Black, 1976) applicable to conflict resolution. 
 
In the above section, the author examined the dynamic between offender and 
victim in the context of pre-industrial private prosecution of (what modern 
standards would deem as) ‘mainstream’ acquisitive crimes.  This analysis relates 
to the fourth intermediate research objective, which seeks to characterise the 
historical dynamic that determined the typical ‘amount’ of applicable law in 
acquisitive crime resolution.  The analysis suggests that the underlying social 
dynamics behind the resolution of offences relating to the concepts of theft and 
fraud were similar in pre-industrial England.  They reflected a victim-preference for 
compensation, supported by social controls (Black, 1976), regulation by reputation 
(King, 2000), and the courts, who appeared to have acknowledged as a wrong for 
which remedies should be applied (Shapiro, 1986; Klerman, 2001).   
 
The underlying social dynamic behind the application of law to the resolution of 
‘predatory’-type and ‘commercial’-type frauds (Naylor, 2003) bore lesser 
difference than it presently does.  The contemporary resolution of ‘commercial’-
type frauds is characterised as not typically synonymous with criminal justice 
system responses (‘more’ law) as it compares to ‘predatory’-type frauds 
(Sutherland, 1949; Black, 1976; Naylor, 2003).  The historical similarity appears 
not to be a product of the modern age (Sutherland, 1949), or the prevalence of 
224 
 
capitalistic politics (Levi, 1987), but rather the scope of effective criminalisation of 
fraud within the purview of the criminal justice system (Black, 1972; Hester & 
Eglin, 1992).   
 
In section 4.7 below, the researcher discusses the introduction of public 
prosecution and the development of its institutions around the concept of theft and 
the protection of the right to property (Hay & Snyder, 1989; Ashworth, 2000; 
Rawlings, 2002; Lentz & Chaires, 2007; CPS, 2013; Schubert, 2015).  Prior to that 
development, interpersonal disputes relating to a cause for damages (theft, 
burglary, assault, or fraud), would not have been within the prosecutorial purview 
of the Crown.  Therefore, it is argued that variability of the typical association of 
the gestalt of fraud to law-enforcement activities is not a ‘new’ phenomenon.  
Instead, it reflects a difference in historical paths between the role of the concept 
of theft and the concept of fraud in the emergence of the institutions of public 
prosecution.  This creates a need to understand the association of ‘more’ law and 
the use of law as a mechanism for dispute resolution in both a historical and 
contemporary perspective. 
 
This section investigated the underlying dynamic that determines the typical 
‘amount’ of applicable law in the absence of adequate social controls and 
settlement agents who function independently of a state mandate (Black, 1976; 
Black & Baumgartner, 1983).  The analytical approach applied in this section 
demonstrates social circumstances that appear to require the use of ‘more’ law 
through the courts when social controls were insufficient to facilitate a final 
resolution.  The use of ‘more’ law was at the discretion and resource of the 
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alleged victim and could have been discontinued if a resolution was achieved 
outside of the court.  The courts would provide compensatory remedies, which 
would be applied in order to undo the harm caused by a range of contemporary 
‘criminal’ concepts, amongst them fraud.  Sanctions would be applied to enforce 
compliance with the compensation ordered by the court and were not different 
from the sanctions used against debtors.  In both cases, the court would use 
imprisonment in order to substantiate a debt it had recognised through legitimate 
trade, or through causes such as theft or fraud. 
 
In relation to the fourth intermediate research objective concerning the 
characterisation of the historical use of variable amounts of law, this section 
demonstrated the applicability of Black’s (1976) theory of law and third-party 
theory (Black, 1976; Black & Baumgartner, 1983).  The result of this analysis set 
the underlying social dynamic that appears ‘organic’ to conflict resolution (Weber, 
1978; Durkheim, 1982) and persistent in the absence of effective association with 
law-enforcement activities (Black, 1972; Hester & Eglin, 1992).  Analysis of later 
historical evidence (4.7) combined with the context in sections 2.4, and 2.6 in the 
literature review relates to underlying social dynamics that characterise the use of 
law where the standard of effective criminalisation is not demonstrably achieved.  
In the following sections, the researcher examines pre-industrial circumstances 
that appear to have been effectively associated with Crown prosecution.  In 
sections 4.5 and 4.6, the author analyses the effective criminalisation of the 
concept of theft and the divergence of the concept of fraud from the overall 




Some sanctions were imposed as a result of a prosecution by the Crown or its 
local representative.  These prosecutions were not aimed at litigating whether a 
compensation to the Crown was due or not, nor were the proceedings potentially 
averted via bilateral negotiations.  These cases addressed challenges to the 
administrative and economic roles, the manifestations of sovereignty and its 
representation at the local level (Walter, 1980; Emsley, 2010; King, 2000).  As a 
guarantee and protection for itself, the assurance of Crown prosecution supported 
compliance with a range of functions such as imposed standards of measurement, 
registration, and taxation.  These prosecutions ‘fit’ the (modern) criminal justice 
system category as they serve as a means of punishment and deterrence to 
achieve (symbolic) crime control rather than social control and other remedies.  
The following section elaborates on specific fraud related ‘sovereign guarantees’. 
   
4.5 The ‘Particularisation’ and Criminalisation of Fraud 
 
This section addresses the first research question (RQ1 ‘duality’) by identifying the 
essential characteristics of a ‘sovereign guarantee’ of trust in commercial and 
legal (‘official’) conduct.  This ‘sovereign guarantee’ refers to the set of fraud 
characteristics to which the Crown responds as prosecutor, as opposed to 
adjudicator.  The reader will note that despite the historical socio-legal context 
through which the pre-industrial scope of the ‘sovereign guarantee’ of trust is 
characterised in this section, it carries contemporary analytical relevance.  The 
identification of frauds that are synonymous with Crown prosecution and appear 
mutually exclusive to discretionary use of law and compensatory remedies 
addresses a dysfunction between legislation and effective criminalisation (Black, 
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1972).  The below discussion synthesises a social dynamic and a sovereign 
function with respect to trust in commercial and official conduct (honesty) and 
identifies drivers for its association with the ‘highest’ quanta of law (Black, 1976). 
 
Prior to its assumption of a prosecutorial mandate over (some) inter-personal 
disputes, the Crown sparingly identified itself as a party to fraud, and only in 
particular circumstances, which were detailed in legislation or by proclamation.  In 
chapter two (section 2.5), the researcher provided contemporary examples of this 
apparent ‘mode’ of criminalisation that co-exist alongside the criminalisation of ‘all 
frauds’.  Such offences, which were either not repealed by the Fraud Act 2006 or 
subsequently legislated, do not appear to ‘add’ to the scope of statutory fraud 
prohibitions, and appear specific and otherwise indistinguishable examples of 
Fraud Act offences.  This ‘mode’ of criminalisation pre-dates the Fraud Act 2006 
and was traced by the author in the context of intermediate research objective 
three.  In intermediate research objective three, the researcher investigates the 
contemporary role of the particularisation of fraud in criminal statute by examining 
its functional roots.  This section examines whether the challenge to effective 
criminalisation of fraud was indeed the (alleged) absence of a legal definition for 
fraud (Law Commission, 2002), by attempting to re-construct the historical 
criminalisation of fraud.  One might ask whether historical legislation sought to 
achieve a similar scope of fraud criminalisation as provisioned for in the Fraud Act 
2006 and failed to predict or circumvent “the fertility of man’s invention [to contrive 
new schemes]” (Holdsworth, 1909, p. 262 citing Lord Hardwicke, 1759; The Law 
Commission, 2002 citing The Criminal Law Committee, 1966).  If not, meaning 
that the concept of fraud was historically only criminalised in part as suggested in 
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R. v. Jones [1703] (“[not to indict a] man for making a fool of another”), then a 
historical ‘duality’ in statute should be available for study. 
 
The particularisation of fraud offences discussed in this section appear to 
articulate a narrow scope of sovereign interest in what is otherwise a category of 
inter-personal disputes. The first instance of particularisation identified by the 
researcher appears to date back to the Statute of Westminster in 1275.  In section 
29, deceit is disallowed by court officials and those pleading before the King’s 
court (Pickering, 1762, pp. 88-90).  This section forms part of a series of 
provisions set to ensure an equitable standard in the courts and appears 
responsive to occurrences of abuse of power by court officials, sheriffs and bailiffs 
(Pickering, 1762; Pollock & Maitland, 1898).  The provision against deceit by 
officials in the King’s courts is part of the cementing of the elevated status of the 
courts in English law and jurisprudence, alongside with other provisions from the 
Statute of Westminster 1275.  The Statute set standards for the dispensation of 
justice by the courts, and the superior principles of the ‘rule of law’, which elevates 
the functional role of the courts in upholding the law, and interpreting laws and 
norms in judicial decisions (Shapiro, 1986).  
 
The historical strengthening of the English courts during the reign of Edward I 
(1272-1307) follows from Shapiro’s (1986) political (functional) analysis of the 
emergence of a state-backed third-party ‘settlement agent’ that supersedes all 
others (Black & Baumgartner, 1983; Shapiro, 1986).  Prior to the reform of the 
judiciary under Edward I, sources of (alleged) judicial authority were fractured 
(Pollock, 1904; Prestwich, 1988).  The makeup of third-party ‘settlement agents’ 
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and systems of justice was not geographically or economically uniform.  In large 
estates, local feudal land owners would have de facto jurisdiction over their 
tenants in various aspects, particularly as it related to matters concerning 
agricultural production and property (Pollock & Maitland, 1898; Anderson, 2013).  
The Church presided over ecclesiastical affairs, but not exclusively, and local and 
regional aristocracy in some localities held its own court.  These courts were a 
manifestation of sovereignty of sorts, or challenge to the Plantagenet claim over 
their land in more extreme cases where royal judgements and writs were not 
recognised, and exceptions were ultimately decided upon (Prestwich, 1988; 
Schmitt, 2005).  Furthermore, courts of a lower jurisdiction were predominantly 
local, and enforcing local norms, and only a minority of them were fully beholden 
to the Crown (Prestwich, 1988).  The legislative capacity of the King was largely in 
the issuance of statutes, which was not an absolutely exclusive prerogative.   
 
The Statute of Westminster 1275 complements the political consolidation of power 
following a power clash between King Edward I and Council of Barons lead by 
Simon De Montfort in the Second Baron’s war of 1264-1267, and the expansion of 
the realm in the 1270’s (Prestwich, 1988).  The Crown proclaimed (and was able 
to substantiate) its authority to decide on exceptions previously decided upon by 
the Church, and mandated due process and reasonable and proportionate fines to 
be imposed by the courts.  In the Statute, certain provisions elevated the rule of 
law above the Crown and its officials and their official duties, and particularly 
before the courts.  The statute ‘guarantees’ honesty from officers of the Crown in 
court pleadings, forbids extortion by officials, or excessive tolls.  The statute also 
provides sovereign backing to the courts by imposing sanctions on those who do 
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not recognise or refuse to participate in the judiciary process.  It strengthens trust 
in Crown institutions through standardisation of processing the role of the Crown 
as a source of uniform and proportionate justice, and the elevated status of the 
judiciary and role of the Crown as the guarantor of justice (Shapiro, 1986; 
Prestwich, 1988).  It is important to note that in principle, dishonest conduct and 
perjury in particular might still have required adjudication by the court but were not 
subject to Crown prosecution. 
 
The identification or certain dishonest manners of conduct by perpetrators and 
circumstance in the Statute of Westminster 1275 appears to reflect a careful and 
precise approach to criminalisation and the purview of Crown prosecution.  The 
provisions that relate to the concept of fraud appear to serve a greater imperative 
of standardising a Crown-backed judiciary, and to make sure Crown officials do 
not undermine royal justice.  In the above example, the Crown is not a direct 
victim of fraud, but rather the victimisation of others in its name is construed as an 
offence against sovereign interests.  Other examples offer a more precise look at 
the sort of fraud in which the Crown takes an interest as a direct victim through 
further particularisation of offender and circumstances of the offence.  Examples 
of such specific provisions include: An Act for Accompts and Clearing of Publique 
Debts and for discovering Frauds or Concealments of anything due to the 
Commonwealth 1653, or An Act for preventing Fraud and regulating Abuses in 
His Majesties Customes 1662 (original spellings preserved).  These are examples 
of a considerable body of law, where specific frauds are being detailed and 
excluded from permissible practice, and as an offence against the Crown.  These 
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offences do not relate to a concept of fraud that is criminal, but rather to its 
practice against the Crown.   
 
In neither of the above provisions, or indeed others that were accessed and 
examined by the researcher in this context, the term fraud does not appear to be 
qualified.  The Statute of Frauds 1677, which was allegedly enacted in order to 
address those “fraudulent practices which are commonly endeavoured to be 
upheld by perjury and subornation of perjury”, does not expand on those practices 
either.  The Statute lacks a definition of fraud, or the level of particularisation of 
what practices and how it seeks to inhibit.  It requires any agreement reached with 
respect of several types of transactions to be recorded on a properly formatted 
and signed contract.  By mandating a contract, signatories agree to one narrative 
of the transactions and its terms and record it on paper as a means of creating a 
standard of records that could be used as evidence of the agreed terms of a 
transaction (Ferguson, 1984, pp. 199-202).  The Act in its mandate over 
transactions to which the Crown is not a party may appear to be similar to the 
purview of the Fraud Act 2006.  Instead, the Act appears to impose a standard for 
recording transactions.  This create both an expectation with ‘settlement agents’ 
to be able to refer to documentary evidence on the terms agreed upon by parties 
to a transaction in dispute, as well as enables both parties to refer to the terms 
from a mutually agreed source.  The Crown does not ‘insert’ itself by guaranteeing 
prosecution in response to fraud as a means of inhibiting the aforementioned 
fraudulent practices in the introductory passage of the Act (Holdsworth, 1909).  
The ‘scope’ of criminalisation (Crown prosecution) was left unchanged under The 
Statute of Frauds 1677, which appears only to standardise the expectation of a 
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written contract in a range of transactions.  This also relates to the discussion in 
section eight below, which examines the development of responses to the 
concept of fraud during the industrial era, and in parallel to the processes that 
have led to the contemporary synonymous relationship of theft with law-
enforcement activities.   
 
In case law, the Statute of Frauds 1766 is sometimes referred to as describing a 
mere technical standard, but insufficient or irrelevant in analysing merits or claims 
of fraud.  The merits of claims were considered on a case by case basis 
(Holdsworth, 1909), for example: "...this would be a good Will in Law, if attested 
pursuant to the Statute of Frauds, but would be set aside in Equity for the 
Fraud..." (Court of Chancery, 1744).  This examination tested whether ‘unfair’ 
business practices were used to render the deal, or components thereof as 
inequitable.  A contract can also be used to test the compliance of a supplier, who 
will not be considered guilty of an offence by not meeting all the terms of the 
contact.  Nevertheless, compliance may be coerced through social controls, risk to 
reputations, enforcement of market rules, or through applications before a court to 
recognised liabilities and damages (Holdsworth, 1909). 
 
The absence of a legislative intent towards the criminalisation of the concept of 
fraud in pre-industrial England is further manifested in the below example where, 
fraud was recognised as a potentially very harmful and disruptive form of practice: 
person shall take my money to cause and procure a third person, his 
trustee, to convey an estate to me; and then shall tell me he cannot 
prevail upon him to do it, and yet will not restore me my money, or put 
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me in the same condition he found me: It would encourage all manner of 
fraud and oppression of that nature, and few men would be safe under 
any agreement (Sir Cornwall Bradshaw, Knight v William Sutton, 
Gentleman [1698]). 
The above extract from the court of equity does not indicate a ‘slap on the wrist’ in 
terms of judicial temperament towards (‘civil’) fraud that was not particularised by 
the Crown.  Instead it stains the reputation of Sutton (above) and would limit the 
future trust that he may be afforded in future trade, whilst providing a 
compensatory remedy to the plaintiff. 
 
Another driver for particularisation appears to be a requirement to standardise and 
regulate the practice of insolvency.  The development of pre-industrial insolvency 
law includes, as an inseparable element to such conflicts, the concept of fraud.  
This discussion highlights how the law is not only a normalising force in social life, 
but in commercial life as well.  Debts are incurred in trade for mutual benefit, yet 
they are based on a degree of (shared) optimism and a sense of mutual trust.  
While some frauds may involve a deliberate acquisition of credit or tangibles with 
no intention of making any return, genuine traders may find themselves in 
situations where assumptions about future success are no longer realisable.  In 
other cases, the ‘ease’ of finding one’s self with a large surplus in parts of a 
business cycle present an opportunity to ‘go rogue’ and convert the surplus to 
criminal benefit and ‘chance it’ (Levi, 2008b).   The concept of credit, particularly in 
the mediaeval context, is not that of credit lines given by banks, other financial 
institutions or investors, but rather the ‘float’ of merchandise, micro-loans, or ‘joint 




Fraud often requires that an agreement be entered into freely, or for a transaction 
to be made by consent (Naylor, 2003; Smith et al., 2011; Levi, 2008a).  In the 
above sense, it is distinct from other forms of acquisitive crime.  When compared 
to other forms of acquisitive crime where the offender and victim interact directly 
without guile, the victim of fraud is unlikely to experience recognition of 
victimisation at the time of transaction (Tollestrup, et al., 1994).  In other cases, 
trust given may be abused and betrayed, despite no malicious intention at the 
point when the victim chooses to place trust in the offender.  The extension of 
credit embodies risk of the unknown, which may result in an amount having to be 
recognised as ‘bad debt’, meaning that it is not likely to be recovered.  Some risk 
relates to fraud, but many other legitimate reasons may result in a default on a 
loan or other forms of credit common in trade through natural disasters, market 
competition, or honest errors in judgment.  Furthermore, the access to securities 
pledged to creditors, or assets that may otherwise be duly distributed to creditors 
in a legitimate (non-fraud related) default may be circumvented by fraud.    
Circumstances may drive a trader to commit fraud against a creditor.  In other 
cases, a fraud could be presented to creditors as an honest default to avoid civil 
or criminal liability, and potentially lead to debt restructuring and further harm.  
(Levi, 2008b) 
 
Under common circumstances of trade in mediaeval England, trust (or the 
expectation of honesty) was rooted in mutual acquaintances, common deference, 
and the expectation of future collaboration given the limitations on travel (King, 
2000).  A farmer who allows a merchant to collect goods based on an agreement 
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that the former would be paid at a later time, and both may expect to repeat the 
transaction in the future for mutual benefit.  Furthermore, the standard imposed by 
the Statute of Frauds 1677 required commercial transactions and some family 
affairs to recorded on a signed a contract detailing the terms of the exchange.  
This stipulation created documentary evidence on terms agreed in relation to a 
given transaction, which would have made it easier for third-parties to ascertain 
what representations were made, and whether they were met.  Marketplace 
reputations could also be affected by demonstrable breach of contract.  These 
factors would have made trade typically subject to normalisation by market rules, 
which were grounded in social controls and personal reputations and therefore 
seldom required further intervention by the courts.  (Black, 1976; Black & 
Baumgartner, 1983; Granovetter, 1985; King, 2000; Laslett, 2005)    
 
A notable exception to the above observation about the market capacity to self-
regulate and use social controls and regulation by reputation to normalise conduct 
and resolve disputes appears to have been fraud by bankruptcy.  Furthermore, 
given the geographically localised context in which local markets self-regulated in 
mediaeval England, social controls and reputations were not as effective against 
debtors who were concealing assets or leaving the country (The Cork 
Commission, 1982).  The body of legislation on the matter did not seem to 
consider the circumstances by which a debt was created, whether it be by honest 
trade, negligence, or fraud.  Rubin (1984) demonstrates that where cases were 
opened – that is, when private negotiations and arbitration failed, and the creditor 
could access the courts – less than 1% of debtors were imprisoned.  This figure 
should be seen in the context of the elaborate sequence that had to take place 
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prior to the imprisonment of a debtor, which is seen in this context as being used 
to maximise recovery for the creditor and enforce debtor compliance (Innes, 1980; 
Rubin, 1984).     
 
The imprisonment of debtors is a topic which bridges both the discussion on the 
‘duality’ of fraud and the more general context of acquisitive crime resolution.  On 
the one hand, while there is no suggestion of criminality, it would appear that the 
function of the prison system of the day was the substantiation of legal orders and 
fines.  In that sense, should the court recognise a debt (via a process initiated and 
financed by the creditor), the instruction of the court to settle it would be subject to 
the same means of substantiation.  On the other hand, this course of action also 
prevents and could deter some frauds in the modern legal sense, specifically 
fraudulent trading, the preference of creditors and long firm fraud (The Cork 
Commission, 1982; Levi, 2008; Goode, 2011). 
 
Historically, the protection of creditors in local trade regulation and common-law 
created a strong compliance regime to prevent debtors from fleeing, hiding assets 
or otherwise obstructing the recovery of their debts (Pollock, 1904; Levinthal, 
1919).  Twelfth and thirteenth century courts, enforced by custom and decree, 
against debtors who attempted to conceal assets or abscond, using harsh and 
summary common-law sanctions (Levinthal, 1919).  With the development of 
commerce and international trade, Tudor monarchs (1584 – 1603) gradually 
introduced legislative measures to particularise and combat fraud against, and 
enable, creditors to seize assets from absconded persons.  Whilst these 
measures did not vary much from common-law practices and local trade 
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regulation techniques administered in English trade hubs of the era, they were still 
necessary to unify and codify assurances to would-be lenders (Levinthal, 1919; 
The Cork Commission, 1982, p. 16).  Critically for the discussion on the 'duality' of 
fraud, sovereign backing for trust given by lenders had to be re-established in 
order to enable and encourage investment and trade despite the growing 
inadequacy of pre-existing social controls.  Furthermore, prior to the introduction 
of dedicated legislative measures, there was no standard legal mechanism to 
investigate debtor assets or trace transfers to other parties.  These deficiencies in 
law were previously supplemented by specific practices and customs in local 
marketplaces, where social controls and the relative simplicity of trade network 
made such affairs subject to local regulation.  (The Cork Commission, 1982; also 
see Bracton, (c. 1210 – c. 1268) above in this chapter). 
 
With the development and growth of the economy and the extent of opportunities, 
the attendant risks increased.  The Crown was therefore required to codify into 
law a better system of rules to empower creditors at the expense of debtors.  The 
increased intricacy of trade in late-mediaeval England took away from the 
practical means through which insolvency could have been regulated by market 
rules alone (and on a localised level).  The increase in foreign trade and multi-
regional supply chains and trade routes had also provided opportunities for 
debtors to challenge their creditors with the task of having to interface with 
multiple localised markets, where assets could be hidden (The Cork Commission, 
1982).  The national system of procedure and powers of investigation and trace 
assets that followed from this context required substantial sovereign-backing in 
order to be effective.  The Act Against Such Persons As Do Make Bankrupts 1542 
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appears to be the first act to create a legal framework to regulate the relationship 
between debtors and creditors (Levinthal, 1919).  As stated in the opening 
remarks of the act, it is responsive in nature, and describes what is now referred 
to as long-firm fraud (Levi, 1987).  This fraud type is defined by the acquisition of 
goods on credit prior to the offender disappearing, or a business declaring 
bankruptcy (Levi, 2008b).  The aforementioned 1542 Act was therefore aimed at 
those who: 
 craftily obtaining into their own hands great substance of other men’s 
goods, do suddenly free to parts unknown, or keep their houses … for 
their own pleasure and … against all reason, equity and good 
conscience (The Cork Commission, 1982, p.16 citing the Act Against 
Such Persons As Do Make Bankrupts 1542). 
    
The 1542 Act does not fundamentally address the administration of bankruptcy or 
administration process, but rather criminalises the practice of intentionally going 
bankrupt or absconding from creditors.  It was not before 1570 that an official 
state-standard for the liquidation of an estate and distribution of court-seized 
assets to creditors was legislated.  This further enabled creditors and imposed a 
rules-based system to encourage further investment.  Non-compliance with a 
liquidation process, or not providing access to a debtor’s assets as ordered by the 
courts, was therefore no longer a civil wrong, but a transgression against the 
state.  The treatment of those who were found to conceal assets from their 
creditors under eighteenth century insolvency laws were substantiated 




The development of insolvency law offers a compelling historical perspective on 
the development of sovereign interest in what presently falls under the definition 
of acquisitive crime.  As discussed in chapter two, insolvency-related fraud is an 
area of practice that, whilst criminal, may still in some cases be resolved outside 
of the criminal justice system.  As well as the wider concept of debtor-creditor 
relations, bankruptcy was traditionally regulated by social controls (Black, 1976) 
and by merchants’ guilds and specific market authorities (Levinthal, 1919; Black & 
Baumgartner, 1983).  Some mediaeval market authorities were empowered to 
take direct action against debtors who were intentionally hiding assets, but no 
uniform standard of enforcement was imposed.  Such ‘autonomies’, where the 
Crown favoured local ‘market rules’ and customs (Holdsworth, 1938) reflected a 
lack of sovereign interest and effective reach over commercial disputes in the 
parishes (Levinthal, 1919; King, 2000).  If there was need for further 
substantiation with ‘more law’ (Black, 1976), debts that were disputed could be 
litigated via an external authority (Black & Baumgartner, 1983), and court levers 
such as imprisonment could assist to foster compliance (Klerman, 2001).  In 1791, 
a Parliamentary study showed that only 10% of the twelve-thousand writs issued 
in London and Middlesex in relation to debts resulted with a period of 
imprisonment even if there had not been an allegation of fraudulent conveyance 
or concealment of assets.  The 90% of the cases where the debtor was not placed 
in a debtors’ prison may indicate that most writs resulted in compliance (Innes, 
1980).  That said, we cannot discount other factors such as creditor exhaustion 




The analysis of the regulation of insolvency in the context of pre-industrial fraud 
particularisation above appears to present a more responsive and ‘measured’ 
model of legislation.  Whilst the concept of insolvency is vastly different to ‘direct’ 
victimisation of the Crown, it is not clear how it is distinctive from other protections 
by the Crown.  In other words, the substantiation of state insolvency standards 
and powers could be seen as similar to the regulation of trade through the prisms 
of a commodity of Crown trade post, where Crown prosecution is readily 
proclaimed to be applied in response to infractions.  Nonetheless, the researcher 
points to an underlying distinction between the threat of Crown prosecution in 
relation to commercial protections, and the insolvency regime.  The letter does not 
relate to narrowly defined circumstances of trade directly regulated by the Crown 
like the former, but rather to all forms and circumstances of trade and credit.  
Furthermore, the insolvency regime addresses emerging shifts in the balance of 
power between debtors and creditors, which did not apply to a commercial setting 
created or defined by the state.  Instead, transgressions against creditors and 
diminished ability to recover losses represent a systemic risk, which could 
potentially impact upon the availability and cost of credit, as well as the tax base 
for the state (The Cork Commission, 1982).   
 
Durkheim (1893) theorises on the implications of an increase in the intricacy of the 
division of labour in terms of the avenues for enrichment it creates, legitimate, or 
otherwise.  Individuals may play a growing number of interchangeable roles in 
varying circumstances, making social controls and pre-existing means of self-
regulation less capable in terms of maintaining social order (Durkheim, 1893; 
Merton, 1934).  Within that context, ‘innovation’ can enable one to undermine the 
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“acceptable modes” (Merton, 1938, p. 673) of achieving financial and material 
goals within a society or a marketplace.  This theoretical context appears to be 
explaining an ‘organic’ demand for ‘more’ law (Black, 1976) from the marketplace 
in general, as social controls and market rules become demonstrably insufficient 
to keep risk to creditors from rising (The Cork Commission, 1982).   
 
The mode of criminalisation, despite its not being delimited to specific forms or 
circumstances of trade and therefore applies to all circumstances of non-Crown-
related creditor-debtor relations, still appears different to contemporary 
criminalisation.  Whilst the contemporary (alleged) scope of criminalisation refers 
to ‘all frauds’ under the Fraud Act 2006, pre-industrial sovereign backing of the 
state-imposed insolvency regime does not provision against fraudulent means 
through which a default occurs.  Instead, provisions are made to ensure the 
compliance of the bankrupt party with the courts and their powers to investigates 
the whereabouts of assets and funds, and against the hiding of assets from 
creditors.  Unless the insolvency regime is directly challenged, pre-industrial law 
does not offer a prospect of Crown prosecution against the bankrupt party, even if 
the debt was incurred by fraud.  For example, a charlatan might have recruited 
funds for a commercial enterprise that was based on a false premise, or did not 
exist, and only be exposed to Crown prosecution in relation to the hiding of 
securitised assets (The Cork Commission, 1982; Taylor, 2013).  With respect to 
the initial investment, R. v. Jones [1703] appears to apply (“[not to indict a] man 





The increase in the division of labour following the industrial revolution and 
expansion of wealth generated higher demand for law to replace the function of 
previously adequate social controls (Durkheim, 1893; Merton, 1934).  In the 
context of the ‘duality’ of fraud, this increase in demand for law seems to manifest 
itself particularly in areas where there was more disparity between parties in terms 
of stratification, morphology, culture, and organisation (Black, 1976).  Prior to the 
industrial revolution, the ‘duality’ of fraud was similar to the ‘duality’ of other 
modern criminal constructs.  Specifically, it was victim driven, and therefore ‘civil’ 
unless directed specifically against the Crown and its stated interests.  The 
‘sovereign guarantee’ in the industrial era expanded initially by the confederation 
of stakeholders who sought to establish standards of prosecution as a means of 
crime control, with less regard to the primary victim interest in compensation.  
 
In this section, the author has discussed an application of a ‘sovereign guarantee’ 
against specific frauds, as a means of indicating that such frauds and involved 
offenders would be liable to prosecution by the Crown.  The section relates to the 
intermediate research objective number three, which investigates the imperative 
behind the historical particularisation of fraud.  This section presented an analysis 
of typical examples of pre-industrial statutory provisions and sought to understand 
whether they were intended to ‘encapsulate’ the concept of fraud, or rather sought 
to define a subset of related offences.  The reader may consider this investigation 
to be without merit given discussion on the overall scope of Crown prosecution in 
pre-industrial England.  Nevertheless, the particular ‘mode’ of fraud criminalisation 
appears to still be employed in parallel to the criminalisation of ‘all frauds’ under 
the Fraud Act 2006.  Furthermore, the terms of reference for the proposed 
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legislation that was later implemented in the Fraud Act 2006 appear to reflect a 
legislative (or political, see Levi, 1987) intent for Crown prosecution of fraud under 
commercial circumstances (Law Commission, 2002, p.1).  The terms of reference 
suggest that the scope of (allegedly) desired effective criminalisation was not 
achieved because of “modern sorts of commercial activities” (Law Commission, 
2002, p.1).  The Law Commission (2002) proceeded to recommend the 
introduction of a general offence to criminalise ‘all frauds’, and listed its predicted 
advantages, which the researcher critically discussed in section 2.2. 
 
This emerging prosecution approach (in this section) was different to the prior 
discussion (further above) on private prosecution, which was the upper-most tier 
to coercion available in the course of inter-personal disputes.  The ‘duality’ of 
fraud was shown to emerge from a selective process of exclusion from a general 
principle of deference to market rules, ‘regulation by reputation’ and other social 
controls.  The Statute of Frauds of 1667 was introduced not as a means of crime 
control, but as a means of systematising a written source of evidence to be used 
in the resolution of commercial disputes, both within the courts and in the 
marketplace (Holdsworth, 1909).  The concept of fraud was demonstrably wider 
than the scope of desired criminalisation in relation to dishonesty in pre-industrial 
England, notwithstanding fraud being a valid basis for judicial adjudication as an 
inter-personal dispute.  The extent of sovereign interest appears to be consistent 
with the distinction between possible private prosecution as an ultimate coercive 




This emerging property (‘duality’) of fraud represents a process whereby some 
frauds belong within the criminal justice system or external resolution 
mechanisms.  These are the same parameters used by the author to describe the 
current ‘duality’ under a system of law which criminalises fraud in absolute terms 
as a primary conduct offence (Fraud Act 2006).  Those frauds that were 
eventually litigated on a victim-led compensatory basis represented either the 
insufficiency of market rules and/or other intermediate resolution mechanisms 
(Black, 1976; Black & Baumgartner, 1983), or a need for judicial recognition of a 
debt (Muldrew, 1993).  The emergence of a class of frauds that was a subject of 
state interest, alongside the general deference to market-rules for the resolution of 
other frauds, is a key theme in analysis of research question one (RQ1).  There is 
added value in understanding what drove the state in the past to resort to crime-
controls measures to guarantee honest conduct when analysing the application of 
an indiscriminate criminalisation under the Fraud Act 2006. 
 
4.6 The Scope of the ‘Sovereign Guarantee’ of Trust 
 
The following analytical discussion represents a proposed typology of pre-
industrial Crown prosecution in relation to the concept of fraud.  The discussion is 
based on the above discussion of the narrow imposition of a ‘sovereign 
guarantee’ of trust prior to the industrialisation of the English economy, as 
opposed to its contemporary (alleged) all-encompassing scope.  It seeks to 
address the apparent dysfunction between ‘law-in-theory’ and ‘law-in-action’ 
(Black, 1972) in the contemporary ‘duality’ of fraud (RQ1) by identifying typological 
and circumstantial theoretical suggestions (Black, 1976; Naylor, 2003) for law-
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enforcement responses (Hester & Eglin, 1992).  The contemporary use of 
particularised fraud criminalisation suggests that despite their apparent lack of 
contribution to the scope or definition of criminality, they serve a purpose in 
substantiating the association of some fraud with law-enforcement activities.  To 
that end, the discussion below provides a characterisation of the functionality of 
particularised legislation in the context of the social dynamic and the ‘invisible 
hand’ behind the ‘duality’ of fraud (Smith, 1776). 
 
The researcher considered the examination of the social dynamic behind 
particularised ‘criminal’ fraud provision to be particularly insightful in the context of 
pre-industrial legislation.  The advantage of a historical perspective is that it 
provides context to the examination of a lack of sovereign interest in typologies 
and circumstances of fraud, which is different to the contemporary applicability of 
a criminal charge under the Fraud Act 2006.  Below are three drivers that are 
understood by the researcher as grounds for the extension of a ‘sovereign 
guarantee’ of trust through direct victimisation of the Crown, or its intervention in 
commercial life. Three key drivers will be identified, including direct state-interests, 
state-interests in normalising trade, and state-interests in normalising the process 
of insolvency.  
 
The first driver for criminalisation was the particularisation of offences against the 
Crown where it undermines direct state-interests or deprives the state of its 
revenue.  Such offences may be similar in outcome to modern prosecution of 
acquisitive crimes, or to cases of pre-industrial private prosecution where the 
offender was not able to provide compensation.  However, the ‘criminality’ of 
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these offences in the context of the analysis of the ‘duality’ of fraud is grounded in 
victimisation being directed at the state.  The state is a different type of prosecutor 
to a (private) person: the authority of the courts and the ‘law of the land’, stems 
from the Crown, and it prosecutes using the public purse, and in the name of the 
existing system of government.  To offend against the Crown is to challenge it, 
which has historically resulted not only with the recovery of revenue, but also 
severe punishments to encourage deterrence through the demonstration of 
sovereign authority.  Within such circumstances, the individual offender typically 
cannot resolve the matter using social controls or bilateral agreement, but instead 
was subject to punitive measures.    
 
The (considerable) body of (fraud-related) offences introduced by the Crown is too 
wide and diverse to be fully elaborated in this thesis, but attention to those frauds 
that have been particularised offers important insights.  Prior to the enactment of 
the Fraud Act 2006, the present chapter makes clear that fraud was not inherently 
‘criminal’ under statutory law (Law Commission, 2002; Sharpe, 2013).   
Allegations of fraud were valid torts and wrongs that could have been resolved 
bilaterally, by a third-party, or by a judge, but not a subject of interest to the 
Crown.  The author’s review of parliamentary records tends to highlight three 
kinds of ‘particularisation’: (i) those that are committed against the Crown and its 
coffers; (ii) those that directly challenge a protection or a guarantee by the Crown; 
or (iii) those that are disruptive of the Crown’s regulation of debtor-creditor 




Of the first type, are offences such as those specified in An Act for Accompts and 
Clearing of Publique Debts and for discovering Frauds or Concealments of 
anything due to the Commonwealth 1653, An Act for preventing Fraud and 
regulating Abuses in His Majesties Customes 1662, An Ordinance concerning the 
Excise, 1645, as well as others.  These Acts refer to situations where the Crown 
directly forbids fraudulent conduct, which is construed as an offence against the 
state or its coffers.  The archival research presented does not establish whether 
such legislation was directly responsive in nature, or whether a degree of foresight 
was applied in order to curb opportunities or uncertainties.  In the pre-industrial 
context of England, the interests of the Crown would tend not to be restrained by 
concerns for due process, and the bar would be set even lower in pursuing any 
parties deemed to be causing damage to the revenue of the Crown.  It is 
conjecture that these acts were a mixture of preventative and administrative 
proclamations.  The underlying imperative appears to have been deterrence 
targeted at specific groups described in a given act from temptation or perceived 
opportunity by making explicit the Crown’s active interest.    
 
The second group of fraud particularisation in statute is where the Crown plays a 
role in the regulation of trade.  There are two main types of sovereign interference 
in trade that form part of this group: first is the establishment of trade standards; 
and second is the normalisation of specific forms of trade.  For the first mode of 
interference, the Crown standardises trade by issuing currency, regulating 
measurements of volume and weight (for example), establishing trade posts and 
encouraging domestic and international trade routes.  Fraudulent practices 
involving standards set by the Crown may not ‘harm’ its financial position in a 
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tangible way.  The Crown is not a party to these transactions, but its guarantees 
are eroded and its role in normalising trade is directly challenged by frauds in 
such circumstances.   Offences under the Counterfeiting of Copper Coin Act 1771 
were added, to the common-law offence against forging silver or gold coins, to 
ensure confidence in English currency. 
 
The second group of Acts of Parliament is that which curtailed fraudulent practice 
from particular areas of trade where the Crown had an interest to encourage 
investment, or balance market forces that affected economic growth.  In this mode 
of particularisation, the Crown forbids specific frauds and forgeries and, at times, 
specifies them as treason.  These offences are an extension of the Crown’s 
protection of itself, and a ‘sovereign guarantee’ of trust and standards in such 
areas of trade to which it was applied.  Such Acts carve out criminal definitions 
from the principle of not “indicting one man for making a fool of another” (R. v. 
Jones [1703]), and (potentially) apply a sanction harsher than the principle of not 
allowing benefit from fraud (see above in this chapter).    
 
The third group represents another form of intervention in commerce, but by 
managing systemic risk to investors by substantiating the priority of creditors and 
access to pledged securities or assets of a bankrupt party.  As discussed in 
section four above, increasing amounts of law are made accessible to a creditor, 
once a debt has been recognised by the courts (Levinthal, 1919; The Cork 
Commission, 1982).  The Crown’s role in normalising the commercial aspect of 
social life was by making available legal instruments to be applied when social 
controls became insufficient to enforce a debt.  As elaborated in the following 
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paragraphs, the Crown has a historical interest in substantiating trust in economic 
life (to promote trade) by playing an enabling role in the collection of debt.  Such 
provisions included the imprisonment of debtors as sanctioned by the courts 
(Levinthal, 1919; Rubin, 1984), which provided greater leverage to creditors.    
 
In legislative terms, the sovereign interest in the retention and expansion of its tax 
base required demonstrable efforts to address the disadvantageous position of 
debtors.  This applied to domestic and foreign trade to encourage investment and 
reduce systemic risk.  In mediaeval times, creditors might have sought to recover 
their losses from the debtor’s possessions, but there was no legal mechanism to 
distinguish and prioritise creditors.   
 
As explained above, the introduction of legislation on practices relating to traders 
and merchants provided a specific framework for debtor-creditor relations.  The 
Crown extends protection to outlaw fraud and extends its authority to administer 
proceedings via the courts and related mechanisms.  The Crown offers creditors 
access to the same protections enjoyed by the state by particularising offences 
within the bankruptcy regime.  Furthermore, the Act to Prevent Frauds Frequently 
Committed by Bankrupts 1705 directly identified and criminalised fraudulent 
conveyance or concealment, as well as provided means of judicial examination 
and interrogation of debtors. The Act empowered the courts to question debtors 
and required them to make full disclosure to creditors, who benefited from access 
to sovereign authority as a tool for optimising recovery and lowering risk 




The above section categorised the drivers for the criminalisation of fraud by 
analysing examples of the extension of a ‘sovereign guarantee’ of trust to three 
types of state-interest in English law.  The first type was the Crown’s own authority 
and direct interest in taxation or in the mismanagement of public funds.  The 
second type was those frauds that undermine the Crown’s role in regulating and 
normalising trade by imposing a rules-based system.  These frauds included 
forgeries of currency, measurement and other standards, and against protection 
in areas and circumstances of trade regulated directly by the Crown.    
 
The third driver for particularisation (insolvency), which may be seen as 
subordinate to the second, is the regulation of debtor-creditor relations.  The 
Crown sought to impose a rule-based system to bankruptcies, which extended to 
cover the interests of creditors.  This category assumed a role which was 
previously managed by market rules on a local level and was driven by a desire to 
encourage private investment and increase lender confidence.  This was achieved 
by imposing a national standard.  A system of dispensation which was not based 
on market rules, which enabled creditors to secure judicial recognition of debt and 
maximised the potential for recovery.  Whilst the administration of these 
processes was not driven or payed for by the Crown, compliance with such 
proceedings was mandated and guaranteed by the Crown. 
 
The first research question on the ‘duality’ of fraud (RQ1) is particularly concerned 
with distinguishing between those frauds which involve the criminal justice system 
in their resolution, and those which do not.  Prior to the criminalisation of fraud in 
statute, this ‘duality’ can be observed as it emerged from legislation aimed at 
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deterring against specific frauds by applying onto them the (threat or) might of 
prosecution by the Crown.  This was an extraordinary measure introduced at a 
time when the state did not typically prosecute other acquisitive crimes.  This also 
begins to highlight themes that relate to RQ2, which discusses the ‘streamlining’ 
and ‘mainstreaming’ of the understanding and enforcement of the Fraud Act 2006.  
The extent to which ‘genuine’ state interest was manifested by prosecuting on 
behalf of the Crown before the 1880’s institution of public prosecution (Ashworth, 
2000; CPS, 2013) offers a framework to understand enforcement priorities under 
current law.    
 
In the literature review chapter, the author discusses contemporary parallel 
provisions to the Fraud Act 2006.  The literature review discussion points out the 
particularised nature of statutory fraud related legislation in provisions that were 
not repealed by the 2006 Act, and in provisions that were introduced subsequently 
to its enactment in 2007.  The critical discussion in chapter two with respect to 
these provisions highlighted two key observations.  The first observation related to 
such provisions not being mutually exclusive to legitimate actions in such way that 
offences are typically scoped (Tappan, 1947).  Instead, if the same manner of 
conduct implied in such provisions is replicated under different circumstances to 
those particularised, they would still constitute an explicit Fraud Act 2006 offence.  
The second observation was that despite their lack of contribution to the scope of 
(alleged) fraud criminalisation, contemporary particularised offences feature an 
objective test that can be applied into ‘mainstream’ investigation, enforcement and 




In the context of the ‘duality’ of fraud (RQ1), and the challenge of identifying 
inhibitors to the ‘mainstreaming’ and ‘streamlining’ of fraud investigation (RQ2), 
the researcher sought to characterise the particularised mode of criminalisation.  
Intermediate research objective three was therefore included in this historical 
socio-legal examination in order to identify the essential social function and 
characteristics of this mode of legislation as a social phenomenon (Weber, 1978; 
Durkheim, 1982).  Notwithstanding the discussion in the literature review on the 
scope of ‘policing by consent’ (see section eight immediately below), there 
appears to be further insight in the examination of the pre-industrial fraud 
particularisation.  Intermediate research objective three asks whether the 
particularisation of fraud represents an outdated approach to legislation, or does it 
function as particular means for particular ends.  In other words, has this mode of 
legislation historically been used to denote a much narrower legislative intent, or a 
failure to capture the concept of fraud through the absence of a legal definition to 
the gestalt of fraud (Law Commission, 2002)? 
 
The above discussion demonstrated that the historical particularisation of fraud 
served to sparingly define those transgressions against trust that were subject to 
Crown prosecution.  For those breaches of trust that were not subject to Crown 
prosecution, compensatory remedies would have been accessible through the 
court, should other means of conflict resolution not suffice in coercing 
compensation.  A ‘sovereign guarantee’ of trust in legal and commercial conduct 
was imposed in connection with three state functions.  The first was as a means of 
retaliation and deterrence against those who transgress against the Crown in this 
fashion, which was addressed by Crown prosecution as an act of subversion.  The 
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prosecution by the Crown could not have been circumvented by the offender 
making the Crown whole (which was guaranteed by the Crown’s supremacy in the 
liquidation of an estate under section 26 of Magna Carta 1215).  ‘Punitive’ means, 
which were otherwise avoidable in remedy-oriented private prosecution, were the 
sole object of Crown prosecution against those who offend against the Crown and 
its coffers.   
 
The researcher draws a direct functional comparison between particularised 
provisions of this category (the Crown is a subject of victimisation), and 
contemporary provisions in relation to tax and social benefit-related frauds.  In 
both cases, harm could potentially be addressed using powers such as in the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 or the Criminal Finances Act 2017 independently of 
the punitive sanction, but ‘voluntary’ repayment does not circumvent punishment.  
The second historical driver relates to contemporary particularised offences that 
relate specifically to narrowly defined areas of trade that are directly regulated by 
the state, and therefore breaches of regulation are subject to Crown prosecution. 
This refers to offences which relate to transaction of deeds to land, food and 
pharmaceutical trade, as well as weights and measurements.  Both sets of 
offences are presently defined with a similar level of particularity, which the 
researcher argues better fulfil the following statement made in recommendation of 
a general dishonesty offence:   
Clear, simple law is fairer than complicated, inaccessible law. If a 
citizen is contemplating activities which could amount to a crime, a clear, 
simple law gives better guidance on whether the conduct is criminal, and 
254 
 
fairer warning of what could happen if it is.  (Law Commission, 2002, 
p.3) 
 
The third driver for particularisation in the pre-industrial context of this 
chapter (thus far) relates to contemporary company (see section eight below) 
and insolvency law.  The contemporary examples of particularised offences 
in the Insolvency Act 1986 (as amended) and the Companies Act 2006 relate 
to the analysis of the emergence of insolvency law above in this section.  The 
essential properties of these narrowly defined fraud provisions do not relate 
to the conduct of a firm or its directors beyond efforts to subvert a national 
insolvency, creditor relations or registration regime.  Frauds by a company 
that are not directed towards its creditors (driver three), HMRC (driver one) or 
a regulator such as the General Pharmaceutical Council (GPhC) (driver two), 
are all (technically) Fraud Act 2006 offences.  The three drivers themselves, 
both in their historical and contemporary contexts, appear to represent a 
reasonable scope for (genuine) sovereign interest in the concept of fraud.  It 
appears that the gestalt of fraud has historically been consistent and 
sufficient in qualifying fraud, where the scope of criminalisation has itself 
been made clear.  There is therefore reason to question what the value-
added is in providing a legal definition to fraud, and whether it enhances 
clarity in applied circumstances as anticipated by the Law Commission 
(2002)? 
 
The reader may wonder at the apparent success of the definition of theft in 
section one of the Theft Act 1968 (as amended) in encapsulating the 
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essential properties of the offence (Griew, 1995):  “A person is guilty of theft if 
he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with the intention 
of permanently depriving the other of it; and “thief” and “steal” shall be 
construed accordingly.”  The functional role of industrial and post-industrial 
law-enforcement around the concept of theft and the resulting utility of a 
simple definition for the criminalisation of ‘all theft’ is discussed in the 
following section.  The roots of the transition between theft as an inter-
personal dispute (Klerman, 2001) to being associated with Crown 
prosecution is discussed in the following section.   
 
In the context of the criminalisation of fraud, it appears that a body of 
particularised fraud provisions was in itself sufficient in effectively defining 
and imposing a ‘sovereign guarantee’ of trust.  Such legislation makes use of 
the gestalt of fraud as a means of qualifying a breach of trust that is 
egregious with respect to custom and market-rules (see section 4.3 for 
historical ontology).  In the context of criminalisation of fraud in commercial 
settings, the gestalt of fraud appeared sufficient in qualifying an offence that 
particularised the ‘sovereign guarantee’ of trust if it was applied.  The 
particularised mode of legislation does not, therefore, seem as a dated 
historical means, but rather a more precise approach to effective fraud 
criminalisation, and one that is still practiced today, and serves a similar 




4.7 The Industrial Revolution (1750-1850) and the Increased Demand for Law 
in England 
 
This section examines the expansion of Crown interest in acquisitive crime and its 
eventual association with law-enforcement activities and Crown prosecution.  This 
discussion is presented in the context of the institution of public prosecution in 
England, and critical analysis of the emergent gap between the concept of fraud 
and the wider concept of theft.  A ‘duality’ in consequence with regards to 
acquisitive crime did not appear to be as specific to the concept of fraud prior to 
the industrial revolution and the social developments that are discussed in part A 
of this section.  The modern concepts of fraud and theft were typically resolved 
between the parties. This may have occurred in the context of a possible victim-
led prosecution, whose primary function was to enhance the negotiating position 
of the victim.  In research question one (RQ1), the contemporary context of public 
prosecution and the criminalisation of fraud itself after 2006 requires a critical 
examination of the role of acquisitive crime in the development of the institution of 
public prosecution.  This developed by the examination of intermediate research 
objective five in this section, which seeks to identify the roots of the success of the 
association of ‘all theft’ with law-enforcement activities, as opposed to ‘all frauds’.   
 
The researcher seeks to understand how the two concepts, which were subject to 
the same social dynamics and legal outcomes as inter-personal disputes and 
‘criminal’ particularisation, have diverged in their contemporary application.  The 
underlying question seeks to identify the social dynamic that underpins the 
contemporary non-criminal fraud resolution mechanism, despite the 
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criminalisation of ‘all fraud’ through its definition into criminal law.  This appears to 
be very similar to the modernisation of the law on theft through the 
recommendations leading to the introduction of the Theft Act 1968 (The Criminal 
Law Revision Committee, 1966).  A similar reasoning (Law Commission, 2002) 
concerning the introduction of a legal definition for fraud as a key to the 
criminalisation of the concept in response to prosecution difficulties have 
nonetheless not resulted with effective criminalisation (Hester & Eglin, 1992).  The 
below analysis and discussion are the result of an investigation into the transition 
of theft as an offence investigated and prosecuted exclusively by the Crown from 
its roots as an inter-personal dispute (Klerman, 2001).  The researcher sought to 
understand the functional imperative (Weber, 1978; Durkheim, 1982) behind the 
effective criminalisation of theft through the development of contemporary criminal 
justice institutions. 
 
4.7.1 Social Change and Change in the Social Functionality of Private 
Prosecution 
 
In the following paragraphs, the researcher points out changes in the social fabric 
of industrial-era England.  The below developments are presented as drivers from 
change for the socio-economic circumstances discussed as a ‘base point’ in 
section 4.4 above in this chapter.  From this point of reference, the researcher 
discusses changes in English society, particularly the division of labour and 
distribution of wealth therein and re-applies Black’s (1976) theory of law in relation 
to the concepts of fraud and theft.  The industrial era was identified by the 
researcher as a period of critical divergence between the functional use of law 
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and social controls in the resolution of the two contemporary criminal concepts.  
The concept of theft appears to have driven an increase demand for law, whilst 
Crown prosecution remained sparingly associated with fraud, particularly when 
harm was not direct towards the state.   
 
In 1640 Lancashire there were seven baronets, seventy knights, one-hundred-
and-forty esquires and six-hundred-and forty-one mere gentlemen (Wrightson, 
2003, p. 32) within a population of under one-hundred-and-fifty-thousand.  
Lancashire was considered one of the poorest counties in England despite 
considerable exploitation of natural resources as well as trade by land and sea 
(Blackwood, 1978).  The rapid growth in population in the county serves to 
demonstrate the effects of industrialisation on social structure, and its rapid pace.  
The population of Lancashire reached nearly 1,380,000 in 1831, after having 
doubled in size during a thirty-year process of urbanisation (Midwinter, 1969).  In 
1830, Liverpool was linked to Leeds via the Liverpool-Leeds canal and to 
Manchester via rail (Midwinter, 1971).  These links increased the number of 
travellers and the ease of travel between these two (growing) communities, which 
contributed to the diminishing power of the pre-industrial social controls.  Figures 
gathered from the Liverpool area estimated that in 1839 some one-hundred-and-
twenty-thousand people were engaged in criminality, which provided economic 
benefits to those participating in such activities and illicit trade (Chadwick, 1839).   
Urbanisation, particularly in the sense of mass-migration of poor men from the 
parishes to local manufacturing and commercial hubs acted as a catalyst of social 
fragmentation (Durkheim, 1897).  The ‘cost of crime’ in the Liverpool area was 
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estimated at £2,000,000, or £167,300,000 in contemporary real price index terms 
(Chadwick, 1839; Midwinter, 1968; measuringworth.com, nd). 
 
Urbanisation and increases in the intricacy of the division of labour in the 
economy generated new opportunities for the creation of wealth, by normative 
means and otherwise (Durkheim, 1897).  The above figures serve as an example 
of an emerged insufficiency of social controls to self-regulate the community.   
This state of anomie (Merton, 1938) encourages deviant behaviour in the sense 
that common deference, intimacy, and personal reputation are no longer 
omnipresent to normalise and uphold standards of behavioural conduct.  From a 
control perspective, the absence of familiarity among the multitudes, ease of 
travel, economic participation and very limited sense of community cohesiveness 
made it easier for offenders to avoid detection (Durkheim, 1893; Merton, 1938; 
McIntosh, 1975). 
 
The five most important changes in Industrial English society that are necessary 
to reflect upon in applying Black’s (1976) theory of law onto industrial legislation 
and case law include: (i) The collapse of social controls, (ii) the rise in disposable 
income, (iii) the shift from a feudal mode of production and finance, (iv) the rising 
labour productivity, and (v) the elevated ratio between households of means and 
‘the poor’ (Royal Commission, 1832).  These shifts perhaps contextualise the role 
of acquisitive crime – namely theft of tangible possessions or cash – and the 
development of modern policing and public prosecution.  The bodies entrusted 
with crime controls are members of the contemporary institutions of law-
enforcement and public prosecution (RQ1).  There is, therefore, value added to 
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the discussion of the ‘duality’ of fraud in critically examining the context from which 
the concepts of policing by consent (Hay & Snyder, 1989; Kleining & Zhang, 1993; 
Home Office, 2012) and public prosecution emerged (Ashworth, 2000) alongside 
their original social function. 
 
With the expansion of wealth and the demise of the ‘one class’ system (Laslett, 
2005), it was necessary to protect private property from ‘the poor’: 
When… some have great wealth and others nothing, it is necessary that 
the arm of authority should be continually stretched forth, and 
permanent laws or regulation made which may protect the property of 
the rich from the inroads of the poor… (Emsley, 2010, p. 9 citing Smith 
(1723-1790), lecture date unknown) 
The ‘battle’-like terminology in the above source may relate to wider class-oriented 
discussion, which falls outside the scope of this thesis.  Nevertheless, the above 
source offers insight to the exclusivity of newly generated wealth and the means 
of its production in relation to the ‘poor masses’ as a rational for the use of ‘more 
law’ to enforce the right to property (Black, 1976).  The increased demand 
appears to flow from the creation and expansion of wealth, but also from 
urbanisation and the resulting physical friction between wealth and poverty in 
circumstances of weakening social controls and intimacy. 
 
The increased demand for law was not only in response to weakening social 
controls, but also in terms of opportunities to commit crime.  The analysis and 
discussion of pre-industrial resolution of inter-personal disputes above in this 
chapter did not include a discussion of investigatory challenges.   Acquisitive 
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crime and the trade of stolen goods became less restrictive thanks to (some) 
valuables being mass-produced and widely marketed.  These valuables were 
commonly available and less identifiable as personal property, and thus 
possession did not overtly incriminate anyone.  Under such circumstances, there 
was greater latitude to accumulate possessions and wealth without raising 
suspicion, and individuals were able to reintegrate stolen goods and convert them 
to gains.  Offenders were both less likely to be identified, and shared little by way 
of intimacy, common deference of reputational considerations with their victims, or 
with others with whom stolen goods might be traded (Midwinter, 1969; McIntosh, 
1970; Blackwood, 1978; Black & Baumgartner, 1983; Wrightson, 2003). 
 
The parish constable who operated at the time held a role that was different to the 
that of impartially upholding written laws.  As late as the early nineteenth century, 
the role of the parish constable was to assist victims in bringing offenders before 
the court, and to report to presenting juries and local government administration.  
These duties did not extend to having a meaningful understanding and application 
of law and of evidence.  The role did not include direct crime control 
responsibilities or ‘whodunit’-type investigations (Rawlings, 2002; Innes, 2012).  
The typical town or parish constable was described as an "uneducated person, 
from the class of petty tradesmen and mechanics" (Commissioners for Inquiring 
into County Rates, 1836, p. 8).  Constables were elected to a one-year term, often 
upon the endorsement by the incumbent, and were generally characterised as 
illiterate, unqualified and sometimes more of a menace than a guardian to the 




The pre-industrial constabulary was an ancillary function to courts, much like that 
of the contemporary bailiff in terms of decision-making and judgement remit.  
Unlike the bailiff’s role under the current system, which is governed by due 
process and standards set in law, the role of keeping the peace and that of the 
parish constable was carried out in a much less formalised and codified set of 
circumstances.  In the following subsection, the researcher discusses the 
emergence of private prosecution associations for the prosecution of felons.  
These local ‘grassroots’ initiatives operated alongside the parish constabularies 
and used private finance to control modes of offending that were of concern to 
their members and to bring private prosecutions against offenders.   
 
4.7.2 The Associations for the Prosecutions of Felons, and the Shift Away 
from Compensatory Justice in the Context of Theft 
 
In this section, the researcher focusses critical attention to historical and social 
circumstances that have led to a shift in the social function of the courts in the 
course of (procedurally) inter-personal dispute related cases.  Given the socio-
economic context discussed in sub-section 4.7.2 above, responses to the concept 
of theft appear to have gradually shifted away from victim compensation in the 
context of individual cases.  Instead, a new imperative had emerged whereby the 
goal of the judicial process was no longer towards compelling compliance, but 
rather punitive.  Local groups of factory owners and members of the emerging 
‘middle class’ appear to have mimicked some of the characteristics of pre-
industrial Crown prosecution and used the courts as a means of retaliation and 
deterrence.  These prosecutions were not intended to recuperate losses for a 
263 
 
member of the group, but rather for a demonstrative denotation of members of the 
group and the area in which it operated as ‘zero-tolerance’ zone.  A form of 
collaborative resourcing of prosecution by remote parishes against local bandits in 
order to distinguish a particular settlement from the lawless state in which its 
surroundings might have been located.  This represents an increase in law with 
respect (seemingly exclusively) to the concept of theft and the protection of the 
right to property.  Instead of seeking compensation as a means of demonstrating 
communal resilience, the concept of theft became synonymous with well-
resourced investigative efforts, and outcome-oriented prosecutions. 
 
The below discussion relates to the fifth intermediate research objective 
presented in the introduction to this chapter.  This objective contributes to the 
analysis of RQ1 (‘duality’) and RQ2 (‘streamlining’ and ‘mainstreaming’) by 
directing critical attention to an underlying difference in the social dynamics 
between the effective criminalisation of theft, as compared with fraud.  The 
researcher compares drivers for the application of more law as a means to 
substantiate a guarantee for the right to property against theft, which appear not 
to have been applied to a sovereign guarantee of trust against fraud.  In the 
context of RQ2 (‘mainstreaming’ and ‘streamlining’), the discussion below 
examines a process whereby the concept of theft evolved from a cause in an 
inter-personal dispute, to being exclusively associated with Crown prosecution 
(Griew, 1995; Klerman, 2001).  The researcher identifies the social context 
through ‘mainstream’ law-enforcement functions in the context of theft.  The 
divergent course on which responses to fraud had developed to the socio-
economic changes of the industrial era are analysed separately in section eight of 
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this chapter and add further depth to the investigation into the contemporary 
‘duality’ of fraud (RQ1). 
  
The prevailing view regarding industrial era acquisitive crime offenses were of 
ones ‘harshly’ addressed by an extensive use of the death penalty (popularly 
known as the ‘bloody code’), is only partially accurate.  It has been estimated that 
some thirty-five thousand people were sentenced to death between 1770 and 
1830, but only about 20% of these sentences were carried out (Gatrell, 1996).  
Whether the discrepancy between death sentences and ‘execution’ rates was 
known to existing and prospective offenders, or whether this served to deter, 
remains unclear.  The regular public spectacle of the execution of convicted felons 
was intended to deter future offenders and substantiated the notion of harsh 
treatment to encourage offenders to settle with their (victim) accusers (Cottu, 
1820; Hobsbawn, 2000; King, 2000; Sharpe, 2013).  
 
This is an extension of the dynamic examined in previous sections of this chapter, 
the judicial process was made disadvantageous enough for the accused so as to 
maximise the potential for compensation to the victim.  Prior to the establishment 
of police forces, local groups combined the resources of their members to form 
local privately funded associations for the prosecution of felons.  These 
associations existed to empower its members to investigate crime, apprehend 
offenders, and prosecute in the courts of law.  These associations had their 
traditional roots in the parishes, and with the dawn of the industrial revolution their 
model was replicated across four-hundred-and-fifty localities in England and 
Wales, typically in the wake of industrialisation, urbanisation, or growth of a middle 
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class (Hay & Snyder, 1989; Koyama, 2012; Schubert, 2015).  These associations 
sought to implement a measure of crime-control by generally favouring to satisfy 
the judicial process to address repeat victimisation (Schubert, 2015).  This 
approach to the judicial system and its (overtly) harsh approach to sentencing, 
together with dedicated communal (association) resources to the detection and 
apprehension of offenders mimicked the modern crime control strategy of the 
state.   It emerged from the increase in private investment in infrastructure and 
means of production. The above along with the emergence of the middle class 
and the growth of socio-economically diverse communities, increased the need for 
public deterrence as a means of crime control (Black, 1976).  The following 
paragraphs elaborate on the development of this emerging form of acquisitive 
crime resolution, and the proposed reasoning for the exclusion of (some) frauds 
from the scope of interest for associations. 
 
Local associations focused primarily on ‘predatory’-type acquisitive crimes 
(Naylor, 2003) such as thefts, burglaries and the general protection of property 
(Schubert, 2015).  Associations for the prosecution of felons not only presented 
cases, but also offered rewards to members of their local communities for 
information or apprehension of criminals.  On March 24th 1791, the Derby Mercury 
recorded the formation of the Belper Association for the Prosecution of Felons in 
an emerging industrial community in Derbyshire.  The association purpose was to 
jointly finance the prosecution of “all persons guilty of murder, burglaries, felonies 




The Belper Association made clear its areas of concerns and priorities.  The 
association announced to the county a crime control program whereby those who 
are not members, but still secure a conviction, will be rewarded by the treasurer.  
The thinking behind the initiative is straightforward crime control.  Encouraging 
and rewarding prosecutions by non-members and association members alike 
fostered a ‘safe’ county in which impunity was (theoretically) not available to 
offenders.  On the first reward tier of five pounds and five shillings were such 
crimes as murder, burglary, robbery, stealing a horse, or setting fire to structures 
or agricultural produce.  On the second tier of three pounds three shillings were 
such crimes as stealing livestock, clothing, cloths, or produce.  The third tier of two 
pounds and two shillings covered night-time robberies and burglaries to domicile 
or commercial property (half the reward for daytime burglars). The final tier of one 
pound and one shilling was reserved for night-time criminal damage to public 
property, stealing fruits and vegetables from a garden, taking wood or timber, 
damaging grass (be it mowed or not), or fishing without a permit (half the reward 
for crimes committed during the day).  (Belper Historical & Genealogical Website, 
2011)    
 
The concept of fraud was evidently not included in this list, yet it would be naïve to 
assume that fraud was not an area of concern for the members of the Belper 
Association, or to others.  There are several ways to approach the absence of this 
area of concern.  The concept of fraud (prior to the introduction of the Fraud Act 
2006) was not considered a crime per se, and it was not subject to the application 
of social labelling in the same way as other acquisitive crimes (Naylor, 2003).  The 
second explanation is that fraud risk is embedded in a specific set of bilateral 
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relationships such as employees, supply chains, or lenders.  These relationships 
were unique to the transactional nature within specific enterprises and their 
employees, supply chain frauds requiring a supply contract, creditors, and 
debtors.    
 
The offences that were specified for reward by the Belper Association were 
directly linked to modes of victimisation that were shared between its members 
and the general population.  Fraud-risk was generic to commercial enterprises 
that may also have had characteristics unique to each.  Unlike the pre-industrial 
concern of local administrative élites with unlicensed tradesmen, or cheating with 
measurements, business owners were responsible to check and regulate their 
supply chains and build long-term business relations and trust.  The prospect of 
supplying new emerging and (relatively) higher margin industry was theoretically 
sufficient to regulate trade by market rules and to impose regulation by reputation.   
Similarly, business risk was managed and ‘policed’ their own workforce and it 
would reward and employ individuals whom they trusted.  Bringing criminal 
proceedings against a worker suspected of misconduct would have been a more 
expensive, intrusive, and prolonged process compared to dismissal.  Although 
prosecution may serve to deter others from crime, the prolonged nature of the 
process would appear to offer limited value-added to dismissal.  Dismissal 
typically required no external involvement, decision-making or indeed any scrutiny 
by the court. 
 
Regardless of specific attitudes and concerns regarding supply chain or employee 
fraud, such risk factors were not commonly seen as shared, and the courts were 
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not typically seen as the preferred means of addressing harm.  Observing the 
behaviour of private prosecution bodies such as the Belper Association offers 
insight into specific responses to victimisation, and also of crime control 
strategies.  In terms of third-party theory (Black & Baumgartner, 1983), supply 
chain fraud and crime emanating from the workforce are also less likely to require 
a sovereign-backed resolution agent to achieve finality.  The degree of shared 
social deference, reputational concerns, and intimacy in industrial-era supply-
chains and other business relations may be analysed in terms of social 
embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985; Feld, 1997; Howard-Grenville & Boons, 2009; 
Paquin & Howard-Grenville, 2009).  In the context of Black’s (1976) theory of law, 
the difference in quantities of applicable law (as a continuation of social controls) 
are apparent from the crime control strategy of private prosecution associations.   
Two main social scales and the application of ‘more law’ from higher to lower 
rankings is apparent in the action of societies for the prosecution of felons, and 
the Belper Association in particular.  In terms of stratification, it is clear in the 
description of offences that they are applicable either to crime amongst those 
lower on the stratification scale, or by those who score low on it against the better 
stratified.  It is not likely for the relatively ‘well-to-do’ to engage in highway or 
footpath robbery, steal a horse, rob a dwelling or shop, stealing apples or damage 
timber.  In terms of organisation, the offences of interest stated by the Belper 
Association were those that occurred outside of organisational frameworks and 
directed against generic interests of its member organisations.  This is manifested 
in the offences of stated interest, but also by the creation of a scheme to reward 
those who bring prosecutions against persons unknown to the members of the 
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association.  These were in relation to harm not necessarily linked to any 
particular member, but to shared risks to repeat victimisation in the area. 
 
The institution of ‘policing by consent’ emerged as the logical successor to the 
role of the local prosecution associations (Ashworth, 2000; Koyama, 2012).   For 
instance, the Metropolitan Police Force established in 1829, operated under nine 
principles set by Sir Robert Peel (Lentz & Chaires, 2007).  For instance, principle 
number two highlights the importance of reciprocal relationships in that the: “ability 
of the police to perform, their duties is dependent upon public approval…” (Home 
Office, 2012, principle two).  Principle four identifies the required relationship 
between social controls and policing powers: “the extent to which the cooperation 
of the public can be secured diminishes proportionately [to] the necessity of the 
use of physical force and compulsion for achieving police objectives” (Home 
Office, 2012).  Principle seven extends the metaphor to describe the police officer 
as a member of society whose role in the division of labour is to maintain the 
social order (Lentz & Chaires, 2007). 
 
The generic nine principles do not relate directly to the mode of crime to which 
they were established in order to address.  Nevertheless, the urban and industrial 
communities who were first to establish modern constabularies communicated 
internally the remit and priorities of their constables. For example, the Manchester 
Constabulary Force, which was also active in Lancaster and Chester at the time of 
its formation in 1882, required its entire staff to take the following oath: 
You swear that you shall… serve our Sovereign… and the Justices of the 
Peace… in the office of Constable, appointed by the Watch Committee… 
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for preserving the peace by day and by night, and preventing robberies, 
and other felonies… (Kleining & Zhang, 1993, p. 28) 
 
 
In intermediate research objective five, the researcher seeks to characterise the 
perspective roles of the concepts of theft and fraud in the development of the 
institutions of law-enforcement and public prosecution in England.  The above 
discussion on of the development of the concept of ‘policing by consent’ and 
(typical) example of a Victorian-era constable oath points to the intrinsic role of the 
concept of theft in the development of policing in England.  Neither of the 
constable oaths examined by the author (see Kleining & Zhang, 1993) included 
references to honesty in commercial representations or other statements that 
could be seen as related to a ‘sovereign guarantee’ of trust.  This observation as 
to the circumstances and context from which the contemporary policing institute 
emerged follows Black’s (1976) analysis of law as a measure used when social 
controls are inadequate to address a challenge to the existing order.  The 
inadequacy of social controls and challenge to the existing social order appear to 
have existed in the context of regulating the right to property and the concept of 
theft, as opposed to the concept of dishonesty.  
 
In a contemporary context, the enforcement of particularised ‘social guarantees’ of 
trust and the three drivers for particularisation discussed in this chapter, remain 
distinctive from ‘mainstream’ policing (as discussed in the literature review).  
Parallel contemporary enforcement bodies, such as HMRC, Trading Standards, 
the FCA, local authorities and other industry-specific regulators.  Although police 
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forces may be called upon to assist their activities, the investigatory remit of tax 
fraud investigation, benefit fraud or regulation and trading standards are 
conducted by agencies whose function does not depend upon popular consent.  
Instead, detection and prosecution against those who offend against the specific 
guarantees of trust under the mandate of such agencies is being prosecuted by 
the Crown in a similar way to the provisions discussed in section six above.  
Public prosecution in such instances may be politically or semantically attributed 
to a sense of ‘public interest’ (Naylor, 2003).  Nevertheless, the researcher traces 
the essential characteristics of the use of law in such circumstances to a different 
function to the wider concept of public prosecution (punitive action against 
offenders who did not commit harm against the state).  This analysis suggests that 
in the context of the ‘duality’ of fraud (RQ1) it appears that non-police enforcement 
agencies trace their functional origin to narrow criminalisation and prosecution by 
the Crown in response to direct victimisation.  This is contrasted below with the 
apparent ‘grassroots’ use of social controls and means of coercion in inter-
personal disputes to affect crime controls tactics at the expense of the 
compensatory orientation of private prosecutions (Klerman, 2001; Schubert, 
2015).   
 
In the context of research question one (RQ1 ‘duality’), the priorities of 
associations for private prosecution (‘confederate prosecution organisations’) 
formed a strategy by communities and investors to respond to the anomic 
conditions associated with emerging industrialisation and urbanisation.  By 
‘strategy’, the author identifies the proactive efforts to detect those who commit 
offences in general, regardless of the identity of the victim, or the victim’s 
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membership of the association.  Furthermore, the use of the courts as a primary 
means of combating repeat victimisation and establishing deterrence marks a 
strategic shift towards crime control instead of the traditional focus on 
compensation for individual victims.  These associations for the prosecution of 
felons exemplify the role of theft and other offences relating to tangibles and 
following the concepts of larceny and theft.  The concept of fraud and victimisation 
was not observed in records relating to the activities of such associations in the 
midlands area, nor were these concepts observed in wider searches of the 
literature.  The social context from which modern crime control institutions 
emerged seem to have fulfilled a role only with respect to a specific subset of 
acquisitive crimes such as theft and burglary.  This is not to say that fraud was an 
alien concept for law-enforcement.  Outside of the narrow scope of tax collection, 
regulated markets, trades or measurements, or to enforce bankruptcy rules on 
debtors, the general category of fraud did not appear to be a concern for the 
bodies from which law-enforcement emerged.     
 
The development of law-enforcement in the UK appears to reflect the industrial 
revolution, urbanisation, expansion of wealth (and poverty), and the role of the law 
of property in a capitalist society.  However, the mandate and politics of law-
enforcement seemed to target some forms of acquisitive crimes rather than 
others.  Deprivation, a relative measure of stratification, expanded with the 
emergence of the ‘middle class’ and the formation of new financial élites outside 
of the landed gentry.  During an 1826 Parliamentary debate, Sir Robert Peel, the 
then Home Secretary, presented figures according to which nearly 86% of criminal 
trials in previous years concerned property-related crime: 
273 
 
…the crime of theft [is] to constitute the most important class of crime.   
There are acts… of much greater malignity…those of theft far exceed… 
other species of offence… there can be no question of its paramount 
importance in the catalogue of offences against society. (Emsley, 2010, 
p. 56) 
 
This section contributed to the analysis of the ‘duality’ of fraud by examining 
selected historical trends towards responding to the first central research question 
(RQ1).  This helped to distinguish the concept of fraud as distinct from modern 
acquisitive crime constructs and offered the opportunity for critical analysis of the 
changes in the role of state powers to resolve such problems.  Other forms of 
acquisitive crime have been shown to challenge communities in a way that 
resulted with a ‘bottom up’ drive to systematise the prosecution of offenders as a 
means crime control.  The types of offences (thefts, burglaries) targeted by the 
local associations for the prosecution of felons became the subsequent focus of 
the first police forces.    
 
As argued in this section, contemporary acquisitive crimes relating to a workforce, 
supply chain and business relations (including fraud), (ACFE, 2016; Levi, 2008a; 
Naylor, 2003) were capable of resolution using ‘less law’ (Black, 1976).   
Resolutions were arrived at based on alternative sanctions (dismissal), common 
deference, and regulation by reputation or social controls (King, 2000; Taylor, 
2013).  The principle of not indicting one man for “making a fool of another” was 
not challenged in law (Law Commission, 2002; Sharpe, 2013).  The research did 
not locate evidence of similar organisations, akin to the local associations, who 
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protected their members and the community against fraud.  The majority of profit-
driven crimes (Naylor, 2003) began to be proactively investigated by local 
associations from the 1700’s (Schubert, 2015), later by law-enforcement from the 
1820’s, and then prosecuted by the Crown from the 1880’s (Ashworth, 2000).  
The new industrial-era constabularies were directly charged with the relief of local 
communities from ‘policing themselves’.  This meant that the central government 
took active measures to supersede the role of the local associations for the 
prosecution of felons (Hay & Snyder, 1989; Emsley, 1996; Rawlings, 2002; 
Emsley, 2010; Koyama, 2012; Schubert, 2015).    
 
The development of the contemporary ‘duality’ of fraud, which allows it to exist as 
both a concept in civil and criminal law, traces back to the pre-industrial and early 
industrial distinction in the identity of the prosecutor, whether state (‘criminal’) or 
private (‘civil’).  For instance, thefts were not ‘criminal’ before the instigation of the 
industrial constabularies and public prosecution, in the sense that they were 
privately prosecuted, and harsher measures existed only to enforce compliance.   
This mechanism was utilised by the associations for the prosecution of felons as a 
means of crime control.  They were prosecuting as part of a crime control strategy 




This section examined the role of the concept of theft as a driver for the 
development of the modern institutions of law-enforcement and public 
prosecution.  In terms of the ‘duality’ of fraud (RQ1), the context in which law-
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enforcement has emerged is the specific need to apply ‘more law’ to address the 
concept of theft (rather than fraud).  ‘Policing by consent’ combined with public 
prosecution of offences (Ashworth, 2000) became the highest ‘amount’ of 
available law. It required little or no resources from victims in terms of access.  In 
turn, it promised and delivered little to satisfy victim needs beyond symbolic crime 
control (Blumer, 1969).  This approach to crime control was established to 
proactively investigate crime, systematically prosecute offenders, and widely apply 
criminal social labels to offenders (Erikson, 1962; Tyler, 2006).  The structuring of 
law-enforcement around the concept of theft and the investigation of other social 
taboos (such as violent or sexual offences), establishes the dominance and 
authority of law-enforcement in its role of regulating English society (Erikson, 
1962; Hester & Eglin, 1992; Ashworth, 2000; Rawlings, 2002).    
 
In the context of the second research question (RQ2 ‘streamlining’ and 
‘mainstreaming’), this section started to develop the analytical theme for the 
analysis on the application of legislation to fraud-control.  The next section will 
analyse the parallel preference for ‘regulation by reputation’ as a means of 
regulating fraud as an undesirable manner of conduct, and not as part of the 
purview of the emerging criminal justice system (except of matters of non-
compliance).  The following section presents these social (and political) dynamics 
in the context of examination of the criminalisation of fraud under the Theft Act 
1968 (as amended) and the Fraud Act 2006 in the literature review.  The author 
will develop a discussion of the (possible) merits of a conduct offence as a means 





4.8 ‘Regulation by Reputation’  
 
The above section examined responses to theft and fraud as inter-personal 
disputes that were historically not subject to Crown prosecution, and it traced 
divergence in the concepts where theft became a focus of such prosecution, but 
fraud was resistant to this trend (Klerman, 2001; Emsley, 2010; Schubert, 2015).  
This section examines the development of responses to the concept of fraud. 
Whilst the course of effective criminalisation through (symbolic) law-enforcement 
activities did not appear to occur in relation to the concept of fraud, industrial-era 
law did feature responses to fraud harm and victimisation.  These responses are 
largely historically concurrent with the developments discussed in section 4.7, but 
instead remain consistent with pre-industrial particularisation of fraud, and steps to 
enable social controls and regulation by reputation (King, 2000), which were 
similar to the Statute of Frauds 1677 (see section 4.5).  Similar to the concept of 
theft, the concept of fraud was too a subject of public concern and political action, 
but of different underlying social dynamics and outcomes (Taylor, 2013). 
 
This section contributes to the discussion of the fifth intermediate research 
objective which concerns and investigates the social dynamic behind the wilful 
exclusion of fraud from the purview of the development of the institutions of public 
prosecution as drivers behind the contemporary phenomenon of the ‘duality’ of 
fraud (RQ1).  Prior to the introduction of public prosecution, social controls were 
relied upon to regulate crime, and the state offered a mechanism to empower 
victims through use of the courts to seek compensatory justice (Cottu, 1820; 
Palmer, 1982; King, 2000; Klerman, 2001).  In commercial contexts, social 
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controls (were historically and) are grounded in the concept of reputation as a 
normalising force.  Risk to reputation served to enforce compliance and deter 
participants from breaking market-rules.  This section will demonstrate that pre-
industrial legislation to strengthen market self-regulation, such as the Statute of 
Frauds 1677 or provisions to mandate compliance with insolvency proceedings, 
dominated industrial fraud prevention.  The industrial ‘fraud problem’ was viewed 
as rare and exceptional.  It gradually required intervention by the state, but such 
interventions mimicked pre-industrial deference to social controls and ‘regulation 
by reputation’ (King, 2000; Taylor, 2013). 
 
The concept of market-rules was more prevalent and intuitive prior to the 
emergence of the modern nation-state (Smith, 1776; Weber, 1978; Wrightson, 
1980; King, 2000; Wrightson, 2003; Emsley, 2010; Sharpe, 2013; Taylor, 2013).   
Historically, and particularly before the establishment of public prosecution, 
commercial disputes including allegations of fraud and debtor misconduct would 
have been regulated by trade associations, guilds and marketplaces (Cohen, 
1982; Black & Baumgartner, 1983; King, 2000; Sharpe, 2013; Taylor, 2013).  The 
‘natural’, and political (Taylor, 2013), tendency of the Crown was to assume an 
enabling or supervisory role rather than challenge other processes (King, 2000). 
 
For example, the Church was allowed to exercise its own jurisdiction, and appoint 
its own ‘judges’, under the protection of the Crown as part of the structure of 
power in pre-reformation times.  The matters on which the ecclesiastical courts of 
archbishops and bishops presided were autonomies used by the Crown, similar to 
how market rules and customs regulated commercial affairs (Church of England, 
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1604; Outhwaite, 2006).  Both systems were allowed (and enabled) to exercise 
their limited jurisdiction over certain manners, but the Crown was largely 
uninvolved in decisions on market, parish or affairs of divinity which did not affect 
matters of state. 
 
The discussion of RQ1 is enhanced by focusing on the particularisation of fraud in 
legislation, and from examining interventions in commercial life as well as 
variations from other forms of acquisitive crime in present-day terms.  The 
following paragraphs offer an exploration on the further divergence of fraud from 
the main body of acquisitive offences whilst continuing to apply Black’s (1976) 
theory of law.  It further qualifies the divergence between the common ‘duality’ 
between inter-personal and Crown prosecution in relation to the concepts of theft 
and fraud by focusing on responses to fraud in the socio-economic context of the 
day.  In section eight, the researcher identifies a dysfunction between the 
circumstances and functionality from which contemporary policing had emerged, 
and the concept of fraud.  Below is a further analysis of the apparent continuing 
use of particularisation with respect to fraud, and the persisting legislative 
hesitancy to regulate fraud by imposing a ‘sovereign guarantee’ of trust to wider 
sets of circumstances. 
 
The development of international trade, banks, financial institutions, and investors 
enhanced the intricacies in financial systems alongside the emergence of London 
as an international trade hub.  Part of this process included an expansion of 
recognised social currencies that could be used in trade.  The main source of 
standard fiat currency was the Crown, and a key means of protecting its value 
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was preventing forgeries.  In 1694 the Bank of England first issued notes which 
promised to pay back their face value weight in gold.  These notes detached the 
symbolic representation of wealth from its precious metal source or 
approximation.  Other banks and financial institutions followed and issued 
banknotes or paper bonds to be used as currency, investment, or capital.  (Taylor, 
2013) 
 
Other means of paper-based trade were open to abuse.  Fraudsters and forgers 
would sell counterfeit share certificates and bonds to unsuspecting members of 
the public as genuine financial instruments.  As the market for stocks and bonds 
was growing, forgeries would be found by ‘mainstream’ traders, such as banks 
and high-volume investors.  Such was the scope of this phenomenon and the 
concern which it raised, that forging East India or South Sea bonds, two large 
corporations who were also trading in British government debt, was made 
punishable by death in 1725 (Taylor, 2013).  At the same time, the forgery of 
paper instruments and coins, used by merchants and the public in common trade, 
was still considered a misdemeanour punishable by a fine or the pillory in most 
cases (McGowen, 2004).  The ‘sovereign guarantee’ that was given to companies 
linked to state interest was different to that which impacted upon ‘common’ trade 
to which the Crown was not a direct party.  
 
Forgery of share certificates of Crown backed companies by individuals who were 
otherwise excluded from this form of trade appear to have demanded ‘more’ law 
to regulate (Black, 1976).  This typology represents an abuse against those with 
typically higher rankings on the stratification and morphology scales to the 
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offender, as well as undermining a narrow sovereign interest.  It is therefore 
consistent with the discussion on the particularisation of fraud in section six above 
in particular, and Black’s (1976) theory of law in more general terms.  For their 
part, members of the political and business élites who may have directed the 
actions of such firms or traded in legitimate articles, were “seemingly immune from 
legal repercussions” (Taylor, 2013, p. 23).  In cases of grossly fraudulent activities 
conducted by directors of companies enjoying high publicity, there were other 
tactics available for shareholders looking to recover funds.  In 1826, an affair 
became public that involved Arigna Iron and Coal Mining Company directors who 
were defrauding stakeholders by funnelling funds away from the company.  When 
the true financial state of the company and the allegations became public, the 
share price collapsed, and triggered a media scandal and moral panic.  After a 
number of unsuccessful attempts to resolve the dispute on bilateral terms, the 
shareholders directed their legal efforts towards the civil courts in order to secure 
compensation.  This course of action was preferred over attempts to bring forward 
a (private) prosecution in the criminal courts.  (Taylor, 2013) 
 
As prominent public and political figures of their time, the directors and trustees 
were, nevertheless, challenged by the shareholders about these transactions.  
While not disputing the facts, the directors argued that the transactions were 
‘honourable’.  Relying on the directors’ public status and the ‘simplicity’ of the 
fraud, the shareholders managed to publish their story in the mainstream printed 
media.  In a Parliamentary debate, the prevailing view was voiced by the Tory 
Attorney General, Sir John Copley, who argued against reforming the law on joint-
stock companies, stating that the law was: “Sufficient to reach any fraudulent 
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attempts, by any number of persons firming themselves into illegal companies” 
(Taylor, 2013, p. 27).  More generally at the time, accusations of fraud were often 
defended against by arguing that mismanagement, poor judgment, and debt were 
not criminal offences.  For example, the Illustrated London News remarked in 
1843 that:  
If we progress at the same rate for half a generation longer, commercial 
dishonesty will become the rule, and integrity the exception.  On every 
side of us we see perpetually – fraud, fraud, fraud. (Emsley, 2010, p. 58) 
 
In the world of financial markets and investment schemes, the most important 
currency was reputation (King, 2000; Taylor, 2013). In the 1840’s it became clear 
that corporate fraud was increasingly becoming a problem that needed to be 
addressed by the state.   As the number of schemes and the volume of trade 
grew, it was no longer possible to tell an honest enterprise from one that did not 
exist on paper.  This resulted with the enactment of the Joint Stock Companies’ 
Registration and Regulation Act 1844.  Accounts were still non-disclosable until 
mandated by the Companies Act 1948. 
 
The Select Committee on Joint Stock Companies (1841) adopted the view that 
public scrutiny is the preferable solution to the challenge to trade presented by 
corporate fraud and conmen. It was said that lack of scrutiny created the 
conditions for these phenomena to occur and the law is required to enforce more 
disclosure and prevail yet again on social controls.  In other words, law is being 
used to reinstate (the otherwise allegedly sufficient) social controls and market 
rules (Taylor, 2013).  High entry barriers were set, such as mandating the 
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publication of the names and addresses of all directors and shareholders as well 
as the introduction of a registration fee.  Criticism of this approach and practice 
was perhaps best voiced by Judge Sir Edward Abbott Parry who wrote that: 
Fraud is [a] more complicated offence then larceny, and defrauders 
sometimes get the better of the law.  Cheating is not always a crime.   
Successful cheating is a question of better education (Parry, 1914; 
Emsley, 2010, p. 7).    
In addition to these provisions, some other regulatory principles were legislated.   
Under the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 and concurrent legislation, the 
incorporated company was defined as a legal entity separate to its directors.   
Further criticism against the lack of anti-fraud provisions addressed this change in 
legal status in relation to the prospect of further fraud victimisation:  
… the corporate conscience is ever inferior to the individual 
conscience… a body of men will commit as a joint act, that which every 
individual… would shrink from did he feel personally responsible 
(Spencer, 1855; Emsley, 2010, p. 6) 
 
Responses to harm and victimisation did not include the criminalisation, or the 
definition of fraud as a prohibited manner of conduct for company directors.  The 
occurrence of fraud involving solvent companies was seen as a ‘necessary evil’, 
part of the ‘ebb and flow’ in venture capitalism (Taylor, 2013, p. 100; The 
Economist, 2014).  ‘Properly’ registered companies under the 1844 Act were 
regarded as ‘safe’, their directors and shareholders known, and their private 
addresses were a matter of public record.  It gradually emerged that ‘registered’ 
companies could also be engaged in fraudulent activities.  Such companies 
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presented themselves as compliant with the new regulatory regime, which offered 
no real assurance to investors.  Turning to market-rules and regulation by 
reputations was criticised as enabling fraudsters to continue to operate whilst 
legitimised “by [an] act of parliament” (The Select Committee on Assurance 
Associations, 1854; Taylor, 2013, p. 97).  Prosecution of frauds by registered 
directors was still subject to earlier legislation, such as the 1757 false pretence 
offence which could only be prosecuted as a misdemeanour (Taylor, 2013).    
 
‘Regulation by reputation’ is consistent with the capitalist ideology and system of 
values (Smith, 1776; Weber, 1978; Sugarman & Rubin, 1984).  Before and during 
the industrial era, the particularisation of fraud did not extend to the guarantee of 
trust between an entrepreneur and his investors, as long as the enterprise was 
compliant with its reporting and disclosure duties in law (Sugarman & Rubin, 
1984).  In the City of London, abuses of investor trust were reconciled from within 
the trade guild, but not prosecuted or made public for fear of creating a scare and 
reducing the potential investment members could attract.  This model of self-
regulation, and the absence of a common authority to which frauds against 
investors could be reported, as they were not a matter of criminality, makes 
statistics of such practices unreliable.  During economic downturns, more frauds 
became exposed by the press, as disenfranchised investors organised to 
pressure Parliament to take legislative steps (Taylor, 2013).  Taylor (2013) and 
Robb (1992) provide examples for cases of public ‘shaming’ in the press of 
swindlers and fraudsters taking advantage of investor trust.  By the 1840’s it 
became clear that they were far more common examples to challenge the 
284 
 
prevailing faith in the “untarnished character of the English merchant” (Taylor, 
2013, pp.26-27).  
 
This section examined the extent and manner to which industrial-era fraud was 
addressed by the state, and the preference to enable market-rules over direct 
criminalisation and crime-control.   The ‘duality’ of fraud began to emerge with the 
extension of Crown prosecution to specific abuses of trust that were deemed to be 
of state interest.  The preference for market-rules was not due to an absence of 
state-interest, but instead manifested an overriding approach that favoured self-
regulation (Balen, 2002; Taylor, 2013).  The preference, and deliberate action to 
enhance and enable ‘regulation by reputation’ as a form of deference to market-





The above chapter provided a historical socio-legal examination of the 
phenomenon of the ‘duality’ of fraud as part of a wider social phenomenon that 
governs the ‘amount’ of law applied in dispute resolution.  The above examination 
was directed by the following five intermediate research objectives presented in 
chapter three: 
1. Are the defining characteristics of the gestalt of fraud a constant in English 
law, or a concept shaped by case law or legislation (or both)? 
2. Is the ‘duality’ of fraud (in terms of use of varying ‘amounts’ of law for fraud 
resolution) a historical trend, or a more recent phenomenon? 
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3. Was the particularisation of fraud in law aimed at substantiating an 
overriding criminal definition of fraud, or has it specified historical states of 
‘duality’? 
4. Can the social dynamic behind the historical relationship between use of 
‘higher’ and ‘lower’ amounts of law (‘criminal’ and ‘civil’ or bilateral 
resolution) (Black, 1976) be characterised? 
5. Given the criminalisation of ‘all thefts’ (Theft Act 1968 as amended) and ‘all 
frauds’ (Fraud Act 2006), how did the two concepts relate to the 
development and social functions of the institutions of public prosecution? 
 
The examination began in section two with the introduction and application of 
Black’s (1976) theory of law and third-party theory Black & Baumgartner, 1983) to 
the study of the ‘duality’ of fraud (RQ1) as a social phenomenon (Smith, 1776; 
Weber, 1978; Durkheim, 1982).  This discussion highlighted the advantages of the 
above theoretical frameworks for the study of the ‘duality’ of fraud, particularly 
through its use of social indicators as theoretical suggestions of means of dispute 
resolution.  This discussion was developed in response to intermediate research 
objective four, which sought to characterise the relationship between varying 
‘amounts’ of law as a social phenomenon as opposed to a legal one (Black, 
1976).  In the context of RQ1 (‘duality), chapter two pointed towards a need to 
examine an apparent dysfunction between ‘law-in-theory’ and ‘law-in-action’ in 
relation to the Fraud Act 2006 (Black, 1972).   
 
In section 4.2, the researcher provided an epistemological analysis of the concept 
of ‘duality’ in the absence of categorical indicators in the form of a distinctive legal 
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jurisdiction (the criminal courts) and the institutions of public prosecution.  Instead, 
a compensatory-oriented system of private prosecution enabled self-proclaimed 
victims to finance proceedings against an accused party concerning a broad 
range of inter-personal disputes that spanned across fraud, theft and violent crime 
(Klerman, 2001).  Sanctions that may appear to indicate a criminal quality to the 
contemporary reader may potentially be applicable in relations to such disputes 
and were used to ensure compliance with the compensatory remedy ordered by 
the courts.  Nevertheless, the same style of outcomes was also applicable in 
relations to debts recognised by the courts with no suggestion of wrongdoing by 
contemporary or pre-industrial standards, in what would be otherwise seen as 
‘civil liabilities’. 
 
In the context of intermediate research objective two, the ‘duality’ of fraud appears 
to be part of a historical trend that extended across multiple concepts that are 
subject to effective criminalisation in their entirety (such as theft).  The state had 
no interest in ‘inserting’ itself as a party to what was regarded as an ‘inter-personal 
dispute’, but instead provided an ultimate means of coercion where social controls 
and other resolution mechanisms were insufficient (Black, 1976; Black & 
Baumgartner, 1983; Klerman, 2001).  This was applied across all disputes that 
were seen as meriting a compensatory remedy, ranging from murder (Rubin, 
1996) to insolvency (Cohen, 1982).  Further analysis was provided in Part B to 
characterise the social function of the courts in pre-industrial inter-personal 
dispute resolution.  The researcher examined the historical developments that 
have led to the emergence of an independent judiciary in England, and the 
functionality that it offered as its supremacy in jurisdiction over the dispute 
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resolution was established.  The discussion included the identification of 
prosecution by the Crown, using its resources, and use of the courts to seek a 
primarily retaliatory form of justice (as opposed to compensatory) as a qualifier to 
pre-industrial analogues for the contemporary criminal justice system.  By 
extension, the compensatory-oriented private prosecution is seen as analogous to 
contemporary civil litigation in that it offers a final means of coercion in inter-
personal dispute resolution.  The court may have acted in a punitive fashion in 
order to enforce compliance with orders that were rendered in relation to 
legitimately incurred debts that it had recognised, or liabilities in relation to civil 
wrongs (including theft and fraud).  Nevertheless, such outcomes in themselves 
were inconsistently applied and universally applicable (in theory) in compensatory-
oriented litigation where the courts recognised a debt or imposed compensation. 
 
In section 4.3, the researcher revisited the overall ontological assumption made 
towards the gestalt of fraud in this thesis.  In section 3.2, the ontology of fraud is 
associated with the unpacking of the gestalt of fraud by the Law Commission 
(2002) and implemented in the Fraud Act 2006.  Nonetheless, it appears that the 
term fraud itself was in common use in both by jurists and laypersons for centuries 
of English history, but with no apparent source of definition.  The first of the five 
intermediate research objectives sought to examine whether the contemporary 
approach to the definition of the concept of fraud (independent of its theoretical 
criminalisation) is applicable in a historical context as well.  The researcher 
reconstructed the same defining characteristics of fraud refined by the Law 
Commission (2002) from pre-industrial records of its use in commercial, judicial 
and casual contexts.  It would appear that the underlying meaning of the gestalt of 
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fraud had not been subject to fundamental change since time immemorial.  
Despite extensive searches, the researcher did not encounter examples of the 
use of the term fraud in any of the above contexts that relates to a different 
meaning than the current definition used to criminalise ‘all fraud’ under the Fraud 
Act 2006. 
 
The socio-economic circumstances of pre-industrial England were subsequently 
discussed in section 4.4.  In sub-section 4.4.2, the researcher identified key socio-
economic characteristics, and an analysis of the circumstances in which the 
concepts of theft and fraud were manifested and resolved.  Prior to the industrial 
revolution, the overwhelming majority of the population were of little financial 
means and lived in rural communities where they enjoyed relative intimacy and 
social exclusivity.  Social controls and regulation by reputation were highly 
functional towards regulating and resolving disputes.  The courts were available in 
rare cases where members could not arrive at a resolution of an inter-personal 
dispute, or when an individual who did not share the same group association and 
common deference, and judicial coercion was required.  In sub-section 4.4.3, the 
researcher introduces the pre-industrial function of Crown prosecution in pre-
industrial England.  Prior to the introduction of public prosecution in the 1880’s 
(Ashworth, 2000), the scope of Crown prosecution was limited.  Nevertheless, this 
mode of prosecution was functionally distinctive from the resolution of inter-
personal disputes.  Crown prosecution in itself does not relate to a specific 
inadequacy of social controls in dispute resolution, but instead to the enforcement 
of sovereign functions and prerogatives that define the jurisdiction (Hobbes, 1651; 
Rousseau, 1762; Schmitt, 2005).  Crown prosecution underscores the ability of 
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the state (and local administration) to regulate certain social functions by 
punitively responding to alleged infractions.  This dynamic, which represents the 
‘highest’ amount of law that could be affected was also analysed and compared to 
private prosecution using Black’s (1976) theory of law.  The detailed theoretical 
discussion in Part B demonstrates the difference between prosecution in the 
context of inter-personal disputes (‘civil’), and prosecution by the Crown 
(‘criminal’).  The former represents the use of state powers to enable victims to 
secure compensatory justice, whereas the latter addresses an undermining of the 
social order. 
 
In sections 4.5, and 4.6, the narrow scope of frauds that are construed as 
undermining the Crown are discussed and characterised.  The scope of pre-
industrial criminalisation in itself is limited, particularly as the Crown did not seek 
to ‘insert’ itself into disputes that did not concern its interest directly.  Those in 
specific positions through which they could fraudulently engage with the Crown 
and its protections would have been well aware of the particularisation of 
dishonesty in such circumstances, and its association with punitive prosecution by 
the Crown.  The researcher identified three drivers for the imposition of a 
‘sovereign guarantee’ of trust in commercial and official conduct.  The first driver 
relates to the direction of harm directly towards the Crown.  Dishonest conduct 
against the Crown was construed as subversive conduct, and was harshly treated, 
as it was deemed to directly challenge the existing social order (Black, 1976).  The 
second driver does not follow the typology of direct harm towards the Crown, but 
rather the exercise of sovereign power to regulate particular aspects of 
commercial life.  The extension of the protection the Crown affords itself, in the 
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form of particularised ‘sovereign guarantees’ of trust, serves to identify the Crown 
as the victim through the transaction in relation to the protections it imposes.  The 
third driver is specific to the substantiation of the regime imposed by the state to 
regulate bankruptcy proceedings and debtor-creditor relations.  Whilst the 
circumstances of insolvency are not subject to Crown prosecution (they might 
become subject to further compensatory-oriented private prosecution), 
compliance with the administrative provisions set by the Crown is subject to direct 
protection.  The particularisation of fraud in this context refers to duties of 
compliance and transparency with respect to the investigatory powers of the local 
courts in administrating bankruptcy proceedings.  Also included in this category 
are particularised provisions against the debtor evading creditors or the courts, 
hiding assets, or making false representations with respect to assets that may be 
distributable to creditors. 
 
The above discussion relates to intermediate research objective three, which asks 
whether the particularised approach was used to manifest a legislative approach 
toward the criminalisation of the concept of fraud.  In other words, was the 
historical legislative intent toward fraud as wide as in the contemporary 
criminalisation of ‘all frauds’ under the Fraud Act 2006, or was the intention 
narrower in scope, leaving some frauds to be resolved as inter-personal disputes?   
The historical and contemporary particularisation seems to relate to the 
enforcement of sovereign functions and prerogatives that exist outside of the 
scope of the concept of ‘policing by consent’.  These examples are also under the 
purview of agencies that are presently separate and operate independently of the 
police.  These separate agencies enforce the law with respect to tax collection, 
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social benefits, trading standards and measurements, and company law.  
Enforcement relates superficially to the particularised provisions that do not 
otherwise add to the scope of criminalisation under the Fraud Act 2006, but 
instead offer advantages in investigation and the scope of responsibility for non-
police agencies. 
 
The apparent contemporary dysfunction between the concept of fraud and 
mainstream policing was the subject of section 4.7.  In sub-section 4.7.2, a 
number of key social indicators that are used in Black’s (1976) theory of law and 
were subject to substantial changes from their pre-industrial state were discussed.  
Urbanisation, physical and social mobility, mass production, and the creation of 
new sources of wealth, social currencies, and financial instruments diminished the 
effectiveness of social controls, and the practicality of regulation by reputation.  
The above was applicable across the concepts of theft and fraud, but instead 
represents an apparent point of divergence between the two.  The demand for 
‘more’ law led to the imitation of the Crown prosecution dynamic detailed in sub-
section 4.4.3 to the concept of theft and the protection for the right to property 
appeared to have come from the ‘grassroots’.  Local associations for the 
prosecution of felons expressly preferred to mimic the Crown in deterring against 
victimisation of their members or in the areas they assigned themselves to ‘police’ 
with punitive prosecution (Schubert, 2015).  Members of these associations did 
not typically seek to recover compensation, but instead were collectively willing to 
invest investigative and legal resources in order to exercise a form of crime control 




The association for the prosecution of felons did not appear to be subject to a 
limitation of the form of inter-personal disputes they elected to respond to with 
punishment-seeking prosecution.  Nevertheless, their activities converged around 
the concept of theft (and criminal damage to property), in what appeared to the 
researcher as an ‘organic’ demand for more law in response to challenges to the 
protection of the right to property in industrial-era England (Schubert, 2015).  The 
same imperative appears to have driven the political process behind the creation 
of the modern police constabularies, which relieved communities from the need to 
regulate crime through investigation and punishment-seeking prosecution.  The 
resulting concepts of ‘policing by consent’ and public prosecution effectively 
‘inserted’ the Crown, into what previously were litigated as inter-personal disputes, 
as it assumed the role of the victim through its guarantee of the right to property. 
 
The concept of fraud was not subject to the same social and political pressure to 
apply ‘more’ law as a means of categorical replacement of resolution mechanism 
grounded sole in social controls (Black, 1976; Black & Baumgartner, 1983).  The 
discussion in section 4.7 identifies a fundamental social difference that 
distinguishes the functionality of post-industrial Crown prosecution between the 
concepts of fraud and theft.  The definitive and modernised definition in the Theft 
Act 1968 is considered successful in making plain what constitutes the offence of 
theft (Griew, 1995; The Criminal Law Revision Committee, 1966).  The same 
method, the inclusion of a readily understood definition of the underlying concept 
(theft/fraud) as an offence, was the principle recommendation of the Law 
Commission (2002).  However, the concept of theft is a driver for and a subject of 
policing by consent and public prosecution, and the protection of the right to 
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property appears to underline the development and conduct of these institutions 
and the use of a punitive form of justice.  The addition of a useful definition to 
theft, a term already associated with effective criminalisation, resulted with 
different outcomes to the imposition of such wide and ethereal modes of 
criminalisation with respect to fraud.  
 
In section 4.8, the researcher presents industrial-era responses to the concept of 
fraud that occurred largely concurrently with the processes the led to the effective 
criminalisation of theft discussed in section seven.  Similar to the concept of theft, 
the industrial-era brought about an expansion of opportunities and means of 
profiting from egregiously dishonest practices.  Despite some sense of moral 
panic and press coverage (see Taylor, 2013), the approach toward the 
criminalisation of fraud does not appear to have changed.  Legislation was 
introduced to particularly criminalise dishonesty regarding narrow sovereign 
interest, and not as means of addressing the challenges of fraud, particularly as it 
relates to abuses of trust in the context of venture capitalism.   
 
In addition, changes were made to company law in order to enable marketplace 
participants to know and track the identities of the individuals behind registered 
companies.  Instead of associating fraud by companies and individuals in 
response to public outcry, the legislative intent with regards to fraud was to enable 
‘regulation by reputation’ (King, 2000; Taylor, 2013).  These changes are 
consistent with the three drivers for the pre-industrial particularisation of fraud, 
identified in section 4.6, and that relate primarily to the second and the third 
drivers.  These two drivers represent the narrow ‘insertion’ of the Crown into 
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breaches of trust that were not directed against its coffers.  Instead, they 
represent an extension of a sovereign protection to specific commercial 
circumstances (driver two), or the imposed regime on creditor-debtor relations and 
compliance with court-led liquidation processes.   
 
The registration of companies, directors and shareholders in response to a 
growing challenge of fraud against investors appears to relate to the ‘prevention’ 
of fraud by the Statute of Frauds 1677.  Whilst both provisions did not expand the 
remit of Crown prosecution, they enacted a procedure that enabled victims of 
fraud to use various means of coercion against their abusers, including private 
prosecution as required.  Whilst the Statute of Frauds 1677 mandated the signing 
of a contract to record terms of a transaction, the Joint Stock Companies’ 
Registration Act 1844 required companies to register the names of their 
shareholders and directors.  In addition to being able to identify the beneficial 
owners of a company that may have engaged in fraud against investors, further 
benefits extend to legitimate bankruptcy situations as well, and limit the scope of 
potential downstream abuses.  Furthermore, company law was expressly intended 
to replace marketplace intimacy by mandating the registration of stakeholders.  
Investors were able to estimate the level of risk they were willing to incur in the 
investment by referring to personal reputations of its owners (Taylor, 2013).  The 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), a contemporary financial regulator that does 
not operate through ‘mainstream’ policing by consent but rather by sovereign 
authority.  The FCA publishes advice with regards to investment fraud on its 
website.  The advice directs potential investors to a register of FCA-authorised 
firm and individuals, issues a warning against prospects ‘too good to the true’ or 
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fixed returns, as directs victims of fraud to a consumer helpline and an FCA online 
reporting form (FCA, 2016). 
  
The (alleged) criminal implications of investor fraud (‘get-rich-fast scams’ in the 
case of the above example), do not appear to feature in this advice.  Instead, the 
advice encourages prospective investors to use the registration mandate to see 
whether the alleged investment opportunity is operated by reputable people.  
Those who suspect a scheme to be fraudulent may contact the regulator, but the 
literature discussed in chapter two points to difficulties in engaging with law-
enforcement and public prosecution bodies in this context (Button, et al., 2013). 
 
The concept of fraud was not itself a subject of association with the emerging 
institutions of the contemporary criminal justice system and policing by consent.  
Instead, it remained a subject for narrow particularisation of insular ‘sovereign 
guarantees’ of trust.  Industrial-era responses to fraud did not appear to have 
changed in nature, but rather adapted to the changing socio-economic landscape 
such as from agrarian to capitalist society.  In the context of the fifth intermediate 
research objective, the above discussion appears to underpin the difference in 
effectiveness in association of ‘all thefts’ and ‘all frauds’ with law-enforcement 
action and public prosecution.  Through this investigation, the origin of the 
dysfunction between ‘law-in-theory’ and ‘law-in-action’ with respect to the Fraud 
Act 2006 (Black, 1972) is explained through contextual sociological analysis of 
historical evidence.  The concept of theft is a useful analogue in that it historically 
shares a common resolution dynamic with the concept of fraud.  Through social 
development, theft is subject to categorical association with law-enforcement 
296 
 
activities and is integral to the work of the institutions of policing and prosecution 
that are (allegedly) tasked with the challenge of fraud.   
 
This chapter identified the dysfunction between the categorical criminalisation of 
fraud, and the social function of law-enforcement.  In addition to the discussion of 
‘competing’ compensatory fraud resolution mechanisms, and the investigative 
difficulties with an offence defined by qualified by test of dishonesty in chapter 
two, this chapter adds additional critique.  The examination of the archival and 
literary sources accessed by the researcher point to limitations to the extent to 
which fraud can be regarded as categorically belonging in the purview of the 
criminal justice system.  In this context, the contemporary ‘duality’ of fraud should 
not be viewed as a surprise but rather the constitution of material history and 
trajectory.  What does appear to be out of the ordinary is the attempt to impose 
the same scope of criminalisation as theft onto the concept of fraud (Law 
Commission, 2002).  The criminalisation of ‘all frauds’ under the Fraud Act 2006 
appears not to account for the difference in association between the concepts of 











In this chapter, the reader is presented with the findings of the survey described 
as ‘phase two’ in section 3.4 of the methodology chapter.  The findings describe 
and critically analyse the (typically) anticipated type of official resolution 
mechanism as a way of measuring ‘how much law’ may be applied (Black, 1976) 
using a five-point ordinal scale.  The data refers to sixteen hypothetical cases of 
fraud victimisation (see section 1 in Appendix A), and respondent answers to how 
such cases may typically be addressed.  The complete dataset is included in 
Appendix B, where the results are presented for the entire sample (N=140), and 
the sub-groups of financial investigators (N=51) in law-enforcement or otherwise 
and laypersons (N=89).   The results are discussed in the context of the three 
theoretical assumptions of which this data collection tool was designed (see below 
in this section and in section 3.4 in the methodology chapter) and presented in 
this chapter.   
 
Following each of the hypothetical questions (presented as Q1-16 in the interest 
of simplicity for the reader), participants were asked to indicate what they 
considered to be the typically most likely outcome on the following five-point 
ordinal scale (Stevens, 1946; 1951): 
1. A criminal investigation potentially leading to an arrest. 




3. Regulatory sanction / commercial litigation 
4. The victim takes other steps against the perpetrator or recovers some of 
the losses from the perpetrator. 
5. No action is taken by law-enforcement or the victim. 
These are referred to as options one, two, three, four, and five, and included in 
short-form in tables included below in section 5.3 and are part of the complete 
dataset of responses provided in Appendix B.  Given the focus of the main 
research questions, the presentation of findings in section 5.2 below is primarily 
focused on the rates in which participants indicated options one and two as 
representative of the typically most likely outcome.  Option one was defined as the 
‘threshold’ of denoting fraud as being responded to by a law-enforcement agency 
for the purposes of the dichotomy between ‘criminal’ and other fraud resolution 
mechanisms in RQ1 (‘duality’).  Option two was designed to be indicative of the 
existence of a perceived barrier to the unpacking of a hypothetical example of 
fraud harm and victimisation as grounds for law-enforcement responses.  Given 
the scope of analysis in this thesis, the focus of critical discussion is on the role of 
legislation in enabling or inhibiting the perceived propensity of law-enforcement 
agencies to respond to indications of fraud harm and victimisation (RQ2, 
‘mainstreaming’ and ‘streamlining’).  Options three, four, and five offered to 
participants a variable scale of resolution mechanisms of the use of different 
‘amounts’ of law (Black, 1976).  Responses including indications of these options 
are included in section 5.3 and are included in the discussion of findings when 
they offer critical value added to the understanding of the main research 




The design of the sixteen hypothetical examples of fraud harm and victimisation in 
this study was intended to test three theoretical assumptions which emerged as 
key themes in the literature review.  The first assumption was that ‘predatory’-type 
fraud offences are more commonly associated with law-enforcement activities 
relative to ‘commercial’-type examples of offending (Naylor, 2003).  ‘Predatory’-
type offences feature simple transactions, readily identifiable victims, clear losses 
and gains, and are strongly associated with law-enforcement responses (Naylor, 
2003, pp. 84-85).  ‘Commercial’-type offences occur in conventional business 
situations, multiple otherwise legitimate transactions that are used as part of an 
illegal method, and sometimes victims, losses, and gains may be difficult to 
identify.  ‘Commercial’-type offences are not as well associated with law-
enforcement response (Naylor, 2003, pp. 88-89), and also related to the definition 
of white-collar crime as a category of circumstances of offending that is under-
represented in crime statistics (Sutherland, 1940).  Naylor’s (2003) typology of 
profit-driven crimes was discussed and applied the critical discussion of the Fraud 
Act 2006 and the ‘duality’ of fraud in the literature review (section 2.4).  This 
typological difference in effective criminalisation (Hester & Eglin, 1992) is 
examined below by comparing responses to examples of expressly ‘predatory’-
type frauds and ‘commercial’-type frauds (Naylor, 2003).  See table 2 below in this 
section. 
 
The second assumption was that offending ‘upwards’ on the socio-economic 
scales of stratification, morphology, and organisation more commonly result with 
the application of ‘more’ law (Black, 1976).  Black’s (1976) theory of law provides 
a scale of resolution mechanisms as indicative of relative ‘amounts’ of law (as 
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discussed in the literature review in section 2.3).  In the context of RQ1 (‘duality’), 
the author sets the threshold for ‘criminal’ resolution of fraud by the use of 
investigatory resources by a law-enforcement agency (regardless of downstream 
outcomes).  The use of ‘more’ law flows from the challenge to the existing social 
order that results from harm and victimisation that is directed ‘upwards’ on socio-
economic scales and is generally directed ‘downwards’ in response (Black, 1976).  
 
The third assumption was that particularised criminalisation of fraud is 
advantageous in its clarity to the conduct-based general offence in the Fraud Act 
2006.  The study included three examples of offending subject to narrow 
definitions in statutory law, which related the three functional categories of fraud 
particularisation from chapter four above (see section 4.6).  The first function was 
the protection of the Crown coffers and its dues, which was examined by the 
inclusion of a Prevention of Social Housing Fraud Act 2013 in Q4.  The question 
presents a benefit of £150,000, which is the same amount indicated in Q10, which 
is an example of a ‘predatory’-type employee fraud not subject to particularisation.  
Two other particularised offences were included in this study.  The second 
function was the narrow regulation of commerce and trade rules intended to 
inspire confidence and investment, which was tested using a company law, which 
was preferred due to its non-industry specific nature.  An offence under the Theft 
Act 1968 (as amended) section 17 and Companies Act 2006 (as amended) 
sections 363 and 393 was included through Q8, which featured a financial 
statement fraud by company directors intended to gain favour with investors and 
creditors.  The third function was the definition of debtor-creditor relations and the 
substantiation of a state-imposed bankruptcy and insolvency regime.  This 
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function was represented in Q1, which featured an Insolvency Act 1986 (as 
amended) sections 213 offence of fraudulent trading (knowingly continuing to 
operate a company whilst insolvent). 
 
In the following section (5.2), the results of the survey are presented with 
discussion of the main research questions with respect to the dataset as a whole.  
This discussion includes the interpretation of the contemporary ‘duality’ of fraud 
(RQ1) in reference to frequency of option one indications by participants.  This is 
followed by discussion of indications of option two, which indicate a perceived 
unfulfilled demand by reporting victims for law-enforcement activities as the 
typically most likely outcome.  Whilst options three, four, and five are indicative of 
functional use of other resolution mechanisms (or failure to resolve or report fraud 
in options five), option two represents a report of an offence to law-enforcement 
agency that does not result with investigative responses.   
 
This discussion therefore relates to difficulties with mainstream application of 
fraud as a criminal concept in the context of the criminal justice system (RQ2) 
under the current system of law, and the Fraud Act 2006 in particular.  This is 
followed by a discussion in section 5.3 in relation to the three assumptions 
discussed in chapter three and in the introduction to this chapter.  This is followed 
by further critical analysis of four groups of results presented in a descending 
order of association with law-enforcement activities (option one) and discussed in 
relation to the three assumptions discussed above in this introduction.  The 
conclusion in section 5.4 below includes specific discussion of limitations and 
recommendations for empirical research.  This section concludes with the below 
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summary table of the sixteen questions summarised and accompanied by 
identification of typology (Naylor, 2003), ‘direction’ of harm (Black, 1976) and 
mode of criminalisation (see above three assumptions).  The questions are 
presented in a descending order of option one selection and retain the sequential 
number of their presentation to participants.  The table provides brief notation of 
how each of the hypotheticals relates to the three assumptions.  In section 5.3 this 
discussion is developed through critical analysis of the correlation between theory 
and survey responses.  
 
Table 2 – Summary of Option One Responses and the Three Theoretical 
Assumptions 
 













see section 4.5 in 
chapter four 







Fraud Act 2006 
Q15 Theft of payment card 
details using a card 







Fraud Act 2006 
Q4 Housing benefits fraud 








protection of state 
coffers and dues. 
Q10 A trader funnels funds 
amounting to £150,000 







Fraud Act 2006 




Fraud Act 2006 
Q5 A trader ran a scheme 
against a financial 
institution over many 
years that resulted with 












Fraud Act 2006 
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Q2 Traders conspire to 








Fraud Act 2006 







trade through a 
business front 














Fraud Act 2006 
Q3 Procurement fraud 
(preferring a contractor 
for family reasons). 
17.14% 
 
Commercial Unknown or 
offending by 
near equals. 
Fraud Act 2006 
(by dishonest 
abuse of position, 
Bribery Act 2010 
may apply) 
Q8 A board of directors 



















Q7* Attempted ‘phishing’ 











ICT-related, offender unknown 
(McGuire & Dowling, 2013; Levi, et 
al., 2015) 
Q14 A business has been 




Commercial Offending by an 
organisation 
head. 
Fraud Act 2006 
Q1 Fraudulent trading (no 
indication of harm) 
11.43% 
 
Commercial No indication of 
harm.  Risk of 







balance of powers 
and insolvency 
regime. 
Q9 Sub-standard insulation 
installed by a handyman 












Fraud Act 2006 
Q12* £150 lost to a car hire 
app user whose 








ICT-related, offender unknown 
(McGuire & Dowling, 2013; Levi, et 
al., 2015) 
 
Q13 An internal report of the 
performance of a 
department is 
understated so to 
supplement the 
following year’s figures. 
5.00% 
 
Commercial Unknown or 
near equals. 
Fraud Act 2006 
(the report is 
internal) 
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In figure 1 above, rates of selection of both options one (as indicated in table 2 
above) and option two (report to a law-enforcement agency that does not result 
with any further action) are presented with respect to each of the hypotheticals.  
The rates of response are plotted on the y axis with respect to the sixteen 
hypotheticals on the x axis order in descending order of option one selection 
(whilst retaining their sequential number for identification).  This presentation 
provides an aggregated overview of options one and two indications in the survey 
results discussed in this chapter, and the two selection options from the five-points 
ordinal scale that directly relate to the main research questions.  The following 
















































































































































Q 1 1 Q 1 5 Q 4 Q 1 0 Q 1 6 Q 5 Q 2 Q 6 Q 3 Q 8 Q 7 Q 1 4 Q 1 Q 9 Q 1 2 Q 1 3
Option one rate of response (criminal investigation)
Option two rate of response (report to law-enforcement – no further action)
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5.2 Results  
 
In this section, the researcher presents the survey findings through the analysis of 
indications of options one and two in reference to the single measurement of 
sixteen hypothetical examples of fraud harm and victimisation.  A table presenting 
the complete dataset of survey responses to the sixteen hypothetical descriptions 
of fraud harm and victimisation across the five-point ordinal scale provided in 
Appendix B.  This section will focus primarily on option one and option two rates of 
selection (see above table 2 and figure 1), as they pertain directly to the main 
research question in this thesis as discussed in the above section.  In the context 
of RQ1 (‘duality’), the existence and extent of a contemporary dysfunction 
between ‘law-in-theory’ and ‘law-in-action’ is discussed through the variability of 
option one rates of responses for examples of fraud that were pre-qualified to 
participants as criminal offences.  This discussion pertains to the concept of fraud 
relative to itself.  The results are not normalised relative to an absolute ‘threshold’ 
for effective criminalisation through the common association of harm and 
victimisation with law-enforcement activities (Hester & Eglin, 1992) (see 
discussion of limitation in sections 5.4, and 6.2).  This is followed by a 
presentation of rates of option two selections relative to the decreasing rate of 
option one selections.  The extent to which participants perceived reports to law-
enforcement agencies as indicative of no further investigatory action being taken 
is presented relative to option one being the most likely outcome or other 
resolution mechanisms.  It appears that a report to law-enforcement agency that 
does not result with an investigation was perceived to be likely across indications 




The null-hypothesis on which this the questionnaire (see Appendix A) was based 
represents a correlation between ‘law-in-theory’ and ‘law-in-action’ with respect to 
the criminalisation of ‘all fraud’ under the Fraud Act 2006 (Black, 1972; Law 
Commission, 2002; Farrell, et al., 2007).  The results provide an empirical basis to 
reject the null-hypothesis (see 3.4), as they indicate a variability in the extent to 
which law-enforcement activities are associated with different hypothetical 
examples of fraud (Hester & Eglin, 1992).  This insight relates directly to varying 
percentage of participants who have indicated a likely criminal investigation 
potentially resulting with an arrest available as option one on the ordinal scale 
(note that other than two examples, the identity of the offender is known to the 
victim).  It emerged that participants associated the possibility of a criminal 
investigation as the most likely outcome at a maximum rate of 79.29% (Q11) and 
a minimum rate of 5% (Q13).  Overall, across sixteen hypothetical descriptions of 
fraud offences the average rate (mean) of criminal investigation anticipation by 
participants was calculated to be 34.97% (standard deviation 29.84).  As 
participants were told that all the hypothetical examples in the survey are criminal 
offences, the above finding demonstrate an apparent inconsistency in perceived 
association with with-enforcement activities across the measurement in the study.  
It demonstrates a low overall level of association with law-enforcement activities 
with pre-qualified offences that primarily feature typological and socio-economic 
variability according to Naylor (2003) and Black (1976) (see introduction above).  
The standard deviation value of 29.84 demonstrates a considerable degree of 
inconsistency, which is re-examined in section 5.3 below in relation to the three 




These inconsistencies in law-enforcement interaction and response to accounts of 
fraud harm and victimisation, further undermine the null-hypothesis in relation to 
the ‘mainstreaming’ and ‘streamlining’ of state-responses to fraud (RQ2).  
In theory, there should not be a statistically significant difference between 
responses amongst the two sub-groups in the sample, despite the above context, 
as FI’s experience ‘law-in-action’ in a consistent way with other members of 
society.  Nevertheless, departure from this null-hypothesis with respect to the 
shared experience of ‘law-in-action’ in the context of fraud between the two sub-
groups may offer further insight, particularly in the context of RQ2 
(‘mainstreaming’ and ‘streamlining’).  In order to identify responses to hypothetical 
examples of fraud presented to participants where the null-hypothesis of 
statistically insignificant variation between the two groups, the Mann-Whitney U-
test (Ruxton, 2006) was applied to all sixteen questions.  The test was used to 
identify statistical significance between the variation of responses between the FI 
and layperson sub-groups in the sample in selecting the typically most likely 
resolution mechanism (Cohen, 1988).    
 
With respect to the null-hypothesis of no discrepancy between ‘law-in-theory’ and 
‘law-in-action’ with respect to the range of offending criminalised under the Fraud 
Act 2006 (‘all frauds’), figure 1 above provides the context for denying this 
hypothesis.  Whilst this study does not set a threshold for effective criminalisation 
in terms of rate of association of known examples of fraud with a criminal 
investigation (Hester & Eglin, 1992), the data presents considerable variance.  
The frequencies for option one selection (investigation potentially leading to an 
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arrest) across the sixteen questions tested in this resulted with a standard 
deviation of 29.84.  Through this definition of the social function of effective fraud 
criminalisation, it would appear that despite the imposition of a ‘sovereign 
guarantee’ for trust of all examples of dishonesty (Law Commission, p.3) is not 
evenly applied.   
 
The findings presented in figure 1 in section 5.1 above demonstrate that there 
exists a varying divergence between ‘law-in-theory’ and ‘law-in-action’ with 
respect to the scope of criminalisation under the Fraud Act 2006 (Black, 1972).  
As discussed in section 3.4, the examples in this study included fraud offences 
that demonstrate different criminological (Naylor, 2003) and sociological (Black, 
1976) attributes.  In the following section 5.3, further analytical discussion is 
provided to characterise the inconsistent dysfunction between ‘law-in-theory’ and 
‘law-in-action’ (Black, 1972) observed in this study in order to characterise the 
contemporary ‘duality’ of fraud (RQ1) using the aforementioned theoretical 
frameworks.  
 
As discussed in the introduction to this chapter and in section 3.4 in the 
methodology chapter, the researcher is not aware of a defined threshold for 
effective criminalisation that could be applied to the measurement in the survey.  
Instead, the interpretation of option one indication frequencies as indicative of 
extent to which a ‘sovereign guarantee’ of trust is perceived to be in place by 
participants in relative to findings in this measurement.  Rates of option one 
selection in response to Q11, Q15, Q4, Q10, and Q16 demonstrate a consistent 
(low standard deviation of 2.57) average rate of 75.77%.  This value represents a 
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basis for comparison of lower values and is not subject to evaluation itself for its 
absolute value.  Whilst a standard of 100% correlation between suspected 
homicide and an investigative response may exist, not all ‘mainstream’ crime 
(theft, sexual offences, violent crime) is reported to law-enforcement, and not all 
reported crime is recorded and further acted upon (Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of 
Constabulary (HMIC), 2014; UK Statistics Authority, 2014).  The rate of option one 
selection with respect to hypotheticals other than Q11, Q15, Q4, Q10, and Q16 is 
therefore considered in terms of how much lower it is from the circa 75% 
threshold. 
 
Indications of option two as the typically most likely outcome provide a potential to 
identify types of fraud where disassociation of the offence with a criminal 
investigation does not stem from victim reporting inhibitions.  Instead, these 
indications point to areas where a criminal investigation does not appear to 
participants as likely to be the result of an engagement with law-enforcement 
agencies.  These indications are insightful in the context of suggesting the 
existence of perceived barriers to the criminal unpacking of the concept of fraud 
by law-enforcement agencies by participants.  These perceptions might have 
been grounded in similar observations as those discussed in the literature review, 
particularly section 2.4 (see Button, et al., 2009; 2013).   Furthermore, option two 
indications provide a measurement of the ‘role’ of unfulfilled demand for law-
enforcement activities in the ‘erosion’ of the criminal fraud offence, as discussed in 




As discussed in the introduction section above, option two selections are 
suggestive of a perceived difficulty for law-enforcement agencies to respond to a 
report of a fraud offence with investigative outcomes (RQ2).  The question is, 
therefore, how does the above relate to rates of association with law-enforcement 
activities and whether option two rates follow a similar trend to option one 
selections, or are the two disconnected?  In other words, what might have been 
the role of context in shaping perceptions by participants towards the possibility of 
fraud being reported to a law-enforcement agency and not investigated any 
further?  Figure 1 (in section 5.1 above) demonstrates that there existed a base-
level expectation for fraud being reported to law-enforcement agencies but not 
investigated further through option two selection in the data.   
 
A report to law-enforcement which does not result with an investigation (or any 
other activities, option two) ranged between a maximum rate of 46.43% (Q6) and 
a minimum rate of 4.29% (Q4).  Overall, a report to law-enforcement which does 
not result with a criminal investigation was indicated as the most likely outcome at 
an average rate of 15.53%, and a standard deviation 13.54.  This demonstrates 
that notwithstanding inhibitions to victim engagement with law-enforcement, some 
demand for law-enforcement activities remains unfulfilled, and relates to 
challenges to ‘mainstreaming’ and ‘streamlining’ (RQ2) of fraud enforcement.  
Whilst the standard deviation is lower by comparison to option one selection 
(29.84), it remains indicative of inconsistency of unfulfilled demand for law-




Offences that are more closely associated with law-enforcement activities (Q11, 
Q15, Q4, Q10, and Q16) were relatively low and consistent, with an average rate 
of 8.86% and a standard deviation of 2.84 (and see figure 1 in section 5.1).  The 
aforementioned five hypotheticals are theoretically (Black, 1976; Naylor, 2003) 
suggested to likely result with a criminal investigation and represent the highest 
group of option one indications in this study (further discussion is provided in the 
following section 5.3).  This ‘criminal’ connotation also resulted with low and 
consistent option two indications, meaning that the sample overall assessed the 
likelihood of a report by a victim to typically be investigated no further at a 
relatively low rate.  In section 5.4 below, the author discusses the limitations of 
this study, including the absence of a parallel study to normalise findings relative 
to the context of theft.  The denotation of the rate of association of option two with 
Q11, Q15, Q4, Q10, and Q16 as ‘low’ refers to this measurement of typical 
outcomes across the concept of fraud and is relative to this study and the scope 
of the main research questions only.  In the context of this discussion, the results 
suggest that the perceived existence of an unfulfilled demand for law-enforcement 
activities does not directly flow from fulfilled demand, but rather from contexts 
where the likelihood of an investigatory response is otherwise low.  Furthermore, it 
would appear that the standard deviation for option two selection percentages 
across the measurement (13.54) is due primarily to ‘peak values’ in Q6, Q7, and 
Q12.   
 
Tukey (1977) defines statistical outliers as exceeding the value of the three times 
the interquartile range (the middle half of all values), which is 9.28% for option two 
rates of selection across the sixteen hypotheticals in this study.  Therefore, rates 
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of option two indications that exceed three times 9.28% (=27.84%) are statistical 
outliers with values of 46.43%, 38.57%, and 40.71% respectively.  Of the above 
outliers, Q7 and Q12 refer to the only two examples where the identity of the 
offender is not known to the victim (or readily discoverable).  These examples 
relate to frauds that are facilitated through the use of information communication 
technology (ICT), where the literature lists considerable difficulties to attribute 
harm and victimisation to a legal entity (Levi, et al., 2015; McGuire & Dowling, 
2013).  These difficulties fall outside the scope of this thesis, yet their emergence 
as outliers alongside Q6 provide a basis for further discussion on the attributes of 
Q6 in the context of RQ2 in particular (‘mainstreaming’ and ‘streamlining’).  In Q6, 
participants are presented with an offence where ‘simple’ bilateral exchanges 
between offender and victim are facilitated through a business front in order to sell 
household items at up to ten times their fair market value.  This hypothetical 
presents an unambiguous morality, as the scheme targets a vulnerable population 
(the elderly) and does not trade in a similar fashion in the open market.  The 
identity of the victim is readily apparent, as well as the losses that were incurred.  
The offence therefore appears to possess all the hallmarks of a ‘predatory’-type 
offence (Naylor, 2003), nevertheless it did not appear to participants as an 
overwhelmingly suggestive of law-enforcement activities (option one rate of 
response: 18.57%).  Instead, participants indicated that the family member who 
discovered the victimisation (a non-vulnerable person) would attempt to involve 
law-enforcement agencies and engage them through assertion of dishonesty 
against the trading firm.  As discussed in the literature review, the qualification of 
fraud through dishonest misrepresentation, failure to disclose or abuse of position 
does not appear to offer an objective test to determine whether a crime had 
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occurred.  Instead, law-enforcement agencies would have to engage in a 
subjective evaluation of where it is likely that an offence took place based on a 
victim account of a wilful transaction.  In chapter four, the historical dysfunction 
between mainstream policing and the concept trust in commercial conduct was 
discussed in sections 4.7 and 4.8.  The emergence of contemporary law-
enforcement appears to have flowed from the increased challenge to social order 
in the context of theft and the protection of the right to property in the wake of 
industrialisation and urbanisation (Emsley, 2010; Schubert, 2015).  The concept of 
dishonesty did not appear to challenge the existing social order in such to a 
similar extent, and response to harm and victimisation included strengthening of 
self-regulation and regulation by reputation mechanisms (Taylor, 2013).         
 
The average rate of option two responses for all questions other than Q6, Q7, and 
Q12 is 9.56%, and a standard deviation of 6.38.  With the exclusion of the three 
outliers, the low mean value of rates and the relatively low standard deviation 
reflects a base-level of perceived unfulfilled demand by participants for 
investigation activities in the context of fraud that is reported to law-enforcement 
agencies.  This finding relates to the discussion in section 2.4 in the literature 
review where the ‘erosion’ of the concept of fraud is discussed in terms of 
difficulties to engage law-enforcement agencies in response to harm and 
victimisation, and in similar manner to other types of acquisitive crime.  The 
findings therefore suggest that perceived challenges to the realisation of the ‘law-
in-theory’ by law-enforcement agencies is consistent regardless of perception of 
the most likely resolution mechanism (option one, or options three, four, and five).  
This highlights the potential role of legislation in the context of RQ2 to enable the 
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criminal unpacking of the gestalt with respect to frauds that are otherwise 
associated and disassociated with law-enforcement activities.  This is not to 
suggest that there are no grounds for individuals to perceive a likelihood of crime 
being reported but investigated no further in the context of other offences (HMIC, 
2014; UK Statistics Authority, 2014).  Nevertheless, the literature does point to 
contextual and procedural difficulties with the concept of fraud (Levi & Burrows, 
2008; Button, et al., 2013), which the critical discussion in the literature review 
attribute in part to difficulties with the current law in sections 2.4, and 2.6.   
 
The data also suggests that the use of a business front in order to systematically 
defraud a vulnerable victim group (the elderly) presents a perceived challenge to 
the existing social order (Black, 1976) through selections of options one and two.  
In response to Q6, 46.43% of participants regarded a report to law-enforcement 
that is not followed by any further action as the typically most likely outcome.  The 
option one (criminal investigation) was indicated at a rate of 18.57%, nearly on par 
with indications of option five (no action taken in response to fraud) at a rate of 
17.86%.  In the following section (5.3), the difference in perceptions towards Q6 
between the FI and non-FI sub-groups in the sample is discussed.  The literature 
accepts that some frauds may be under-investigated and prosecuted by law-
enforcement agencies, yet this suggestion is generally reserved for ‘commercial’-
type frauds or white-collar crime (Sutherland, 1949; Naylor, 2003;).  Nevertheless, 
Q6 provides an example of the challenge that dishonesty-based criminalisation 
presents to the effective criminalisation of ‘predatory’-type fraud that is primarily 
defined by dishonesty (Naylor, 2003).  Whilst some frauds do present a lesser 
challenge to the social order (Black, 1976), there appears to be a demand for law-
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enforcement activities in the context of this insular example of dishonest 
behaviour that goes unfulfilled.  This context relates to the discussion in section 
2.6, where conduct-based criminalisation is critically discussed through Tappan’s 
(1947) dissent from non-specific definitions for criminality.  The standard for clarity 
alleged by the Law Commission (2002) with respect to the general fraud offence 
seems to theoretically apply to Q6, yet perceptions in this study appear to point 




In this section, the author discusses survey findings relative to the three 
assumptions that were made with respect to theoretical suggestions for relative 
correlation between ‘law-in-theory’ and ‘law-in-action’ in the context of fraud 
(Black, 1972).  The first assumption that is being discussed is Naylor’s (2003) 
typology of profit-driven crime and how participants perceived the likelihood for 
law-enforcement activities in response to ‘predatory’- and ‘commercial’-type 
hypotheticals.  The second assumption that is being discussed is that ‘more’ law is 
applied in response to challenges to the existing social order that flow from 
offending ‘upwards’ on the social scales of stratification, morphology, and 
organisation (Black, 1976).  The third assumption tests the limits of the theoretical 
advantages of particularisation in terms of applied clarity, and relative to the first 
and second assumptions, which refer to crime typologies (Naylor, 2003) and the 




The above discussion is developed by the examination of the increasing 
disassociation between known examples of fraud harm and victimisation with law-
enforcement activities.  The rates of option one selections are discussed 
compared to Q11, Q15, Q4, Q10, and Q16 (‘group one’) and three groups 
arranged in descending order or option one indications for the purpose of 
presentation.  Additional critical discussion is provided with respect to the 
hypothetical examples of fraud harm and victimisation that form the groups, and 
further critical insight in reference to the main research questions.  
 
This is followed by a discussion of four groups of responses that demonstrate.  
The first assumption was that ‘predatory’-type frauds, particularly those which 
exhibit readily identifiable losses and are morally unambiguous will be more 
closely associated with law-enforcement activities (Naylor, 2003).  Figure 2 below 
presents the percentage of respondents who have indicated that law-enforcement 
activities are the typically most likely outcome for thirteen of the sixteen examples 
of fraud offences that are clearly ‘predatory’ or ‘commercial’ (Naylor, 2003).  The 
three questions that are not included are Q6, Q7, and Q12, and are discussed 
separately.  As indicated in table 2 above, Q7 and Q12 are the only two ICT-
related offences in this study, where the identity of the offender in not known or 
reasonably subject to discovery (McGuire & Dowling, 2013; Levi, et al., 2015).  A 
discussion specific to Q6 (elderly fraud) was provided in section 5.2 above in 
reference to Naylor’s (2003) typology of profit-driven crimes and focuses attention 
on limitations to effective criminalisation that stem from the use of a ‘business 
front’.  The six examples on the upper end of figure 2 represent ‘predatory’-type 
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offences, whereas the seven examples on the lower end include rates of law-
enforcement action indication in relation to ‘commercial’-type frauds.   
 
Figure 2 – Option one (‘criminal investigation’) Indication in Response to 
‘Predatory’ and ‘Commercial’ Type Offences (Naylor, 2003) 
 
 
Figure 3 immediately below presents the same structure but includes both 
indications of option one (criminal investigation) and option two (no action taken 
following a law-enforcement report).  The inclusion of option two rates of response 
provides further visualisation of the variable extent to which the two categories 
from Naylor’s (2003) typology were associated with law-enforcement activities 






































‘Predatory’-type examples of harm and victimisation were much more clearly 
associated with law-enforcement activities (as indicated by about 75% of 
respondents).  By contrast, between 5% and 21.5% of participants indicated the 
same outcome as the typically most likely outcome with respect to ‘commercial’-
type offences.  The reader will note that Q5 is classed as ‘predatory’-type, yet it 
was not as closely associated with law-enforcement activities in the same manner 
as the other offences of this type.  In table 3 below, the author demonstrates the 
differences between the ‘simple’ terms used in Q10 and vague references and 
obscured identification of losses in Q5, which was designed so as to appear as a 
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In chapter two, the insight in Naylor’s (2003) theory of profit-driven crimes and 
Black’s (1976) theory of law is applied to the critique of the Fraud Act 2006 in the 
context of the ‘duality’ of fraud (RQ1).  It emerged that the concept of fraud is 
present in both ‘predatory’ and ‘commercial’ constructs, and that victims of 
‘predatory’-type frauds are typically in a favourable position to apply ‘more’ law 
against offenders in response to victimisation (Black, 1976; Naylor, 2003).  
Furthermore, ‘predatory’-type frauds employ simple financial vehicles, involve 
tangible and readily identifiable losses, and are therefore ‘easier’ to investigate, 
particularly as they are simple to translate to points of proof and evidential tests 
(Naylor, 2003). 
 
The two hypotheticals (Q5 and Q10) were designed to examine the effects of 
terminology and ease of loss identification on association with law-enforcement 
engagement and the possible subsequent investigatory actions (Naylor, 2003).  
Table 3 demonstrates these similarities and differences between Q5 and Q10 in 
terms of the references included in the hypothetical descriptions that relate to 
differentiating factors between ‘predatory’-type and ‘commercial’-type frauds.  
These differences relate to means of transaction, and the ability to identify and 
quantify losses in simple terms (Naylor, 2003).  This comparison relates to the 
discussion in section 2.4 in the literature review, where Naylor’s (2003) typology 
and the suggestions of typologically variability between association of law-
enforcement activities with different acquisitive crime typology was discussed in 




Table 3– Key Differences and Similarities Between Q5 and Q10 in Terms of 
Naylor’s (2003) Theory of Profit-Driven Crime 
 Q5  Q10  Discussion 
Financial vehicle  Unspecified.  
Qualified as a multi-




as funnelling funds 
(simple): 
(“funnelling funds to 
a bogus account in 
order to benefit 
from it”) 
Are not necessarily 
materially different.  
Q5 is perceived as 
‘commercial’. 
Losses Estimated at 2 per-
cent of an 
investment bank’s 
annual profit for the 
year of detection. 
£150,000 over 
three years. 
Q5 losses are not 
quantified in 
currency terms, but 
could amount to 
more.  Q10 losses 




















The above comparison appears to provide empirical support to Naylor’s (2003) 
suggested effects of perceived complexity of financial vehicles and the 
quantification of losses on the likelihood of a law-enforcement responses. Across 
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this typological ‘fault line’ in terms of suggested law-enforcement activities, option 
one indications shifted from 74.29% to 46.43%, and the overall likelihood of crime 
being reported (option one and two combined) shifted from 80.72% to 55.72%.  
The above in notwithstanding the implied possibility of a higher loss in Q5, and the 
typological similarity between the two examples of ‘occupational fraud’ (ACFE, 
2016).  It is important to note that whilst the physical setting is a place of business, 
the transactions in both Q5 and Q10 are not themselves conducted in a business 
situation, but rather they occur as fraud against the firm and without consent.   
  
The second assumption that was made identified Black’s (1976) theory of law as a 
possible framework through which socio-economic factors can suggest stronger of 
weaker association with law-enforcement responses.  ‘More’ law in generally 
suggested to be applied in responses to harm and victimisation being directed 
‘upwards’ on the social scales of stratification, morphology (the division of labour), 
culture and organisation (Black, 1976).  Only three of the social scales were 
included in this study, as the ‘culture’ social scale was not readily captured in short 
harm and victimisation descriptions and may not have been interpreted in a 
consistent fashion.  The following tables represent the direction of harm in each of 
the sixteen hypothetical fraud offences presented to participants of this study: the 
following tables (4, 5, and 6) refer to direction of harm in terms of stratification, the 
direction of harm in terms of morphology, and the direction of harm in terms of 
organisation.  Given the context of RQ1 (‘duality’) the tables below only contain 
indications of option one (criminal investigation) and its indications relative to the 




‘*’ – offender unknown fraud 
 
Table 4 – Indications of Option One (Criminal Investigation) According to 






























































‘*’ – offender unknown fraud 
Table 5 – Indications of Option One (Criminal Investigation) According to 


















































































Table 6 – Indications of Option One (Criminal Investigation) According to 












 ‘*’ – offender unknown fraud 
 
As the above tabular breakdown of option one (criminal investigation) indication 
demonstrates, law-enforcement activities are better associated with offenses 
committed ‘upwards’ on the social scales of stratification, morphology, and 
organisation (Black, 1976).  Furthermore, in some cases, ‘more’ law appears to be 
applied to circumstances where there is no clear indication of the relative 
positionality between offender and victim in the hypothetical narrative provided to 
participants.  In other cases, the difference in positionality is implied from job titles 
or typologies, yet relatively few participants indicated that a criminal investigation 
is the typically most likely outcome in responses to offending ‘upwards’ on these 
social scales. 
 
By Heads of 
Organisation 
By Internal to an 
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Finally, the literature review in chapter two discussed ‘overlapping’ offences to the 
general conduct-based offence in the Fraud Act 2006, which particularises narrow 
offences through specification of that which amounts to fraud.  These offences do 
not qualify what fraud is, but rather provide an insular example of specific actions 
that are criminalised as frauds.  These offences appear to present a clearer 
association of ‘law-in-theory’ and ‘law-in-action’ (Black, 1972), as they are tied to 
narrow sovereign interest (such as the collection of taxes), and enforcement 
bodies (HMRC and local authorities inter alia).  These offences specify either a 
general duty that is communicated to all (for example, benefit fraud), or to specific 
populations that are in position to engage in such fraud (fraudulent trading, 
compliance with insolvency regime and industry-specific state-imposed 
standards).   
 
The latter category of offences is not as broadly communicated, and the 
association of known examples of the behaviour particularised as fraud and law-
enforcement activities may not be as clear to all.  That said, some particularised 
offences that relate to company and insolvency law may still be resolved 
bilaterally or through the civil court jurisdiction.  For example, the particularised 
offence of fraudulent trading may be resolved by the administrator and former 
director of a company on a bilateral basis, or as a tort of ‘wrongful trading’ 
provisioned for under the Insolvency Act 1986.  Notwithstanding the victim 
imperative enabling element of this provision discussed in the literature review 
and in a socio-historical context in chapter four, the latitude for law-enforcement 
activities in this context appears to be clear.  The difference between 
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particularisation that potentially applies to all (benefit fraud), and that which is 
more socially exclusive (fraudulent trading) is examined in Q1, and Q4.  Law-
enforcement activities were associated by 11.43 % of participants in relation to 
hypothetical example of fraudulent trading, whereas 75% associated an example 
of known housing benefit fraud with such an outcome as the typically most likely.  
 
Whilst the difference between these two examples can be explained using 
Naylor’s (2003) typology of profit-driven crimes and Black’s (1976) theory of law, it 
addresses a further theoretical theme.  In the literature review, the categorical 
criminalisation of theft under the Theft Act 1968 was compared to the categorical 
criminalisation of Fraud under the Fraud Act 2006.  It appears that the categorical 
criminalisation of theft through the introduction of a legal definition into criminal 
law related to a pre-existing social function that enabled categorical criminalisation 
of violations against the right to property (The Criminal Law Revision Committee, 
1966).  The strength of this principle and its role in the formation of the 
contemporary institutions of policing and public prosecution is discussed in 
chapter four (Ashworth, 2000; Emsley, 2010; Schubert, 2015).  Nevertheless, 
dishonesty itself and the violation of trust does not in itself seem to be a 
categorical challenge to the existing social order and merit use of the highest 
‘amount’ of law.   
 
This discussion adds another dimension to the discussion of particularised 
offences.  The difference in association with law-enforcement activities between a 
hypothetical example of benefit fraud and fraudulent trading demonstrates that 
despite an offence particularisation, these examples are subject to different 
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sociological and criminological ‘predictions’ (Black, 1976; Naylor, 2003).  
Particularisation of fraud offences does not in itself drive effective criminalisation 
(Hester & Eglin, 1992).  Instead, particularisation appears to enable stakeholders 
to qualify an action as criminal through an objective test and a narrow definition in 
law, from which ‘mainstream’ application of law may stem.  In other words, 
general suggestions of a lesser likelihood of law-enforcement activities may still 
apply along typological (Naylor, 2003) and social (Black, 1976) ‘fault lines’, to 
which particularisation appears secondary (Sutherland, 1949). 
 
Another point of comparison to evaluate the relationship between particularisation 
and the aforementioned theoretical frameworks (Black, 1976; Naylor, 2003) is the 
comparison of responses to Q4 (housing benefit fraud) and Q10 (a trader who 
funnels funds).  Both hypothetical descriptions included a quantification of harm 
through determining the criminal benefit at a hundred-and-fifty-thousand pounds 
(£150,000).  Respondents indicated the typical likelihood of a criminal 
investigation at rates of 75% and 74.29% with respect to Q4 (particularised) and 
Q10 (non-particularised) offences respectively.  This nearly identical rate of 
association with law-enforcement activities demonstrates the applicability of 
Naylor’s (2003) typology of profit-driven crimes.  Both Q4 and Q10 are ‘predatory’-
type frauds (see figures 1, and 2), and results seem to strongly echo their 
theoretical association with law-enforcement activities.  On the other hand, the 
offence in Q1 (fraudulent trading) belongs in the ‘commercial’ category of offence 
and is therefore subject to the theoretical suggestion of a lesser association with 
law-enforcement activities (Naylor, 2003).  The association of Q1 with law-
enforcement activities by 11.43% of participants demonstrates empirical 
327 
 
agreement with the definition of such offences by Naylor (2003) as not commonly 
associated with law-enforcement activities.   
 
Below the reader will find tables 7 through 10, which present segments of the 
table in Appendix B in descending order of the percentage of participants who 
indicated option one (criminal investigation potentially resulting with an arrest).  
Tables 7, 8, 9, and 10 represent four groups of offences that are subject to further 
analytical discussion relative to key themes from the literature review.  Each of the 
table segments include the question number (Q1-16), a short description (the 
questions in full are included in Appendix A), and the percentages of indications of 
options one through five with respect to the sample at large, and the subgroups 
therein (financial investigators and laypersons).   
 
The tables include the U-test results (Ruxton, 2006), which are marked for 
significance using asterisks along with the respective probability value: * for 
p<0.05.  The distribution of responses in relation to each question is accompanied 
by Mann-Whitney (U-test) results.  The U-test assesses statistical significance in 
the variation between responses in the subsets of the sample, financial 
investigators and laypersons.  The test examines whether results from two 
samples (financial investigators and laypersons in the context of this study) exhibit 
an inter-compatible distribution.  The U-test is defined by a null-hypothesis of two 
samples that are homogeneous in terms of the distribution of results.  In this 
study, the two populations represent subsets of the same non-probability 
convenience sample (financial investigator and laypersons).  When the U-test 
results with a probability of p<0.05, the difference in distribution of responses 
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between the two subsets is statistically significant with only a 5% likelihood that 
the results are due to chance.  Such a degree of variability in distribution of 
responses requires further consideration in the context of the sub-group 
characteristics in the paraments of the question (Ruxton, 2006; Nachar, 2008).    
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The results of the five hypothetical scenarios above presented the highest 
proportion of participants indicated an investigation leading to an arrest as the 
most likely outcome (75.72% on average).  Group one results do not represent or 
relate to threshold for effective criminalisation.  Instead, the findings in group one 
demonstrate the highest level of association between known examples of fraud 
and law-enforcement activities (Hester & Eglin, 1992).   In terms of RQ1 (‘duality’), 
these offences demonstrate the lowest dysfunction between ‘law-in-theory’ and 
‘law-in-action’ observed in this study (Black, 1972).  These offences appear to 
offer clarity with regards to the means of transaction, loss and moral imperative, 
and thus were more commonly associated with and aligned to law-enforcement 
activities.  Responses appear to be consistent with the underlying theoretical 
construct of ‘predatory’-type frauds (Naylor, 2003), and offences committed 
upwards on the social scales of stratification, morphology and organisation (Black, 
1976). 
 
Furthermore, Q4 refers to a particularised offence that is subject to investigation 
by dedicated non-policing resource (although operational assistance may be 
called upon) (Chartered Institute of Public Finance & Accountancy (CIPFA), 2017; 
Elmbridge Borough Council, 2017).  The question refers to the first of the three 
historical functional drivers for particularisation discussed in section 4.6 in the 
above chapter, which relate to the protection of the Crown’s coffers and dues.  It 
represents a narrow set of circumstances where dishonest conduct is specifically 
prohibited, and an objective test is available through the implicit identification of 
the evidence generated by the offence (a false housing benefit claim).  Of note is 
the rate of option one indications by the FI group in the sample (82.35%), which is 
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the highest for this group across all question in this study together with Q16 
(discussed below).  This suggests the existence of a level of working-knowledge 
of the effectiveness of enforcement of fraud in this context, which encouraged 
perception of an association with law-enforcement activities in this context.  
Furthermore, it is not clear to what extent individuals who are not claiming social 
benefits are aware of particularised legislation and special enforcement resources 
in this context. 
 
The Ponzi-scheme example (Q16) was not anticipated by the author to be 
included in the first group.  The assumption was that the victimology of fraud and 
association with investment advice would have resulted with fewer indications of 
law-enforcement involvement by participants (Ganzini, et al., 2001; Levi, 2001; 
Titus & Gover, 2001; Button, et al., 2009; Perri & Brody, 2012).  Responses from 
laypersons have better reflected this expectation, but financial investigators 
indicated a clearer association between Ponzi-schemes and law-enforcement 
intervention.  The variance in responses between the two sub-groups in the 
sample is statistically significant (U-test probability value p=.021) (Nachar, 2008), 
and therefore requires further discussion and rationalisation.   
 
Participants with a financial investigation background seem to echo in their 
responses a high association between Ponzi schemes and law-enforcement 
activities.  Financial investigators (in law-enforcement or otherwise) would not be 
a preferable target for offenders involved in a Ponzi scheme.  The financial 
investigators are also less likely to gather knowledge of Ponzi schemes from 
within their social circles without it resulting in a law-enforcement outcome; 
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capable guardians (Cohen & Felson, 1979) are better situated to provide direct 
and indirect victim support and assistance in response to a dishonesty offence.  
These assumptions appear to offer an explanation to the difference between FI 
and layperson responses to Q16, with option one at 82.35% and 67.42%, 
respectively.    
 
Group one questions present a ‘simple’ ‘predatory’-type fraud case, where the 
criminality (dishonesty) is inherent (Naylor, 2003).  The findings with respect to the 
above description of harm relates to ‘simple’ financial vehicles and bilateral 
transactions, readily quantifiable losses, and the dishonesty reflected is inherent 
and not interwoven with legitimate conduct (Naylor, 2003; Sutherland, 1940).  
Furthermore, the offence descriptions depict relative positionality in terms of 
stratification, morphology and organisation (Black, 1976) and reduced likelihood of 
constructive bilateral resolution or one that is grounded in social controls or 
market rules (Black & Baumgartner, 1983).  These characteristics appear to 
describe social and typological circumstances to which ‘blanket’ criminalisation of 
fraud could be applied and result with a lesser degree of dysfunction between 
‘law-in-theory’ and ‘law-in-action’ (Black, 1972).  This tendency is more 
pronounced when considering both option one (an investigation by a law-
enforcement agency) and option two (no action taken despite a report to a law-
enforcement agency.  This combined measurement of the anticipated demand for 
law features high values demonstrating a social tendency toward to function of 
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The analysis of this group provides the reader with the results of four (4) 
hypotheticals (out of the sixteen) to which a lower proportion of participants 
indicated a criminal investigation as the most likely options (25.89% on average).   
Respondents indicated that the hypothetical offence would typically result with a 
report to law-enforcement but not followed by an investigation at an average of 




The observed tendency in the data to associate law-enforcement engagement 
and investigation (options one and two) at a lower rate for similar cases that differ 
primarily in terminology and accessibility is insightful.  It would appear that a fraud 
that typologically relates to the category of ‘predatory’-type offences may be less 
associated with law-enforcement action where it is described using terms more 
appropriate to ‘commercial’-type offences (Naylor, 2003).  This finding may reflect 
a tendency by participants to perceive obscure presentation of harm and 
victimisation in the context of a professional working environment as typically less 
associated with potential for law-enforcement action (Sutherland, 1940).  The 
extension of the concept of fraud across typologically ‘predatory’-type and 
‘commercial’-type offences (Naylor, 2003) appears to be grounded in a perception 
of complexity of the transactions and the quantification of losses.    
 
The hypothetical in Q2 was fashioned to resemble R. v. Hayes [2015] (LIBOR 
rigging prosecution by the SFO and see section 2.7), which might have increased 
the number of individuals who have indicated a likely criminal-justice system 
outcome.  Nevertheless, it would appear from the rate of responses with respect 
to Q2 that the sample may have perceived the prosecution by the SFO as the 
‘exception that proves the rule’ rather than the most likely outcome.  This is 
perhaps grounded in at least two occasions where the media reported that the 
SFO had requested separate funding to progress the investigation, fostering the 
public and practical notions that such an investigation was not a matter of course 




A stated component in the reasoning for the regulatory action against a number of 
banks was the lack of compliance as well as obstruction of the regulatory 
investigation into the LIBOR rigging itself, upon which it appears that prosecutorial 
attention was directed (Treanor, 2015).  This discussion relates the general theme 
of substantiating regulatory frameworks and the wider concept of obstruction of an 
investigation under US law, a topic for which substantive discussion would fall 
outside of the scope of this thesis.  The use of law to substantiate state-imposed 
regulation regimes was discussed as one of three drivers for the extension of a 
‘sovereign guarantee’ of trust both historically and in contemporary society (see 
sections 2.5, and 4.6). 
 
 
The hypothetical in Q6 (elderly telemarketing fraud) describes an example of 
inherent dishonesty (no sense of market value and the targeting of a vulnerable 
segment of the population (the elderly), bilateral exchanges and readily 
understood harm (Naylor, 2003).  These properties of an otherwise ‘predatory’-
type offence are conflicted with the appearance of a legitimate business 
transaction, and augment the consensual nature of some frauds, and relate to the 
principle in R. v. Jones [1703].  It exposes the difficulty to associate law-
enforcement activities with transactions that are grounded in ill-judgement, even if 
a third-party (a family relative in this case) is aware of the fraudulent nature of the 
transactions.  This difficulty appears to inhibit the association of knowledge by a 
family relative with law-enforcement activities, particularly amongst non-FI 
participants (option one: FI: 27.45%, non-FI: 13.48%).  Both groups associated a 
report to law-enforcement that does not result with any further action above any 
other option, representing a perceived high and unfulfilled demand for law-
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enforcement activities in this context (option two: FI: 52.94%, non-FI: 42.7%).  
Finally, nearly a quarter of non-FI participants indicated that the discovery of 
telemarketing fraud involving the sale of price-inflated goods to an elderly family 
member would typically result with no action at all.  This is a much higher figure 
than that of similar indication by FI participants (FI: 7.84% non-FI: 23.6%).  
Overall, the variance in responses between the two sub-groups in the sample was 
statistically significant and reflected the highest level of inter-group variance 
across the measurement U-test probability value p=.002 (Nachar, 2008). 
 
This difference on perception towards the existence of a ‘sovereign guarantee’ of 
trust in the context of dishonesty between the two groups in the sample.  Both FI 
and non-FI participants indicated a high unfulfilled demand for law-enforcement 
activities.  Nevertheless, non-FI participants were less likely to associate Q6 with 
law-enforcement activities, and instead tended to indicate no resolution (23.6%) or 
extra-judicial bilateral resolution (15.73%).  The findings appear to provide further 
empirical basis for the theoretical misalignment discussed in section 2.4.  
Although ‘predatory’-type offences are subject to stronger association with law-
enforcement activities, in the context of dishonesty alone such an association 
refers to demand for such activities, as opposed to their perceived likelihood.  The 
literature review also refers to qualitative evidence that demonstrates the strength 
of perceived disassociation amongst victims identified though their reporting 
(Button, et al., 2009), by the criminal justice system (Button, et al., 2013), and by 
jurists (Fraud Trials Committee, 1986).  The use of dishonesty as a criminal 
qualifier in the Fraud Act 2006 was a subject of critical analysis in chapter two 
(Tappan, 1947; Cressey, 1961).  Participants of this survey appear to have 
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superimposed their difficulties in identifying a means of articulating an offence 
despite being informed in the briefing that all sixteen questions refer to criminal 
fraud offences.  The cumulative frequency for options one and two (indicating an 
interaction with law-enforcement) was 65%.  However, the sample at large was 
two-and-a-half times more likely to indicate option two (report to law-enforcement 
which does not result with an investigation) rather than option one (a criminal 
investigation).  
 
In the context of the ‘duality’ of fraud (RQ1), the difference between group one 
and group two responses demonstrate an emergence of a ‘dysfunction’ between 
‘law-in-theory’ and ‘law-in-action’ in the context of fraud (Black, 1972).  As 
discussed in this chapter above and in section 5.5 below, this dysfunction does 
not refer to an absolute threshold of effective criminalisation, but instead to 
relative perceptions in the context of fraud.  Group one represents those offences 
that were indicated by participants to be the most closely associated with law-
enforcement activities and high demand for criminal justice system resolution as 
discussed in the above section.  The offences featured in group two demonstrate 
the ‘widening of the gap’ between legislation and legal theory (Law Commission, 
2002) and effective criminalisation (Hester & Eglin, 1992).  In the context of RQ2 
(‘streamlining’ and ‘mainstreaming’), evidence of persisting ‘duality’ under the 
Fraud Act 2006 highlights the dysfunction between a conduct offence and the 
stated aim and legislative intent towards simplification and standardisation (Law 




The hypotheticals in Q3 and Q6 demonstrate the influence of ‘moral ambiguity’ 
(Naylor, 2003) in the context of ‘predatory’ and ‘commercial’-type frauds.  Both 
raise questions of the location of a dividing line between ethics and the remit of 
criminal law, and the lack of functional support for the imposition of a categorical 
‘sovereign guarantee’ of trust.  Tappan (1947) questions the extension of the 
concept of ethics and equitable conduct into the domain of criminal law, and in 
particular the study of such conduct as ‘crime’ in the absence of a judicial finding.  
Empirical findings in this group substantiate the theoretical discussion developed 
in chapter two on conduct-based criminalisation in its vagueness (Tappan, 1947) 
and the absence of an objective test for criminality.  Group two offences appear to 
demonstrate how the categorical criminalisation of ‘all frauds’ (Law Commission, 
2002, p.3) may fall short of the promise of clarity that underpinned the rationale for 
adopting a conduct-based approach to criminalisation.  The apparent lack of 
clarity is relative to frauds that are subject to particularised criminalisation and 
occur in circumstances that are generally associated with law-enforcement 
activities (Black, 1976; Naylor, 2003).  Similar to group one, offences in group two 
feature inherent dishonesty, and relate to RQ2 in terms of role of legislation on 
perceived disassociation of fraud and law-enforcement activities.  The following 
discussion is an analysis of offence descriptions where dishonesty is implied, and 
outcomes may not necessarily include financial harm (readily understood or 
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Group three includes three offences where dishonesty is implied in a manner of 
‘commercial’-type frauds (Naylor, 2003) (Q1, Q8, and Q14).  The following relate 
to these three offences, and further below Q7 is discussed.  Unlike the examples 
of this category of offending by professional against their employers in group two, 
group three offences are done so as to create the potential of a financial benefit 
for the firm (Sutherland, 1949; Naylor, 2003).  Losses are, therefore, not 
necessarily inflicted (but rather a risk assumed), and there is no indication of what 
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(if any) losses were suffered, how they could be quantified, and the identity of the 
victims (Naylor, 2003; Levi & Burrows, 2008; Smith, et al., 2011).  Furthermore, 
whilst group two examples of ‘occupational fraud’ (ACFE, 2016) were committed 
by employees, group three refers to offences committed by company directors.  
This reflects offending by those who rank explicitly high on the morphology and 
organisation scales, as well as implicitly high on the stratification scale (Black, 
1976).  These two theoretical suggestions (which are discussed above as the first 
and second assumption) converge with the concept of white-collar crime, and a 
lesser correlation between the level of discovered fraud and law-enforcement 
action (Sutherland, 1940; Black, 1976; Naylor, 2003). 
 
The above discussion appears to be notwithstanding the particularisation of 
fraudulent trading and financial statement fraud under the Insolvency Act 1986 
Theft Act 1968 respectively (as well as additional particularisation under the Fraud 
Act 2006) in the context of Q8.  It would appear that particularised legislation is 
also subject to the social dynamic that underpins the use of law in the context to 
which it belongs.  This finding relates to the discussion of role of particularised 
legislation in the context of historical fraud use of fraud particularisation.  As 
discussed in section 4.6, the function of particularised fraud provision in the 
context of company and insolvency law is the substantiation of a state-imposed 
regime by threat of punitive-seeking prosecution in response to violation of the 
regime.  In the context of company and insolvency laws, industrial nineteenth 
century principles of company law that were introduced to address the increasing 
risk of fraud address compliance in registration and financial reporting (Taylor, 
2013).  The extent to which this ‘guarantee of trust’ is associated with law-
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enforcement activities in this context appear to be lesser in this study than those 
frauds that affect harm against companies (group two) and outside of a business 
context (group one). 
 
Furthermore, the variance in responses between the two groups in the sample (FI 
and non-FI) in their responses to Q1 (U-test probability value p=.041) (Nachar, 
2008) is statistically significant and requires further consideration.  It would appear 
that the degree of association with law-enforcement activities in relation to an 
example of fraudulent trading amongst financial investigators was low (3.92%) 
relative to non-FI participants (15.73%).  Furthermore, FI participants indicated 
civil litigation or regulatory action (option three) or no action being taken (option 
five) at higher rates than non-FI participants.  The experiences of FI participants in 
this study appear to have contributed to an increased perception of dysfunction 
between ‘law-in-theory’ and ‘law-in-action’ in the context of the particularised 
offence of fraudulent trading (Black, 1972).  It would appear that the role of 
criminal law in this contemporary context relates to the functional historical 
analysis with respect to the ‘sovereign guarantee’ of trust as it relates to the state-
imposed insolvency regime (see chapter four).  
 
The hypothetical in Q7 is one of two offence descriptions that were included in this 
study and display a typology where the identity of the offender is not known or 
discoverable by the victim or investigators.  The hypotheticals in Q7 and Q12 (in 
group four below) both refer to ICT-related frauds (‘cybercrime’), where offending 
is facilitated through technology that both obscure the identity of the offender and 
enables non-UK based offender to interact with British victims (Levi, et al., 2015).  
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These offence descriptions appear to relate to investigatory difficulties and 
challenges with transnational enforcement (Levi, et al., 2015) in the context of 
ICT-related offences.  These difficulties and low rates of effective law-enforcement 
responses contribute to perceptions of a ‘clever’ and ‘mysterious’ type of offending 
which is often conducted with practical impunity (Wall, 2008).  Nevertheless, the 
data suggests that the association of these offences with law-enforcement 
activities is on par with suggestion of most likely resolution mechanism of other 
frauds where the identity of the offender is known or readily discoverable (groups 
three and four).    
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In the above discussion of group three, the researcher referred to the dysfunction 
that exists in the context of particularised criminalisation of ‘commercial’-type 
frauds and law-enforcement activities (Sutherland, 1940; Naylor, 2003).  Group 
four offences represent the highest degree of disassociation of fraud offences with 
law-enforcement responses.  The researcher contextualises Q9 (the installation of 
a sub-standard insulation) to the discussion in the literature review of the absence 
of a lower threshold to an offence that is designed to capture ‘complex’ financial 
frauds (Law Commission, 2002).  Q9 demonstrates that whilst ‘petty theft’ remains 
a challenge to the protection of the right to property, ‘petty fraud’ does not seem to 
commonly be perceived as a basis for law-enforcement activities.  This relates to 
the growing contemporary dysfunction between the concept of theft and the 
concept of fraud.  Both are subject to categorical criminalisation, but breaches of 
the ‘sovereign guarantee’ of trust do not present a categorical challenge to the 
existing social order and therefore do not (necessarily) require the use of ‘more’ 
law for their resolution (Black, 1976).   
  
The hypothetical in Q12 is the second of the two examples of ‘cybercrime’ in this 
study (alongside Q7A statistically significant differences between the two groups 
in the sample was observed in the responses to Q12 (U-test probability value 
p=.019) (Nachar, 2008).  The difference was primarily grounded in selection of the 
bilateral steps (option four), which were selected by 19.61% of FIs and 47.19% of 
laypersons. As the identity of the victim is unknown, it is unclear with which party 
37.14% of participants indicated the victim is likely to engage with bilaterally 
(option four, as compared to 9.29% in Q7, where it was indicated that no direct 
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losses were inflicted).  The researcher assumes that in bilateral resolution (option 
four), participants may have considered interaction with the firm that operates the 
mobile application service in question (as opposed to the actual offender).   
 
The hypothetical in Q12 may have been subject to different interpretations by 
participants in terms of the applicability of option four (which was intended to 
represent bilateral resolution between offender and victim).  Nevertheless, there is 
still some analytical value as to the essential characteristics of the ‘invisible hand’ 
(Smith, 1776) that shapes the social dynamic of fraud resolution and the role of 
criminal law therein (RQ1, ‘duality’).  Given the potential for an inconsistent 
understanding of whether options four related to the offender exclusively or could 
be extended, this discussion is developed in principle in relation to Q12.  The 
literature appears to point to a contemporary and historical compensation-seeking 
victim imperative in relation to the concept of fraud (Bracton (c. 1210 – c. 1268) in 
Harvard Law School Library, 2003; Bentham, 1789; Levi & Burrows, 2008; Fisher, 
2015; Rawlings & Lowry, 2017; Smith & Shepherd, 2017).  In the context of Q12, 
47.19% of non-FI participants indicated bilateral resolution presumably because of 




This chapter addressed the results of the survey conducted as part of this thesis 
and provided critical analysis specific to RQ1 (‘duality’) and RQ2 (‘mainstreaming’ 
and ‘streamlining’).  The survey (included in Appendix A) featured a single 
measurement using a five-point ordinal scale of typically most likely resolution 
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mechanisms across sixteen hypothetical examples of fraud pre-qualified to 
participants as criminal offences.  The dataset on which the analysis was carried 
out represented responses from a convenience sample of one-hundred-and-forty 
(N=140) participants.  The sample included two sub-groups.  The first groups 
included participants with professional experience as financial investigators 
(N=51), and the second groups included laypersons without financial investigation 
experience (N=89).  In section 5.2, the three main assumptions that the sixteen 
questions included in this single measurement were designed to examine were 
discussed.  The first assumption was that associations of fraud with law-
enforcement activities will flow from Naylor’s (2003) typology of profit-driven crime 
and the distinction between ‘predatory’ and ‘commercial’-type offences (Naylor, 
2003).  The second assumption was that the social function of ‘law’ and the role of 
law-enforcement activities relative to other resolution mechanisms in the context 
of fraud flows from Black’s (1976) theory of law.  The third assumption that was 
tested was the advantage of particularisation as a clear means of criminalisation 
(Tappan, 1947), and its relative impact on responses relative to the above two 
assumption    
 
The analysis of the findings relative to the first and the second theoretical 
assumptions appears to be consistent with the context provided in section 2.4 of 
the literature review.  In terms of an association with law-enforcement activities 
with the concept of fraud, the data demonstrated that ‘predatory’-type offences 
were more closely associated with law-enforcement activities relative to 
‘commercial’-type offences (Naylor, 2003).  The application of Black’s (1976) 
theory of law to the finding appears to demonstrate that the use of ‘more’ law, and 
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particularly an association with law-enforcement activities flows from relative 
socio-economic positionality between offender and victim.   
 
Responses to Q4 (benefit fraud), which related to the first driver for 
particularisation (protection of the Crown’s coffers and its dues), demonstrated 
one of the highest degrees of association with law-enforcement activities in this 
study.  This driver relates to the ‘sovereign guarantee’ of trust in interactions with 
mechanisms of the state.  Transgressions against this protection were historically 
amongst a few types of behaviour that were associated with punishment-seeking 
prosecution by the Crown, as discussed in section 4.5.  The hypothetical Q4 
therefore belonged with the first group of responses (‘group one’) and ranked 
amongst the highest in this study in terms of association with law-enforcement 
activities.  The two other examples of particularised offences in this study (Q1, 
and Q8) were not as closely associated with law-enforcement activities and 
related to the substantiation of business regulation (driver two, Q8), and state-
imposed debtor-creditor relations (driver three, Q1).   
 
This chapter also contributed to the critical analysis of the lack of uniform practical 
understanding and enforcement of hypothetical Fraud Act 2006 offences (RQ2).  
The data seems to suggest that there is a lack of uniformity in the manner that 
law-enforcement ‘unpacks’ the concept of fraud and responds to reports of harm 
and victimisation as evidenced by the perception of study participants.  It is 
interpreted from the average frequency of 15.53% for option two selection 
(standard deviation 13.52), which indicates an expectation from participants of a 
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fraud offence being reported to a law-enforcement agency but does not result in 
an investigation. The author discussed the structural (Button, 2011; Button et al., 
2013; Levi et al., 2015), theoretical (chapter two), and contextual (chapter four) 
barriers to a uniform application of a dishonesty-based general offence.    
 
The evidence in the results above would appear to undermine the null-hypothesis 
by demonstrating material inconsistencies in the extent to which the ‘sovereign 
guarantee’ of trust is perceived to be applied by indication of typical responses.  It 
would also appear that approaches to law-enforcement (combining options one 
and two) were indicated to be the most likely outcome with an average of 50.71% 
across the sixteen questions.  In addition to the examination of the dataset, this 
chapter provided additional analytical discussion in relation to the growing 
dysfunction between ‘law-in-theory’ and ‘law-in-action’ in the context of fraud as it 
emerged from the survey results.   
 
The theoretical context used to evaluate the alleged clarity attributed to the Fraud 
Act 2006 offence in chapter two, and the historical functional contextual analysis 
in chapter four, appear to agree with the above findings.  The ordinal scale from 
which participants in the above study selected the typically most likely resolution 
mechanism for different fraud offences resulted with uneven results, particularly in 
terms of association with law-enforcement activities.  Some offences were more 
commonly associated with law-enforcement activities or an unfulfilled demand for 
a response by the criminal justice system (options one and two).   The dysfunction 
between ‘law-in-theory’ and ‘law-in-action’ (Black, 1972) in the context of the 
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Fraud Act 2006 appears to vary according to three main assumptions noted 
below.   
 
The first assumption related to the theoretical ‘fault line’ in terms of association 
with law-enforcement activities between ‘predatory’ and ‘commercial’-type 
offences (Naylor, 2003).  The pre-qualification of offences in this study as criminal 
at the briefing stage was intended to clarify doubts about the criminal law, and 
thus the applicability of law-enforcement responses.  It would appear that 
‘predatory’-type offences better associated with law-enforcement activities than 
‘commercial’-type frauds.  In table 3, the researcher compared two typologically 
similar offences that were communicated to participants through clarity in terms of 
means of transaction and readily identifiable losses (‘predatory’) and using 
ambiguity so to resemble a ‘commercial’-type offence.  The clearly communicated 
‘predatory’-type offence (Q10) was associated with a law-enforcement response 
by 74.29%, whilst 46.43% answered in the same way in relation to Q5 that was 
worded as a ‘commercial’-type offence (Naylor, 2003). 
 
The second assumption related to the historical analysis of the functional role of 
the criminal justice system and different ‘settlement agents’ in the context of fraud 
resolution.  This assumption relates to the discussion in chapter three of an 
‘invisible hand’ (Smith, 1776) that is grounded in a social dynamic, and the 
relevance of social theory and methodology to the study of a phenomenon such 
as the ‘duality’ of fraud (Black, 1972).  The relative positionality between offender 
and victim and ‘direction’ of offending on the social scales of stratification, 
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morphology and organisation suggest that the ‘amount’ of law applied in response 
(Black, 1976).  As demonstrated above in this chapter, better association with law-
enforcement activities tended to be indicated by participants in response to the 
direction of harm ‘upwards’ on socio-economic scales (Black, 1976).   
 
The third assumption associated particularisation with a stronger association of 
known examples of fraud with law-enforcement activities.  Nevertheless, there 
appears to exist a dysfunction between ‘law-in-theory’ and ‘law-in-action’ in 
relation to white-collar (Sutherland, 1949) ‘commercial’-type (Naylor, 2003) 
offences, despite their particularisation in company and insolvency law.  It would 
appear that particularisation may assist law-enforcement agencies to initiate an 
investigation and engage with victims in cases where fraud presents clear moral 
imperatives for prosecution (Naylor, 2003), or upwards on social scales (Black, 
1976).  In response to the particularised housing benefit fraud in Q4, 75% of 
participants associated it with law-enforcement activities.  Nevertheless, only 
11.43% of participants associated law-enforcement activities with known 
examples of fraudulent trading (an offence particularised in company and 
insolvency law) in Q11.  Similarly, only 16.43% of participants associated law-
enforcement activities with false accounting (an offence particularised in company 
law) in Q8.  Q8 and Q11 suggest that particularisation of fraud offences fulfilled a 
secondary role in comparison to general criminological (Naylor, 2003) and 
sociological (Black, 1976) theory.  This appears to underline the advantages of 
social theory and methodology as a means of studying the dysfunction between 




The above chapter appears to demonstrate a correlation between empirical 
results generated by use of the measurement tool developed for the purpose of 
this study (see chapter three). The results that were produced strongly tended to 
agree with theoretical suggestions from the literature (Black, 1976; Naylor, 2003) 
and the functional context provided in the historical analysis in chapter four.  
Nevertheless, the researcher is aware of the low sample size (N=140) and it being 
a non-probability sample as limitations to its external validity (Bryman, 2012), 
particularly as compared with the large-scale US crime severity survey (Wolfgang, 
et al., 1985).  Further validation of the approach presented in this study to the 
study of effective criminalisation (Hester & Eglin, 1992) through the use of Black’s 
(1976) theory of law could be achieved in the context of fraud (or indeed other 
offences) through probability sampling and greater sample size. 
 
Furthermore, this study does not appear to present a definitive threshold for 
effective association of known examples of fraud and law-enforcement activities 
so as to demonstrate a categorical denotation of an example of fraud as ‘criminal’.  
For example, had the study included examples of other offences outside the 
category of fraud, it is conceivable that these could demonstrate a much stronger 
association with a criminal investigation than the 79.29% as in Q11 (organised car 
insurance fraud).  Had a hypothetical question pertaining to a body that had been 
recovered in residential area of a large city, it would most likely have resulted near 
unanimous association with a criminal investigation by participants.  To a lesser 
extent, sexual offences and violent crime too would conceivably produce 
comparable results.  Specific examples in the context of theft are also considered 
by the author to have produce near-complete association of a hypothetical 
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example and a criminal investigation, even when the identity of the offender is not 
readily discoverable.  These assumptions are primarily based on literature on 
crime severity, and particularly the late 1970’s US survey of sixty-thousand 
(N=60,000) participants (Wolfgang, et al., 1985), and the later 1980’s survey of 
England and Wales police officers (Levi & Jones, 1985).   
 
The concept of ‘severity’ relates directly to Black’s (1976) association of law with 
the degree to which actions challenge the existing social order.  The concept of 
severity therefore measures the demand for law-enforcement.  The researcher 
discusses the critical difference between the aforementioned methodologies and 
the tool designed in the context of this study in section 3.2.  The concept of 
severity relates to a question of ‘what ought to be’, whereas the measurement in 
the above study asks ‘what is’ the typically most applicable ‘amount’ of law (cf 
Black, 1976; Wolfgang, et al., 1985).  The researcher did not include questions 
that relate to concepts that are demonstrably more ‘severe’, as the purpose of this 
study was the measurement of the dysfunction between ‘law-in-theory’ and ‘law-
in-action’ in the context of fraud, and not the relative perceived ‘severity’ of fraud.  
The inclusion of other ‘brackets’ of severity would likely have skewed the results 
through implicit bias alongside perceptions of severity (Levi & Jones, 1985; 
Wolfgang, et al., 1985).   
 
The absence of an empirically validated ‘threshold’ for effective criminalisation in 
the context of this study could have been addressed by the repetition of the 
measurement in the context of violent and ‘volume’ crime.  Such a survey would 
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pertain to ‘traditional’ crime categories adapted from the CSEW (Office of National 
Statistics, 2017), and performed on a separate sample.  Such a study would also 
benefit from wider application of Black’s (1976) theory of law and the study of 
fraud that fell outside the scope of this thesis.  These include (inter alia) a further 
validation of this measurement tool, and application of Black’s (1976) theory of 
law to the research interests that pertain to fraud relative to other crime 
categories.  A study of this nature was not included in this thesis due to the low 
overall relevance of such an endeavour to the core research questions and 








This thesis provides a critical assessment of the applicability of the categorical 
criminalisation of the concept of fraud using a singular ‘catch all’ conduct-based 
offence – The Fraud Act 2006.  This assessment is based on a social science 
examination of the ‘duality’ of fraud as a historical and contemporary phenomenon 
of variability of mechanisms used for fraud resolution (RQ1).  The current scope of 
criminalisation (‘all frauds’) does not appear to be realised or provide the 
necessary clarity for the fulfilment of demand for law-enforcement activities 
consistently across the concept of fraud.  The approach adopted by the author 
directs attention to the limitations of the Fraud Act 2006 in fostering clarity and 
supporting ‘mainstreamed’ and ‘streamlined’ enforcement against ‘criminal’ fraud 
(RQ2).  These limitations are examined through the development of a functional 
understanding of the effective criminalisation in the context of fraud and an 
examination of its contemporary applicability across the concept of fraud.  The 
criminalisation of fraud appears to flow from non-fraud-specific social and 
criminological frameworks that demonstrate the potential of social science input in 
defining and shaping legislation towards applied clarity. 
 
Through systematic inquiry in the preceding chapters, an original contribution to 
knowledge is developed through critical focus on the variability of fraud resolution 
mechanisms relative to contemporary criminal law.  The concept of fraud appears 
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to be both historically, and in contemporary society, subject to multiple resolution 
mechanisms and different offender-victim dynamics.  Nevertheless, the concept of 
fraud is presently subject to categorical criminalisation in English law.   
 
In chapter two, the Fraud Act 2006 was introduced through an examination of 
the work of the Law Commission (2002) and its recommendations that were 
later adopted in the Act.  The creation of a general dishonesty-based offence 
appears to have resulted from anecdotal difficulties to secure and sustain 
fraud convictions under an ‘untidy’ body of law and provisions that existed in 
2002 (inter alia) under the Theft Act 1968 (as amended).  The standard of 
clarity and applicability are then critically discussed in the context of Black’s 
(1976) theory of law and Naylor’s (2003) typology of profit-driven crime.  The 
two frameworks provide suggestions of high and low associations of crime 
with law-enforcement activities across socio-economic and typological ‘fault 
lines’ transcended by the conduct-based approach in the 2006 Act.  The 
author also demonstrated that perceptions of attributes of the under-policed 
category of ‘commercial’-type fraud appear in perceptions towards 
‘predatory’-type offences (Button, et al., 2009; 2013). 
 
This ‘crossover’ in perceptions is further contextualised in the literature 
review by comparing the conduct-based criminalisation of the concept of 
fraud with narrow overlapping legislation.  This mode of criminalisation is 
referred to in terms of ‘particularisation’, and examples of operative 
legislation of this stem from both pre-2006 and post-2006 provisions that are 
discussed in section 2.5.  These offences define specific activities that 
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amount to fraud and imply the nature of evidence that are generated by the 
offence.  This mode of criminalisation appears to offer a simpler way to 
communicate and understand fraud harm and victimisation.  Different to the 
litigious qualifier of dishonesty, an objective test to establish a reasonable 
suspicion that a crime had occurred is available for victims and other 
stakeholders in the context of particularised offences. 
 
In chapter three, a consideration of methods from the literature was 
presented in the context of developing a research philosophy and strategy for 
the study of the historical and contemporary ‘duality’ of fraud (RQ1).  
Research methods from the literature accessed by the author did not appear 
to present a validated tool that could be used in the context of the principle 
research questions RQ1 and RQ2.  The author discussed the considerations 
that have led to the adoption of a mixed-methods approach to the study of 
the ‘duality’ of fraud as a latent social function not available for direct 
observation (Smith, 1776; Weber, 1978).  Nevertheless, the researcher 
sought to identify its essential characteristics through an examination of 
historical records and relevant contributions to the study of historical crime 
control and dispute resolution.  In ‘phase one’ (chapter four) the resolution of 
the phenomenon of fraud is discussed in the context of the socio-economic 
shift from agrarian to industrialised society subject to interpretivist 
functionalist analysis (Weber, 1978).  In ‘phase two’ (chapter five) a survey 
was operationalised to realise a positivist approach to the measurement of 
the contemporary ‘duality’ of fraud as a social fact (Durkheim, 1982) that 




In chapter four, the researcher developed an understanding of the social 
function of the criminalisation of fraud relative to non-criminal dispute 
resolution mechanisms, and relative to the concept of theft.  The two 
concepts prior to the industrial resolution were generally not a subject for 
Crown prosecution then as they occurred as inter-personal disputes subject 
to resolution using social controls or private prosecution (Klerman, 2001). 
Judicial remedies in the context of fraud and theft were compensatory, and 
the litigation was financed and driven by the victim.  Similarly, seemingly 
‘punitive’ sanctions by contemporary standards appeared to have functioned 
as ‘means to an end’ of substantiating compensation orders and coercing 
payment by the convicted person, or family relatives.  This mechanism was 
applicable across cases of theft and fraud, but also torts and personal 
insolvency – all resolved by private and compensation-seeking prosecution 
(Cohen, 1982; Klerman, 2001).  Exceptions to this generalisation related to 
particularisation of narrow circumstances in statutory law where the Crown 
directly prosecuted offenders in search for punitive sanctions, and harm was 
construed in terms of treason.  Functional analysis of these bodies of law 
associating particularised examples of fraud with Crown prosecution 
identified three drivers.  First, the response to harm and victimisation against 
the Crown through its coffers or its dues.  Second, the response to activities 
that undermine specific regulations of currency, measurement, or in relation 
to specific commodities or in Crown trade-posts.  Third, the response to fraud 
that undermined the state-imposed insolvency regime or against the ‘balance 




Through the process of industrialisation and urbanisation, the concept of theft 
appears to have no longer been controlled sufficiently through social controls 
and private compensation-seeking prosecution of offenders.  The researcher 
discussed the ‘grassroots’ operation of privately resourced associations for 
the prosecution of felons in England and Wales.  These associations appear 
to have mimicked Crown prosecution in the sense that they used the 
procedure of private-prosecution to bring charges against individuals, but in 
search for punitive sanctions.  Compensation-seeking victims would tend to 
settle with the offender and maximise their recovery potential through the 
threat of prosecution and would typically not finance proceedings against the 
destitute if not for the purpose of deterrence.  The association for the 
prosecution of felons explicitly sought to prosecute and with no inclination to 
settle.  Furthermore, the associations typically defined categories of offending 
in their area where they would prosecute any examples of harm and 
victimisation, regardless of the victim being a member or not.  These 
extended to the concept of theft and criminal damage to property – not the 
concept of fraud.  (Koyama, 2012; Schubert, 2015) 
 
The work of the association for the prosecution of felons and their crime 
control response to challenges to the right to property in their geographical 
areas appear to have provided the social context for ‘policing by consent’.  
The largely passive and justice administrating parish constabularies 
(Commissioners for Inquiring into County Rates, 1836) were gradually 
replaced by pro-active police forces that were established in urban areas and 
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were primarily concerned with the concept of theft (Kleining & Zhang, 1993; 
Emsley, 2010).  This was later complemented by the establishment of public 
prosecution by the Crown in the 1880’s (Ashworth, 2000).  At the same time, 
responses to fraud harm and victimisation resulted with reinforcement of 
‘regulation by reputation’ as the primary means of fraud control outside the 
scope of narrow particularisation.  Examples for such measures include 
company registration (Taylor, 2013). 
 
The function of effective fraud criminalisation was surmised in terms of an 
imposition of a ‘sovereign guarantee’ of trust in commercial and official 
conduct.  Prior to its categorical criminalisation as a headline offence under 
the 2006 Act, fraud was not grounds for Crown prosecution unless committed 
in violation of a criminal law (Taylor, 2013).  This context demonstrates that 
whilst the protection for the right to property is both functionally and 
contextually integral to mainstream policing, dishonesty does not (appear to) 
present a categorical challenge to the existing social order (Black, 1976).  
Furthermore, the inter-personal dispute dynamic remains operative in the 
context of fraud and its regulation inside the marketplace and using the civil 
remedy-seeking jurisdiction (Fisher, 2015; Smith & Shepherd, 2017).  The 
question that emerged was to what extent is the ‘sovereign guarantee’ of 
trust experienced as a social fact by members of the British public? 
 
In chapter five, the results of a single measurement survey completed by a 
hundred-and-forty (N=140) participants were presented and analysed.  The 
bespoke questionnaire asked participants to indicate the typically most likely 
358 
 
resolution mechanism of sixteen examples of fraud on a five-point ordinal 
scale.  This tool is unique in the sense that it does not measure ‘what ought 
to be’ through the concepts of ‘severity’ (Wolfgang, et al., 1985) or 
‘seriousness’ (Levi & Jones, 1985).  Instead, this tool was designed 
specifically to ask participants ‘what is’ through their perception of the 
workings of the social dynamic that underpins the determination of fraud 
resolution mechanisms (RQ1) (Durkheim, 1982; Weber, 1978).  The five-
point scale was adapted from Black’s (1976) theory of law, which places 
dispute resolution mechanisms of a relative scale of use of social controls 
and ‘law’.   
 
The findings demonstrated the contemporary existence of a ‘duality’ between 
criminal and non-criminal resolution of fraud (RQ1) as a varying dysfunction 
between ‘law-in-theory’ and ‘law-in-action’ across the concept of fraud (Black, 
1972).  Three assumptions were made about the association of examples of 
fraud harm and victimisation with law-enforcement activities, and the 
questions in the measurement were fashioned so as to test these 
assumptions.  The first two assumptions were Black’s (1976) theory of law 
and Naylor’s (2003) typology of profit-driven crimes and their varying 
theoretical suggestions of association of law-enforcement activities with 
known examples of fraud.  Questions pertaining to ‘predatory’-type frauds 
and examples of harm and victimisation being affected ‘upwards’ on socio-
economic scales were better associated with law-enforcement activities and 
a demand for such services (Black, 1976; Naylor, 2003).  The third 
assumption was that particularisation offers the clarity and objective test 
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required to enable law-enforcement responses to an offence.  Nevertheless, 
examples of white-collar fraud against shareholders and creditors 
(Sutherland, 1949) relating to a particularised offence (which negate the 
above two assumptions) were not commonly associated with law-
enforcement activities.  This suggests the continuation of the historical 
functionality of an enabling environment for creditors to achieve market-
based or civil resolution under the protection of criminal law (The Cork 
Commission, 1982).    
 
6.2 Limitations and Recommendations for Further Research 
 
Notwithstanding the above contributions to the literature included in this thesis, 
there is room for further critique of the above scope of investigation and the 
reliability and validity of the findings.  Whilst a degree of disassociation between 
known examples of offending and law-enforcement activities likely exists in 
relation to other offending categories, this thesis did not provide a basis of 
discussion of such phenomena relative to the ‘duality’ of fraud (RQ1).  The scope 
of this thesis is centred around fraud and does not offer substantive comparative 
discussion of the ‘duality’ of fraud relative to other categories of crime.  Instead, 
this thesis offered a social-science-based systematic inquiry of the dysfunction 
between ‘law-in-theory’ and ‘law-in-action’ (Black, 1972) relative to the Fraud Act 
2006.  The critique of categorical and monolithic criminalisation of fraud was also 
relative to the range of other resolution mechanism and the social dynamic of 




In terms of reliability, the approach adopted by the author towards historical socio-
legal analysis in chapter four integrates a considerable element to the findings 
and analysis.  The ‘journey’ through the historical records, the denotation of time 
periods of interest, and historical re-construction of pre-industrial analytical 
analogues for the modern distinction between the civil and criminal jurisdiction in 
section 4.2 were subject to perception and decision-making.  Researchers from 
different backgrounds might have placed more emphasis on case-law or 
legislation at the expense of contextual social analysis, confined their investigation 
to localised archives, or included more analysis of records. 
 
A particular avenue that appears to hold the potential for further insight in this 
context is comparative international law.  Nonetheless, in the context of the 
tension between a general offence and particularisation in the context of fraud 
(see section 2.6), a (brief) comparison between the jurisdiction of England and 
Wales and that of large state economies in the US appears apt.  The author did 
not include in this thesis a comparative discussion due to the scope of focus of the 
main research questions, and particularly given the objective of making 
recommendations specific to England and Wales (RQ2).  California, Texas, and 
New-York (inter alia) appear (superficially) to be similar to England in the sense 
that their laws (in concert with Federal law) regulate extensive and diverse local, 
national, and international commercial activities.  The three jurisdictions 
mentioned above feature considerable particularisation of fraud offences in 
felonies and misdemeanours that relate to specific industries (healthcare, 
insurance, real-estate), identity theft, and financial representations.  
Particularisation is also featured in the context of consumer protection laws, 
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description of Ponzi-type fraudulent investment schemes, and miscellaneous 
offences such as handicapped parking fraud.  Specific attention was provisionally 
drawn to: California’s Penal Code § 484, § 528-539, § 25400, and § 25402; 
Texas’ § 17.46 Deceptive Trade Practices – Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (as 
amended); and New-York’s Penal Code Title K. 
 
US states operate under the supreme jurisdiction of the Federal government, and 
its laws.  Title 18, chapter 47 of the US code provides a definition for fraud and 
particularised Federal offences therein, such as making a false statement to the 
Federal Government (§ 1001) or defrauding the government (§ 1031).  Fraud 
against the government is also particularised against separately in the context of 
tax fraud in Title 26.  Other federal provisions substantiate regulatory and 
insolvency related regimes at the Federal level, such as fraud against federally 
chartered banks (§ 1344), identify theft (§ 1028), and securities fraud (Title 19).  
Federal law also contains offences against bankruptcy laws and procedure (§ 
151).  These offences appeared on the surface to functionally relate to the 
categorisation of pre-industrial fraud particularisation in England in section 4.6, but 
this analysis was not fully developed for this thesis. Nevertheless, there should be 
benefit from further research to compare and contrast approaches to fraud in the 
US as compared and contrasted with the UK. 
 
With respect to the primary data analysis presented in chapter five, the primary 
limitation to the validity of the findings appears to be the non-probabilistic nature 
of the sample and its small size (N=140).  The findings did tend to conform with 
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theoretical frameworks (Black, 1976, Naylor, 2003) and therefore suggested a 
degree of external validity, these frameworks are not themselves grounded in 
empiricism.  Furthermore, since the measurement was a bespoke instrument and 
not a validated tool from the literature, the reliability of the data that was collected 
is somewhat limited.  There are a number of possible limitations to the overall 
reliability of the question of ‘most likely dispute resolution mechanisms’:  First, it 
has not been demonstrated that a measurement across hypothetical descriptions 
of harm that are theoretically similar in terms of suggested expectation for law-
enforcement activities (or their absence) is valid.  A measurement that includes a 
set of hypotheticals that is subject to theoretically consistent association with law-
enforcement activities was not conducted in isolation and in tandem with 
hypotheticals that are theoretically less likely to be associated with law-
enforcement activities.  As a result, it is not clear to what extent the measurement 
itself may cause an augmented variability of responses, particularly relative to the 
dichotomy between the association with law-enforcement activities and other 
outcomes. The findings in chapter five may have appeared to correlate with 
theoretical assumptions as a result of an implication that the variability of 
outcomes was necessary the ‘correct’ type of findings expected from participants.  
Second, it has not been demonstrated that results with respect to a singular 
headline offence are replicable in either absolute or relative terms when included 
alongside with hypotheticals from multiple headline categories of crime.  Third, as 
discussed in section 5.4, the analysis of the ‘duality’ of fraud was conducted 
relative to the highest level of association with law-enforcement activities in the 




6.3 Fraud Policy Development (Recommendations)  
 
The critique of the Fraud Act 2006 in this thesis should not be seen as a call to 
abolish the Act itself.  Instead, this thesis calls for a legislative approach to the 
criminalisation of fraud that is independent of the 2006 Act in scoping the 
‘sovereign guarantee’ of trust.  This advocated approach is different from the 
categorical criminalisation as it exists for the concept of theft (under the Theft Act 
1968), and the Fraud Act 2006 (inter alia).  Both Acts contain a clear definition for 
the headline offence and, yet legal clarity does not appear to ‘translate’ to a 
uniform association of fraud with law-enforcement activities across the scope of 
criminalisation in the 2006 Act (see 2.4).  The call for particularisation flows from 
the functional difference between the protection of the right to property as a ‘social 
fact’ (Durkheim, 1982) that underpins the regulation of the concept of theft, and 
the ‘sovereign guarantee’ of trust (see 4.6).  The aforementioned self-regulation 
mechanisms appear to have historically been realised through similar states of 
‘duality’ with respect to the role of Crown prosecution in their regulation (see 4.2).  
Nevertheless, it would appear that in a post-agrarian society the challenge to the 
existing social order that is presented by violations of the right to property is 
generally beyond the capacity of social controls to regulate (see 4.7).  The Theft 
Act 1968 is therefore an articulation of the post-industrial categorical protection of 
the right to property through law-enforcement activities.   
 
The process of industrialisation appears not to have resulted with a similar 
categorical replacement of social controls with law-enforcement activities in the 
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context of dishonesty (see 4.8).  Instead, nineteenth and twentieth century 
legislation appears to fulfil one of the three pre-industrial drivers for association of 
Crown prosecution with the concept of fraud through narrow particularisation: the 
protection of the treasury and dues of the Crown, substantiating state-imposed 
regulatory and commercial standardisation regime, and the management of 
creditor-debtor relation and the administration of bankruptcy proceedings (see 2.5, 
4.5, and 4.6).  The Fraud Act 2006 therefore does not seem to reflect the role of 
law-enforcement and Crown prosecution in the regulation of dishonesty with 
sufficient accuracy despite the unpacking of the gestalt of fraud into criminal law 
by the Law Commission (2002). 
 
Whilst the above thesis added value to the (academic) pursuit of the historical and 
contemporary scope of fraud criminalisation (‘in-action’) (Black, 1972) in the 
context of RQ1, it has also sought to develop legislative recommendation.  The 
standard for such recommendations was determined in RQ2 as contributing to the 
‘mainstreaming’ and ‘streamlining’ of criminalisation in the context of fraud.  Whilst 
the literature (see 2.4) demonstrates that some particularised offences are subject 
to similar observations and particularly so in the context of white-collar crime 
(Sutherland, 1949; Naylor, 2003), the ‘duality’ of fraud applies more broadly (Levi 
& Burrows, 2008; Button, et al., 2013; National Fraud Authority, 2013).  The 
discussion of the survey findings in section 5.3 provides additional discussion to 
the understanding of law-enforcement activities in relation to the concept of fraud 
in the context of Black’s (1976) theory of law.  A hypothetical fraud offence that 
relates to a particularised fraud offence of the first driver for particularisation 
(protection of the Crown) was included in the first group of offences most widely 
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associated with law-enforcement activities.  Two hypothetical fraud offences 
subject to particularisation of the second (trade regulation) and third (insolvency 
laws) drivers that were included in the study.  The aforementioned hypotheticals 
were associated with law-enforcement activities to a similar (and relatively lower) 
degree together with other ‘commercial’-type (Sutherland, 1940; Naylor, 2003) 
offences in the study. 
 
Unlike the concept of theft (or other headline categories of ‘mainstream’ harm and 
victimisation), a ‘duality’ between resolution by the criminal justice system and 
other resolution mechanisms appears integral to dishonesty related disputes 
(Taylor, 2013; Fisher, 2015; Rawlings & Lowry, 2017; Smith & Shepherd, 2017).  
A ‘duality’ across the concept of fraud is not seen by the author as an objective to 
‘overcome’.  Non-criminal resolution mechanisms and civil litigation appear to fulfil 
a similar function to private prosecution in the context of pre-industrial inter-
personal disputes in the sense that it serves to regulate and enforce market-rules 
and may enable extra-judicial resolution (Klerman, 2001).  Rawlings and Lowry 
(2017) cite the Law Commission (2014) in its analysis of the contemporary role of 
civil law in regulating insurance fraud:   
It is important for the law to set out clear sanctions to deter policyholders 
from acting fraudulently.  Although insurance fraud is a criminal offence, 
prosecutions are relatively rare, meaning that the civil law has an 
important part to play in deterring fraud.  (Law Commission, 2014, p. 19) 
This appears contrary to the standard for clarity set by the Law Commission 
(2002):   
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Clear, simple law is fairer than complicated, inaccessible law.  If a citizen 
is contemplating activities which could amount to a crime, a clear, simple 
law gives better guidance on whether the conduct is criminal, and fairer 
warning of what could happen if it is.  (Law Commission, 2002, p.3). 
 
It therefore appears that cerebral clarity as to the criminalisation of fraud (‘law-in-
theory’) is secondary to the ‘social fact’ of the ‘duality’ of fraud that compounds 
‘law-in-action’ (Black, 1972; Durkheim, 1982).  As the Fraud Act 2006 is not 
sufficiently accurate in identifying fraud that is generally subject to law-
enforcement responses in the context of RQ1 (‘duality’), the Act poses difficulties 
to the ‘mainstreaming’ and ‘streamlining’ of fraud enforcement (RQ2).  The 
categorical and monolithic dishonesty-based offence in the Fraud Act 2006 is 
applicable across ‘predatory’ and ‘commercial’-type frauds (Naylor, 2003).  The 
findings presented in chapter five demonstrated an agreement with Naylor’s 
(2003) typology of profit-driven crimes and Black’s (1976) theory of law, including 
in the context of particularised offences (see 5.3).  One might therefore wonder 
why the policy recommendations in the context of RQ2 leans towards further 
particularisation.  The answer to this question in twofold. 
 
The first form of reasoning relates to the literature discussion of the relationship 
between anti-social behaviour and criminalisation.  Traditionally, criminal conduct 
is narrowly defined to identify a clear subset of anti-social behaviour that is subject 
to responses from law-enforcement agencies (Tappan, 1947; Hester & Eglin, 
1992), as it cannot be satisfactory regulated by social controls (Black, 1976).  This 
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observation relates to ‘law-in-theory’ (legislation), and may still result with a 
dysfunction relative to ‘law-in-action’, such as in the context of white-collar crime 
(Sutherland, 1949) and other degrees of relative challenge to social order (Black, 
1972; 1976).  In imposing categorical criminalisation on a phenomenon that in 
itself is not a challenge to the existing social order (such as murder or theft), the 
Fraud Act 2006 appears to present an inversion of the above relationship.  
Section 2.6 contains specific discussion of examples of the dysfunction between 
anti-social (and quasi-anti-social) dishonest behaviour and the expansion of 
criminalisation under the Fraud Act 2006 (Ormerod, 2007; Allgrove & Sallars, 
2009; Monaghan, 2010).  This expansion combined with the monolithic nature of 
the conduct-based offence in the 2006 Act is connected in this thesis to evidence 
of difficulties to attribute criminality to some ‘predatory’-type fraud offences 
(Naylor, 2003; Button, et al., 2009; 2013).   
 
The second form of reasoning relates to the functionalist identification of three 
drivers for fraud particularisation in sections 2.5, 4.5, and 4.6 as mentioned above 
in this section.  The categorisation of drivers proposed in this thesis provides a 
platform through which to develop a body of particularised offences, and the 
extent to which the role of criminal justice therein.  The first driver it addresses is 
harm and victimisation against the state through its treasury or dues.  This form of 
particularisation appears in contemporary society (KPMG, 2016) and historically 
(Walter, 1980; Wrightson, 1980) to be effectively associated with prosecution by 
the Crown.  The primary data analysis in section 5.3 demonstrates accordingly 
that a hypothetical example of this form of offending was associated with law-
enforcement activities in a similar rate as other group one offences.  In other 
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words, the survey data in chapter five demonstrates that a particularised offence 
that stems from the first driver was consistent with the highest levels of effective 
criminalisation observed in this study. 
 
The second and third drivers do not address harm and victimisation against the 
Crown, but instead against narrow guarantees of trust it imposes in narrowly 
defined circumstances (see 4.6).  The examples of offences from these categories 
that were examined in the study presented in chapter five related to ‘commercial’-
type offences (Naylor, 2003), and were scarcely associated with law-enforcement 
activities by participants (see discussion in section 5.3).  The third driver 
(substantiation of state-imposed debtor-creditor relations and insolvency regimes) 
is exclusive to ‘commercial’-type offending due to its applicability to otherwise 
legitimate business settings (Naylor, 2003).  Nevertheless, the second drivers for 
particularisation (substantiation of state-imposed regulation and standardisation of 
trade) is not exclusive to a business setting.   
 
For example, under section 17 of the Weights and Measurements Act 1985 it is a 
criminal offence to possess for the use of trade false measurements equipment, or 
to engage in trade based on false measurements or instrumentation.  The 1985 
Act imposes a regulatory regime and extends a ‘sovereign guarantee’ for trust in 
weights and measurements, substantiated by the narrow criminalisation of 
activities that could be taken to undermine the state-imposed standard.  As with 
other particularised offences (see 2.5), the above example defines an objective 
(actus reus) test for an offence otherwise subject to means rea criminalisation 
under the Fraud Act 2006 and the subjective test of dishonesty (see 2.2, and 2.6).  
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This mode of criminalisation appears to provide an arguably preferable standard 
for clarity to the approach favoured by the Law Commission (2002).  Whilst 
particularised fraud offences may not encapsulate the full meaning of the term or 
be directly transferable to other forms of dishonest conduct, it offers clarity in the 
circumstances of its application, and identifies evidence generated by the offence. 
 
A body of fraud particularisation provisions will not ‘undo’ the ‘duality’ of fraud.  
Instead, it will enable victims to assert their victimisation should social controls 
and regulation by reputation not be sufficient in resolving fraud-related disputes 
(Black, 1976; Black & Baumgartner, 1983).  This form of victim empowerment 
relates to the analysis of the role of state-law in resolving pre-industrial inter-
personal disputes in relation to concepts such as fraud (and theft) in section 4.2 
(Klerman, 2001).  When imposed, particularisation holds the potential to facilitate 
interaction between victims and law-enforcement agencies in a context of a 
specific offence and evidence that could support an objective test of whether an 
offence has occurred (‘streamlining’).  By comparison to the present law, 
particularisation appears to offer a platform through which ‘mainstream’ police 
interfaces may be possible to re-establish in the context of some fraud offences. 
 
There is therefore a basis to re-examine the question of what ought to be the 
extent of a ‘sovereign guarantee’ of trust in English law.  The imposition of the de 
facto categorical ‘sovereign guarantee’ of trust as advocated by the Law 
Commission (2002) has been a subject of a systematic critiqued in this thesis 
based on the literature (chapter two), historical socio-legal analysis (chapter four) 
and primary data (chapter five).  It is doubtful that there exists a categorical 
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‘grassroots’ demand for the high ‘amount’ of law in association with law-
enforcement activities in the context of dishonesty.  Alternately, a legislative 
process of consideration for what narrow types and circumstances of fraud ought 
to be controlled through criminalisation and the commitment of law-enforcement 
and Crown prosecution resources.  This consideration can benefit from 
development relative to the identification of functions that are subject to 
regulation.  For example, the Fraud Trials Committee (1986) identifies an 
imperative to provide households the security needed to invest some of their 
savings in British firms.  This function could be particularised through a 
particularised criminalisation of producing a false statement pertaining to an 
investment portfolio, or to misrepresent the source of distributed returns to 
investors. 
 
A body of particularised offences that imposes narrow ‘guarantees’ for trust where 
Parliament identifies an imperative to criminalise dishonest anti-social behaviour 
could offer more to promote trust and control harm and victimisation.  Such a body 
of laws should provide narrow actus reus definitions of the offence and greater 
fidelity of the degree of ‘sovereign guarantee’ of trust expressed through variable 
maximum sentences.  Offences should be defined so as to imply an objective test 
for a reasonable suspicion of offending, and possible evidence created by the 
offence to the extent possible.  Levi (2008a) provides a typology of frauds based 
on types of victims by sector, type, and modes of fraud harm to which they are 
particularly susceptible.  The above victim-centric matrix does not identify frauds 
using mutually exclusive fraud typologies, but rather by generic techniques used 
by offenders in such circumstances of interaction with the victim.  This typology 
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appears to offer an appropriate basis for categorisation of areas of fraud risk, and 
the extent to which criminal law is needed to sufficiently regulate and ‘guarantee’ 
trust in circumstances that pertain to each category.  The reader will note that 
similar to the scope of discussion across this thesis, the above typology mostly 
relates to examples of fraud where the identity of the offender is known to the 
victim, or readily discoverable.   
 
As discussed in section 2.7, the common-law offence of conspiracy to defraud 
presently functions as a ‘fall-back’ offence to the Fraud Act 2006 for use in 
circumstances where conduct cannot be as effectively prosecuted under the 2006 
Act (CPS, 2012).  Relative to the recommended body of particularised offences to 
denote the scope of fraud criminalisation, the Fraud Act 2006 (and the conspiracy 
to defraud common-law offence) should be used as ‘fall-back’ offences.  As 
discussed in section 5.3, the use of criminal law with respect to particularised 
frauds appears to be less likely in some typological and social circumstances 
(Sutherland, 1949; Black, 1976; Naylor, 2003).  Nevertheless, particularisation 
and clarity are functionally important in substantiating the state-imposed 
protection to which they apply (see section 4.6), and in enabling dispute resolution 
through the use of mechanisms that are representative of ‘less’ law (Black, 1976; 
Black & Baumgartner, 1983; Klerman, 2001).  The scope of particularisation 
should therefore refer to known types of dishonest conduct to which Parliament 
wishes the Crown to prosecute on behalf of a victim who seeks to involve an 
appropriate law-enforcement agency.  Where this protection is not afforded, fraud 
would be subject to resolution as a commercial or an inter-personal dispute in the 




The recommended function of the Fraud Act 2006 as a ‘fall-back’ offence is 
therefore to provide for means of prosecuting an example of dishonesty that had 
not been foreseen when it presents a challenge to the existing social order (Black, 
1976).  The Fraud Act 2006 should not be used to codify the extent to which fraud 
is an offence in English law.  In other words, an identified form of fraud harm and 
victimisation that legislators wish to criminalise should be subject to particularised 
legislation and a definition of the evidence that are generated by the offence.   
Investigators and prosecutors may use the 2006 Act as a general framework to 
test in court whether a fraud technique that emerged, not-subject to 
particularisation, can meet a criminal threshold of dishonesty.  In other words, the 
definition for fraud in the 2006 Act may offer a means to retrospectively ensure a 
means of addressing acute challenges to the economy from “schemes which the 
fertility of man’s invention would contrive” (Holdsworth, 1909, p. 262 citing Lord 
Hardwicke, 1759; The Law Commission, 2002 citing The Criminal Law Revision 
Committee, 1966). 
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Appendix A - Survey 
Fraud Enforcement 
1. Briefing and Consent  
  
 
This study examines perceptions towards fraud enforcement in the UK and is 
aimed at practitioners and non-practitioners alike, and is conducted as part of a 
doctoral research conducted by Nir Tolkovsky MSc CFE at the University of 
Derby, under the supervision of Dr David C. Hicks. In the following pages, you will 
be presented with 16 short offence description and be asked to choose what 
would be the likeliest legal response to the victimisation described. Please 
consider the identity of the offender known to the victim, but the crime is not by 
default reported to a law-enforcement agency. You will be able to choose 
between:  
• A criminal investigation potentially leading to an arrest 
• The incident being reported to a law-enforcement agency but taken no further 
• Regulatory sanctions / commercial litigation 
• The victim takes other steps against the perpetrator or recovers some of the 
losses from the perpetrator  
• No action is taken by law-enforcement or the victim  
 
In the following section, you will be asked two general questions designed to test 
different priorities towards corporate fraud enforcement for indirect victims. You 
will be asked to assign priorities and allocate resources for the investigation team 
in the way which of the following you feel best represent your interest: Future 
prevention, Criminal prosecution, Asset tracing and victim compensation 
(unpredictable result and returns) This questionnaire is completely anonymous. 
You will only be asked to indicate whether you are a financial investigation or law-
enforcement practitioner or not professionally involved in the field. The study will 
not include subset of findings from of any particular agency, nor does the dataset 
allow for such analysis.  
 
No UK law-enforcement or private sector body identification details are recorded 
by this study. This online survey platform used does not record IP addresses and 
web browser information and is Data Protection Act 1998 registered. This study is 
conducted under the University of Derby’s Research Ethics Policy and Code of 
Practice:http://www.derby.ac.uk/media/derbyacuk/contentassets/documents/resea
rch/ethicsandgovernance/University-of-Derby-Research-Ethics-Policy-and-Code-
of-Practice-June-2011.doc) and the Data Protection Act 1998For any question or 
queries please contact the researcher using the details below. 
Thank you!  
Nir Tolkovsky MSc CFEn.tolkovsky@derby.ac.uk * 
 
   I have been informed and understand the purpose of this study. 
  
2. Participation in this study is completely anonymous. * 
 




3. Please tick the following box to confirm. * 
 
   I understand that the study is completely anonymous. 
  
4. Are you professionally involved in financial crime investigations (law-enforcement or 
otherwise)? * 
 
   Yes, I am a practitioner  
   No 
  
5. For Practitioners:  
 
   I have received appropriate consent from my employer 
   
I do not require further consent from my employer to participate in an 
anonymous study 
  
6. Please indicate your area of residence from the list below (localities are based on local 
police forces). * 
 
   Scotland 
   Northern Ireland 
   Avon and Somerset 
   Bedfordshire 
   Cambridgeshire 
   Cheshire 
   Cleveland 
   Cumbria 
   Derbyshire 
   Devon & Cornwall 
   Dorset 
   Durham 
   Dyfed-Powys 
   Essex 
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   Gloucestershire 
   Gwent 
   Hampshire 
   Hertfordshire 
   Humberside 
   Kent 
   Lancashire 
   Leicestershire 
   Lincolnshire 
   Manchester 
   Merseyside 
   London 
   Norfolk 
   North Wales 
   North Yorkshire 
   Northamptonshire 
   Northumbria 
   Nottinghamshire 
   South Wales 
   South Yorkshire 
   Staffordshire 
   Suffolk 
   Surrey 
   Sussex 
   Thames Valley 
   Warwickshire 
   West Mercia 
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   West Midlands 
   West Yorkshire 
   Wiltshire 
2. Section 1  
In this section you will be presented with hypothetical descriptions. Please 
indicate which outcome, in your opinion, is the most typical of the kind of incident 
describe. Note that this study examines what outcomes are considered most 
likely, and not necessarily what is desired, 'just', or prescribed by law. Please tick 
the most applicable answer for each case.  
  
7. In hope of winning a major contract, a director decides to allow her business another three 
months of trade knowing full well that the company is unable to pay its lenders. Which of the 
following is typically the most likely outcome? * 
 
   A criminal investigation potentially leading to an arrest 
   
The incident being reported to a law-enforcement agency but taken no 
further 
   Regulatory sanctions / commercial litigation 
   
The victim takes other steps against the perpetrator or recovers some of 
the losses from the perpetrator 
   No action is taken by law-enforcement or the victim 
  
8. Three traders are coordinating investment activities in order to boost their portfolio 
performance. Which of the following is typically the most likely outcome? * 
 
   A criminal investigation potentially leading to an arrest 
   
The incident being reported to a law-enforcement agency but taken no 
further 
   Regulatory sanctions / commercial litigation 
   
The victim takes other steps against the perpetrator or recovers some of 
the losses from the perpetrator 
   No action is taken by law-enforcement or the victim 
  
9. A Procurement officer for a large construction company decides to favour one supplier over 
another as the winner of an open bid due to an undisclosed family connection. Which of the 
following is typically the most likely outcome? * 
 
   1. A criminal investigation potentially leading to an arrest 
   




   3. Regulatory sanctions / commercial litigation 
   
4. The victim takes other steps against the perpetrator or recovers some of 
the losses from the perpetrator 
   5. No action is taken by law-enforcement or the victim 
  
10. Whilst claiming unemployment and housing benefits, a household benefited from rent 
payments paid for undeclared properties. The total benefit from undue payments and un-paid 
tax amounted to £150,000 over ten years. Which of the following is typically the most likely 
outcome? * 
 
   A criminal investigation potentially leading to an arrest 
   
The incident being reported to a law-enforcement agency but taken no 
further 
   Regulatory sanctions / commercial litigation 
   
The victim takes other steps against the perpetrator or recovers some of 
the losses from the perpetrator 
   No action is taken by law-enforcement or the victim 
  
11. A global investment bank's internal control have uncovered a rogue trader whose scheme 
lasted for a many years and have resulted with the bank having to write off 2% of its annual 
profit in one year. Which of the following is typically the most likely outcome? * 
 
   A criminal investigation potentially leading to an arrest 
   
The incident being reported to a law-enforcement agency but taken no 
further 
   Regulatory sanctions / commercial litigation 
   
The victim takes other steps against the perpetrator or recovers some of 
the losses from the perpetrator 
   No action is taken by law-enforcement or the victim 
  
12. Bob discovers that his elderly parent has been purchasing household items over the 
phone for up to ten times their market value. Which of the following is typically the most likely 
outcome? * 
 
   1. A criminal investigation potentially leading to an arrest 
   
2. The incident being reported to a law-enforcement agency but taken no 
further 
   3. Regulatory sanctions / commercial litigation 
   
4. The victim takes other steps against the perpetrator or recovers some of 
the losses from the perpetrator 
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   5. No action is taken by law-enforcement or the victim 
  
13. Paul received an email with an urgent notice from his bank to confirm his contact details. 
Paul pressed a link to log in to his account and enters his online banking credentials and 
confirms his payment card details in what he later discovers was another website designed to 
copy the layout of his bank's login screen. Paul's bank identifies suspicious transactions on 
his card shortly after and contacts Paul. Paul's online banking account is closed and his 
payment card cancelled. In a matter of days, he receives a new payment card and a new 
online account without suffering any losses. Which of the following is typically the most likely 
outcome?  
 
   A criminal investigation potentially leading to an arrest 
   
The incident being reported to a law-enforcement agency but taken no 
further 
   Regulatory sanctions / commercial litigation 
   
The victim takes other steps against the perpetrator or recovers some of 
the losses from the perpetrator 
   No action is taken by law-enforcement or the victim 
  
14. The board of a global firm intentionally obscures some components of the company's debt 
structure so as to appear more attractive to investors and have better access to credit. Which 
of the following is typically the most likely outcome? * 
 
   A criminal investigation potentially leading to an arrest 
   
The incident being reported to a law-enforcement agency but taken no 
further 
   Regulatory sanctions / commercial litigation 
   
The victim takes other steps against the perpetrator or recovers some of 
the losses from the perpetrator 
   No action is taken by law-enforcement or the victim 
  
15. A person undertakes to install high-end insulation in a private residence but uses regular 
insulation materials to make a higher profit, leaving the property owner with a higher energy 
bill. The property owner discovers that the insulation is to blame a couple of years later. 
Which of the following is typically the most likely outcome? * 
 
   1. A criminal investigation potentially leading to an arrest 
   
2. The incident being reported to a law-enforcement agency but taken no 
further 
   3. Regulatory sanctions / commercial litigation 
   
4. The victim takes other steps against the perpetrator or recovers some of 
the losses from the perpetrator 
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   5. No action is taken by law-enforcement or the victim 
  
16. A trader in a large and successful investment firm has been funnelling funds, amounting to 
£150,000 over three years, to a bogus account in order to benefit from it. Which of the 
following is typically the most likely outcome? * 
 
   A criminal investigation potentially leading to an arrest 
   
The incident being reported to a law-enforcement agency but taken no 
further 
   Regulatory sanctions / commercial litigation 
   
The victim takes other steps against the perpetrator or recovers some of 
the losses from the perpetrator 
   No action is taken by law-enforcement or the victim 
  
17. A group is carrying out a scheme against multiple car insurers involving the faking and 
orchestration of road accidents. Which of the following is typically the most likely outcome? * 
 
   A criminal investigation potentially leading to an arrest 
   
The incident being reported to a law-enforcement agency but taken no 
further 
   Regulatory sanctions / commercial litigation 
   
The victim takes other steps against the perpetrator or recovers some of 
the losses from the perpetrator 
   No action is taken by law-enforcement or the victim 
  
18. Claire discovers that her popular car hire app service account was used for journeys she 
did not make, costing her £150 prior to her closing the account. Which of the following is 
typically the most likely outcome? * 
 
   A criminal investigation potentially leading to an arrest 
   
The incident being reported to a law-enforcement agency but taken no 
further 
   Regulatory sanctions / commercial litigation 
   
The victim takes other steps against the perpetrator or recovers some of 
the losses from the perpetrator 
   No action is taken by law-enforcement or the victim 
  
19. A department head in a large multinational company reports only some of the 
department's revenues in the end of year 1 and carries some of them through to the following 
year so to project a more stable income stream. Which of the following is typically the most 




   A criminal investigation potentially leading to an arrest 
   
The incident being reported to a law-enforcement agency but taken no 
further 
   Regulatory sanctions / commercial litigation 
   
The victim takes other steps against the perpetrator or recovers some of 
the losses from the perpetrator 
   No action is taken by law-enforcement or the victim 
  
20. A business owner sells his business based on an over-valuation he knows to be false. 
Later on, the buyer recognise a substantial loss as a result. Which of the following is typically 
the most likely outcome? * 
 
   A criminal investigation potentially leading to an arrest 
   
The incident being reported to a law-enforcement agency but taken no 
further 
   Regulatory sanctions / commercial litigation 
   
The victim takes other steps against the perpetrator or recovers some of 
the losses from the perpetrator 
   No action is taken by law-enforcement or the victim 
  
21. A criminal gang installs devices on local cash machines (ATMs) in order to acquire card 
and pin numbers so to sell them on the internet. Which of the following is typically the most 
likely outcome?  
 
   A criminal investigation potentially leading to an arrest 
   
The incident being reported to a law-enforcement agency but taken no 
further 
   Regulatory sanctions / commercial litigation 
   
The victim takes other steps against the perpetrator or recovers some of 
the losses from the perpetrator 
   No action is taken by law-enforcement or the victim 
  
22. A person targets wealthy business owners in his social reach and persuades them to 
invest thousands of pounds each in a scheme which does not exist. Which of the following is 
typically the most likely outcome? * 
 
   A criminal investigation potentially leading to an arrest 
   




   Regulatory sanctions / commercial litigation 
   
The victim takes other steps against the perpetrator or recovers some of 
the losses from the perpetrator 
   No action is taken by law-enforcement or the victim 
 
Section 2  
Below are two hypothetical description of indirect fraud damage. Please consider how your 
interest as a victim and justice are best served when assigning law-enforcement resources 
towards the following goals: Future prevention Criminal Prosecution Asset tracing and victim 
compensation (unpredictable results and actual returns) Please note that in victim 
compensation the intention is the victim of the fraud(s) and not necessarily yourself. 
  
23. Your pension fund has depreciated by 5% last year due to an investment in a FTSE 
100 company which had to recognise a loss, due to a long term procurement fraud, and 
thus suffered a drop in share price. Please allocate law-enforcement resources as you 
see fit (adding up to 100%). * 
 
Future prevention   
  
%  
Criminal prosecution resulting in an arrest   
  
%  
Asset tracing and victim compensation (unpredictable result and returns)   
  
%  




24. Last year, the cost of excess rates and premiums imposed on you by various 
vendors and service providers due to losses from fraud amounted to around 
£200.Please allocate law-enforcement resources as you see fit (adding up to 100%). * 
 
Future prevention   
  
%  
Criminal prosecution   
  
%  
Asset tracing and victim compensation (unpredictable result and returns)   
  
%  







Section 2  
Below are two hypothetical description of indirect fraud damage. Please consider how your 
interest as a victim and justice are best served when assigning law-enforcement resources 
towards the following goals: Future prevention Criminal Prosecution Asset tracing and victim 
compensation (unpredictable results and actual returns) Please note that in victim 
compensation the intention is the victim of the fraud(s) and not necessarily yourself. 
  
23. Your pension fund has depreciated by 5% last year due to an investment in a FTSE 
100 company which had to recognise a loss, due to a long term procurement fraud, and 
thus suffered a drop in share price. Please allocate law-enforcement resources as you 
see fit (adding up to 100%). * 
 
Future prevention   
  
%  
Criminal prosecution resulting in an arrest   
  
%  
Asset tracing and victim compensation (unpredictable result and returns)   
  
%  




24. Last year, the cost of excess rates and premiums imposed on you by various 
vendors and service providers due to losses from fraud amounted to around 
£200.Please allocate law-enforcement resources as you see fit (adding up to 100%). * 
 
Future prevention   
  
%  
Criminal prosecution   
  
%  
Asset tracing and victim compensation (unpredictable result and returns)   
  
%  
Total:     
 
You have completed this survey! 
Thank you for participating in this survey, which form a part of a study into the application of fraud in English 
law and Practice. This survey is part of a study which examines current expectations towards fraud 
enforcement in terms of ‘how much law’ is expected to be applied towards typical fraud victimisation 
scenarios as part of a doctoral research project provisionally titled “The Dual Nature of Fraud in English Law 
and Practice”.  
Should you have concerns regarding fraud that you have experienced or witnessed, please contact Action 
Fraud, or refer to one of the support organisations listed on their website for any other concerns and 
enquiries: 
 
Action Fraud - http://www.actionfraud.police.uk/support-and-prevention/ive-been-a-victim-of-fraud 
 
Support organisations recommended by Action Fraud - http://www.actionfraud.police.uk/support-and-
prevention/useful-organisations 
 

































4: (Bilateral or 
attempted 
bilateral 
resolution)   
5: (No action 
taken by law-
enforcement or 
the victim)  
Mann-Whitney U-




Q1 Fraudulent trading (no 


















Q2 Traders conspire to boost 



















Q3 Procurement fraud 
(preferring a contractor for 

















Q4 Housing benefits fraud 

















Q5 A trader ran a scheme 
against a financial 
institution over many 




































Q7* Attempted ‘phishing’ 
attack against a personal 





















Q8 A board of directors 
obscures elements of a 

















Q9 Sub-standard insulation 
installed by a handyman 

















Q10 A trader funnels funds 
amounting to £150,000 




































Q12* £150 lost to a car hire app 
user whose account has 

















Q13 An internal report of the 
performance of a 
department is understated 
so to supplement the 

















Q14 A business has been sold 


















Q15 Theft of payment card 
details using a card reader 

















Q16 A Ponzi scheme TOT: 72.86% 
FI: 82.35% 
Non-FI: 67.42% 
TOT: 10% 
FI: 13.73% 
Non-FI: 7.87% 
TOT: 5% 
FI: 1.96% 
Non-FI: 6.74% 
TOT: 6.43% 
FI: 1.96% 
Non-FI: 8.99% 
TOT: 5.71% 
FI: 0.00% 
Non-FI: 8.99% 
0.021* 
416 
 
 
